Discourses of Anger in the Early Modern Period
Intersections
INTERDISCIPLINARY STUDIES IN EARLY MODERN CULTURE

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Discourses of Anger in the Early Modern Period

Edited by

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Chapter 1

Introduction: Discourses of Anger in the Early Modern Period

Karl A.E. Enenkel and Anita Traninger

‘It seems fair to say that “being angry” is in many respects like “having mumps”,’ writes J.L. Austin, best known for his theory of the performative speech act, in response to the question ‘How do you know that a man is angry?’ ‘It is,’ he continues, ‘a description of a whole pattern of events, including occasion, symptoms, feeling and manifestation, and possibly other factors besides. It is silly to ask “What, really, is anger itself?” as to attempt to fine down “the disease” to some one chosen item’.1

Austin’s judgement holds all the more true for the early modern period, when anger was regarded as a social emotion, one that consisted of physical symptoms as much as of psychological emotions, of conscious action as much as spontaneous reaction. Various discourses in the early modern period were interested in different aspects of anger, some more in its roots and its psychology, others more in its social consequences, thus construing notions of anger that were tied to a palette of religious, political, and cultural concerns. It is against this background that the contributions in this volume aim at mapping perceptions and expressions of anger in the early modern period by describing and analysing the specific notions of anger that were brought about by discourses such as law, theology, politics and diplomacy, medicine, the arts, and literature.

While there has been an international upsurge of interest in the historical study of emotions in recent years, the phenomenon of anger in the early modern period has not yet received the attention the complexity of the phenomenon would merit. What is more, anger, which has traditionally been described as being informed by a tension between emotion and rationality, is not a perfect fit with the focus on the psychology of emotions (as reason’s counterpart) that has prevailed in recent years.2

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2 Cf. e.g. Demmerling C. – Landweer H., Philosophie der Gefühle. Von Achtung bis Zorn (Stuttgart: 2007).
aims at revaluating the field of affects and emotions vis-à-vis the traditional philosophical focus on rationality. Influential new theories, such as that put forward by António Damásio, take a post-Cartesian notion of emotion as their starting point, only to counter it by citing recent neuro-physiological insights that vouch for a connection or even mutual dependence of emotionality and rationality. What approaches in this vein do not acknowledge is the fact that it was precisely the intertwining of rationality and affect that informed notions of anger from antiquity to the early modern period. The notion of anger, however, has since been subject to a fundamental process of transformation, and modern anger is but a homonym of its early modern counterpart. It may well be argued that no other psychological concept has been subject to such a drastic change as that of anger.

Some Milestones in the History of Anger

While they may have been contested by later commentators, it is Aristotle’s influential definitions, given in the *Nicomachian Ethics* and the *Rhetoric*, that serve as the point of reference for most later developments. Aristotle construes anger as the desire for revenge for a perceived slight (*olígoria*). Conceived thus, anger joins pain and pleasure together, as it roots in pain suffered, but results in the pleasurable anticipation of sweet revenge. This is combined with a complex model of social roles because anger can only be sensed and acted upon by those who are slighted by a lower ranking person. The sensually perceived agitation that results from the suffered slight depends on an instantaneous judgement of the social status of the people involved: being insulted by a higher-ranking person is not a (legitimate) reason for anger. Also, anger depends on the other’s intention to insult. The insulting person needs to be someone who is not entitled to insult, and the act needs to be intentional. Anger is always directed towards a specific person, and the revenge it involves is nothing but the re-establishment of a perturbed hierarchical order. Pleasure results from the hope to be able to get revenge; it is, as Aristotle says, pleasurable to imagine the accomplishment of what one desires (cf. Aristotle, *Rhetorica*, 11, 2, 1). Revenge is sweet, but it is not limited to personal satisfaction, but rather serves a greater good.

While anger is characterised by at least two inner tensions in Aristotle’s concept—in that it unites pain and pleasure as well as emotional agitation and complex judgement—it is generally seen in a positive light. Other philosophical schools of antiquity, however, rejected anger radically. Whereas Aristotle stressed that anger is a just reaction to social misbehaviour that threatened the social order, other schools did not welcome it as acceptable social behaviour. Epicurus and his school held that anger, just as sorrow and fear, could not be reconciled with the pursuit of a happy life. Only insofar as man gets rid of these weaknesses is he able to be on par with the gods and live his finite life as happily as the gods live theirs in eternity. The Stoics insisted that anger had to be suppressed at the smallest hint of emotional disturbance in order to liberate oneself from the perturbation by affects, the first and most important tool for achieving the good life (*apatheia*).

Christianity integrated Stoic teachings from very early on, yet had to reconcile them with an Old Testament God who let humanity suffer his anger, as well as a New Testament Son of God who, in the Sermon on the Mount, taught his disciples to turn the other cheek (Matthew 5:39) but who also gave in to violent rage when faced with the money changers in the temple (Matthew 21:12). Homogenising and synthesising these contradictory aspects proved an almost insurmountable challenge for the Church Fathers. Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, and Lactantius struggled to explain how God’s anger could be reconciled with his perfection. Philo of Alexandria is credited with the solution that God’s anger was free from affect: *ira Dei* was construed as essentially different from human anger in that it was generally just and free from affective perturbation. This notion of godly anger became so widely accepted that, in the Middle Ages, the day of judgement, thus the final act of divine justice, could be termed *dies irae* without any sense of contradiction. Human anger was in turn discussed with a view to its regulation. Basil the Great described human rage as a type of mental incapacity and developed a programme of anger management that echoed Stoic positions—only that it was not reason

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that was supposed to tame anger, but faith. At the same time, Basil describes anger as a *pharmakon* to be employed against sinners: in this one regard man was encouraged to mirror divine anger. But the Fathers were not unanimous: Gregory Nazianzen, for example, disapproves of anger as an obstacle on the way to God.9

Under Pope Gregory I, anger was ranked among the capital sins, yet the chief theological work of the Middle Ages, Thomas Aquinas’s *Summa theologica*, largely avoids the discussion of anger as a sin and focuses on anger as an affect (Ia–IIae, q. 46–48). Thomas actually follows Aristotle so closely that his discussion has been characterised as an ‘apologia pro ira’.10 Of crucial importance to his position is that anger requires an act of reason, that it is a natural behaviour of man, that it resembles the good more than hatred, and that it reflects a natural need for justice.

This very brief summary of some influential positions is indicative of how contradictory Christian notions of anger were—and to what degree they required interpretation: ‘a conceptual dilemma for anyone who thought about it’, as Barbara Rosenwein has put it.11 Yet it was these diverse and contradictory traditions that formed the normative grid to which early modern notions related and into which they needed to fit. The delicate distinction between just and sinful anger is encapsulated in the oft-quoted exhortation by the Apostle Paul to the Ephesians: ‘In your anger do not sin!’ (Ephesians 4:26–27). Thus interpretation and judgement are called for, but the question of where just anger ends and excessive rage begins could never be definitely solved.

Early modern anger is thus informed by fundamental paradoxes: first, anger motivates the seeking of revenge in the service of restoring social order; at the same time, the fight against one’s own anger is perceived as exceedingly difficult. Second, the primary function of anger is the defence of an individual’s social position; at the same time, it is seen as a self-destructive force. Thus while anger is credited with a systemic value with a view to society as a whole, it was the individual’s wellbeing that was under threat, and the identification of techniques and instruments for placating, moderating, and taming anger became an issue of utmost concern to many commentators.

This complicated notion of anger was even further complicated by long-term transformations that affected the intellectual framework of the early

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modern period. It was shaped by long-term transformations of received traditions and philosophical systems: Aristotelianism was attacked as a philosophical system, first and foremost in conjunction with an attack on scholasticism; at the same time, Aristotelian positions gained normative force in the field of poetics. Religious factioning engendered concurrent theologies and, in their vein, competing doctrines of moral philosophy; the rediscovery of classical philosophical doctrines, first pushed by the humanists, had to reconcile diametrically opposed positions (such as the Stoa and Scepticism), but these positions were also creatively transformed and connected with existing Christian teachings in partly surprising ways. Against this background, anger became the object of new processes of negotiation which were not limited to learned debates. Rather, anger was conceived and discussed in specific ways in politics, pastoral care, medicine, art, and literature, giving rise to powerful concepts and norms.

While the early modern period was characterised by an attempt to deal with doctrinal tensions through subtle adjustments and continuous debate, the eighteenth century saw a radical transformation of notions of anger. The desire for revenge was definitively discarded as a *movens* for anger and replaced by concepts that focus on the disturbance of the ego, as Johannes F. Lehmann has shown in his comprehensive study. Anger became, for the first time, a purely psychological problem. It was no longer a social phenomenon, but rather an inner experience of the individual. This ‘inward turn’ of anger marks end of an era, and the end of the time frame covered in this volume.

**The Contributions in this Volume**

Despite a markedly increased interest in the history of emotions in recent years, anger in the early modern period has not yet been studied in interdisciplinary collaboration. While several ground-breaking studies and collective volumes on Greek and Roman antiquity and also a series of works on the Middle Ages

exist, the early modern period has not been awarded the attention it deserves. This is all the more surprising given the wealth of materials (admittedly, the host of unedited sources may well be an obstacle) and the fact that modern lines of thinking on the nature of the emotions emanated from early modern positions.\textsuperscript{15} Recent volumes have put together chapters on a range of affects and emotions without acknowledging the particular nature of anger;\textsuperscript{16} others operate with an anthropologically generalised notion of anger that does not do justice to early modern lines of thought.\textsuperscript{17}

The contributions in this volume investigate the transformations of anger with a view to the specific discursive fields in which the notion figures in the early modern period. These discourses include philosophy and theology, poetry, medicine, law, political theory, and art. The contributions converge in the aim of mapping out the discursive networks in which anger featured and how they all generated their own version, assessment, and semantics of anger. They investigate how literary and non-literary texts, religious practice, and scholarly controversies themselves contributed to shaping the notion of anger.

The following overarching questions have guided the contributors’ approach to the topic:

- Notions of anger: Which philosophical and theological traditions inform particular notions of anger? Which concepts of anger are presupposed by specific texts or images? Do these texts and images integrate competing notions of anger or do they betray preferences for certain schools of thought? Are different approaches valued differently, resulting in new hierarchies?
- The morality of anger: How is anger judged with a view to moral precepts in different contexts? How and with regard to which aspects is anger denounced as a sin? How grave is the sin of anger and where does it rank in the hierarchy of sins in various religious denominations? Which problems and cases are characteristically discussed in which discourse?

• Social consequences of anger: Which social functions are attributed to anger in different contexts? Did authors of the early modern period defend positive effects of anger in and for society? What is the relation between anger and the social order? Which expectations and fears were linked with anger?

The End of Early Modern Anger

The volume opens with a contribution by Johannes F. Lehmann on the transformation of the concept and the discourse of wrath and anger that took place in Germany in the eighteenth century. The definitions of anger that prevailed from antiquity (Aristotle, Seneca, etc.) to the early modern period (Descartes, Bacon, Thomasius, etc.), conceive of anger as the result of pain or suffering inflicted by way of an injury and therefore as a pleasurable desire for revenge. In the eighteenth century, this concept was fundamentally transformed. The core element of the Aristotelian definition—desire for revenge—was replaced, or at least displaced, by the individual’s feeling of being blocked or hampered. Instead of lusting for revenge, the resulting energetic impulse is now directed toward resisting frustration. For Kant, anger is a fright that all of a sudden incites all forces of resistance. One of the main reasons for this change is the concept of feeling (Gefühl), which became a key concept of human psychology during the last third of the eighteenth century. In the course of this development, anger was partially removed from the social sphere and came to be primarily located in the individual’s interiority.

Anger Management in Early Modern Philosophical Discourses

The early modern period ascribed eminent importance to the mastering, moderating, and managing of anger and dedicated a lot of space to the topic in philosophical and theological debates. Many commentators have linked this to the severe religious and political tensions that informed the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. The sixteenth century in particular saw a marked interest in Stoic philosophy. Several twentieth-century scholars such as Gerhard Oestreich, Günter Abel, and Mark Morford saw this as evidence for a coherent philosophical movement that was termed “Neostoicism”, allegedly founded, masterminded, and headed by the Dutch humanist Justus Lipsius.

Several contributions in this volume are concerned with debates about anger management and the renewed interest in the Stoic doctrine of affects.
Karl Enenkel studies the case of the treatise *De ira morbo* (1577) by the German physician Johann Weyer. According to Weyer, anger is one of the most urgent problems of his age. Thus he dedicates his treatise on *ira* entirely to anger management. As a physician, he combines medicine with philosophy, viz. Galen’s doctrines with an intensive reception of ancient Stoic thought, especially Seneca’s *De ira*. Nevertheless, the philosophical, psychological, and theological parts of his work turn out to be much more important than the medical part. Most interestingly with respect to the management of emotions, Weyer developed ideas very similar to Lipsius’s *De constantia*, but some eight to ten years earlier. Compared to Lipsius’s *De constantia*, Weyer’s *De ira morbo* is at least as “Neostoic” or Stoic as are Lipsius’s teachings. However, so far this has not been noted in the discussions on Neostoicism, on Neostoic views of the emotions, or Lipsius’s *De constantia*. This indicates that the conventional image of the Neostoic movement, founded by Lipsius, may be in need of revision.

The evidence suggests that the reception of the Stoa happened on a much broader basis and was not as homogenous as has been claimed. Also, Lipsius’s role as a trailblazer may have been overestimated. What have been considered the basics of Neostoicism—the reconciliation of ancient Stoicism with determinism as the denial of free will, Fate’s superiority to God as the principle of natural and everlasting order, materialism, and the denial of contingency—turns out to be less specific, less homogeneous, and, in part, even less relevant.

On the one hand, similar attempts at synthesizing Christian with “Stoic” concepts can already be found in the Church Fathers; on the other, the answers given by the so-called “Neostoics” do not always address the above-mentioned concepts and problems. The case of anger exemplifies this. The Stoic idea of radically “killing” the emotion of *ira* based on a one-sided emphasis on *ratio* differs considerably from Christian positions. However, as Karl Enenkel and Jan Papy demonstrate in their contributions, while both Lipsius in *De constantia* and Weyer in *De ira morbo* focused on reintroducing and adapting the radical Stoic doctrine of killing the emotions, both departed from Seneca’s therapy of the passions, and both regarded control of the emotions as a major remedy against the public calamities of their times.

As Jan Papy’s contribution shows, it is rewarding to take into account the Jesuit approach to anger, in particular the ideas of Lipsius’s close acquaintance Martin Antonio Del Río. What is the early modern Christian view adopted by the Jesuits when dealing with ancient Stoic ideas on anger and the passions, and how does Lipsius react to it? So far, modern scholarship has focused on Lipsius’s reception of ancient Stoicism, but less so with the early modern reactions Lipsius’s ideas provoked. Michael Krewet’s paper deals with Descartes’
reaction by tracing the premises of his doctrine of anger back to ancient Stoic
doctrines as well as to Lipsius's Neostoic concepts, and shows how Descartes
construed his own notion of anger within this Stoic framework.

Michel de Montaigne appears to be relying on Plutarch in his essay “De
la colère” (II, 31), but his take on anger management is equally informed by
Senecan concepts. As Anita Traninger shows, Montaigne chooses an unusual
angle for his reflections on anger in that he contemplates his role as the head
of a household, suggesting that anger is almost inevitable when dealing with
the subordinate members of a maison. While this differs from his contempo-
raries' predominant focus on princely anger, Montaigne is still very much in
line with mainstream views that advocate the bridling of one's anger as an
absolute necessity.

Anger management was also a core concern in the field of religious didactics.
What is interesting here is the question of how medical approaches to regu-
lating anger relate to meditative or spiritual practices that aim at calming the
agitated spirit. Prayer had been appreciated as a remedy for anger since Gregory
Nazianzen, and pastoral care was particularly concerned with the treatment of
excessive anger. In this vein, the above-mentioned Weyer not only joined Stoic
with Christian practices of meditation, with, e.g., a view to the daily exami-
nation of one's conscience (examen conscientiae), but also designed his own
theological anger therapy that clearly shows some Catholic traits. This is all the
more remarkable as Weyer has been labelled a Protestant by some historians.

A pastoral concern with anger is also evident in the work of William Perkins,
one of the most influential figures in Puritanism. Perkins developed a taxon-
omy of the different types of anger that ranged from sinfulness to virtue in
some social situations, as shown by David Barbee in his contribution. To date,
most of the scholarly work related to Puritanism and the expression of emo-
tion has revolved around Puritan religious experience, particularly conver-
sion. Although anger posed a very real question in the exposition of Puritan
practical divinity, it has received scant scholarly attention. This is not because
Puritans neglected to discuss anger. In fact, the Puritans saw anger a multi-
faceted issue that demanded analysis from a number of perspectives. Discourses
of anger functioned on three levels in Puritan thought and practice. First,
the question was broached by considering the expression of divine anger.
Christological doctrine gave the matter a finer point by compelling Puritans to
discuss the question of Christ's perfected human emotions. This foreshadows
the final layer wherein Puritans addressed anger as a concern for spirituality.
The topic of anger provides a different perspective on traditional Puritan con-
cerns related to soteriology and the assurance of salvation.
Learned Debates About Anger

Early modern learned debates about anger were informed by bigger patterns of intellectual transformation. Humanists, for example, argued against scholastic notions of anger, sometimes by stressing sensuality over rationality. This is the topic of John Nassichuk's case study of the philosophical treatises of the Neapolitan Humanist, Neoplatonist, and Neoaristotelian Giovanni Pontano, which focuses in particular on the works *De fortitudine* and *De immanitate*. By presenting a general account of the Neapolitan humanist's treatment of anger, one that remains directly related to the *Quattrocento* theories of human misery and dignity, Nassichuk further examines Pontano's recurrent use of the theme in his description of the final limits separating “human” and “animal” behaviour.

Humoural pathology was at the centre of a debate among Scandinavian scholars about berserkers which covered antiquarianism, psychology, and an assessment of the pagan. Bernd Roling's contribution deals with the fascinating Nordic Saga literature that confronted early modern antiquarians with the strange phenomenon of the berserkers. How could their extreme anger be explained? Were the heroes of the “Egils saga” or the “Hervarar saga”, as some early editors like Olaus Verelius in the seventeenth century suggested, obsessed by demons? Was the devil responsible for the extreme rage of the northern warriors? In the early eighteenth century, different and more naturalistic explanations were brought forward: maybe berserkers were suffering from a strange mental disease, as Jon Eiriksson suggested. The knowledge of Lapponia and the religions of Inner Asia finally made another model attractive for Scandinavian scholars: berserkers were taking extracts of toadstools or mushrooms to become ecstatic, as Samuel Oedmann, a student of Linne, proposed. Roling's paper reconstructs the early modern debate on berserkers as a part of the history of early demonology and medicine.

Writings on anger by Scottish philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are testimony to the intertwining of natural and moral philosophy, and these two fields in turn form a bridge to the physiology of anger. By exploring various theoretical discourses on anger in Enlightenment Scotland, Tamás Demeter demonstrates that various branches of theoretical inquiry were intertwined in such a way that different layers of discourse exerted influence on each another: physiological discourses were filled with hidden moral meaning and religious content, and vice versa. Thus discourses on the natural, psychological, social, and transcendent aspects of human beings exhibited a remarkable conceptual unity in this period, just before they started to develop into specialised fields of knowledge.
Anger in Literary Discourses: Epic and Drama

The *Iliad*’s central narrative of Achilles’s anger established this passion as a powerful *moven* in epic narrative. Is it possible to identify genre-specific notions of anger in early modern literature against this backdrop? Betül Dilmac discusses this question with regard to the Italian debate about the relation between epic and *romanzo*, Christian Peters with a view to Neo-Latin epic.

For the panegyric Latin poet of the fifteenth century, writing an epic poem meant fashioning himself as an imitator of Virgil. Imitating Virgil, in turn, meant having to deal with the depiction of the hero’s anger as well as with the debates and criticism it elicited among humanists, a discussion to which Maffeo Vegio’s supplemental thirteenth book of the *Aeneid* bears particular witness. While the adoption of the Virgilian model to celebrate the person who was both the hero and addressee of the panegyric epic provided a suitable means for the poet to lift his patron and his achievements beyond the scope of contemporary history, he still had to be careful not to draw too close a connection between the humanist assessment of an angry and vengeful Aeneas and the contemporary hero. Christian Peters analyses the depiction of anger and its agents in three major Neo-Latin epics and shows how poets were not only aware of the ambivalent nature of epic anger, but were also able to turn this ambivalence into a powerful literary device for marking the patron-heroes and their enemies as, respectively, deserving winners and losers, thus commenting on contemporary events through epic discourse and the role of anger therein.

Betül Dilmac addresses Tasso’s monumental epic *La Gerusalemme liberata*. The narrative centre of this text is the representation of a historical event that, as such, is worthy of the epic. The choice of title opens up the thematic field of battle and enmity; this field is not only constitutive for the text, but above all defines the domain in which anger as a historical phenomenon and subject of artistic treatment has been located since antiquity. Dilmac shows that *La Gerusalemme liberata* depicts anger on the one hand as a destructive power opposed to rational action, but on the other as a positive force, embedded in reflections on warlike as well as reproductive manhood.

Barbara Sasse Tateo analyses early modern literary representations of anger by pointing out the specific connotations of gender and the specific characteristics of different literary genres. She focuses on the secular dramas of the Nuremberg author Hans Sachs, composed in the mid-sixteenth century, in which an increasing number of angry characters appear. Sasse shows how the

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specific patterns of the dramatic representation of anger reflect notions that are reminiscent of the contemporary discourses of gender. For example, the staging of anger is informed by the misogynist discourse of early bourgeois culture, thus confirming the contemporary gender order. But this construction also undermines the prevalent idea of anger as a typical male characteristic that contrasts with the fundamental passive nature of woman. Both kinds of angry characters receive a pathological connotation: while angry male characters are generally coupled with impulsive rage (prototypical is the “wüterich” Herod), female anger is coupled with the vice of sexual lust (“Geilheit”). As deviant behaviour, anger—and especially female anger—always reveals a failure of the regulative forces of the patriarchal order.

Visual Representations of Anger

There are few mythological characters in the Western cultural tradition who could more aptly represent the quintessence of anger than does Medea. Maria Berbara’s contribution addresses the question of how Medea was represented in the visual arts during the early modern period, and how these representations were connected to traditional discourses on anger. She also explores the ways in which Medea’s iconography relates to ancient literary sources—especially Ovid and Seneca—with a special emphasis on the varying interpretations of her anger.

Anger in Political Discourses

Anger plays a recurring role in the great political and religious conflicts in early modern Europe. Little attention has so far been given to what was supposed to happen after the conflicts subsided. Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen thus looks at how the early moderns understood the nature of reconciliation. Early modern diplomats, who may have been expected to act in a conciliatory manner, had a surprisingly complex relationship with anger. While instruction manuals taught the art de plaire, as was to be expected, they also taught the intentional provocation of anger in order to tempt high-ranking officials to reveal precious secrets while in a state of excitement and loss of control. Anger is thus used as a generator of truth, and in turn diplomats were advised to consciously employ anger if it helped them in accomplishing their mission, as Tilman Haug shows in his contribution. And anger was certainly an issue at the highest echelons of society as well: taking the cases of the sultans Süleyman I and Selim as examples, Zeynep Yelçê discusses the legitimacy of princely anger in the Ottoman Empire.
Studying seventeenth-century French diplomats and ministers, Tilman Haug analyses the ways in which anger was perceived as a “political emotion”. Haug shows how displaying anger was on the one hand deemed inappropriate in the light of concepts of negotiation emphasizing politeness and subtle manipulation, while on the other hand provoking anger could be considered instrumental in uncovering true intentions or establishing emotional commitment. Furthermore, early modern concepts of princely representation could, despite the moderate demeanour they demanded, justify anger and even violence, when princely honour was at stake or an ambassador’s personal honour was compromised. Nevertheless, such practices of anger frequently entailed elaborate narratives of justification. Practicing disruptive anger could also be regarded as indicating prospects of lasting cooperation and thus strengthen political relations—provided it was performed by allies and clients towards the representatives of rival powers.

Van Dijkhuizen’s article reflects on the historical origins of the modern preoccupation with remorse-based forgiveness as a road to reconciliation, and asks whether this particular model of interpersonal reconciliation is peculiar to the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries and whether its roots can be discerned in earlier historical eras. If remorse-based forgiveness is peculiar to the modern era, moreover, what alternative reconciliation paradigms were available in early modernity, and what transformations were necessary to lend forgiveness its cultural dominance in the modern world? Van Dijkhuizen argues that early modern culture thought of reconciliation primarily in terms of clemency and oblivion. Both are linked intrinsically to the Christian idea of anger control and the suppression of resentment. The role of heartfelt remorse as a starting point for reconciliation, by contrast, was at best limited. At the same time, the idea that remorse can have an important role to play in interpersonal reconciliation was beginning to be explored in literary texts; a brief reading of four Shakespeare plays serves as a case study. Likewise, the origins of the idea that victim and perpetrator share a common humanity, central to the modern idea of remorse-based forgiveness, can be traced back to the early modern era if not even further.

Zeynep Yelçe's article explores the notion of anger in the Ottoman context of the early modern world. Focusing on the actions of Sultan Mehmed II (d. 1481) and the representations thereof over a period of approximately 150 years, she traces the conditions, manifestations, and expressions of wrath in contemporary chronicles and works on ethics and seeks to explain the role of “wrath” in shaping, reinforcing, and perpetuating the image and the authority of the Ottoman sultan. Issues concerning legitimate causes and manifestations of anger, the relationship between wrath and mercy, and responses to anger in collective memory are among the main points discussed in this contribution.
Transcultural Notions of Anger

With its focus on the Ottoman Empire, Yelçü’s contribution prepares the ground for the concluding paper of the volume, a study of anger and rage in traditional Chinese culture. Paolo Santangelo takes the Chinese equivalents of anger and rage (nù 怒, qi 氣, fèn 怒/憤, hèn 愤) as well as their symbolic and idiomatic expressions as the starting point for a comprehensive survey article.

Santangelo aims at reconstructing an anthropological description of the emotion of anger in late imperial China with a view to both social roles and gender. While anger may be considered one of the basic emotions, common to the affective experience of human beings, it still reflects the cultural background and values of each society and culture. Anger-like emotions are amongst the most frequently described feelings in the Chinese sources, which testifies to a marked interest in the social and individual problems they entail. The descriptions of manifestations of anger demonstrate that traditionally Chinese people were not as self-controlled as some reports tend to state. Rather, anger is portrayed as a psychophysical reaction, involving indignant posture, a stern look, impudent manners, the grinding of one’s teeth, and gestures of hands and feet. Anger is also described as entailing various degrees of aggressiveness, from cursing and abusing others to quarrelling and making trouble. Chinese medicine contributes to the representation of anger and its bodily roots and somatisation. Its main ambiguity lies in its contradictory evaluation: anger may be condemned for its disruptive effects on personal health and on social relations, its excessive violence, and loss of human dignity. But it may also be praised as a moral and justified reaction, as a quest for justice (if it is the adequate attitude in a certain the situation), and even the source of inspiration for writing.

Selected Bibliography


Chapter 2

Feeling Rage: The Transformation of the Concept of Anger in Eighteenth Century Germany

Johannes F. Lehmann

During the second half of the eighteenth century in Germany, the concepts of the emotions of anger and rage (Zorn and Wut) are subjected to an epochal discursive transformation. The crucial event is the replacement of anger as an emotion (Affekt) by rage as a feeling (Gefühl). The present paper will be explaining this process of transformation.1

In his Art of Rhetoric, Aristotle defines anger (Zorn, in German translations) based on a formula of “slight—pain—revenge” which has remained valid for centuries: ‘Let us then define anger as a longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge for a real or apparent slight, affecting a man himself or one of his friends, when such a slight is undeserved.’2 Anger is a social event; this is a fact essential to the entire discourse of anger in classical antiquity, and, accordingly, the term ‘slight’ (ολιγωριο) is pivotal to Aristotle’s description.3 His focus on the principle that connects pain to disregard and, finally, to a lusty desire for revenge, suggests a twofold social determination. Firstly, the slight one has suffered causes a pain which will then provoke anger, as it is considered either to be ‘undeserved’ or has been emitted by a subject who in one’s own opinion does not have the merit to do so.4 In this case, anger signifies the impulse to seek revenge for an inappropriate social slight. Secondly, and this is the other aspect of social determination, anger is always born out of one’s own hypostatized superiority. I believe the decisive sentence in Aristotle’s theory on

1 My paper gives an abbreviated and condensed version of chapters IV and V from my book: Lehmann J.F., Im Abgrund der Wut. Zur Kultur- und Literaturgeschichte der Wut (Freiburg i. Br.: 2012) 131–190. In the present paper, “anger” will be used whenever it indicates “Zorn”, while “rage” will be standing for “Wut” in the German sense. For the translation I have to thank Silke Mestern.
3 Aristotle, The Art of Rhetoric 175, mentions three forms of disregard: ‘disdain, spitefulness, and insult.’
anger is the observation that a person displays anger because of ‘her superior rank’.5

The principle of “slight—pain—revenge” is repeated by other antique authors, albeit in different variations, either explicitly (in theoretical writings) or implicitly (in the narrated examples), as in Cicero and Plutarch,6 or as in Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic school of philosophy. Zeno is reported to have said: ‘anger [is] a craving or desire to punish one who is thought to have done you an undeserved injury.’7 Seneca8 claims nearness to Aristotle, and even though his Stoic view on anger differs considerably from the Aristotelian viewpoint, both authors do coincide in that they emphasise the link of honour and revenge as the main element in the basic narrative of anger.9 In the Middle Ages, anger continues to be the emotion (Affekt) of revenge. Leaning strongly on Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas explains in his Summa theologica how ‘an angry reaction arises only when one has endured some pain, and desires and hopes for revenge.’10 Authors from the early modern period up to the eighteenth century,


9 The differences mainly concern the appraisal of the committed insult of honour. The Stoics take the insult as an internal challenge, denying it could be a legitimate trigger for anger, as only lowly beings allow themselves to feel anger if their honour is slighted. Thereby, the interconnection of slight of honour and an irate desire for revenge is confirmed even in the attempt of dissolving it.

including Francis Bacon, René Descartes, Michel de Montaigne, John Locke, Christian Thomasius and Christian Wolff, vary only slightly in their definitions of anger, while all of them place emphasis on the factor of revenge.\footnote{Bacon Francis, “Of Anger”, in Essays (N.p. 1601). Bacon stays true to the antique definition of anger (\textit{Zorn}) as a desire for revenge provoked by hurtful offense, but he introduces a new aspect by describing the insulting event from the viewpoint of the recipient of the offense: ‘The next is, the apprehension and construction of the injury offered, to be, in the circumstances thereof, full of contempt.’ Cf. his essay “On Revenge”, in which he tends to an art of mastering anger. Michel de Montaigne, “Of anger and cholera”, in The Essays of Montaigne, Done into English by John Florio. With an Introduction by George Saintsbury. The Second Book (New York: 1967) 452–459, also advocates mastery and moderation of anger, especially as anger usually includes a moment of revenge for an insult (453). Accordingly, he draws his examples mainly from classical antiquity, when theories on anger revolved centrally on the social relationship between master and slave—cf. Anita Traninger’s contribution in this volume. Descartes René, \textit{The Passions of the Soul}. An English Translation of \textit{Les Passion de l’âme}, trans. S. Voss (Indianapolis – Cambridge: 1989) Article 199, 129. Locke John, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, ed. P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: 1975) 231, writes: ‘Anger is uneasiness or discomposure of the mind, upon the receipt of any Injury, with a present purpose of Revenge.’ Thomasius Christian, \textit{Ausübung der Sittenlehre} (Halle, Salfeld: 1696; reprint Hildesheim: 1968) 422: ‘For not only in common life does one understand / by talking of anger / this desire for revenge / but the philosophers have also commonly described anger as such.’ (‘Denn man verstehet nicht allein in gemeinen Leben / wenn man von Zorne redet / diese Rachbegierde / sondern es haben auch die Philosophi insgemein den Zorn also beschrieben.’)}


\begin{itemize}
\item Bacon Francis, “Of Anger”, in Essays (N.p. 1601).
\item Thomasius Christian, \textit{Ausübung der Sittenlehre} (Halle, Salfeld: 1696; reprint Hildesheim: 1968).
\item Keckermann Bartholomäus, \textit{Systema rhetoricae} (Hannover, Antonius: 1608).
\end{itemize}
‘Anger is a covetous inclination of the heart to take prompt revenge for defamation encountered.’

It is at the end of the eighteenth century, when authors like the jurist Christian Westphal first find the old definition of anger insufficient and broaden it significantly: ‘We hate that which causes us unpleasant and ill willed feelings for being contrary to our wish and desire. If it erupts suddenly, then there is anger. *There does not need to be any prior insult*, no action of another that defies duty.’ With this statement, Westphal draws attention to the significant limitation of the antique definition of anger as he expressly includes motives for anger that do not arise either from an insult of the sphere of honour, or from the violation of any given norm: he speaks of anger beyond slight and injustice. Whereas the jurist Westphal points out the necessity of amplifying the definition of anger, the psychologist Johann Gebhard Ehrenreich Maaß from Halle analyses the emotion (Affekt) of anger with regard to the *perception of annoyance* (Verdrüß), out of which may arise not only anger but also vexation (Ärger). However, annoyance and vexation are not reactions to an insult, but relate instead—energetically—to the ‘agitation that takes hold of the mind through the vague activities of its powers.’ Avoidable evils, of which one finds a person guilty, produce annoyance and excite ‘all powers to go against this evil and its creator.’ When this happens in an effervescence of emotion, it elicits anger; should it occur, instead, with constraint and moderation, the emotion produced is that of vexation. In a similar fashion, in his definition of anger in paragraph 987 of his *Philosophische Aphorismen*, Ernst Platner accentuates the

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17 ‘[…] alle Kräfte auf, diesem Uebel und seinem Urheber zu widersprechen.’ Platner, *Neue Anthropologie* 348f.

18 Platner, *Neue Anthropologie* 350: ‘This constrained or moderated annoyance is vexation, whereas the unrestrained or effervescent is anger.’ (‘Dieser gehaltene, oder gedämpfte Verdrüß ist der Aerger, und der ungehaltene oder aufbrausende dagegen der Zorn.’)
element of experiencing annoyance: ‘Anger is a vivid sense of annoyance about persons who involve us in unpleasant events, e.g. loss, insult, obstacle, etc.’\textsuperscript{19}

While in this instance Platner still does mention insults received from other people as a cause for annoyance, he is quick to correct himself by expanding on the issue in the paragraph following the next: ‘Even though anger is always directed toward people, it is not always, at first, provoked by the annoyance at people who cause the unpleasant event; rather, it is often directed at random, to have an object on which to express itself.’\textsuperscript{20} Insult has ceased to be the paradigm; it has been replaced by obstruction, as anger now seems to arise from a specific disposition of the inner world that stands in no direct causal relationship with the events occurring in the environment. Instead, there can be an inner irritability, a—possibly unconscious—‘reluctant dissatisfaction’, which ‘was (already) present when the unpleasant event arose but was intensified by it, only then to be transferred onto it.’\textsuperscript{21} This consideration of energetic transfers and abreactions points to the concept of the individuality of the psyche.

While the causes for anger are thus extended beyond the genuine events of insult and slighting, one can find earlier as well as parallel instances where the intentionality of anger has already been transformed, i.e. where, in the course of the eighteenth century, revenge has been eliminated from definitions of anger.\textsuperscript{22} A prominent example of this new view is Immanuel Kant’s definition of anger, which does not mention insult and revenge at all, but instead talks of evils (\textit{Übel}), powers (\textit{Kräfte}) and resistance (\textit{Widerstand}). ‘Anger’, so he says in his \textit{Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View}, ‘is fright that at the same time quickly stirs up powers to resist ill.’\textsuperscript{23} Johann Christian Hoffbauer writes:

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{19} ‘Zorn ist ein lebhafter Verdruss über Personen, die uns unangenehme Ereignisse verursachen, z.B. Verlust, Beleidigung, Hindernis u.s.w.’ Platner Ernst, \textit{Philosophische Aphorismen nebst einigen Anmerkungen zur philosophischen Geschichte. Anderer Theil} (Leipzig, Schwickert: 1782) 397.
  \item \textsuperscript{20} ‘Obwohl der Zorn allzeit auf Personen gerichtet ist, so ist doch die erste Ursache, die ihn erregt, nicht allzeit Verdruss über die Personen, welche die unangenehme Begebenheit verursachen, sondern oft nimmt er diese Richtung nur zufälliger Weise, um einen Gegenstand zu haben, an dem er sich äußere.’ Platner, \textit{Philosophische Aphorismen} 397.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} ‘[Ein] unwilliges Mißvergnügen[, das] vorhanden war, als die unangenehme Begebenheit entstand und durch dieselbe erst lebhafter erregt, dann aber auf dieselbe übertragen wurde.’ Platner, \textit{Philosophische Aphorismen} 399.
  \item In the doctrine of the four kinds of anger (\textit{Lehre vom vierfachen Zorn}) which Platner sets out to develop in a space of ten pages in his \textit{Philosophische Aphorismen}, revenge is not mentioned once.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} Kant Immanuel, \textit{Antrophology from a Pragmatic Point of View}, ed. R.B. Louden (Cambridge: 2006) 153. ‘Der Zorn ist ein Schreck, der zugleich die Kräfte zum Widerstand gegen das
'For motivations for anger exist already for the child, as soon as it experiences a resistance that tempts it to gather its powers and rise against it.' And Johann Christian Lossius, professor of theology in Erfurt since 1772, regards anger as the attempt not to be taking revenge for any insult or evil deed, but rather 'to eliminate it' (‘dasselbe zu entfernen’). And finally, Albert Mathias Vering writes in his 1817 Psychische Heilkunde: ‘The feeling born out of the loathing of an object, and accompanied by a fierce action aiming to eliminate it, is called anger; a state of mind counted among the emotions [Affecten].’

Zedler’s definition of anger already stands out as it substitutes revenge, but not the insult, by mere reluctance: ‘Anger is the emotion that arises from the idea of any suffered insult, be it to oneself or to another person whom one regards highly, and that drives one to fend off the evil that threatens to spring from it.’ As revenge ceases to be an issue, Zedler proceeds to also exclude, by


26 ‘Jenes Gefühl, welches aus dem Abscheu eines Objects entspringt, und mit einer heftigen Tätigkeit, dasselbe zu entfernen, begleitet ist, heißt Zorn; ein Gemüthszustand, der zu den Affecten gezählt wird.’ Vering A.M., Psychische Heilkunde, vol. 1 (Leipzig: 1817) 58. The fact that Vering needs to mention explicitly that anger is an emotion (Affekt), is due to the separation of the terminology of emotion (Affekt) and passion (Leidenschaft) following Kant. I will expand on this further on. Compare also the definition of anger given by Waitz Th., Lehrbuch der Psychologie als Naturwissenschaft (Braunschweig: 1849) 475: ‘The irate person grasps at any means to fend off the attack, be it real or imaginary, and to eliminate that which he regards as the immediate cause of the imbalance of his inner life.’ (‘Der Zornige ergreift jedes Mittel um den auf ihn wirklich geschehenen oder nur eingenildeten Angriff abzuwehren und dasjenige zu beseitigen was er als nächste Ursache des gestörten Gleichgewichts seines innern Lebens betrachtet.’) This anger without revenge will be adopted most gratefully by theologians in their attempt to explain the wrath of God. For a direct reference to Vering and the anger of God see Weber F., Vom Zorne Gottes (Erlangen: 1862) 7–14.

definition, the pain which had initially been stated as the cause for seeking revenge. What remains is anger as an ‘eagerness to remove the evil’. The question of whether anger is desire for revenge (and therefore evil) or an ‘emotion that perceives evil and in response to this perception moves man to rid himself of it’ (thereby being indifferent), is discussed by Thomasius as early as at the close of the seventeenth century. Albeit with a defensive attitude, he once more repeats the definition of anger based on a desire for revenge: ‘But everybody admits that anger, should it be a desire for revenge, is indeed true anger.’

Thomasius explicitly names two possible concepts of anger that exclude one another: ‘One calls for revenge to establish good and has already overcome the insult or the evil; the other, however, merely seeks to get rid of the evil while he is experiencing it, without any desire for revenge.’ Thomasius rejects this second concept of anger without revenge, but cannot prevent it from becoming more and more accepted. A similar interpretation can be found in John Locke, who points out expressly how anger is an emotion not to be found in all men, as it presupposes ‘some mixed Considerations of our selves and others’ that are sometimes lacking, namely ‘valuing their Merits, or intending Revenge.’ To Locke, anger indisputably counts among the privileges of the honourable man: without a desire for revenge there can be no anger. In his writings, Gottsched—like Adelung and, later, Campe—does acknowledge

30 ‘Nun geben aber alle zu / daß der Zorn / so ferne er eine Rachbegierde ist / ein eigentlicher Zorn sey.’ Thomasius, Ausübung der Sittenlehre 424.
31 ‘Jener verlanget nach Rache als was guten / und hat die Beleidigung oder das Böse schon überstanden; Dieser aber will nur das gegenwärtige Böse von Halse los werden / ohne Verlangen nach Rache.’ Thomasius, Ausübung der Sittenlehre 423.
32 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 23f.
33 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 23f.
34 Gottsched Johann Christoph, “Erste Gründe der gesammten Weltweisheit (Praktischer Teil)”, in Ausgewählte Werke, ed. P.M. Mitchell, vol. v, 2 (Berlin – New York: 1983) 342: ‘Finally, anger results from the idea of injustice that somebody has brought upon us. Should one want to lessen it, one has to demonstrate to the irate person that he whom he considers his insulter has not committed the evil.’ (‘Endlich entsteht der Zorn, aus der Vorstellung des Unrechts, das uns jemand angethan hat. Will man denselben dämpfen, so muß man dem Zürnenden zeigen, daß derjenige, den er für seinen Beleidiger hält, das Böse nicht gethan habe.’)
The transformation of the concept of anger; the closest he admits to is ‘repulsion’ (‘Unwillen’). Since the Age of Enlightenment, revenge has thus been separated from anger as an emotion, and/or reformulated as a resistance against evil or, generally, against any opposition to one’s own wishes.

Toward the end of the eighteenth century, under the aegis of feeling as a new category, the emotion of anger is placed in a field of energetic terms: activity, energy, and power (Kraft) on one side, obstruction and resistance on the other. And to all of them applies that ‘each power will increase its activity in relation to the resistance encountered in its exertion.’ Jurists like Ernst Carl Wieland go as far as to redefine the category of insult—which is elemental for anger and the right to revenge—in energetic terms of feeling. From Aristotle to Schottelius, insult and slight had been deduced from social hierarchies and the notions of honour originating in them. Wieland, however, considers the insult to be aimed at the ‘humiliating conscience of the superiority of external forces’.

In a similar way, i.e. in the sense of a distinctly felt decline of powers, physiologist Karl Friedrich Burdach formulates in his *Handbuch der Pathologie*: ‘anger is a vivid feeling of incompleteness, and all efforts to remedy this are directed against the causer of this imperfection.’ Even if there is an evidently guilty person, anger can be said to be generated entirely from within, as a sense of ‘imperfection’, which Burdach describes as a ‘limitation of ourselves or as a constraint of another power, to which we feel related’. In consequence, the wish for revenge and retaliation can be explained by the consciousness of a competition of powers and the self-affection by one’s own sense of power.

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35 Joachim H. Campe writes that anger is ‘the passion that leads one to openly and unrestrainedly express strong repulsion regarding an insult one has suffered.’ (‘Diejenige Leidenschaft, da man seinen Unwillen über eine erlittene Beleidigung ohne allen Rückhalt heftig äußert.’) Campe J.H., *Wörterbuch der Deutschen Sprache*, vol. 5 (Braunschweig: 1811) 879.


According to this, revenge makes sense simply because ‘it is only after the humiliation of the enemy that the idea of the superiority of his powers can be dissipated as well in their own minds as in those of other people, and make room for the much more pleasant notion of their own activities and range of influence.’\textsuperscript{40} Retaliation is intended to reestablish one’s own sense of power and superiority by causing the other to experience the very feeling of inferiority one has been made to suffer.

As we can see, the end of the eighteenth century brings with it two noticeable developments: Firstly, the old anger being completed by new emotions and feelings that go beyond slight—pain—revenge. This leads either to a critical review of the definition of anger or/and to the expansion of the narrative by vexation (Ärger) and annoyance (Verdruß) against the background of a paradigm of power and resistance. Secondly, it becomes evident how the components of the old definition of anger—revenge and insult, insofar as they are still mentioned at all (and they are)—are themselves either adapted to the paradigm or concealed by it.

If one takes into further account that the early European narrative discusses anger as the emotion of the kings (Herrscheraffekt) and ties the lust for revenge to the availability of resources of power (Macht) and violence to follow through with it, then one can say that at the end of the eighteenth century, anger is democratized at the level of its description and of its theory. If the principle of slight and revenge is replaced or expanded by a model of obstruction and resistance, everybody is entitled to feel anger or rage—indeed independently of the actual distribution of power.

\textbf{1 Emotion (Affekt) and Representation (Vorstellung) around 1700}

This completely new description of rage and anger dating from the end of the eighteenth century no longer follows the old emotional model (Affektmodell) which regards emotion as an obscure idea and therefore as a manifestation of the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen), defining anger as the desire to seek revenge. Instead, it approaches emotion as a feeling. The transition of the discourse about emotions from emotion (Affekt) to one about feeling (Gefühlt) is essential as historic background of the discourse that leads to the new definition of anger at the end of the eighteenth century.

\textsuperscript{40} ‘[. . .] weil sich erst nach der Demüthigung ihres Feindes die Idee von der Ueberlegenheit seiner Kräfte sowohl bei ihnen selbst als bei andern Menschen verlieren, und der weit angenehmern Vorstellung von ihrer Thätigkeit und von dem weiten Umfange ihres Wirkungskreises Platz machen konnte.’ Wieland, \textit{Wiedervergeltung} 109.
According to the philosophical tradition of the seventeenth century, as represented by Leibniz, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Thomasius, or Wolff, emotions are representations, resp. ideas. However, they are only such ideas that act immediately on the will, i.e. eliciting sensual desires, and these are mainly the so-called obscure, the unclear resp. the confused ideas. All of the inner life (Seelenleben)—as well as the emotions—can be ascribed to representations, and is attributed to the will or sensual desire (appetitus sensibilis) that is commanded by the respective representation. Consequently, emotions start out as being specific manifestations of thoughts or ideas. Even Garve still writes, in 1767, how we must describe emotions as a particular sort of ideas, since ‘the only power of the soul that we know of is to produce ideas’. Accordingly, John Locke defines hatred ‘as the thought of the pain’ that determines a kind of quest. The representations are the ones to define the will and they produce the affective twofold motion of desiring and loathing, of loving and hating. ‘It is evident’, says Hobbes in his Leviathan in the paragraph on ‘the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions; commonly called the PASSIONS’, ‘that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all Voluntary Motion.’

41 In view of the privileged regard for the representing power (vorstellende Kraft) that is characteristic of Leibniz’s and Wolff’s philosophy, Max Dessoir speaks of an ‘energetic theory of consciousness’ (energetische Theorie des Bewußtseins). Dessoir M., Geschichte der neueren deutschen Psychologie (Berlin: 1902; reprint Amsterdam: 1964) 377.

42 In opposition to the appetitus sensibilis (sensual desire), Wolff mentions the appetitus rationale (force of will). Wolff Christian, Vernünfftige Gedancken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen überhaupt, anderer Theil. Anmerkungen zur deutschen Metaphysik (Hildesheim u.a.: 1983) 227. Thomas Aquinas writes about the appetitus sensibilis as the defining element of the emotions. So does Hobbes, who describes emotions as desires and aversions (appetitus et fuga constant); Christian Wolff, too, includes the appetitus sensibilis in his definition of emotion. All references in Art. "Affekt", in Eisl R., Wörterbuch der philosophischen Begriffe (Berlin: 1904).

43 ‘[Da] die Kraft Ideen hervorzubringen die einzige der Seele ist, die wir kennen […]’. So much for Christian Garve, as cited in Campe R., Affekt und Ausdruck. Zur Umwandlung der literarischen Rede im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Tübingen: 1990) 384. This is why Descartes already tries to differentiate ‘passions of the soul […] from all its other thoughts’. Descartes, The Passions of the Soul art. 27, 33.

44 Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding 230 (emphasis added).


47 Hobbes, Leviathan 39.
especially applies to the obscure representations. ‘Out of an unclear idea of
good, sensual desire is born.’\textsuperscript{48} Descartes, too, defines emotions as ‘cognitiones
confusae’\textsuperscript{49}. It is the representation of an object we have identified as good that
incites our will to strive for this very object. Wolff writes correspondingly: ‘since
all good leads to perfection of ourselves as well as of our condition (§ 422), and
since the intuition of perfection causes pleasure (§ 404), so the intuitive cogni-
tion of the good must cause pleasure, as soon as we recognize it to be good.’\textsuperscript{50} In
the case of the obscure representations, the notion whether objects are good or
evil is acquired through the respective feeling of pleasure or displeasure/pain.
Accordingly, Leibniz writes (in compliance with Locke): ‘From pleasure and
pain come the passions.’\textsuperscript{51} For out of the intuition of the good, however unclear
it may be, and the pleasure resulting from it, rises in turn sensual desire, which
to Wolff is the \textit{definiens} of emotion:\textsuperscript{52} ‘Out of the unclear representation of
the good arises sensual desire, which is therefore nothing but an inclination
of the soul toward the matter we obscurely identify as good.’\textsuperscript{53} Thereby, on the
one hand, emotions are related to the present sensations of pleasure and pain,
while on the other hand they refer to the future of that which the will, moved
by the obscure representation, is striving to achieve. Insofar as pleasure and
pain are ultimately conceived of as representations (however obscure) and not
as feelings, they are always related, originally, to either will or desire. Hobbes


\textsuperscript{49} As cited in Bernecker K., \textit{Kritische Darstellung der Geschichte des Affektbegriffes. (Von
Descartes bis zur Gegenwart)} (Berlin: 1915) 20. Definitions of emotion (\textit{Affekt}) as ‘confusa
idea’ (Spinoza) or ‘pensées confuses’ (Leibniz) are quite common. They all have their ori-
gin in Baumgarten’s ‘ex confusa cognitione’. Quotes in Art. “Affekt” in Eisler,
\textit{Wörterbuch}.

\textsuperscript{50} ‘Weil das Gute uns und unseren Zustand vollkommen machet (§ 422), das Anschauen
der Vollkommenheit aber Lust erreget (§ 404), so muss die anschauende Erkäntniß des
Guten Lust erregen, wenn wir es nämlich als gut einsehen.’ Wolff, \textit{Vernünftige Gedanken},
ch. 3, § 423, 261.

J. Benett (Cambridge: 1997) 163 (11, XX, §3). ‘Aus der Lust und dem Schmerz rühren die
Leidenschaften her.’ Leibniz Gottfried Wilhelm, \textit{Neue Abhandlungen über den mensch-
lchen Verstand I. Philosophische Schriften}, vol. 3.1. French and German, ed. and trans.

\textsuperscript{52} Wolff, \textit{Vernünftige Gedancken} § 439, 269: ‘A noticeable degree of sensual desire or sensual
aversion is called emotion’ (‘Ein mercklicher Grad der sinnlichen Begierde und des sinn-
llichen Abscheues wird ein Affect genennet’).

\textsuperscript{53} ‘Aus der undeutlichen Vorstellung des Guten entstehet die sinnliche Begierde, welche
dennach nichts anderes ist als eine Neigung der Seele gegen die Sache, davon wir einen
speaks of the passions as ‘the Interior Beginnings of Voluntary Motions’. This is why Christian Thomasius calls the emotions *dispositions* of the mind (*Gemüthsneigungen*, temper) and defines them as follows:

The dispositions of the mind are movements of the human will toward pleasant or adverse things which are nonexistent or lie in the future and that arise from the powerful impressions of exterior things on the heart of man and from the consequent extraordinary movement of the bloods.

The fact that emotions should be defined as motions of the will triggered by representations (this is still the case in Gottsched), leads to consequences in the definition of anger. Thomasius, who follows the Aristotelian tradition, defines anger as the pain caused by an insult and the resulting wish for revenge. The element of the presently felt pain (the feeling) thus recedes on behalf of the element of the will as the *definiens* of the emotion: anger ‘calls for revenge as something good and has already overcome the insult or evil.’ However, the aspect of the presently felt pain or sense of annoyance which arises beyond any desire for revenge turns into the full definition of anger as soon as the emotions cease to be regarded as movements and representations of movements, but are regarded as feelings (*Gefühle*) instead. The problem inherent to the discussion of emotions during the seventeenth and even the eighteenth century is that pain and pleasure are linked to the present, while the emotion as movement and desire is regarded in relation to something either not present or lying in the future. Thomasius’s defense of the classic view which equates the emotion of anger with the desire for revenge is entirely

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56 Gottsched, “Erste Gründe der gesammten Weltweisheit” 335.
57 Thomasius, *Ausübung der Sittenlehre* 423.
58 Ibidem 425. ‘[Der Zorn] verlangt nach Rache als was guten und hat die Beleidigung oder das Böse schon überstanden’.
59 See Dessoir, *Geschichte* 78. An exemplary exposition on this can be found in Meier Georg Friedrich, *Theoretische Lehre der Gemüthsbewegungen überhaupt* (Halle, Hemmerde: 1744) § 47–49.
due to this definition of emotion as will.\textsuperscript{60} For this implies that the emotion is exclusively seen in relation to future or absent matters, i.e. as movement toward something. By contrast, according to Thomasius, the dimension of the present, the sensation of pleasure or displeasure, does not belong to emotion and will, but to the understanding, where these sensations are registered.\textsuperscript{61} This is why Thomasius cannot define anger as a feeling of incompletion, as is done at the end of the eighteenth century, i.e. in relation to the dimension of the present self-perception (\textit{Selbstempfinden}), but only in relation to the inherent volition of something in the future: revenge. It is precisely this dimension of the present, which Thomasius reassigns from the emotional sphere to the sphere of understanding, that at the end of the eighteenth century is incorporated into emotion as ‘feeling’ (\textit{Gefühl}), with immediate consequences for the description of anger. As an example, the ‘fright’ (\textit{Schreck}) which Kant considers to be essential to anger is not an emotion at all in the eyes of Thomasius, as it lies in the present and has no relation to a will directed at the future.\textsuperscript{62}

2 

Rage as a Feeling (around 1800)

The changes made to the theory of emotion during the eighteenth century focus mainly on transcending the seventeenth century’s analysis of emotion as a correspondence of representation and affective motion\textsuperscript{63} and on elaborating instead on the distinction of feeling, emotion and passion i.e. focusing on the \textit{experience} of the emotion. The old emotional entities taken from classical rhetoric are now dissolved and replaced by an ‘infinity of differences in

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\textsuperscript{60} Thomasius, \textit{Ausübung der Sittenlehre} 73–78. In opposition to Descartes’s concept of passion, Thomasius emphasises the aspect of activity inherent to emotion by positioning the emotion (\textit{Affekt}) within the scope of the will.

\textsuperscript{61} Ibidem 88f. This relocation is also applied to the body. While the present sensation (\textit{Empfindung}) of pleasure resp. displeasure occurs in the understanding and brain of man (‘im Verstande und Gehirne des Menschen’), ‘the tempers reside in the will and heart’ (‘Gemüthsneigungen [sitzen] in dem Willen und Herzen’). Ibidem 89.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibidem 101. To Thomasius ‘the strong impressions on the brain / or the movement of the spirits in the nerves’ (‘Die starcke Eindrückung ins Gehirn / oder die Bewegung der Geister in Nerven’) are neither equivalent to the emotion nor are they its cause.

\textsuperscript{63} Descartes’s analysis of emotions describes these as concatenation of motions, proposing that the representations (\textit{Vorstellungen}) may be regarded as (physiological) motions and the physiological motions as representations. For more details see Campe, \textit{Affekt und Ausdruck} 341–344.
feelings'. Psychology as an empirical science is developed by covering the space of ‘feeling’ between will and representation which the discourse has opened up by the end of the eighteenth century. The emotion ceases to be regarded solely in reference to the sphere of representations, i.e. as an obscure representation, as will resp. desire. Rather, emotion is now regarded as the increase and climax of a feeling. Ever since, we regard emotions as feelings, so that—in accordance with Tetens and Kant—we are ‘used to discuss them along with the feelings’. What, then, is feeling?

Feelings are not representations, nor consciousness, nor sensations, nor excitation/stimulus of the body, nor ideas arising from this, nor feelings stimulated merely by the body; they are not touch or intuition: instead, they are a distinct category of predispositions [Inlagen] that exist in the soul together with knowledge and consciousness, and whose main kind are pleasures and displeasures.

Feeling, in terms of a ‘distinct category of predispositions’, is developed as a sort of continuously processing psychological instrument for self-perception.
and feedback. As described by Tetens, the feeling informs ‘of the correlation between the object that is felt, and the present composition of the soul with its capacities and powers’. Central to this feedback is the respective current composition, the momentum of change: A feeling is ‘not a permanent disposition, but a transformation of my temper’, and ‘the condition of our temper is constantly changed.’

What essentially drives the discourse to distinguish feeling on the one hand from imagination and the faculty of desire (Begehrungsvermögen) on the other, is, as indicated above, the temporal dimension, i.e. the permanent presentness. ‘Only changes in the now and here, only our present conditions can be objects of feeling. An object of representation can be a thing in the past or the future.’ And other than the faculty of desire, feeling cannot reach past the present moment. It does not consist in ‘any effort or preparation to make a change. It does not go beyond the present.’ Finally, in contrast to the old

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71 ‘Nur jetzige Veränderungen, gegenwärtige Zustände von uns, können Objekte des Gefühlseyn. Die Vorstellungen haben auch das Vergangene und Zukünftige zum Gegenstand.’ Tetens, *Philosophische Versuche* vol. 1, 170. The paragraph is entitled: ‘1) Feeling has to do only with things in the present’ (’Das Gefühl hat nur mit gegenwärtigen Dingen zu thun’).


Even where feeling is thought of as the basis for any effort of the mind to uphold or to abandon the current condition, it is still differentiated from the effort itself. See, for instance, Schmid, *Empirische Psychologie* 262f. By differentiating, within the concept of feeling, the aspect of pleasure/displeasure on one hand and the aspect of desire on the other, it becomes possible to think of a disinterested delight (Wohlgefallen)—or a delight ‘without further interest’ (’ohne weiteres Interesse’ Tetens, *Philosophische Versuche* vol. 1, 188) that elicits an agreeable feeling insofar as it allows to perceive the usefulness of one’s own faculties and powers. For this argument, cf. Stöckmann E., *Anthropologische Ästhetik.*
perception of emotion linked to the faculty of desire (which describes a figure of movement, a passing *perturbatio animi*) a feeling never ceases to be active.\(^{73}\)

It does not denote an event or disturbance, but a necessary and innate 'passive modification of the soul'.\(^{74}\) Thus feeling becomes fundamental, and it does so to the extent 'that a life without feeling appeared to be as impossible as a consciousness without a sense of self.'\(^{75}\)

‘Thus originates the threefold division into feeling (i.e. the faculty to modify them and consciousness of them!), understanding and will.’\(^{76}\) To this day, this division into the ‘three main faculties’,\(^{77}\) resp. the ‘three principal forms of life of the psyche’,\(^{78}\) remains fundamental for textbooks on emotional psychology.\(^{79}\)

What we call, today, the emotional or the mental (*das Psychische*) first originates here. In turn, Kant determines the modern use of language for the word

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*Beneke F.E., Psychologische Skizzen. Vol. 1: Zur Naturlehre der Gefühle* (Göttingen: 1825) 35, defines feeling as the 'measurings of the soul's activities against one another that occur in every moment of life' (emphasis in original) ('[das] in jedem Lebensaugenblicke Statt findende Sich-gegen-einander-messen der Seelenthätigkeiten').

*Tetens, Philosophische Versuche* vol. 1, 173.


*Dessoir, Geschichte* 344. According to Abicht, *Psychologische Anthropologie* 61, these are the heart (power of feeling), the mind (power of representation) and the temper (power of will). A detailed justification of the genuine power of feeling (*Gefühlsvermögen*) can be found in Richter, *Ueber das Gefühlsvermögen* 14. In opposition to Krug, who considers a feeling to be a creation ('neugeschaffen') and nonexistent, Richter writes: ‘To want to turn our pleasant and unpleasant feelings into representations, means to not explore their nature, but to distort it’ (Die ‘angenehmen und unangenehmen Gefühle unser selbst zu Vorstellungen machen wollen, heißt ihre Natur nicht ergründen, sondern verkehren.’) Cf. the section on Kant (‘Übergang zum Gefühl’) in *Newmark C., Passion, Affekt, Gefühl. Philosophische Theorien der Emotionen zwischen Aristoteles und Kant* (Hamburg: 2008) 204–223.


“feeling”, by setting it off terminologically from sensation (Empfindung) and declaring that ‘that which must always remain merely subjective and can constitute absolutely no representation of an object [we shall call] by the ordinary term “feeling”’.

So emotions are now intense feelings that develop out of the subjective self-awareness of what is pleasant and what is unpleasant, and out of the subsequent formation of the soul (Bildung der Seele). They are no longer explained as obscure representations and as concatenations of representation and motion; also, as particularly strong feelings, they are no longer part of the faculty of desire (Begehungsvermögen). Kant admits, in his Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, first part, book II, about “The feeling of pleasure and displeasure”, that the treatment of emotions (affects) ‘as feelings of pleasure and displeasure that transgress the bounds of the human being’s inner freedom’, should be dealt with in the same section. Similarly, in The Metaphysics of Moral: ‘Affects and passion are essentially different from each other. Affects belong to feelings.’ By contrast, according to Kant, passions are

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81 The proposition of emotion as the gradual intensity of a feeling is also discussed by Maaß and Carus. See Bernecker, Affektbegriff 109ff. It is Herbart who first dismisses the intensity-based distinction between feeling and emotion (Affekt) and divides them according to principles. Cf. Herbert J.F., Psychologie als Wissenschaft vol. 11 (Amsterdam: 1968, reprint of the 1850 edition) 103. So does Franz X. Biunde, arguing that both sexual desire and physical pain are intense feelings without being counted as emotions. Ergo emotion (Affekt) must be defined in some way other than merely as an intense feeling. See Bernecker, Affektbegriff 121. This distinction, however, will not prevail: emotion will continue to be regarded as a particularly intense feeling, as in Rehmke, Wundt, Ziegler etc. See Bernecker, Affektbegriff passim.


inclinations.84 This distinction is broadly commented on by Professor Johann Christoph Hoffbauer from Halle: ‘Emotion (Affekt) is always a condition of the faculty of feeling; [...] Passion is always some desire striving for satisfaction. Its expressions are often linked to emotions. However, this does not mean that emotion is a passion.’85

Kant exemplifies this distinction of emotion and passion by comparing anger (Zorn) and hatred. The angry emotion implies a momentary and quickly passing ‘weakness in the use of one’s understanding’.86 Emotion is defined as ‘surprise through sensation’87 and thereby as a gradually rising intensity of feeling ‘which makes reflection impossible’.88 By contrast, passion corrupts reason while leaving the understanding untouched, it ‘permits reflection’.89 This is why passion, which turns into an inclination, is closer to vice than the passing storm of emotion (Sturm des Affekts). And this is also the starting point for the reassessment of anger (in medical terms as well), which gets promoted from a mainly dangerous illness90 to a mainly healing energy, while, by contrast,

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84 This view is supported by Johann G.E. Maaß, who publishes both an essay on the feelings, Versuch über die Gefühle, besonders über die Affecten (Halle – Leipzig: 1811/12), and an essay on the passions: Versuch über die Leidenschaften. Theoretisch und praktisch, 2 vols. (Halle – Leipzig: 1805‒1807). Nevertheless, in his Anthropology, Kant chooses the traditional arrangement, by treating the emotions (Affecte) in conjunction with the faculty of desire in the third chapter. Cf. Kant, Anthropologie 172 (∫ 61).


86 Kant, The Metaphysics of Moral 166. ‘Schwäche im Gebrauch des Verstandes’, Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten 539/540 (A 59).

87 Kant, Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View 156. ‘Überraschung durch Empfindung’, Kant, Anthropologie 193 (∫ 74).

88 Kant, Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View 156. ‘[…] die Überlegung unmöglich macht’, Kant, Anthropologie 193 (∫ 74).

89 Kant, The Metaphysics of Moral 166. ‘[…] läßt Überlegung zu’, Kant, Metaphysik der Sitten 540 (A 51).

suppressed anger, hatred and, later, resentment, are described as a mental or physical cancerous damage.\textsuperscript{91}

At the same time, we have seen how even the element of revenge associated with anger has lost its impact during the process of transcoding emotion. In his \textit{Anthropology From a Pragmatic Point of View}—and this is essential for any further discussion on emotions—Immanuel Kant links the separation of anger and revenge to the distinction of the faculty of feeling and the faculty of desire (a novel concept around 1700). Anger and revenge, which up to this date had always been considered united as one emotion (\textit{Affekt}) (representation plus desire), are now split into feeling/emotion (anger) on one hand, and desire/passion (revenge) on the other. The new limit between the faculty of feeling and the faculty of desire runs right through the middle of the old emotion of anger. The distinction, in principle, of emotion and passion which Kant draws by applying the criterion of duration, quickly became generally adopted. Accordingly, “emotion” describes a strong feeling that erupts suddenly and lasts only moments, while “passion” denotes an inclination that takes root. A distinction that, to this day, sounds plausible especially in regard to the terminology used in the field of anger: ‘What the affect of anger does not accomplish quickly it does not at all; and it forgets easily. But the passion of hatred takes its time, in order to root itself deeply and think about its opponent.’\textsuperscript{92} At the same time, this distinction by the criterion of duration is based on the assignation of emotion/feeling to the biological sphere, and of passion to the social sphere.\textsuperscript{93} Emotions result from feelings of pleasure and displeasure, from ‘the effect that the sensation produces on our state of mind’;\textsuperscript{94} and in view of obstructions and stimulations to the ‘vital force’ (\textit{Lebenskraft}):\textsuperscript{95} ‘Enjoyment is the feeling of promotion of life; pain is that of a hindrance of life.’\textsuperscript{96}

\textsuperscript{91} Kant already describes the passions as ‘cancerous sores for pure practical reason’. Kant, \textit{Anthropology} 166 (§ 81). ‘Krebsschäden für die reine praktische Vernunft’, Kant, \textit{Anthropologie} 211. The association of suppressed anger and cancer turns into a common topic during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Cf. Sontag S., \textit{Illness as Metaphor} (New York: 1978).

\textsuperscript{92} Kant, \textit{Anthropology} 150. ‘Was der Affekt des Zorns nicht in der Geschwindigkeit tut, das tut er gar nicht; und er vergißt leicht. Die Leidenschaft des Hasses aber nimmt sich Zeit, um sich tief einzuwurzeln und es seinem Gegner zu denken.’ Kant, \textit{Anthropologie} 193 (§ 74).

\textsuperscript{93} Cf. Campe, \textit{Affekt und Ausdruck} 391f.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibidem. ‘Vergnügen ist das Gefühl der Beförderung; Schmerz das einer Hindernis des Lebens.’ Kant, \textit{Anthropologie} 167 (§ 60). This thesis will be further differentiated and
Anger is the condition caused by the obstruction of one's life force and provides a sudden mobilisation of energy in order to override the obstruction. Anger is described as a strong feeling resp. emotion and as such affects man's feeling of self as well as his attitude toward life. This is why anger can be considered separately from the social dimension of honour and revenge. All social requirements for anger, which had, for centuries, upheld it as the privileged emotion of a sovereign, linking it to the condition of having the necessary force available for taking revenge, are now obsolete, as anger transforms into a function of life itself. In consequence, anger grows close to a pre-cultural, self-defensive reaction of life, so that the natural right to self-defense as the spontaneous and immediate energy for clearing life's obstructions may be recoded biologically.

By contrast, according to Kant, the passion of a lust for revenge originates in the most powerful of the natural passions, i.e. in the inclination toward freedom that can be found in the natural or primitive man as much as in a child. Man perceives the limitation of freedom as an injustice—which makes for the social dimension of passion. Even the newborn ‘seems to enter the world with loud cries [...]’, simply because it regards the inability to make use of its limbs as constraint97 and cannot but ‘take an obstacle to it as an affront’98 Kant even deduces that it is ‘as if a certain concept of justice (which relates to external freedom) develops along with their animality, and is not something to be learned gradually.’99 So for Kant the inclination toward freedom (and love of self) goes along with an innate desire for justice that will turn into desire for revenge whenever freedom is limited. Kant argues that in the event of the emotion of anger, the slight (as an obstruction to life) is aimed only at the inner life, toward one's own sense of self and the elimination of the obstruction. However, if anger does not erupt,100 and the desire for justice turns, instead, extended in the course of the nineteenth century; cf. Nahlowsky, Gefühlsleben, who writes about ‘obstruction and furtherance of organic [and] mental vital activity: (‘Hemmung und Förderung organischer [und] psychischer Lebensthätigkeit.’ Ibidem 17).

99 Kant, Anthropology 168 (footnote). ‘[Es sei,] als ob ein gewisser Rechtsbegriff (der sich auf die äußere Freiheit bezieht) sich mit der Tierheit zugleich entwickele und nicht etwa allmählich erlernt werde.’ Kant, Anthropologie 214 (§ 82).
100 It is crucial for the subsequent discursive development of anger, revenge and justice in the nineteenth century that anger which erupts is now perceived in a positive way, while anger that is adjourned (out of lack of power) turns into hatred or resentment, and is
into hatred of the unjust, then passion gains a genuinely social dimension, insofar as the postponed anger bears a ‘passion of retribution’ (‘Leidenschaft der Wiedervergeltung’) that will socially attribute the evil as slight and injustice. As we can see in the example of the crying newborns, we apparently cannot simply perceive an evil and want to get rid of it without at the same time interpreting it as a slight and an injustice.

In order to evaluate the consequences which transcoding emotion into feeling has on the modelling of anger and rage, we need to further analyse the concept of “feeling”. Feeling, as distinguished from representation and desire, always implies a sense of self (Selbstgefühl) insofar as it not only “observes” its own observations, but gives a ‘felt’ feedback on its own abilities of observation. When there is feeling, there will always be feedback, as well as a retroactive effect on one’s faculties resp. one’s ‘inner realities’.101 Along the same lines, Abicht says that ‘according to this, all our feelings are a sense of self.’102 Tetens defines the ‘sense of self’ as ‘a sense of any kind of inner conditions and changes, as seen both for themselves and in the way they exist within us.’103 Apparently, the concept of the sense of self implies a self-referentiation that is its own object. Tetens clearly states this:

We also feel the subjectivistic circumstances and relations of objects and changes on our current condition; or rather, we perceive the things along with their effects and impressions within us, as they originate them inside us according to their relation toward us.104

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101 Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 1, 187.
102 ‘Demnach sind alle unsere Gefühle Selbstgefühle.’ Abicht, Psychologische Anthropologie 68. See also Weber, Vom Selbstgefühle und Mitgefühle 9.
104 ‘Wir fühlen auch die subjetivistischen Verhältnisse und Beziehungen der Gegenstände und der Veränderungen auf unseren jetzigen Zustand, oder eigentlich, wir empfinden die Dinge mit ihren Wirkungen und Eindrücken in uns, die sie in Gemäßigkeit ihrer Beziehungen auf uns hervorbringen.’ Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 1, 190 (emphasis added).
Feeling, as the entity of self-reference which acts neither through representation nor will,\textsuperscript{105} does not register inner operations of understanding, but only relations to the exterior and the self. It communicates other-reference by way of self-reference: ‘Therefore, we cannot think of an object that would be felt immediately and in itself, other than of “anybody’s self-acquirable perfections of mental faculties” stated in the precept’.\textsuperscript{106} It is feeling, in the form of pleasure or displeasure, which communicates to the subject the state of her powers within the energetic polarity of lightness and resistance. ‘When we feel our easy and animated occupations, we have a pleasurable feeling’.\textsuperscript{107} At the core of feeling stands ‘the sense of self that registers the exercising or obstructing of my powers’.\textsuperscript{108} Going beyond the intuitively imagined perfection of representation, Schmid also describes the pleasurable feeling as a positive feedback effect in regard to the internal system’s mental processes:

If the objects (and the organs, as modifying objects) of our faculty of representation are disposed in such a way and stand in such a relation to ourselves that they offer to its sensibility (Empfänglichkeit) such material, and as much material, as they do to the purpose (Zwecke) of the advancing effectiveness (Würcksamkeit) of its active faculty, and as is appropriate to this: thus arises the feeling of pleasure.\textsuperscript{109}


\textsuperscript{106} ‘Folglich ist kein Objekt denkbar, welches unmittelbar und an sich fühlbar wäre, als die im Grundsätze genannten “selbsterwerblichen Vollkommenheiten der Seelenkräfte eines Jeden”’. Abicht, Psychologische Anthropologie 67 (emphasis in original).

\textsuperscript{107} ‘Wenn wir unsere leichten und muntern Beschäftigungen fühlen, so haben wir ein angenehmes Gefühl.’ Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 1, 183.

\textsuperscript{108} ‘das Selbstgefühl von der Uebung oder Einschränkung meiner Kräfte’. Hungar Karl Ferdinand, “Gedanken über die Natur der Empfindung—des Vergnügens und Missvergnügens”, in Karl Adolf Caesar, Denkwürdigkeiten aus der philosophischen Welt, vol. 1 (Leipzig, Johann Gottfried Müller: 1785) 268–318, 284. This polarity of effort and ease as criterion for pleasure and displeasure is frequently found even throughout the nineteenth century, see e.g. Nahlowsky, Gefühlsleben 87f.

\textsuperscript{109} ‘Wenn die Gegenstände (und Organe als modificirende Gegenstände) unsres Vorstellungsvermögens so beschaffen sind und in einem solchen Verhältnisse zu uns stehen, daß sie der Empfänglichkeit desselben einen solchen und so vielen Stoff darbieten als dem Zwecke der fortschreitenden Würcksamkeit seines thätigen Vermögens an denselben angemessen ist: so entsteht das Gefühl der Lust.’ Schmid, Empirische Psychologie 273.
The relation to the world as well as the object relations of pleasure are opaqued by self-reference. Says Weber: ‘Here we have the fundamental law of all pleasures and displeasures [...]’. Pleasure does not originate from knowledge (Erkenntnis) (from the intuition of perfection), it arises whenever one’s power is able to ‘express itself’, i.e., when one feels that things are advancing. This feeling of advancement is not meant in absolute terms, but rather as advancement in relation to the experience of the prior moment. Richter even identifies this feeling of empowerment with ‘happiness’ (Glückseligkeit), and happiness, in turn, with ‘life’. Whatever blocks or restrains, by contrast, the feeling of one’s ‘progressing effectiveness’ (fortschreitende(n) Würksamkeit), be it for internal or external reasons, injures the sense of self and causes displeasure. The complete internalization of the injury to one’s feeling of personal power opens a new and ample space for rage as a feeling of displeasure which is totally different from the space occupied by anger as of old Zorn (and its mixture of pain and pleasure), with both “insult” as its social event and its desire for revenge.

As the blockades from the outside world are perceived as insults to one’s sense of self, new forms of rage are created, in which that what had been the element of injury in the old narrative of anger is quasi taken within. The element of revenge is internalized as well, thereby rid of its function, and once internalized may be joined to self-destruction. Whereas anger leads us to want to take revenge on someone, rage causes us to be driven out of our skin, to want to get past ourselves or—even—to destroy ourselves.

The (avant la lettre) given, fundamentally narcissistic grounding of the human soul in feeling, is what first allows man, with his psyche and “emotional life”, to be constituted as the object of an independent empirical science. If, ‘in the stream of time and in the change of sensation connected with it’, feelings

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112 ‘Whether a condition or a series of conditions is to be regarded as pleasurable or disagreeable can only be judged, therefore, by relating the actual condition to the preceding conditions.’ Schmid, *Empirische Psychologie* 274. ‘Ob ein Zustand oder eine Reihe von Zuständen angenehm oder unangenehm sey, kann also nur aus dem Verhältniss des gegenwärtigen zu den vorhergehenden Zuständen beurtheilt werden.’
of pleasure and displeasure permanently scan the feedback and modification of one's system status, and if each feeling represents, in turn, the condition for the subsequent act of the soul, which, again, will be felt etc., then the psychological experience of man is individualized and subjected to time in a way that can only be recovered empirically.\textsuperscript{116}

The leading metaphors to this end will be metaphors of live force and of creative force as well as the hypothesis of the "metabolism" between system and environment, all of which are paradigmatic for human thought by the end of the eighteenth century, biologically as well as aesthetically. The psychological and the biological man are of the same provenance. Together with the feeling, a feedback system is introduced into the human being, which modifies and communicates the conditions of its own powers, and in the end refers to the life force energy that underlies all powers of the soul, as well as the medical categories of health and sickness which accompany it. ‘Enjoyment’, as, once again, Kant states, ‘is the feeling of promotion of life; pain is that of a hindrance of life. But (animal) life, as physicians also have already noted, is a continuous play of the antagonism of both.'\textsuperscript{117}

Not only when it comes to defining feeling as such, but also in his analysis of single emotional feelings (\textit{Affektgefühle}) does Kant refer to the role played by feelings in relation to the obstruction and ‘promotion of the vital force'.\textsuperscript{118}

In analogy to the theory of illness by the Scottish physician John Brown, Kant divides the emotions (which now belong to the faculty of feeling and no longer to the faculty of desire) into \textit{sthenic} and \textit{asthenic}, i.e. into such which either excite or relax the vital force.\textsuperscript{119} Time and time again, Kant approaches the emotions (\textit{Affekte}) not only in regard to ethical, but also to medical questions,\textsuperscript{120} i.e. in regard to the way in which single emotions influence the life force resp. in how far they might be effective as ‘a provision of nature for health’.\textsuperscript{121}

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Again, I follow the groundbreaking work of Campe, \textit{Affekt und Ausdruck} esp. 383–401.
\item Kant, \textit{Anthropology} 126 (§60). ‘Vergnügen ist das Gefühl der Beförderung; Schmerz das eines Hindernisses des Lebens. Leben aber (des Tiers) ist, wie auch schon die Ärzte angemerkt haben, ein kontinuierliches Spiel des Antagonismus von beiden.’ Kant, \textit{Anthropologie} 167 (§60).
\item Kant, \textit{Anthropology} 126 (§60). ‘Beförderung der Lebenskraft’, Kant, \textit{Anthropologie} 167 (§60).
\item Kant, \textit{Anthropology} 154 (§76).
\item Ibidem 153–159 (§76–77), 161–163 (§79).
\item Ibidem 162 (§79).‘Vorsorge der Natur für die Gesundheit’, Kant, \textit{Anthropologie} 206 (§79).
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
Erhard Schmid, who continues to develop the Kantian terminology, also works on his formulation of a ‘natural law of the feeling of pleasure’122 using terms like ‘matter’, ‘stimulus’, ‘power’ and ‘learning ability’. Just as the organism, since Blumenbach described within the framework of epigenesis, uses its own formative power (Bildungskraft) to process the stimulus of all matter offered by the outside world, creating itself in a continuous autopoiesis,123 so does Schmid relate this exact process to the feelings of pleasure and displeasure. The first concern is an adequate ratio between matter and power: The outside world is the matter which functions as a stimulus (or, as Beneke will later write, as ‘educational momentum’)124 on the power or activity of the organism which now starts to process or to form the matter. ‘The moment of progressing, of forming, is the moment of pleasure. The moment of being obstructed, of striving in vain to form, is the moment of displeasure.’125 While, at first, the concept of formation (Bildung) refers only to the processing and forming of the matter, the autopoietic moment of self-creation resp. the moment of feedback appears a little further into the text. The story of the respective events occurring between power and matter leads to consequences regarding the intensity of the imagination and the intensity of pleasure. Both their degrees of inten-

123 Cf. Blumenbach Johann Friedrich, Über den Bildungstrieb (Göttingen, Johann Christian Dieterich: 1791, 1789). Tetens, Philosophische Versuche vol. 2, 529, writes: ‘Just as human nature is never alone, and nowhere detached of the influence of external things, but always acting, where it does act, in conjunction with others: such it is with the inner principle of formation in its seed.’—‘Wie überhaupt die Natur des Menschen nirgends allein ist, und nirgends abgesondert von dem Einfluß äußerer Dinge, sondern nur immer in der Verbindung mit andern das wirkt, was sie wirkt: so verhält es sich auch mit dem innern Princip der Bildung in dem Keim.’—Hillebrand J., Die Anthropologie als Wissenschaft. Erster Teil oder Allgemeine Naturlehre des Menschen (Mainz: 1822) 211f., describes human life in analogy to a plant as a ‘self-acting creating, a reproducing, a nourishing and an internally conditioned interacting with the outside world or the external potencies of life’ (‘selbstthätiges Gestalten, ein Fortpflanzen, ein Ernähren und ein innerlich bedingtes Verkehren mit der Außenwelt oder den äußeren Potenzen des Lebens’, emphasis added).
sity depend on the organism’s history: ‘The stronger the drive of imagination is, generally, and the more it has been stimulated: that much stronger will be the pleasure if it can find satisfaction in the matter.’\textsuperscript{126} And the power of the imagination, too, depends on the previous occurrence of stimulus and processing: It is ‘strong due to practice per se—or weak due to lack of any practice.’\textsuperscript{127} By way of a training effect, today’s displeasure can help prepare tomorrow’s pleasure. Thereby, in the end, the natural law of feeling leads us back to the individual history of the organism.

For feeling itself, as the continuous and involuntary self-reference of the system, depends on its own system status with its own history of formation, which is why theories on feeling are able to expand at length on why one and the same object does not always elicit the same feeling. ‘A feeling is not the objective trait of an object, but something entirely subjective.’\textsuperscript{128} The focus lies always on the fact that the thought or representation which produces a feeling has a specifically variable relation to other thoughts and representations:

That same thought, which a deep thinker, whose every thought displays the same level of stress, forms within himself without a trace of feeling, would announce itself to a less practiced thinker with a feeling of the sublime, should he succeed in recreating that thought in all of its truth.\textsuperscript{129}

To each new feeling, the system brings along itself and its specific structure, which it has itself constituted through its feelings. Beneke calls this ‘the dispositions or inner traces which the feelings leave behind’\textsuperscript{130} or else the ‘basic

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\text{126} ‘Je stärker der Trieb der Vorstellungskraft überhaupt, und je mehr er jedesmahl gereizt worden ist: um so stärker ist die Lust, wenn er in dem Stoff seine Befriedigung findet.’ Schmid, \textit{Empirische Psychologie} 283f. (emphasis added).
\textsuperscript{128} ‘Ein Gefühl ist kein objektives Merkmal des Gegenstandes, sondern etwas ganz und gar Subjektives.’ Schmid, \textit{Empirische Psychologie} 266.
\end{flushright}
formations’ (‘Grundbildungen’)\textsuperscript{131} resp. the ‘remaining connections’, which ‘can offer most influential moments for the mental development.’\textsuperscript{132}

This fundamental thought of the historicity of mental formation, in which the dispositions formed become themselves the subject of further development of the soul, is formulated by Herbart to the effect that the history of the system affects the respective and always present self-observation: ‘Involuntarily, throughout their lives, everybody is their own spectator and this is how they acquire their own life story. They also bring this story, and the knowledge of their person taken from it, along to any self-observance.’\textsuperscript{133} This explicitly addresses the crucial aspect that feelings and emotions are now founded in personal history (\textit{Lebensgeschichte}).\textsuperscript{134} The result of the discourse that laid bare the feeling and associated emotion to it, is that rage resp. anger is now a \textit{feeling} and, as such, rooted in each individually structured inner mental world. From now on, in order to understand the reason for an outbreak of rage, as well as against what or whom it erupts, one has to tell the whole inner story (and the external personal history), one must know the ‘system’ and its conditions in order to understand how and why rage originated. One does not sympathise easily with the angry person, for: ‘We do not know the reference his imagination has made to his self-love; his temper and his relations and situations are not our own.’\textsuperscript{135} If rage arises out of the self-observance of the system and the injury to the sense of self, it is necessarily linked to internal, invisible and probably distant factors. Consequently, in order to understand the anger/the rage,

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\item \textsuperscript{131} Beneke, \textit{Lehrbuch der Psychologie} 187: ‘The circumstances of feelings that arise from the basic formations will propagate themselves onto all complex formations which will be composed of the basic formations.’—‘Die in den Grundbildungen begründeten Gefühlsverhältnisse werden sich auf alle zusammengesetzten Bildungen fortpflanzen, in welche jene als Bestandtheile eingehen.’
\item \textsuperscript{132} ‘[…] zurückbleibenden Verknüpfungen [die] höchst einflußreiche Momente für die psychische Ausbildung abgeben können.’ Beneke, \textit{Lehrbuch der Psychologie} 229.
\item \textsuperscript{133} ‘Unabsichtlich ist jeder sein eigener Zuschauer während seines ganzen Lebens, und eben dadurch gewinnt er seine eigene Lebensgeschichte. Auch bringt er diese Geschichte, und die aus ihr geschöpfte Kenntniss seiner Person, zu jeder Selbstbeobachtung mit.’ Herbart, \textit{Psychologie als Wissenschaft} 18f.
\item \textsuperscript{134} For this cf. the paper by Fink-Eitel H., ”Affekte. Versuch einer philosophischen Bestandsaufnahme”, \textit{Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung} 40 (1986) 520–542. Although the details of the historic reconstruction in this paper are in part incorrect, it gives a clear account of the relevance of emotions for any subject theory and the theory of verbal communication. On the narrative scheme of the life-story cf. the section on Schiller’s \textit{Verbrecher aus Infamie} in chapter VI in Lehmann, \textit{Im Abgrund der Wut} 192–223.
\item \textsuperscript{135} ‘Wir kennen bey diesem die Beziehung nicht, die seine Einbildungskraft auf seine Selbstliebe gemacht hat, sein Temperament und seine Verhältnisse und Lagen sind nicht die unsrigen.’ Lossius, Art. ”Zorn” 653–655, here 655.
\end{itemize}
one must—in accordance with the level of general hermeneutics formulated around the same time—focus all efforts both on the smallest detail and the entire context.\textsuperscript{136} This leads to consequences in the depiction and narrative of rage and anger, for now, the ‘material of the narrative can be separated entirely from the conceptual analysis [of the emotion, J.L.].’\textsuperscript{137} Once more I cite Rüdiger Campe:

> While the narrative schemes of the old doctrine of affections (who hates whom and in which regard?) always gave a definition of single emotions, we now have case reports in which is displayed the mechanism of passion, or reports taken from introspection, which place before our eyes the change of times as a subjective experience.\textsuperscript{138}

For the depiction of feelings of rage and anger, this separation of the narrative scheme (of the old emotion) on the one hand and the case report on the other hand implies that the occasion for, resp. the cause and eruption of rage, can no longer per se be ascribed to each other by way of the plot of the definition of emotion, but may diverge in each new case in new ways. From now on, one can recount rage whose “reason” or “unreason” permeates the whole text resp. the textuality of the emotional life resp. the personal history of feeling.\textsuperscript{139}

**Selected Bibliography**


\textsuperscript{138} ‘Waren die Erzählschemata der alten Affektenlehre (wer haßt wen in Hinsicht worauf?) immer auch schon die Definition des einzelnen Affekts, gibt es jetzt Fallberichte, an denen sich das Wirken der Leidenschaft zeigt, oder aus der Introspektion gewonnene Berichte, die den Wechsel der Zeit als subjektives Erleben vor Augen stellen.’ Campe, *Affekt und Ausdruck* 392.

\textsuperscript{139} In fact, Nahlowsky, *Gefühlsleben* later describes the emotional life as ‘the individually shaped inner world’ (‘die individuell gestaltete Innenwelt’) (p. 5) and this ‘inner world’ as a ‘texture of combinations of representations’ (‘Textur von Vorstellungsverbindungen’) (p. 6).


PART 1

Anger Management in Early Modern Philosophical Discourses

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Neo-Stoicism as an Antidote to Public Violence before Lipsius’s *De constantia*: Johann Weyer’s (Wier’s) Anger Therapy, *De ira morbo* (1577)

Karl A.E. Enenkel

Among the works of Johann Weyer (Wier, Piscinarius; 1515/1516–1588), court physician to Wilhelm the Rich, 5th Duke of Cleve, Jülich, and Berg,1 occurs a most intriguing treatise, *De ira morbo, eiusdem curatone philosophica, medicina et theologica*—*On the Disease* (Kranckheit) *of Anger, and its Philosophical, Medical, and Theological* Therapy, *which appeared in 1577.*2 Weyer intended to

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2 Ed. pr. Basel, Officina of Johannes Oporinus: 1577; for the Latin text cf. also Ioannes Wierus, *Opera omnia* (2. Aufl. Amsterdam, Pieter vanden Berge: 1660) pp. 771–875 (with the title *De irae morbo*). In the edition by the Officina of Oporinus the work is divided into (unnumbered) chapters, and in the *Opera omnia* edition it is divided into (unnumbered) chapters and *numbered* paragraphs; in the quotations below I added chapter numbers. The layout
compose a work that would be useful for his contemporaries, and to contribute to the 'public good' \((\text{publicum commodum})\). He devoted it to the emotion of anger because he considered anger's most devastating effects—acts of outrageous public violence, including mass killing, torture, and assassination—as a peculiarity of his time, i.e. the 16th century:

Proinde, quando in \(\text{noster saeculi}\) intuerer tum \(\text{extremas calamitates}\), tum calamitatum occasiones, commentari volui aliquid de causis veris ac remediis certis ipsius \(\text{Irae}\), e qua hodie privatae factiones, publica bella, caedes truculentae ac inauditae immanitatis exempla in Christiani popelli cervices et fortunas miserrime exundant. […] Una est, quod quum \(\text{nulla peste}\) magis depopuletur sua crudelitate vastissima regna, amplissimas ditiones, florentissimas republicas, quam haec ipsa, cuius, proh dolor, recentia nimis testimonia coram coelesti tribunali vindictam clamant […]\(^3\)

Therefore, since I watched the most terrible catastrophes of our century and the occasions on which they occurred, I wanted to comment on their true reasons of and on the effective remedies against anger itself, of anger that nowadays leads to riots of private factions, public wars, cruel murders, and examples of unheard of cruelty that are poured out on the shoulders and fortunes of the poor Christians. There is no other epidemic of the two editions is very different: the Off. Oporinus edition is in 8\(^o\) and in italics; the Amsterdam edition is in folio and in Roman type. In Weyer’s lifetime a German translation appeared: \(\text{Vom Zorn Iracundiae Antidotum. Von der gefährlichen Krankheit dem Zorn, und desselbigen Philosophischer, und Theologischer Cur oder Ertzeney. Allen Zornsüchtigen in allerley Stenden, so mit dieser Schweren Plag behafft, D. Iohannis Wieri Des hochberühmpten Philosophi und Medici Buch, Zu nützlichem brauch und nötigem heil aus dem Latein in gut verstandlich deutsch gebracht}\), trans. by Lukas Mai (Wittenberg, Matthes Welack: 1585). So far, \(\text{De ira morbo}\) has not been studied in detail; there are summaries of its content in Binz, \(\text{Doctor Johann Weyer 140–150}\), and Hoorens, \(\text{Een ketterse arts voor de heksen}\) 263–272. Binz had already remarked that the work would deserve a separate study (\(\text{Doctor Johann Weyer 141}\)).

disease that, with its cruelty, depopulated more profoundly the largest kingdoms, the richest reigns, the most flourishing republics, than anger itself, the most recent instances of which cry out for wrath at the heavenly court […].

The Latin ‘pestis’ indeed refers to an ‘epidemic disease’, even in a technical sense, as the following sentence shows (‘[…]exitialem morbum, qui vere Epidemicus nominari hoc tempore potest, proponere curationem’).4

In her recent biography of Jan Weyer, Een ketters arts voor de heksen […], Vera Hoorens regarded Weyer as a Calvinist5 and interpreted the De ira morbo as an ardent polemical writing directed against the Catholics and Spaniards, and the cruel acts of violence they committed during the Dutch revolt.6 As Hoorens puts it, Weyer’s main goal was to criticize the Spaniards and Catholics, and the topic of his work, anger, was in fact only a pretext to express his religious and ideological criticism.7 According to Hoorens, the work was written in 1572/1573, partly during the siege of Haarlem (1573), and thus represented a direct reaction to the Spanish war crimes in Zutphen and Naarden (1572).8 In her biography Hoorens has brought many interesting facts to light, and at first glance, her thesis on De ira morbo seems attractive. But if one looks closer at the contents of the treatise,9 it becomes doubtful whether Weyer indeed would have conceived it primarily as a polemical writing, and whether it was

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5 Especially 289–303, chapter 13 “De toets van het geloof”; e.g. 300, Hoorens says that the letters from 1576 prove ‘unambiguously’ that Weyer became a Calvinist confessor in the 1570s at the latest (‘[…] toont de briefwisseling van Wier uit 1576 ondubbelzinnig aan dat hij zich ten laatste in de jaren zeventig […] tot het calvinisme bekeerde’ [emphasis mine]).
6 Een ketterse arts voor de heksen, chapter 11 “Een spion voor de doktor” 247–271, there 263–272; e.g. 265: ‘Pakte Wier de Rooms-Katholieke Kerk in Over duivelse begoochelingen aan door critiek te leveren op de heksenvervolgingen, dan viseerde hij in Over de ziekte gramschap katholieke legers en heersers’ (‘As Wier attacked the Roman Catholic Church in his De praestigiis daemonum by criticizing the persecution of witches, he attacked in his De ira morbo Catholic armies and rulers’); and 266: ‘Om de wandaden van de katholieke strijders zo goed mogelijk in de verf te zetten bestookt Wier zijn lezers met voorbeelden van groepen en figuren die ook wreed waren, maar die het naar zijn mening aflegden tegen Spanje’.
7 See Een ketterse arts voor de heksen 263: ‘Wier verpakte zijn kritiek op het Spaanse leger in een traktaat over de oorzaken, symptomen, gevolgen, preventie en behandeling van “de ziekte gramschap”’. 
8 Ibidem.
9 See infra.
indeed composed ‘in anger’, so to speak, immediately after the bloodshed of Zutphen and Naarden\textsuperscript{10}—although Weyer may have been a Protestant (or had Protestant sympathies).\textsuperscript{11}

\textsuperscript{10} It is hard to describe the genesis of the work in terms of exact dates, and to ascribe certain chapters or paragraphs to certain weeks or months. Hoorens’s view that he ‘must have written it’ (or completed it?) in 1573 is speculative; undisputable evidence is lacking.

I think that in *De ira morbo* Weyer’s scope was much broader. He wrote the work not only, and certainly not primarily, as an attack on Spaniards and Catholics, but his advice was directed to other nations, and to Protestants as well; not only to princes or monarchs, but also to the administrators of towns; not only to politicians, but also to private persons from various professions; and it is a telling detail that Weyer also included himself. In connection with the composition of *De ira morbo*, he took a personal *impresa* or motto VINCE TE IPSUM, which refers to his personal effort to overcome anger [Fig. 3.1]. Furthermore, since Weyer discussed *superbia* (pride/arrogance) as an important reason for *ira*, it is clear that he regarded noblemen as a category of people who were especially prone to suffering from attacks of anger. Within this category of patients, however, he made no discernible difference between Catholics and Protestants. The same is true for scholars and academics, who might be prideful of their learning and status. Another important reason for anger, according to Weyer, is envy. Envy, however, is relevant for all kinds of people, nations, and social classes, and members of all religious confessions. Envy is universal. The same goes for bad fortune (‘adversitas fortunae’), poverty, illnesses, bodily shortcomings, or various sorts of stress; and

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use in *De ira morbo*? What confessional flavour do they have? How do they combine with his Neo-Stoic ideas? See below, the section “Weyer’s Theological Anger Therapy”.

12 The *impresa* appears on a woodcut portrait of Weyer, dated 1576, printed as an author’s portrait on the verso of the title page (fol. A1v) in the fifth and final edition of his *De praestigiis daemonum et incantationibus ac veneficiis libri sex*, postrema editione quinta aucti et recogniti. *Accessit liber Apologeticus, et Pseudomonarchia daemonum* (Basel, Officina of Oporinus: 1577) (cf. exemplar of the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek digitalized: [http://dfg-viewer.de/show/?tx_dlf%5Bid%5D=http%3A%2F%2Fdaten.digitale-sammlungen.de%2Fdb%2Fmets%2Fbsb00022713_mets.xml&tx_dlf%5Bpage%5D=6&tx_dlf%5Bdouble%5D=0&cHash=62ac2ab9c3e07722eadd55e0c63d989]). Weyer’s author’s portrait with the *impresa* VINCE TE IPSUM also appears (as an etching) in the *Opera omnia* edition of 1660. There are several allusions to Weyer’s *impresa* in his treatise *De ira morbo*, cf. below, and Hoorens, *Een ketterser arts voor de heksen* 272: ‘Tot twee keer toe zinspeelde hij erin [i.e. in *De ira morbo*] op wat korte tijd later zijn lijfspreuk zou blijken, *Vince te ipsum*, Overwin jezelf’. Hoorens suggests that Weyer chose his *impresa* after the composition of *De ira morbo*; the woodcut, however, dates from 1576, and *De ira morbo* appeared in 1577. Therefore, it seems likely that he chose the *impresa* during the composition of the treatise. The motto *Vince te ipsum* indeed played a role in Weyer’s daily spiritual exercises, as is apparent from their description in *De ira morbo*; for this aspect, see below.


14 Ibidem.

social or personal contempt, slander, etc.  

16 And, moreover, the scope of the work is surely not limited to the depreciation of people who are guided in their behaviour by ire; on the contrary, Weyer conceives anger as a mental disease that can seize anybody, and can severely damage anybody’s mental and physical health. A person who suffers from anger not only harms others, but in the

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first place harms herself, even in a physical sense: according to Weyer, anger causes, among other things, fever, paralysis, epilepsy, phrenitis, and sudden death by cerebral haemorrhage.\textsuperscript{17} Weyer’s conception of anger as a mental and physical disease, of course, implies that it cannot be a sin in the first place, or cannot just be the result of moral guilt. Furthermore, Weyer avoids connecting a state of mind that is free from anger with the Calvinist conception of divine grace: he does not say that the chosen people, the \textit{electi}, are free from anger. As he conceives anger as a disease, he devotes the longest and most important part of his treatise to prophylactic therapy (ca. 50\%, \textit{Op. omn.} pp. 802–845 and 853–875). The way in which this therapy is shaped proves that it is meant not just for violent, tyrannical, cruel, and morally abject characters, but for decent, just, morally conscious people; for people with a humanistic and philosophical education;\textsuperscript{18} for those who are able to engage in meditation, reflection, and critical investigation of the self; for those who enjoy spiritual exercises; and for those who are willing to work on their moral, mental, and religious improvement on a daily basis.\textsuperscript{19} It is a telling detail that Weyer even lists a certain ‘bonus impetus animi’, i.e. a sense for justice and moral integrity, among the reasons for anger.\textsuperscript{20}

Moreover, if one looks more carefully at the way in which Weyer mentions contemporary outbursts of anger caused by religious and political conflicts, it becomes clear that he always refrains from direct attacks, deliberately avoids harsh, polemical criticism, and above all does not mention names. In a revealing passage, in which he deals with historical examples of outrageous cruelties, he says that he leaves contemporary examples that occurred ‘in the religious struggles that arose’ (‘in motibus religionis ergo ortis’) and their evaluation (whether they are more cruel than the calamities of other ages or not) to other writers with ‘a more free pen’.\textsuperscript{21} Surprisingly, Hoorens misunderstood Weyer’s statement and translated it in the opposite way: ‘But however tragic the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Cf., among others, introduction, ed. Off. Oporinus, pp. 8 and 42 ff.; \textit{Op. omn.}, p. 775 and chapt. 4 (“De effectibus irae”), § 2–4, pp. 795–796.
\item \textsuperscript{18} E.g. ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 25; \textit{Op. omn.}, chapt. 2, § 17, p. 785, is directed toward \textit{academics}—people who are proud of their ‘eruditionis titulus’.
\item \textsuperscript{19} On the spiritual exercises which contain the most important part of the treatise (ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 55 ff.; \textit{Op. omn.}, chapt. 5, § 4–90, pp. 803–853), see below.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 24; \textit{Op. omn.}, chapt. 2 (“De causis irae”), § 16, p. 785.
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 105; \textit{Op. omn.}, chapt. 5, § 67, p. 831: ‘Similiane, an tragica magis quam supra enarravi, immannium irarum exempla hoc nostrum viderit aevum, et adhuc calamitosissime experiatur, in motibus religionis ergo ortis, aliorum liberiori calamo relinquendum securius existimavi.’ From the same passage it becomes apparent that Weyer thought primarily of the religious conflicts in ‘Germany’ (i.e. the Empire), and only thought of the
examples I gave above may be, with respect to their calamities they *are surpassed* (sic!) by far (sic!) by the inhuman cruelties we experienced in a most disastrous way during the religious struggles. In fact, Weyer explicitly *does not maintain this*, and he says that he prefers to leave this judgement to other writers because it is safer to do so; furthermore, he does not indicate that he talks specifically about his personal experience or the experience of the members of his confession (i.e., in Hoorens's view, Calvinism). In the whole treatise, Weyer remains deliberately vague about confessional issues, and especially his own confession.

However, Weyer's idea that anger represented a peculiar feature of the 16th century is remarkable. In a passage in chapter 4 ("De effectibus irae") Weyer dwells in detail, as it seems, on the contemporary damage brought forth by anger:

> Si porro fusius huius effectus et damna aliis illata intueri lubet, nulla pesteis humano generi stetis pluris. Videbis caedes et veneficia, atque eorum mutuas sordes et urbium clades, exitia item gentium multarum et principum, quorum exempla admodum funesta annis retro paucis in nostra Germania, Galliis, apud Belgas et alibi, nimirum (proh dolor) conspicatis; sumus et quotidiani adversi truculentiora cernimus; item sub civili hasta venalia capita, bona nobilium ac ditionum indita caussa nequiter exuta, sobole mendicitati prostituta; [et] subiectas tectis faces nec intra moenia

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22 Emphasis mine; see Hoorens, *Een ketterse arts voor de heksen* 268: '“Maar hoe tragisch de voorbeelden ook zijn die ik hierboven verteld heb”, schreef Wier, “toch laten de onmenselijke wreedheden die we tijdens de godsdiensttroebelen op allerzwaarste wijze hebben ervaren hen in endelende ver achter zich”.


24 Seneca, *De ira* 1, 2 has ‘reorum’ (‘of accused persons’; cf. also Lipsius's text of 1604, with his correct interpretation of the phrase in the *apparatus criticus*: ‘persons that accuse and are accused’—‘Qui accusant invicem, et accusantur’); ‘eorum’ (present both in ed. Off. Oporinus and *Op. omn.*) is either the reading of Weyer's Seneca, and thus of Weyer's paraphrasing of the passage, or a printing error. Its sense, compared with ‘reorum’, is a bit poor.

25 Seneca, *De ira* 1, 2 has ‘totarum’.

26 ‘et’ is an addition of *Op. omn.*; it is not in ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 47.

27 The text of *Op. omn.*, p. 797, has erroneously ‘testis’, which does not make sense; the correct text ‘tectis’ is in ed. Off. Oporinus, as in Seneca, *De ira* 1, 2, which means that it is the reading both of Weyer’s Seneca and Weyer’s paraphrase in *De ira morbo*. 
coercitos ignes, sed ingentia spacia regionum iracunda\textsuperscript{28} flamma longe reluentia. Intuere nobilissimarum civitatum fundamenta agnitu difficilia: has ira prostravit. Aspice iam nunc tot memoriae proditos duces mali exempla fati: alium ira in cubili suo quandoque etiam post datam solenniter fidem confodit; alium intra sacra mensae et nuptiarum\textsuperscript{29} ira\textsuperscript{30} percussit, alium intra leges celebrisque spectaculum fori lancinavit, alium\textsuperscript{31} filii parricidio dare sanguinem iussit, et ediverso; alium servili manu regalem aperire iugulum, et contra; alium in cruce\textsuperscript{32} membra diffindere.

Moreover, if you wish to view its (i.e. anger’s) results and the harm of it done to other people, no plague has cost the human race more dear. You will see murderous bloodshed and poisoning, and their [? ] vile effects, many nations given to destruction, the downfall of cities, and of princely persons as well—the terrible examples of which we have observed a few years ago in our Germany, in France, among the Dutch, and elsewhere, and daily watch more cruel ones; persons sold at public auction, the loss of possessions of noblemen and rich citizens unjustly put to charge, and their offspring condemned to the state of beggars; houses put to the torch, and conflagration that halts not within the city walls, but makes great stretches of the country glow with the flame of ire. Look at the most glorious cities whose foundations can scarcely be traced anymore—anger cast them down; look at so many leaders (or: dukes) who have been handed down to posterity as instances of an evil fate—anger stabbed this one in his bed, even after having received a solemn oath of faith; struck down this one amid the sanctities of wedding feasts, tore this one to pieces in the very home of the law and in full view of the crowded forum, forced this one to have his blood spilled by the murderous act of his son, and the other way round; another one to have his royal

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{28} Seneca, \textit{De ira} 1, 2 has ‘hostili’.
\bibitem{29} ‘nuptiarum’ does not appear in Seneca’s \textit{De ira}, and it was added by Weyer. As Hoorens, \textit{Een ketterse arts voor de heksen} 266, correctly remarked, it was meant as a pun on the bloodshed of the Night of Barthelme of 1572.
\bibitem{30} Weyer’s Seneca had obviously ‘ira’, which is also the relevant reading of his paraphrase. ‘Ira’ is still there in Lipsius’s new Seneca edition; the modern \textit{textus receptus} of \textit{De ira} 1, 2, however, is ‘iura’.
\bibitem{31} The text of \textit{Op. omn.}, p. 797, has ‘aliam’ erroneously.
\bibitem{32} Weyer’s Seneca, like many other prints and manuscripts, had ‘cruces’, which, however, makes little sense. Lipsius in 1604 in his new edition of Seneca printed ‘cruces’ as well (\textit{De ira} 1, 2), although in a critical note he mentioned ‘cruce’ as an alternative reading, which became the reading of the modern \textit{textus receptus}.
\end{thebibliography}
throat cut by the hand of a slave, and the other way round; and another to have his limbs torn apart upon the cross.

First of all, it is clear that Weyer here again looks at the devastating effects of anger not from a Dutch, but a German (‘in nostra Germania’) perspective. But even more important is the fact that the greater part of the text does not represent Weyer’s words, but is taken from the treatise *De ira* written in the middle of the 1st century AD by the Roman Stoic Seneca the Younger. The italics in the cited text indicate its dependence on Seneca’s *De ira*, which is quoted *verbatim* or paraphrased by Weyer. Thus, maybe surprisingly, the idea of anger’s special connection with the 16th century is taken from a text written in the 1st century AD. This brings us to the heart of Weyer’s treatise: many of its basic ideas closely resemble those in Seneca’s *De ira*, and it is essentially built on Stoic concepts, views, and methods. As Weyer indicates in the introduction, in his work *De ira morbo* he tried to ‘imitate the Stoics […] and Galen’. It is

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35 *De ira morbo*, ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 7; *Op. omn.*, Introduction, § 1, p. 775: ‘Dicturus de Ira morbo […] imitari conabordi tum Stoicos, qui affectus tamquam morbos ex homine nituntur evellere, tum Galenum nostrum […]’ (‘Writing about the disease of anger […] I am imitating on the one hand the Stoics who strive for kill the emotions as if they were bodily diseases, on the other hand our Galen […]’). Galen’s influence will be mentioned briefly below; however, within the framework of this article it is impossible to fully discuss Galen’s role in *De ira morbo*: this will be done elsewhere. For the Stoics’ theory of emotions cf. *inter alia* Krewet M., *Die stoische Theorie der Gefühle. Ihre Aporien. Ihre Wirkmacht* (Heidelberg: 2013); Buddensiek F., “Stoa und Epikur: Affekte als Defekte oder als Weltbezug”, in Landwehr H. – Renz U. (eds.), *Klassische Emotionstheorien. Von Platon bis
essentially a Stoic stand to regard strong emotions as a mental disease, and the Stoic philosopher (sapiens) as a physician, and Stoicism is also the longest and most important part of Weyer's prophylactic therapy, the 'philosophical' one (= chapter 5, “De Prophylactica Irae curatione philosophica”).

1 Neo-Stoicism, Weyer, and Lipsius

Justus Lipsius36 is usually seen as the great inventor of Renaissance Neo-Stoicism,37 especially with his De constantia […] in publicis malis
(1583/1584), but also with his *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* (1604); the dialogue *De Constantia*, a literary masterpiece, served as the founding text and manifesto of the new ‘philosophical movement’. The *Manuductio* is less a manifesto of a new philosophy than it is a new comprehensive history of Greek and Roman philosophy focused on Stoicism, a work that was originally meant to function as a kind of introduction to Lipsius's edition of

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Seneca (1605) but proved to be of independent value as a manual of Stoic thought, equipped with a large number of antique sources. John Sellars renders the *communis opinio* when he remarks ‘Although early Renaissance figures such as Petrarch and Politian displayed an interest in and sympathy for Stoic philosophy, the first concerted attempt to resurrect Stoicism as a living philosophical movement (called Neo-Stoicism) must be credited to […] Justus Lipsius’. Other Neo-Stoics listed the most often are Guillaume du Vair (1556–1621), with his *Philosophie morale des Stoïques* (ca. 1586), his *Traité de la constance et consolation és calamitez publiques* (1590; ed. pr. Paris: 1594), his *Le Manuel d’Épictète, suivi des réponses à l’empereur Hadrien et translaté en langue française par Guillaume Du Vair* (1591), and his La Saincte Philosophie, avec plusieurs traitez de piété (1603); Pierre Charron (1541–1603), with his *De la sagesse* (he, however, was more of a sceptic philosopher); and Francisco de Quevedo (1580–1645), with his *Doctrina Estoica* (1636) and his Spanish

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41 Cf. its subtitle, as given in the *editio princeps*: L. Annaeo Senecae, aliisque scriptoribus illustrandis.

42 In his art. “Neo-Stoicism”, *Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (http://www.iep.utm.edu/neostoic/); very similar Papy, “Neostoizismus und Humanismus”.


45 Abel, *Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit* 125–145, with a full description of its content.


48 For Quevedo see Méchoulan H., “Quevedo stoïcien?”, in Moreau (ed.), *Le stoïcisme au XVIe et au XVIIe siècle* 189–203.

translations of Lipsius’s *De constantia*, Epictetus’s *Encheiridion*, and, occasionally, works by Montaigne. Abel added a number of other intellectuals: printers, translators, possessors, and readers of Lipsius’s works; printers such as Claude de Monstr’oeil and Jean Richer; the translators of *De constantia*, such as Clovis Hesteau and Charles Le Ber (who also translated Boethius’s *De consolatione philosophiae* into French); the translators of Lipsius’s *Politica*, such as Simon Goulart and again Le Ber (*Lôtres des Politiques*); Calvinists, such as the poet François Beroalde de Verville, Jacques Bongars, and Philippe Duplessis-Mornay; some of Lipsius’s correspondents in France; members of the Politiques, such as François Hotman; and so on. Marc Morford added Lipsius’s pupils in the Southern Low Countries, such as Philipp Rubens, Joannes Woverius, and the famous painter Peter Paul Rubens.

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51 Abel, *Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit* 278–280. Cf. the contribution by Anita Traninger in this volume.

52 Abel, *Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit* 272–310 (chapter “Neustoisches Denken in Frankreich zwischen 1580 und 1610/20”); Abel’s chapter indeed suggests a “movement” but remains rather speculative and vague. For example, printers, editors, translators, and possessors do not exclusively print, edit, translate, and possess works that express their innermost convictions; furthermore, it is questionable whether it is adequate to regard Lipsius’s *Politica* as a manifesto of Neo-Stoicism. Oestreich’s effort to identify Neo-Stoicism also as a political conviction and “movement” has been regarded as attractive, but is not at all convincing. Cf. his *Antiker Geist und moderner Staat bei Justus Lipsius (1547–1606): der Neustoizismus als politische Bewegung*.

53 *Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius*. Morford’s picture of the relationship between Lipsius and his pupils—especially in chapters two and three (14–95)—is a bit biased, as if it were predominantly about Stoic education; Lipsius, however, taught in primarily Latin philology and antiquarianism. The timetable Lipsius drafted for his pupils (Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics* 31–32) shows the character of the education of the ‘contubernales’: philological training, reading of various Greek and Latin classics. Morford’s chapter on the painter Peter Paul Rubens’s ‘Neostoicism’ is very speculative (181–210). The fact that Rubens owned a replica of a bust of Seneca and designed the title pages and illustrations to Lipsius’s Seneca editions is no valid proof of Neo-Stoic convictions. Rubens painted and designed a great number of extremely different topics, and for the Plantin-Moretus Officina he designed many frontispieces without sharing the views of the works he adorned. Furthermore, Morford’s picture of Lipsius’s Neo-Stoicism suffers from the fact that he mixes it up with Lipsius’s interest in Tacitus. Cf. chapter 5 “Tacitus and Seneca” (139–180).
An important goal of Neostoic philosophy is the reconciliation of antique Stoicism with Christian religion, for example with respect to Stoic determinism denying free will, Fate’s superiority to God as the principal of natural and everlasting order, Stoic materialism, the Stoics’ denial of contingency, and, last but not least, their theory of the emotions. The Stoic stand of radically “killing” the emotions and the one-sided emphasis on ratio differ considerably from Christian positions. Most interestingly, both Lipsius in *De constantia* and Weyer in *De ira morbo* focused on reintroducing and adapting the Stoic doctrine of emotion management, both departed from Seneca’s theory and therapy of the passions, and both regarded control of the emotions as a major remedy against the public calamities of their times. Weyer, however, so far has not been mentioned in the discussions on Neo-Stoicism, Neostoic views on the emotions, or Lipsius’s *De constantia*.

Lipsius very much emphasized the originality of his revival of Stoic philosophy, and especially its application as an antidote against the public calamities of his time. In the letter of dedication for *De constantia*, addressed to the Magistrates of Antwerp and dated September 1583, he points to the ‘novitas’ of his work and plainly says that he is ‘the first to level and build this road to Wisdom’ (‘hanc Sapientiae viam sternere et munire aggredimur primi’) ‘[…] which alone can lead to Tranquillity and Peace’ (‘quae sola possit ducere ad Tranquillitatem et Quietem’). Similarly, in the preface “To the Reader” (“Ad lectorem”) of the 1584 edition he says ‘I have sought out consolations against public evils: who has done so before me?’—‘solatia publicis malis quaesivi: quis ante me?’ And, the interpreters of both Neostoicism and *De constantia* have unanimously supported Lipsius’s claim for originality and novelty.

However, the one who designed Neostoicism before Lipsius’s *De constantia* (1583/1584), and who adapted ancient Stoicism as a remedy against the political calamities of the 16th century, was Johann Weyer with his *De ira morbo*, which appeared some seven years earlier (1577) and was composed eight (1576) or even a few more years earlier. At that time Lipsius was not yet appointed
professor in Leiden (which took place in 1578); Mark Morford has correctly dated Lipsius’s first intensive study of Stoic philosophy in his Leiden years (1578–1591), although he over-interprets it as a ‘final move from philology to philosophy’. In fact, Lipsius kept on working on philological and antiquarian projects. By the end of 1580 Lipsius said that was about to go into or dig deeply in Stoic philosophy; Mark Morford is probably right when he thinks that around 1582 Lipsius ‘became especially interested in Seneca’s philosophy as a source of comfort in the troubles of his own time’. The result of these studies was *De constantia*. Lipsius did not publish anything before *De constantia* in which he would have unfolded his Neostoic ideas, and, as far as we know, there was no personal contact between Weyer and Lipsius. Weyer’s *De ira morbo* does not just coincidentally render some Stoic ideas; as we will see below, Stoicism determines its main message and its very structure as a therapeutic treatise. It remains unclear whether Lipsius knew Weyer’s work. He could have known it, because the Oporinus factory was famous in the humanist Republic of Letters and was an important source of text editions of classical authors. However, Lipsius never mentioned Weyer’s *De ira morbo*.

With respect to the adaptation of the Stoic management of the emotions, and its application to the calamities and conflicts of the 16th century, Weyer’s and Lipsius’s works have many features in common, but also have some differences in scope and perspective: Lipsius deals more with the mental reaction of the individual as a victim of the calamities of his age, and he includes catastrophes that were not caused by acts of human violence, such as earthquakes, pestilence, and floods. Weyer, on the other hand, only takes into account

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59 Ibidem, 160: ‘This was the period in which he (Lipsius) moved finally away from philology to philosophy’. I am afraid that such a definite move never took place.
60 *ILE*, vol. 1, 128, to friend Janus Lernutius (d.d. 31 December 1580): ‘Philosophiam dico, in quam me penetreo: et quidem Stoicam’; Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics* 158.
61 Morford, *Stoics and Neostoics* 159. Morford bases his argument on two letters: *ILE*, vol. 1, 192, to Alexander Ratlo, professor of philosophy at Ghent (d.d. 23 January 1582); and *ILE*, vol. 1, 213, to Andreas Schott, who was then staying in Toledo (d.d. 7 July 1582).
63 However, as the dialogue setting of *De constantia* suggests, Lipsius’s major source of inspiration probably was the acts of violence that appeared in the Dutch ‘civil war’. In *De constantia* 1. 1, young Lipsius says: ‘Quis enim, Langius, [. . .] tam firmo et tam ferreo pectore, qui diiitius ferendis iis malis sit? Iactamur iam tot annos, ut vides, bellorum civilium aestu, et, ut in undoso mari, non uno vento agitamur turbarum seditionumque’ (‘Who posses, Langius, [. . .] such a strong and iron mind that he could any longer bear those calamities? We are thrown to and fro, as you see, in the storm of civil wars, and we are shaken, as if it were on the high waves of the sea, by the storm of riots and rebellions’). Cf. also
acts of public violence caused by human beings, either by individuals (such as assassinations) or by communities (factions, religious groups, armies), and he explicitly discusses the state of the human mind that causes such calamities, especially in terms of revenge, murder, war, and genocide. Lipsius's Stoic virtue of *constantia* aims at avoiding emotions on the level of the individual (especially pain, fear, and desire), and only implicitly includes anger (e.g. as a form of desire); as Jan Papy correctly remarks, 'Lipsius urges his readers to detach themselves completely from all feelings which might lead to any sort of emotional involvement in the political and religious wars which were raging around them'.64 The argument of *De constantia* is directed toward proving that public evils range among the Stoic *indifferentia*, that they are neither unusual nor grievous, and that we may even take advantage of them, but also that they are imposed by God and necessity.65 Weyer's therapy of anger tries to safeguard a quiet state of mind that sometimes comes close to Lipsius's *constantia*, but it pays less attention to the spectrum of the other emotions and hardly ever addresses the ideal state of mind as constancy.

More important, however, are the features in common: both works developed Stoicism, and especially the control of emotions, as a major tool for mastering the political and religious violence of their times, and in doing so, they were both inspired by Seneca.66 As the above-quoted passage of Weyer's chapter 4 shows, it was Seneca who brought him to the idea of regarding anger as a peculiarity of his age; and it was also Seneca who gave anger a status different from those of the other emotions. Seneca ascribed to *ira* the potential to affect whole communities: anger was for him—at least potentially—a "public

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64 Papy, “Justus Lipsius” (revised 2011); cf. also Abel, *Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit* 72–73, 79.
disease”. It was only a small step from this Senecan thought to Weyer’s application of the medical *terminus technicus* of ‘epidemic disease’.67

2 Seneca’s *De ira* as a Therapeutic Treatise, and the Shades of Its Stoic Approach

As a Stoic, Seneca in *De ira* also regarded anger as a mental disease.68 Therefore, it is not surprising that he too devoted a considerable part of his *De ira* to therapy (III, 10–40), especially to prophylactic therapy (book II, 18–36, and book III, 5–9), and that the whole work is designed as a so-called therapeutic treatise.69 Seneca’s therapy is shaped by, among other things, three important features: first, a strong emphasis on active and intellectual aspects in the genesis of anger; second, revenge (*ultio*) as a *sine qua non* in the definition of *ira*;70 and third, a pragmatic approach, in which he displays a keen sense of psychological sensitivity. In accordance with the Stoic founding father Chrysippus in his treatise *On the Passions/ Emotions* (*Peri pathoon*),71 but probably a bit

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67 Cf. above.
68 Cf., *inter alia*, Seneca, *De ira* I, 1 (2–4) 2: ‘But you have only to behold the aspect of those possessed by anger to know that they are insane. For the marks of a madman are unmistakable—a bold and threatening mien, a gloomy brow, a fierce expression, a hurried step, restless hands, an altered colour, a quick and more violent breathing [. . .]’ (transl. Basor).


69 Cf. Julia Wildberger, “Nachwort”, to her German transl. of Seneca’s *De ira* (Stuttgart: 2007) 313: ‘Da Wut schädlich und ungesund ist, muss sie behandelt und ausgemerzt werden. *De ira* ist also eine therapeutische Schrift und hat dementsprechend eine zweigliedrige Form, wie man sie auch in anderen therapeutischen Texten findet: Zunächst zeigt man, dass die betreffende Emotion behandelt werden muss, wobei man sie definiert und charakterisiert und ihre schädlichen Auswirkungen herausstellt (in *De ira* bis II, 17). Dann folgt die eigentliche Behandlung (in *De ira* ab II, 18).’

70 For this aspect cf. especially Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice”; Seneca does not acknowledge milder forms of anger, or certain gradations and nuances of it. Cf. *De ira* I, 4, 2 f.

differently from Posidonius, Seneca insists on the fact that active steps taken by the mind (animus)—which is ideally guided by ratio—play a crucial part in the genesis of anger (ira). According to Seneca, a person cannot get angry “automatically”, “unwillingly”, “spontaneously”, or “unconsciously”, i.e. without the assent of the animus; anger is always caused by erroneous perceptions, estimations, conclusions, judgements, and decisions. Seneca analyzes the process of getting angry by subtly splitting the reaction of the animus into four steps: (a) a first, still unfocused perception of ‘something’, i.e. something unpleasant (‘intellexit aliquid [sc. animus]’, ‘the mind has grasped something’; De ira 11, 1, 4); (b) an indignant reaction to the animus on the initial perception of something unpleasant (‘indignatus est [sc. animus]’, ibidem); (c) the judgement of the perceived fact as an injury or an act of injustice (‘damnavit [sc. animus]’, ‘the mind has condemned the act’; ibidem); and (d) the decision to retaliate against the perceived fact or act with an aggressive counteraction, i.e. to take revenge (‘ulciscitur [sc. animus]’, ibidem). This process displays two or three steps of voluntary ‘assent’ of the mind (consentiens animus; animus approbans), while even more ‘assents’ may well exert their influence in the background. Only after all of these assents can the passion of anger come into being.

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73 Cf. Seneca, De ira 11, 1, 3: ‘The question is whether it (i.e. the passion of anger) follows immediately upon the impression (sc. of an injury) and springs up without the assistance from the mind, or whether it is aroused only with the assent of the mind. Our opinion is that it ventures nothing by itself, but acts only with the approval of the mind’ (transl. by Basor).
74 For Seneca, the perception of an injury is a sine qua non of anger; cf., inter alia, De ira 11, 1, 3: ‘There can be no doubt that anger is aroused by the impression of an injury’ (transl. by Basor, adapted).
75 Seneca regarded the first step, obviously, as involuntary. Cf. De ira 11, 4, 1; Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice” 65. Vogt, ibidem, however, seems to be inclined to regard only the two last steps as voluntary movements of the mind.
76 As demonstrated by Vogt, “Anger, Present Injustice” 66; for example, ‘when someone is offending me, he needs to be paid back’ or ‘when people don’t greet me, they express disrespect’.
77 As Seneca himself clearly states in De ira 11, 1, 5: ‘These steps are impossible unless the mind has given assent to the impressions that moved it’ (transl. Basor, adapted).
Therefore, anger is something essentially different from spontaneous physical reactions to outward influences, such as shivering as a reaction to cold.\textsuperscript{78} And it is this theoretical analysis of anger that instigated Seneca to focus his therapy on detecting, arguing against, neutralizing, and destroying the erroneous perceptions, estimations, conclusions, judgements, and decisions that may lead to anger. Seneca’s pragmatic and casuistic approach very much depends on this goal. He unfolds before the eyes of his readers a great number of cases he considers typical for the genesis of anger; e.g. ‘a slave is too slow, or the water for the wine is lukewarm, or the couch-cushion is disarranged, or the table carelessly set’,\textsuperscript{79} ‘For why is it that we are thrown into a rage by somebody’s cough or sneeze, by negligence in chasing a fly away, by a dog’s hanging around, or by the dropping of a key that has slipped from the hands of a careless servant?’,\textsuperscript{80} or social contempt, gossip, irritating social interaction,\textsuperscript{81} labour, illness, sleeplessness, falling in love, etc.\textsuperscript{82} The wrong perceptions, estimations, conclusions, judgements, and decisions are especially provoked in the course of social interaction: ‘Suspicion and surmise—provocations that are most deceptive—ought to be banished from the mind. “That man did not give me a civil greeting; that one did not return my kiss; that one broke off the conversation abruptly; that one did not invite me to dinner; that one seemed to avoid seeing me.” Pretext for suspicion will not be lacking’.\textsuperscript{83} The connection of \textit{ira} with revenge is a feature of many ancient texts on anger and is certainly also there in Stoic texts.

3 Spiritual Exercises: Weyer’s Prophylactic Course of Neostoic Anger Management

In his \textit{De ira morbo} Weyer has borrowed the basic ideas of Seneca’s \textit{De ira}, the design of the work as a therapeutic treatise, some of its definitions, and many elements, thoughts, observations, and historical examples. Weyer shaped his therapy for anger, however, as a more systematic, complete, and complex course of mental exercises, \textit{exercitatio spiritualis} in the sense of the philosophical “Seelenleitung” (as described by, among others, Paul Rabbow and Ilsetraut

\textsuperscript{78} Ibidem I, 2, 1.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibidem I, 25, 1 (transl. Basor).
\textsuperscript{80} Ibidem I, 25, 3 (transl. Basor).
\textsuperscript{81} Ibidem I, 24.
\textsuperscript{82} Ibidem I, 20.
\textsuperscript{83} Ibidem I, 24, 1–2 (transl. Basor).
Johann Weyer's Anger Therapy

Hadot). One may say that in his central chapter on "philosophical prophylactic therapy" (chapter 5) Weyer designed a true course of anger management, carefully built up in nine parts. In the original edition special attention is given to these parts, by large Roman numbers in the margins.

The first part is daily philosophical self-reflection (recognitio sui) in the morning and in the evening. The morning meditation reflects on the moral status quo of the self and formulates concrete plans for self-improvement; the evening meditation is an examen conscientiae ("Selbstprüfung"; "Gewissenserforschung") or self-investigation (sibi rationem reddere). Which moral progress has been achieved? What has been done well, what went wrong? With respect to the philosophical self-investigation Weyer advises the individual to act as his own judge (iudex), evaluator (censor), and observer (speculator sui), to be totally open and honest, to hide nothing, and

89 Ibidem: ‘vespertinis itidem, priusquam lectum ingrediatur, sibiipsi rationem reddat […]’.
91 Weyer, De ira morbo, ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 58; chapt. Op. omn., p. 804: ‘Quod hodie malum tuum sanasti? Cui vitio restitisti? Qua parte melior es?’ (‘Which evil [disease] of you did you cure today? Which vice did you resist? Which part of you has improved?’); Weyer ascribes these methodical questions to the Stoic philosopher Aulus Sextius; Weyer’s text is, however, a literal quote from Seneca, De ira 111, 36, 1 (instead of ‘restitisti’ Seneca has ‘obstittisti’).
92 For this daily self-investigation Weyer quotes in extenso the hexametric poem "Vir bonus" from the Appendix Vergiliana, cf. ed. by R. Ellis (Oxford: 1955), lines 14–26: ‘Non prius in dulcem declinans lumina somnum/ Omnia quam longi reputaverit (sc. Vir bonus) acta diei […]’; also quoted and discussed by Erasmus in his Adagium 2901, designed in 1526. Erasmus prescribed the philosophical self-investigation in the evening especially for young people (adolescents) as a means of moral self-improvement. Weyer’s quote is longer than the one in the Adagia; see De ira morbo, ed. Off. Oporinus, pp. 59–60; Op. omn., § 8, p. 805.
to evaluate every single action committed and word spoken during the past day.\textsuperscript{92} Moreover, the evening meditation should focus on the management of the emotions, especially \textit{ira}. The individual should ask ‘whether it is more honest to give way to the emotions’ or to control them, and he should concentrate on the sentence ‘se ipsum vincere […] omnium celeberrimam esse victoriæ’ viz. ‘Seipsum vincere Victoria maxima’.\textsuperscript{93} The importance of this kind of self-control is emphasized by the highlightening of the sentence as a marginal note.\textsuperscript{94} The fact that Weyer considered this exercise to be of the highest importance for himself proves his personal \textit{impresa} VINCE TE IPSUM, which he created in connection with the treatise (Fig. 3.1).\textsuperscript{95} Morning meditation and evening self-investigation, of course, were important for moral improvement of any kind; but these exercises were regarded as especially relevant for anger, since it is this emotion that makes a person go totally out of control, and both exercises were means \textit{par excellence} to establish a kind of permanent self-control.\textsuperscript{96}

The way in which Weyer shapes the \textit{examen conscientiae} shows that he gave it a typically Stoic flavour: it focuses on controlling the emotions, it is ascribed particularly to the Stoic philosopher Sextius, and moreover, Weyer found it in Seneca’s \textit{De ira} (III, 36), from which he partly copied it literally. From the same passage of \textit{De ira} it appears that Seneca himself used to engage in this daily exercise:

\begin{quote}
I avail myself of this privilege, and every day I plead my cause before the bar of self. When the light has been removed from sight, and my wife, long aware of my habit, has become silent, I scan the whole of my day\end{quote}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{93} Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 58; \textit{Op. omn.}, § 6, p. 804. For the \textit{sententia} that comes close to proverbial wisdom cf. Publilius Syrus, \textit{Sententiae} 77 ‘Bis vincit qui se vincit in victoria’; Publilius focuses on victory, which includes the ideas of anger and revenge, of course on the side of the victorious.
\item \textsuperscript{94} Ibidem, both in ed. Off. Oporinus and in \textit{Op. omn.}.
\item \textsuperscript{95} See above, esp. note 12.
\item \textsuperscript{96} Ed. Off. Oporinus, pp. 58–59; \textit{Op. omn.} § 7, p. 804: ‘Minus certe corrumpere […] volet animus, qui ad rationem reddendam quotidian vocandus est. […] Desinet ira vel erit sedatio, quae sibi quotidian coram iudice comparandum esse sciet’ (‘A mind who knows that he must report on a daily basis, will be certainly less inclined to deteriorate […] […] Anger will stop or at least will calm down, if it knows that it must appear daily before a judge’); cf. Seneca, \textit{De ira} IIII, 36, 1–2.
\end{itemize}
and retrace all my deeds and words. I conceal nothing from myself, I omit nothing. For why should I shrink from any of my mistakes […]?

Utor hac potestate et quotidianie apud me causam dico. Cum sublatum est conspectus lumen et conticuit uxor moris iam mei conscientia, totum diem meum scutor factaque ac dicta mea remetior; nihil mihi ipse abscondo, nihil transeo. Quare enim quicquam ex erroribus meis timeam […]?97

Weyer reformulated Seneca’s autobiographical self-description as a general moral imperative, in which he curiously included the collaborating role of the wife,98 and he connected it with the morning meditation, not mentioned by Seneca ad loc. As Weyer indicates, Stoic self-investigation goes very well together with Christian moral theology (‘quod et Theologorum schola docet [...]’; ed. Off. Oporinus p. 58; Op. omn. § 6, p. 804).99 In the same sense Petrarch had already presented it in his De vita solitaria (1345),100 and Erasmus in his Adagia (1526; no. 2901).

Justus Lipsius attached a very high value to this exercise: as he indicates in the last chapter of his Manuductio (111, 24), he regarded it as one of the three methods that would make Stoic philosophy “living” and fruitful for his contemporaries. He advises his pupil (auditor) to engage daily in the examen conscientiae, and he quotes the above-cited Seneca passage in extenso. According to Lipsius, Seneca’s examen conscientiae proves man’s moral greatness, and it leads him to the emotional comment and appeal: ‘O vel hoc argumento virum bonum, virum magnum! Et qui non scrivit sensisse solum talia, sed fecit! Nos quoque, tu meus, et examen hoc, stimulum et protegium virtutis, cotidie adhíeamus!’— ‘Oh good and great man, who would be great solely because of this! He who not only wrote and thought this, but who also practised it! My good

98 Weyer reformulated also Seneca’s autobiographical remark on his wife as an imperative: When the individual is going to undertake his examen conscientiae (as usual) in bed, his wife should ‘shut up’ (§ 8 ‘contíceanscat uxor’). This is a bit odd. One wonders whether Weyer did so in close imitation of Seneca or because he was (a bit overly) concerned with the practicalities of the exercise. Of course, it is less curious that he automatically looked at his exercises solely from a male perspective and with an eye on male persons; this goes for the majority of 16th-century philosophers and intellectuals.
friend, let us also exercise it daily, as incitement and motor (literally ‘draught oxen’) of Virtue!101 Thus, similarly to Weyer, Lipsius presented Seneca’s exa-
men conscientiae as a general moral imperative for his contemporaries. This,
however, he did in 1603, the year in which he finished his Manuductio.102 One
may take into account that he did so after he had returned to the Southern Low
Countries and to Roman Catholicism.

The second part of Weyer’s programme has a pragmatic design: it demands
that one always think about keeping up a good reputation, i.e. to be counted
among the composed, civilized, and morally good persons.103 This advice is
directed toward outward appearance only, otherwise not much appreciated by
the Stoics, but Weyer included it because he expected it to be helpful in slowing
down the process of getting angry. The structural care for one’s reputation
was meant to bring forth cautiousness and increase moral consciousness.

The third part of the programme prescribes a personal coach or advisor.104
This coach should be a morally outstanding, serious, severe, and critical per-
son, ideally a kind of Cato the Elder.105 Weyer’s advice seems to draw on the
Greco-Roman philosophical practice of the so-called contubernium (originally
a military term referring to soldiers on campaign, sharing a tent, in German
“Zeltgemeinschaft”).106 According to this practice, pupils lived together with
their philosophical teachers, ideally in the same house. In daily contact with
his personal coach, the pupil was supposed to imitate his behaviour and adopt
the right ethical attitudes and judgements. The pedagogical impact of the con-
tubernium is referred to frequently in Seneca’s Letters to Lucilius; in a sense, one
can read them as a kind of artificial replacement of the contubernium, since
the philosophical teacher Seneca lived in Rome and its surroundings, while
pupil Lucilius stayed in faraway Sicily. Thus, Seneca advised Lucilius to choose
an imaginary mental coach: ‘Iam clausulam epistula poscit. Accipe, et quidem
utilem et salutarem, quam te affigere animo volo: “Aliquis vir bonus eligendus
est ac semper ante oculos habendus, ut sic tamquam illo spectante vivamus et
omnia tamquam illo videntе faciamus”. […] Magna pars peccatorum tollitur,
si peccaturis testis adsistit’—‘But my letter calls for its closing motto. Hear and
take to heart this useful and wholesome motto: “Choose some man of high
character, and keep him ever before your eyes, living as if he were watching you, and ordering all your actions as if he beheld them. […] We can get rid of most faults, if we have a witness who stands near us when we are likely to go wrong.

The concept of contubernium, however, does not occur in Seneca’s De ira, let alone as a philosophical exercise.

Lipsius was well aware of the contubernium; he attached a high value to it and exercised it himself by taking students into his house. In his Manuductio in Stoicam philosophiam he called the device ‘bonorum virorum conversatio’ (‘contact with good people’) and shaped it in a more general way, not in the least by extending it to the meditative imagination of a moral coach (Manuductio 111, 24), as Seneca had done.

The fourth part of Weyer’s therapy is closely connected with the third: it works out the positive effects of corrective instances in controlling anger. Its special aims are to improve the individual’s ability to accept criticism without getting angry, to get used to very harsh, exaggerated, and even unjustified criticism; in a second step, this moral improvement was supposed to enable the pupil to develop and sharpen the tool of self-criticism.

The fifth part is an analytical meditation on the reasons, outward symptoms, and terrible effects of anger, such as those described in Weyer’s chapters 2 (“De causis irae”), 3 (“De signis irae”), and 4 (“De effectibus irae”), with a special emphasis on their disadvantageous, harmful, destructive, and self-destructive aspects for both the body and the mind. As he indicates, Weyer included in this meditation the larger descriptive part of his treatise up to this point (ca. 2/3; ed. Off. Oporinus pp. 15–55). This meditation should be exerted by the ‘clear inner eye’ of the animus/mens, and be exercised on a daily basis (Weyer says ‘constantly’/‘semper’): its heart is its rational and analytical design, which enables the individual (a) to understand the awkward and partly ridiculous reasons that cause anger; (b) to understand the extremely disadvantageous

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107 Seneca, Epistulae morales 11, 8 (transl. by R.M. Gummere, with adaptations). The passage is quoted by Lipsius in his Manuductio 111, 24.
108 Cf. Morford, Stoics and Neostoics 14 ff. However, Lipsius taught his pupils not in the first place Stoic philosophy, but philology and antiquarianism.

mental and physical results of anger, such as the loss of social decorum, cruel bloodshed among family members, divorce, factions, war, self-destruction, the loss of physical health, and even the loss of one’s life; (c) to compare the futile reasons for anger with its much more harmful results; and (d) to estimate the dangerous and devastating character of anger in comparison with other emotions, especially the worst, such as avarice/greed (avaritia), sexual desire (luxuria), and envy (invidia).

The core of this mental exercise is to count, enumerate, compare, weigh, and estimate. One should enumerate and count as many harmful and destructive results of anger as possible, put them, as it were, on scales, and weigh them by comparing them with the results of other harmful passions; one should recall and memorize the reasons for anger and carefully compare them with its results. Then one will clearly see that anger is the worst of all passions. For example, the result of avarice is that one acquires possessions, but the result of anger is that they will be destroyed. Nobody seized by an attack of anger is able to get rid of it without the loss of possessions. Thus, anger is more disadvantageous than avarice. A person’s sexual desire (luxuria) results in his lust, whereas anger leads to another person’s pain. Ergo: with respect to its results, anger is worse than sexual desire. And, mutatis mutandis, the same goes for envy. Another example of the meditation’s structure: A lord may get angry at servants because their negligence may have caused some material loss. In an attack of anger he chases them away or kills them. By comparing the reason for anger with its results one must conclude that the passion has caused a much heavier loss than its reason did.

If this mental exercise is repeated on a daily basis, it is clear that it will slow down, and ideally stop, the impetus, the force that leads to an attack of anger. This is facilitated already by its focus on rational and analytical processes; more specifically, it leads to thought patterns that prevent ira through typically Stoic “pre-meditation”/praemeditatio techniques. This method tries to generate thoughts that prepare the mind for “emergency cases”, or even, more generally, for possible future “choices”, by focusing on the results of bad choices. The pre-meditative mental exercises as prescribed in part 5 play an important part in Seneca’s De ira, where they appear passim. In a long section in the third book, Seneca compares anger with the other passions and emphasizes that it

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117 Ibidem: ‘Quanto plus irascendo quam id erat, propter quod irascebatur, perdidit?’. 
is the worst and most dangerous of them all. In this, Weyer was clearly inspired by Seneca.\footnote{Especially De \textit{ira} III, i, 3–5 and \textit{De ira morbo}, p. \textit{68}: ‘Quum autem Sestius asserat iratis mire speculi inspectionem profuisse […].\textbf{\textit{---}}’—‘Since Sestius affirms that angry people profited enormously from looking into the mirror.’}

The sixth part, the exercise of the “mirror meditation”, has a special character: it prescribes a process of profound self-reflection and prescribes it to be performed on a daily basis. If one suffers from an attack of anger, one must go immediately to a mirror, sit in front of it, and carefully study the deformations of one’s face, its ugly and strange features, similar to the expressions of madmen or wild and savage animals such as lions, wild boars, and bulls. The description of the ugly outward appearance of anger also plays an important part in Seneca’s \textit{De ira}, since it appears at the very beginning of the treatise, where Seneca compares the angry man with a madman: ‘[…] likewise are the marks of the angry man; his eyes blaze and sparkle, his whole face is crimson with the blood that surges from the lowest depth of the heart, his lips quiver, his teeth are clenched, his hair bristles and stands in the end, his breathing is forced and harsh, his joint crack from writhing, he groans and bellows, burst out into speech with hardly intelligible words, strikes his hands together continually, and stamp the ground with his feet […]’ (I, 1, 3–4).\footnote{And more often, for example in \textit{De ira} II, 36, 1 ff. ‘Nothing, however, will prove as profitable as to consider first the ugliness and deformity of the matter (i.e. anger) […]’.}

In this vivid description in I, 1, however, Seneca did not advise a “mirror meditation”. One may suppose that Seneca might have already been sceptical about its sense because ancient Roman mirrors only produced rather vague and imprecise images—comparatively, the mirrors of the 16th century were much better. Nevertheless, the advice to the angry man, that he should look into the mirror, went back to the Roman Stoic philosopher Sextius, as Weyer very well knew.\footnote{Seneca, \textit{De ira} II, 36, 1: ‘Quibusdam, ut ait Sextius, iratis profuit aspexitisse speculum; perturbavit illos tanta mutatio sui; velut in rem prae sentem adducti non agnoverunt se’ (transl. Basor).} And, moreover, it was Seneca who transmitted Sextius’s “mirror therapy” in \textit{De ira}: ‘As Sextius remarks, it has been good for some people to see themselves in a mirror while they are angry; the great change in themselves alarmed them; brought, as it were, face to face with the reality that they did not recognize themselves.’\footnote{Weyer, \textit{De ira morbo}, ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 68: ‘Quum autem Sestius asserat iratis mire speculi inspectionem profuisse […].\textbf{\textit{---}}’—‘Since Sestius affirms that angry people profited enormously from looking into the mirror.’} Seneca himself was not much impressed
by Sextius’s advice. According to Seneca, to look into the mirror when suffering from an attack of anger did not make much sense, because the affectus had already broken through and had overmastered the person; if a person in such a state of mind looked into the mirror, Seneca argues, he would only be pleased. Seneca regarded Stoic praemeditationes on the horrible effects of anger, such as suicide and other forms of self-destruction, much more effective.

Weyer, however, in a marked difference with Seneca, constructed a special “mirror meditation” as a means of therapy of anger. He incorporated and transformed the elements of Seneca’s descriptions of the outward appearance or bodily effects of anger, partly by cut and paste, into an impressive “mirror meditation”:

Si […] ipse ira percitus speculum adieris et te ipsum contempleris, experieris ipsa re nihil deformius, tetrius aut foedius quam ab ira superari. […] Enimvero, si formam externam […] intueris: quam varius vultus, quam anxius, anhelus, truculentus et horridus? Quam turpis haec mutatio? […] Color terret insolitus, a nativo immutatus […]. Venae extumescunt, […] fervens oculis dat ira ruborem; […] quam ridiculi, quam truces nictus? Horrent subrigunturque capilli; corrugatur frons; strident dentes […]; lingua sui impotens, dissoluto freno minitabunda, titubans, in quamcumque injuriam profusa; sermo varius, inconstans, praeruptus, non sani hominis; hiulcus, mutilus, clamoribus pudendi nunc raucus, nunc turbatione interceptus; fremit vox […]; spiritus incensus, coactus, nec ordinatus; crebra et vehementius acta suspiria;

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122 Cf. his comment, ad loc.: ‘And how little of the real ugliness did the image reflected in the mirror disclose […]’.
123 Ibidem 11, 36, 3: ‘For people taken away by the passion of anger no image is more beautiful than the one that is fierce and savage, and that is exactly the way the wish to look like’.
124 Ibidem 11, 36, 4.
126 Cf. Seneca, De ira 1, 1, 3 ‘color versus’.
127 Cf. ibidem 11, 35, 3 ‘tumescunt venae’.
128 Cf. ibidem 1, 1, 4: ‘horrent ac surriguntur capilli’.
129 Cf. ibidem 1, 1, 3 ‘tristis frons’.
130 Cf. ibidem: ‘parum explanatis vocibus sermo praeruptus’.
131 Cf. ibidem 11, 35, 3: ‘rabida vocis eruptionio’.
132 Cf. ibidem 1, 1, 4: ‘spiritus coactus ac stridens’.
altius tracti gemitus;134 subsultans citato inaequaliter ateriae motus; cor velut prorupturum, extra palpitans [...].

If [...] you yourself get an attack of anger you shall go to a mirror and look at yourself, and you shall experience that there is nothing more ugly and disgraceful than to be overmastered by anger. [...] Because, if you just look at the outward appearance [...] how often does the expression of your face change, how anxious, hastened, savage, and horrible does it look like? How ugly is this changing expression? [...] The strange colour of the face, much different from its genuine one, is frightening. [...] The blood vessels are swelling up; because of boiling anger the eyes get red; [...] how ridiculous, how savage does the shaking of the head look like? The hair bristles; the forehead becomes wrinkled; the teeth are clenched [...] the tongue loses control, and having lost control it emits threats, swaggers, and utters all kinds of words of abuse; the speech becomes uncontrolled and chaotic as well, totters, breaks off all of a sudden, and does not resemble that of a sane person; it is not well connected anymore, and gets mutilated; sometimes it groans and breaks out into shameful screams, sometimes it breaks off in confusion; the voice sounds horrible [...] the breathing becomes accelerated, difficult, irregular; often it breaks out into heavy, sometimes long and deep sighs; the pulse becomes quick and irregular; it seems as if the heart is about jumping out of the body [...].

Interestingly, in his description of the angry person’s mirror image, Weyer included a number of features that cannot be seen, for example audible elements, such as groans, screams, tottering, words of abuse, sighs, etc., and physiological processes that take place in the interior body, such as abnormalities of the pulse and the “jumping” of the heart. I think that this is due to the fact that Weyer conceived his “mirror meditation” essentially as an inner process in which the inner self is able to observe all kinds of its own features, and to meditate on them. The senses certainly partake in this complex process, but bodily experience is from the very start always mixed with the intellect’s interpretations and reflections.

“Look into the mirror” in this exercise does not only mean to physically look into a mirror, but to engage in a complex self-reflection that takes into account as many of the bodily aspects of anger as possible. Weyer advises frequent engagement in this kind of self-reflection, which implies, of course, also

134 Cf. ibidem, 1, 1, 4: ‘gemitus mugitusque’.
conducted it at times when one has no access to an actual mirror. It is a telling detail that Weyer says in the introduction of this exercise also that one should ‘constantly’ (assidue) meditate on the image of the iratus ‘as if one were looking into a mirror’.135

In fact, this part of Weyer’s therapy seems to include a kind of double “inner meditation”: first, on the “inner self” in its mental constitution, i.e. on the state of the animus (mind and soul), and second, on the processes of the interior body. As both a Stoic and a Galenian physician, Weyer emphasized the interconnectivity of mind and body, and thus parallelized the relevant processes:

Porro si ad internarum partium viscerumque anatomen progredi lubet, Deus bone, qualis intra animus, cuius imaginem tam foedam, tumultuosam et exerçabilem cernis? Quanto illi intra pectus facies terribilior, impetus intensior, rupturus se nisi eruperit? Quantus universi sanguinis fervor, quam halituosa spirituum lucta, quanto cor incendio flagrat, quam hepar turget vindictae desiderio, quam ventriculus in vomitum proclivis, quam nervi agitatione multiplici convelluntur? […] Quam facultas vitalis labefactatur, quam virtus animalis quassatur? Quam potentia naturalis laeditur?136

Furthermore, if one wishes to proceed to the interior parts of the body and its anatomy, my God, how does the mind (animus) look, whose outward appearance you see in such an ugly, confused, and abominable state? How much more terrible is his inner face, how much stronger his impetus—his impetus that is about to explode if it did not yet burst out? How hot is the boiling of all the blood in the body, how heavy the struggling of the various spirits, how heavy does the heart burn, how much is the liver swollen because of the ardent desire to take revenge, how much is the stomach inclined to vomit, how much are the nerves torn by multiple agitation? […] How much does the power of life137 decrease, how much is it shattered, how much damaged?

Furthermore, the mental exercise of the “mirror meditation” implies an artificial and systematic identification of the self with the iratus. The meditator

137 Weyer seems to have used facultas vitalis, virtus animalis, and potentia naturalis as synonyms.
should imagine as many symptoms of anger as possible, even symptoms he never experienced himself; he should place those symptoms in the “mirror of his mind” and look at them carefully. The same goes *mutatis mutandis* for the last part of the exercise—the imagination of the features of a composed person in the “mirror of the mind”. One should imagine the look of a person with a serene and peaceful mind, and compare it with the one of the angry man.\(^{138}\)

In fact, the seventh item of Weyer’s philosophical therapeutic programme contains two different parts.\(^{139}\) The first one is designed as a kind of pragmatic and common-sense psychology, the second as spiritual exercises. The first advises avoiding outward occasions of irritation and anger.\(^{140}\) This means avoiding all people who might cause irritation in the first place, especially the contentious (‘litigiosi’), provocative (‘qui in iram […] provocant’), and irascible (‘qui […] in iram propendent’).\(^{141}\) One should carefully choose one’s companions. Weyer advises looking for plain, frank, straightforward, sincere, easy, good-natured, compliant, affable, yielding, temperate, moderate, modest, humble, mild, gentle, pleasant, delightful, and caring persons.\(^{142}\) With respect to this advice, Weyer closely follows Seneca, *De ira* 111, 8, 3–5, with a number of verbatim quotes.\(^{143}\) Furthermore, one should have also keep an eye on material objects, i.e. one should avoid the possession of precious and expensive objects, especially fragile ones, such as sophisticated glasses, vessels, sculptures, stones, and works of art that may cause anger if they get broken or lost.\(^{144}\) Weyer brings, among others, the example of Emperor Augustus, who saved the life of Vedius Pollio’s servant, who had broken an expensive crystalline vase.\(^{145}\)

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138 Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 70: ‘Iam si ex adverso illius, qui ab hoc irae morbo liberam degit vitam, imaginem contempleris, faciei intuearis decorum, oculorum venustatem, sermonis venustatem, compositos uniuscuiusque motus, morum comitatem, universi denique corporis actiones mire placidas, quis non abacto mordicus illo monstro hanc omnium gratissimam amplectatur formam?’


141 Ibidem.

142 Ibidem: ‘elige simplices, faciles, moderatos, submissos, humanos, suaves, pios quibuscum verseris quibusque familiariter coniunctiusve utaris[. . .].’

143 E.g. Seneca, *De ira*, 111, 8, 5: ‘Elige simplices, faciles, moderatos, qui iram tuam nec evocent et ferant. Magis adhuc proderunt summissi et humani et dulces, non tamen usque ad adulationem, nam iracundos nima assentatio offendit’.


145 Weyer took the story from Seneca’s *De ira* 111, 40, 2–4; in Weyer’s text, however, ‘Vedius Pollio’ is called ‘Atidius Pollio’), cf. ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 73; *Op. omn.*, p. 812. Vedius Pollio
Vedius had gotten so angry that he had ordered the clumsy servant to be fed to his murenas.

The second part (of item seven) is devoted to the Stoic exercise of the “innere Rückzug” (“retraite spirituelle”) the philosopher engages in deliberately ignoring all outward influences, especially sensual impressions, and in concentrating on his inner self and the essentials of the Stoic doctrine. He should be able to do so also in difficult circumstances, e.g. in the middle of a noisy crowd at the marketplace, or in a noisy bath or a fitness studio. Seneca makes Lucilius attentive to this exercise in *Letter to Lucilius* 56: ‘So imagine all kinds of sounds you may hate: when the bodybuilders, for example, are exercising themselves by lifting heavy leaden weights; when they grunt and sigh during their workouts, or pretend serious workouts by grunting and sighing; or when they produce wheezy and high-pitched tones after having retained breathing; or when a lazy fellow, [unwilling to work out and] content with a vulgar massage, gets rubbed, and one hears the crack of the pummeling hand on his shoulder, varying in sound according as the hand is laid on flat or hollow; the bloody limit is, when a ball player comes along and shouts out the score; and add to this uproar when a pick-pocket gets arrested, and the racket of a man who loves to hear his own voice [...]’. Seneca shows Lucilius how he himself successfully exerts the “retraite spirituelle” under these terrible conditions: “But I assure you that this racket means no more to me then the sound of waves or falling water [...] this time I have toughened my nerves against all that sort of thing, so that I can endure even a boatswain marking the time in high-pitched tones for his crew. For I force my mind to concentrate, and keep it from straying to things outside itself; all outdoors may be bedlam, provided that there is no disturbance within. [...] For what benefit is a quiet neighbourhood, if our emotions are in an uproar?” Similarly, in his prophylactic therapy of anger Weyer advises training the senses in ignoring impressions; and, differently from Seneca’s letter, he addresses all senses. However, he gives special attention to sounds that may cause irritation, which appears from the fact that he makes a detailed list of them: laughter, weeping, flattering, quarrels, outbursts of joy and disappointment, human voices and shouting, the voices of animals

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such as the lowing of cows and the bellowing of dogs.\textsuperscript{149} Interestingly, Weyer’s list has a typically Stoic flavour, since it contains primarily sounds that display emotional reactions: it was the Stoics who especially hated emotions. One may read Weyer’s list as “sounds a Stoic dislikes”.

Interestingly, in the same passage Weyer extended the “retraite spirituelle” to a prophylactic technique that aimed to ignore possible irritations caused by words on a larger scale, thus including \textit{written texts} (comprising insults or slander) and words one actually cannot hear, such as those of absent people. In doing so, he praises Caesar, who refused to read the correspondence between senators and Pompey that he had at hand, which surely contained many offences and expressions of slander (“\textit{multa contumeliosa verba}”).\textsuperscript{150} Instead, Caesar ordered the letters to be burned. Weyer highly estimated this as a major achievement of anger management, closely approaching the highest goal of the ‘seipsum vincere’: ‘\textit{Nam seipsum vincere, maxima est et laudatissima victoria}’\textsuperscript{151} Pompey is said to have done the same thing with the correspondence of Sertorius.\textsuperscript{152}

The eighth section is probably the most comprehensive, complex, and demanding part of the prophylactic spiritual exercises.\textsuperscript{153} It contains the repetitive reading of advice, sentences and writings of wise men with respect to anger and its careful internalization by meditation. These repetitions should take place very frequently, or as Weyer puts it, ‘\textit{constantly}’ (‘\textit{assidue}’);\textsuperscript{154} they include learning advice by heart (‘\textit{admonitiones}, ‘\textit{consilia}’), and exercising it, as it were, in a physical training. Of course, short or sententious texts especially suit this kind of exercise, texts such as

\begin{quote}
\textit{Iracundia nihil amplum decorumque molitur.} (Anger does not bring forth anything great or decent)—\textsc{Seneca}
\end{quote}

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{} Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 71; \textit{Op. omn.}, p. 81: ‘\textit{Aures [...] quandoque obturandae, ut audientes non audient: quas etiam risum, fletum, blanditias, lites, prospera et tristia, hominum voces et clamores, animalium fremitus, boum mugitus, latratus canum [...] tolerare oportet}’.
\bibitem{} Ibidem.
\bibitem{} Ed. Off. Oporinus, pp. 74–75; \textit{Op. omn.}, p. 813: ‘\textit{Octavo animi fervorem te praeventurum ne dubites, si aliorum insignium virorum scripta, admonitiones et consilia adversus praecipitis huius mali virulentiam non modo semel atque iterum lectites, sed et in iis assidue nec ignaviter exerceas}’.
\bibitem{} Ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 75; \textit{Op. omn.}, p. 814; \textsc{Seneca, De ira} 1, 20, 3.
\end{thebibliography}
Pusilli hominis et miseri est, repetere mordentem.\textsuperscript{156} (It is characteristic for fainthearted and miserable people to respond to verbal attacks)—SENECA

Magni animi est, iniurias contemnere.\textsuperscript{157} (It is characteristic for great minds to despise attacks)—SENECA

Nullum est argumentum magnanimitatis certius quam nihil posse, quo instigeris, accidere.\textsuperscript{158} (There is no surer proof of greatness than to be in a state where nothing can possibly happen to disturb you)—SENECA

Hominem homini nocere non posse [...] nisi in externis bonis. [...] Nemo itaque laeditur nisi a seipso.\textsuperscript{159} (A man cannot be damaged by his fellow man, except with respect to external goods. [...] Thus, nobody can be damaged except by himself)—CICERO

Melius non agnoscere quam ulcisci.\textsuperscript{160} (It is better not to notice something [an injury] than to take revenge)—CATO THE ELDER

An quicquam similius insaniae quam ira?\textsuperscript{161} (Is there anything more similar to madness than anger?)—CICERO

Ira initium insaniae.\textsuperscript{162} (Madness starts with anger)—ENNIUS

Nulla est tanta vis, tanta copia, quae non ferro ac viribus debilitari frangique possit; verum vincere animum, iracundiam cohibere, quae semper est inimica consilio, victoriam temperare [...] haec qui faciat, non ego eum summis viris comparo, sed deo simillimum iudico.\textsuperscript{163} (There is no power, no number of soldiers that cannot be destroyed by iron and force; but to conquer one’s own mind, to stop anger, which is always opposed to reasonable behaviour, to moderate victory [...] him who is...
able to act this way I do not only count among the most outstanding men, but regard him as very similar to God)—CICERO

These sententious texts were not only written by Stoics, but stem from a number of Greek and Roman philosophers, authors of philosophical works, or wise men, such as Chilo, Bias of Priene (6th century BC), Zeno of Elea the dialectician (5th century BC), Phocylides of Milotus (6th/5th century BC), Plato, Aristotle, Pyrrhus, Epicurus, Plutarch, Cato, Cicero, etc., but also from poets and other writers, for example Homer, the comedy author Menander, Ennius, Lucretius, Horace, Melanthius of Athens, Publilius Syrus, and so on. The broad spectrum of authorities does not imply that Weyer’s mental exercise lost its Neostoic character. Conducting exercises with the sententious text of non-Stoics is not in contradiction with Stoic practice, as one can see from Seneca’s letters. Many of the sententiae Seneca offers Lucilius to meditate on stem from non-Stoics as well, such as Epicurus and Virgil. In Weyer’s collection, however, Seneca nevertheless plays a very important part. The first four of the above-quoted sentences, and a considerable number of the total amount, stem from Seneca’s De ira; De ira is clearly a major, if not the main source of the collection, and it is therefore no surprise that the collection starts with excerpts from Seneca’s treatise. The sentences from other philosophers and writers are of a kind that they can very well be applied for the internalization of the Stoic views on anger. This even goes for the sententiae taken from philosophical opponents with respect to the theory of emotions, such as Aristotle or Epicurus.

Whereas the eighth part deals with the meditation on philosophical sententiae, the ninth prescribes the meditation of historical examples: first of “negative” ones, i.e. of rulers and princes who were seized by anger, with the most terrible results (mostly killing, torture, and other cruelties), and ending with a final section on ‘tyrants’, and second of “positive” ones, i.e. of clement rulers who succeeded at suppressing anger and VINCERE SE IPSUM. The

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168 Seneca, De ira 1, 20; 20, 3; 203; 11, 32; 34; 111, 5, 7–8; 111, 6.
examples stem from European, Asian, and African history, from antiquity up to the 16th century, and were collected from various sources accessible to Weyer, especially from Greek and Latin historiography. Contemporary examples of special importance are De immannitate, a treatise of the 15th-century humanist Giovanni Pontano on cruelty, and Marcantonio Sabellico’s Enneades sive Rhapsodia historiarum.\textsuperscript{173} Although Weyer describes Italian (and other foreign) acts of cruelty in detail, he remains rather vague and general on those of closer regions, such as northwestern Germany or the Low Countries.

How should the reader meditate on (negative) historical examples? If the reader is himself a politician or ruler, he may use them “directly”, so to say, in the sense of a mirror of princes. If not, he must engage in a different and more demanding mental exercise. In almost all examples Weyer has emphasized the cruelty and lack of justice of the irati. He wants the reader, in a first step, to focus on precisely this aspect: the reader shall linger on the examples of cruel behaviour and be filled with awe, abhorrence, surprise, and repulsion; he shall become emotional over all those horrible images of bloodshed, torture, and senseless killing. In a second step, the reader shall apply the images to himself in the sense of the “mirror meditation” described above. As the ugly face and voice distorted by anger in the “mirror meditation”, the reader shall transfer the ugly features of outrageous cruelty to himself; he shall imagine that it is he himself who commits the disgusting acts of violence. Mutatis mutandis, this is the same process as Luther’s meditation on the Passion: the meditator is supposed to identify not with Christ, but with the culprits, the Jews. The result envisaged by Weyer is not that the reader shall condemn cruel rulers from a moral or religious point of view, but that he condemns himself, is repulsed by himself, and shows repentance. Moral victory, Weyer says, will be achieved by repentance (resipiscencia).\textsuperscript{174} Weyer wants it so that the reader, when he looks at all the cruelties described in detail, ‘spits on his own breast’, i.e. detests and loathes himself, and ‘finds in himself of what he accused his fellow man’, i.e. puts his “hand inside his cloak”, as the Lord ordered Moses to do.\textsuperscript{175} Repentance is

\textsuperscript{173} Cf. e.g. ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 104; Op. omn., § 66, p. 830; Sabellico’s work appeared in 1498 in Venice (Bernardo dei Vitali), and again, in the Collected Works, in Basel in 1560; Pontano’s appeared in the same town, 1518, edited by Pietro Summonte.


\textsuperscript{175} Walther, Lateinische Sprichwörter und Sentenzen des Mittelalters und der frühen Neuzeit in alphabetischer Anordnung 11 (Göttingen: 1983) 144: ‘In sinu nostro invenire est, carpimus que in altero’; Exodus 4, 6: ‘when Moses took it out, the skin was leprous—it had become as white as snow’; cf. ed. Off. Oporinus, p. 108; Op. omn., § 70, p. 833: ‘in proprium quilibet sinum inspuat. Resipiscencia vincamus, a malo quisque declinet, et quod bonum est operatur’.
crucial for living a good life in a Christian sense, to ‘run the curriculum of this world in a pious, just, and chaste way’, and of course, *eo ipso*, to control anger.

And it is also in this sense that the reader should meditate on more recent examples, e.g. Sultan Mehmed the Great or Italians. Mehmed (Mahometes Othomanus) is presented as a homosexual who used to walk around for pleasure in the secret garden of his residence in Constantinople, always accompanied by his two dearest boy lovers. When he discovered once that two cucumbers were missing, he accused the boys of having eaten them, and after they denied it he got so furious that in his rage he opened up their bellies with his sword in order to prove that at least one of them was lying. After the terrible bloodshed it turned out that neither of the boys had eaten the cucumbers. Maybe even more cruel are the acts of violence exerted in faction or family wars in contemporary (or near contemporary) Italian towns, such as those described by Marcantonio Sabellico: persons burned alive, little children slaughtered in their cradles, pregnant women stabbed in their bellies, persons thrown down from towers, and other persons disembowelled (‘exenterati’); or such as those acts transmitted by Giovanni Pontano, who tells of a certain person who was caught and cut into little pieces; so was his liver, which was roasted and offered as a snack to the person’s relatives.

Thus Weyer unfolds a remarkably elaborate, carefully constructed, and detailed meditative programme of some 50 folio pages. Its major parts consist of exercises that can be called Stoic, or stem from Stoic pedagogy as described in Seneca’s *Letters to Lucilius* (such as the personal coach; the *retraite spirituelle*; the systematic internalization of sententious texts designed by wise men). Some of the typically Stoic exercises or prophylactic devices are borrowed from or inspired by Seneca’s *De ira* (such as the daily *examen conscientiae* or the *prae-meditatio* of the harmful and destructive effects of anger). Given its sources, the whole programme is correctly labelled as ‘philosophical’ by Weyer, while it hardly comprises elements that are in contradiction with Christian religion. The *examen conscientiae* is also part of Christian exercises, and it looks back on a long, especially monastic tradition. The meditation on historical examples of cruelties, on the other hand, has a Lutheran touch and uses affecting images as a means to bring forth self-repulsion and repentance.

In general, Weyer’s programme of prophylactic exercises is much more elaborate and systematic than the advice given in Seneca’s *De ira*. One may wonder

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176 Ibidem.
179 Ibidem.
why Weyer has chosen this approach. Of course, it could be that he simply wanted to surpass his antique predecessor, or that he intended to systematize the thoughts of a Latin text that was regarded by some modern readers as ill structured, confused, full of repetitions, and unedited, and by others, such as Marcantonius Muretus, as mutilated and incomplete, and thus disorderly and imperfect in that sense. But I think that there is also something else. In a marked difference from Seneca and other Stoics—but in accordance with Christian theologians, Galen, and Neostoic philosophers, such as Justus Lipsius—Weyer did not believe that it was possible to radically ‘kill’ or ‘eradicate’ emotions, but only to strive against them, to lower and dampen them. In Weyer’s view, the individual will never succeed with breaking completely free of passions, but it may well succeed with preventing emotions from breaking fully through, and with avoiding the most terrible and dangerous results of anger, i.e. killing other people. In Seneca’s De ira the destructive action, i.e. revenge, is part of the definition of anger; for Weyer it is not. For Weyer, the element between anger and destructive action is ratio, rational thinking. Ratio is for him a kind of lifeline: a means of rescuing the individual in difficult situations. He does not say so, but implicitly he does not agree with the way in which Seneca described the process of getting angry: a sequence of conscious, quasi-rational ‘assents’ by the animus to wrong and harmful impressions, with the last, explicitly conscious assent leading directly to revenge. As a physician, and especially because of his Galenic background, Weyer also acknowledged physical reasons for anger, such as disharmonies in the temperamentum of the humours, especially an exuberance of yellow or black bile; diseases of the liver and the gallbladder (including stones); problems of digestion; and so on. If there are natural reasons for anger, it is clear that it is impossible to banish

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180 Cf. Lipsius’s introduction of De ira in his Seneca edition (“argumentum et ordo”) (Antwerp, Moretus: 1604), p. 1: ‘Libri [sc. De ira] in partibus pulchri et eminenter sunt, in toto parum distincti, et repetitionibus aut digestione confusi’. Lipsius thought that De ira was Seneca’s first moral treatise, written in the time of Caligula, but that it either remained unedited or had been edited by him only superficially shortly before his violent death. Cf. ibidem: ‘Scripsit tunc igitur, sed non edidit […] , etsi statim, opinor, ab eius morte’. Weyer, however, in all probability did not react on Lipsius’s judgement, because the above-quoted introduction appeared only many years after De ira orbo.

181 Cf. E.g. Seneca, Opera omnia quae extant […] cum omnium selectionibus commentariis hactenus editis […] (Geneva, Alexander Pernetus: 1628) 597: ‘Hi libri […] ita mutili decurtagitate sunt, ut iusta prope causa fuerit graviter iis irascendi, quorum id negligentia con-tigit, nisi ipsimet irasci nos vetarent’.

182 Cf. above.

ira; it may come back at any moment. But it is possible to dampen it, and to prevent aggressive action. I think it is because of these differences in thought that Weyer developed his elaborate programme of prophylactic philosophical exercises. One must constantly do his best; one must exercise *daily* in order to dampen anger and to prevent it from bursting out into destructive action.

4 Weyer's Theological Therapy of Anger: Catholic Inclinations

These thoughts are also the point of departure of Weyer’s theological anger therapy,¹⁸⁴ which is basically a *religious supplement* to the programme of philosophical prophylactic exercises. The theological therapy contains religious meditations Weyer considered necessary or useful *in combination* with the Stoic exercises discussed above.

In general, his “remedia theologica” do not have a typically Protestant, either Lutheran or Calvinist, design and outlook. Weyer does not quote a single Protestant author, but he does extensively quote the Church fathers—Jerome, Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory the Great, Isidore, Bede the Venerable, Basil the Great, and Chrysostomus—as *auctoritates* on the emotion of anger and as authorities for the interpretation and understanding of the Bible as well. Weyer brings in a number of biblical passages by quoting the commentaries of Chrysostomus, Ambrosius, Gregory the Great, and Augustine. In Protestant theology no such authority is given to the above-mentioned authors. Even more remarkably, Weyer applied a number of monastic authors/authorities, such as Bernard of Clairvaux (*Sermons*);¹⁸⁵ the Cistercian monk Guerricus, abbot of Igny (1138–1156, *Collected Sermons*);¹⁸⁶ Cassiodorus (ca. 485–585),¹⁸⁷ the founder of the monastery of Vivarium (which also consisted of a hermitage); Jerome, the lover of *solitude*; the Greek monk Basil;¹⁸⁸ the Eastern hermits Agathon (5th century),¹⁸⁹ Pastor de Scythi,¹⁹⁰ Ioannes de Scythi,¹⁹¹ and Beno of Thebes,¹⁹²

¹⁸⁶ Ibidem.
¹⁹¹ Ibidem.
plus an anonymous ‘Egyptian monk’ (probably a hermit as well) quoted in the *Ecclesiastica historia* of the Byzantine historian Nicephorus Callistus (ca. 1256–ca. 1325);\(^{193}\) the monastic founding father Bede the Venerable of Northumbria (673/674–735); and furthermore, a couple of important monastic source texts, such as Isidorus’s *Soliloquia*;\(^{194}\) Jerome’s letters on the monastic life, such as the one to the nun Demetrias (“Ad Demetriadem de servanda virginitate”, letter 130), and Gregory the Great’s *Moralia in Iob*.\(^{195}\)

The monastic portion of Weyer’s authorities give his therapy a kind of Catholic flavour. As is generally known, Calvinists and Lutherans despised monks and were certainly not inclined to accept them as authorities of religious piety or moral conduct. The authoritative sentences of Weyer’s monks are often designed after the model of the monastic *contemptus mundi*, comprising extreme abnegation of the self and of sensual pleasures,\(^{196}\) and a radical withdrawal from human society, in order to cultivate a tranquil, quiet, and peaceful mind. This feature, again, does not go well with Protestant thought. But there is no criticism of the monastic life on Weyer’s side, only praise. For example, about the Egyptian hermit Beno Weyer says: ‘Nobody saw Beno, hermit of the desert of Thebes, ever in a state of anger. He, who does not get angry at anybody, enjoys everlasting peace. […] He took everything with a tranquil mind, and found his peace in the hope for the reward of heaven’.\(^{197}\) In comments such as this, Weyer even seems to subscribe to the ideals of monasticism.

Another Catholic element is Weyer’s denotation of some authorities as *Saints*, such as ‘Divus Ambrosius’\(^{198}\) or ‘Divus Paulus’.\(^{199}\) To call upon saints, of course, severely goes against Calvinist rules. But Weyer hails even the monastic hero Jerome as a saint (‘Divus Hieronymus’),\(^{200}\) as well as James (‘Divus Jacobus’), the author of the well-known letter—which was damned by Lutherans and Calvinists alike as ‘Catholic’.\(^{201}\) Another Catholic characteristic


is brought forth when Weyer quotes the book *Jesus Sirach* (*Wisdom of Sirach/Joshua ben Sirach*),
which was accepted by the Catholics as canonical, and an important authority,
whereas it was not acknowledged by the Lutherans and Calvinists: Luther had rejected the book as apocryphal. Weyer, however, did not just quote *Jesus Sirach*, but attached to it a value that came close to the words of Jesus Christ. Sirach says: “Forgive your fellowman his offence, and your sins will be forgiven at your prayer.” This has, in fact, the same content as a famous line in the *Pater noster*, Christianity’s most important prayer. In another passage Weyer quotes the *Letter of James*, one of the *Catholic Letters*, as an authoritative text. While the letter was canonized by the Catholic Church (by Athanasius of Alexandria), Luther listed it among the *antilegomena* because he considered it as contradicting Paul’s doctrine of justification, which was according to Luther ‘sola fide’ (‘by faith alone’). Luther was so offended by *James* 2, 17 ff. (‘faith devoid of charity and good works is a dead faith, and in the eyes of God insufficient of justification [...]’ and ‘by works a man is justified, and not only by faith’) that he called it an ‘epistle of straw’, one that had no evangelical character at all (‘keine evangelische Art’). Weyer, in a marked difference from Luther, quotes James’s views on justification with consent; a person filled with anger against his fellow man is devoid of charity, and such a person will not be justified by

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204 Ibidem. It is a telling detail that both Jesus Christ and Sirach appear in the same paragraph, and that Sirach’s ‘wisdom’ seems to built on the one of ‘our Saviour’ (‘Servator noster Christus Iesus’).


206 Cf. below.

207 In the Calvinist Bible, these are the letters of James, two letters of Peter, three letters of John (the Apostle), and the letter of Judas; in the Lutheran Bible, the *Catholic Letters* comprise the letters of James and Judas only. For the letter of James cf. Camerlynck A., “Epistle of St James”, in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (dig., retrieved 16 May 2012).


God: ‘Ira enim viri iustitiam Dei non operatur, teste Iacobo’. At another place in the “remedia theologica” Weyer calls a certain piece of advice from James's letter ‘pious’ (pie). Another telling detail is the fact that Weyer has systematically lowered the self-consciousness of his religious meditator. Weyer avoided ascribing to him an independent judgement, or a self-conscious trust in God’s grace, based on the conviction of belonging to the chosen ones (electi). Instead, Weyer returned to the well-known authorities of the Christian—i.e. Catholic—Church, and above all the Church Fathers: with respect to the theory of emotions and their theological therapy, Weyer's attitudes and sentences are basically identical to those of Saint Jerome, Saint Ambrose, Augustine, Gregory, Basil, and Chrysostomus.

Since Weyer did not believe that it was possible to radically ‘kill’ or ‘eradicate’ anger completely, only to dampen it and prevent it from bursting into violent action, he designed religious meditations that would work in this direction. In these meditations the individual generally displays a more humble and modest attitude than he does in the philosophical exercises. The meditator is not convinced that striving successfully against anger depends on his own decisions and strength. For example, it would have been easy for Weyer to parallelize the Stoic morning meditation with a Christian one, and the examen conscientiae in the evening with a Christian examen. Weyer, however, replaced it with a daily morning and evening prayer (oratio). The agent is not man, but God. In the morning we shall pray to God so that he may control our emotions and save us from sinful behaviour. The relevant prayer is the Pater noster. Its line ‘forgive us our sins, for we ourselves forgive everyone who is indebted to us’ Weyer interprets as a prayer against anger, in the sense of ‘forgive us our offences, for we ourselves forgive everyone who has offended/injured us’.

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211 Cf. above.


213 Ed. Off. Oporinus, pp. 154–155; Op. omn., § 2, p. 859: ‘Remitte nos debita nostra, sicut et nos remittimus debitoribus nostris’; the concept of forgiving injuries/offences is central. It is interesting that in this case, Weyer has not quoted the Vulgate, but preferred Theodor Beza's translation. This is may be a hint as to his Protestant sympathies, but the reading may also have been chosen with an eye on the concept of forgiving injuries/offences.
The *Pater noster* (with its special application to anger) should also be repeated each evening. The above-quoted line has an underlying *do ut des* relation: if we want God to forgive us, we are principally not allowed to burst out in anger against our fellow man, viz. to take revenge. Therefore, we must try to avoid situations that might prompt our irritation.

The fifth part of Weyer's philosophical exercises, which was focused on counting, weighing, estimating and comparing, has now turned into parallel religious meditations. Instead of comparing the small and ridiculous reasons for anger with its most deplorable results, one shall take into account the relationship between the amount of offence we may experience, and the amount of sin God may remit to us (if we do not take revenge). The conclusion of this estimation can only be that it is more than worthwhile not to take revenge, and to forgive one's fellow men. And, in order to internalize this conclusion, Weyer asks us to meditate on the authoritative sentence of *Joshua ben Sirach*: ‘Forgive your fellow man his offences, and your sins will be forgiven’.214

Maybe the most important and powerful exercise among Weyer's theological remedies against anger is the *meditation on Christ's Passion*.215 In a marked difference from Luther's method, Weyer asks the meditator to *identify with Christ* and engage in a profound *imitatio Christi*. If Christ was able to take so many and such heavy offences, even torture and a painful death, without getting angry at his persecutors, it should be easy for us to accept much less severe offence. Weyer concludes the exercise with an emotional appeal to ‘take one's cross each day, and follow’ Christ, just as Jesus had asked his disciples.216 The fact that Weyer preferred the text as transmitted by Luke indicates that he designed the *imitatio Christi* meditation as a daily exercise.217 One should vividly imagine each day that one carries the cross (just as Christ did) to the place of one's execution; i.e. one should imagine that one experiences the most terrible verbal and physical injuries, pain, torture, and in the end even a shameful death. The goal of the exercise is *self-denial* (*abnegatio sui ipsius*), just as

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214  *Sirach* 28, 2.


217  Only *Lucas* 9, 23 has the reading ‘cotidie’ (‘daily’).
Christ demanded from his disciples. Weyer considered it the most effective exercise in order to strive against anger and prevent one from taking revenge.218

This is a profoundly Catholic exercise, omnipresent in late medieval spiritual exercises, such as Thomas of Kempen’s *Imitatio Christi* (III, 32), and in monastic theology. The meditation on Christ’s Passion was considered the *via regia* of conversion and spiritual progress. It has no real equivalent in Weyer’s Neostoic exercises. Moreover, its design has little to do with Stoic meditations, because it is built on a very strong emotionalization of the self, followed by total self-denial. The meditation on Christ’s Passion, however, is conceived as an antidote against the pride of Stoic autarky and the arrogance of the Stoic sage, who—in absolute control of himself—may feel himself to be a king, as the well-known Stoic paradox indicates. And this is, in general, the sense Weyer attached to his theological meditations: they are meant to serve as a supplement to the philosophical and Stoic exercises, and as a *correctivum* at the same time. Weyer’s theological supplement is a Neo-Stoic instrument *par excellence*: it is designed to merge Stoicism with Christianity.

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Chapter 4

Anger Management and the Rhetoric of Authenticity in Montaigne’s De la colère (II, 31)

Anita Traninger

Michel de Montaigne did not tire in drawing attention to the fact that his Essais confounded received opinion. In his own words, they were to be seen as “paradoxes”, which, in the old understanding of the term, means that he preferred to part with the common doxa and to take a stance contrary to accepted wisdom.1 At first glance, this seems to apply equally to Montaigne’s reflection on anger, De la colère (II, 31), which appears to be at odds with the general consensus on anger management in that he supposedly ‘refuses categorically […] to suppress any passion’.2 In what follows I will show, however, that Montaigne is actually in line with contemporary definitions of, as well as concerns about, how to handle anger. He shares with his contemporaries doubts about the individual’s capability of governing the passion and a certain uneasiness about the fact that anger can, at any time and no matter how thoroughly reflected and methodically tamed, get the better of a man. But he is also in line with contemporary opinions about anger management, which is portrayed as a power technique, one that transforms raw affect into a display of superiority. What is unusual, however, is the context to which this use of anger is applied: it is the management of a household, and the case for or against anger is made with a view to the disciplining of unruly subordinates. Here, Montaigne does again largely concur with precepts of how to govern a maison, and how to treat the members that are under the rule of the head of the household, namely women, children, and servants. Montaigne’s reliance on classical authors and patterns of argumentation necessarily entails that reflections on slavery are transposed from Antiquity to the Ancien régime, paralleling relations between masters and servants with that between masters and slaves.


Michel de Montaigne was not the only one to reflect on anger in late sixteenth century France, however the typical focus was rather on the anger of princes than that of heads of households. Anger figured prominently in the pamphlet literature produced in the course of the French civil wars, where both sides not only accused each other of acting out of anger but also took to an aggressive style of accusing and denigrating the opposing party. The fact that the magistrate and diplomat Guy du Faur de Pibrac (1529–1584) pronounced a “Discours de l’ire et comment il faut la modérer” in Henri II’s Palace Academy at Blois in 1576 has been directly linked to the hardened emotions and the acrimony that had both informed and, tragically, also resulted from the religious wars. From 1576 to 1579, Henri II assembled dignitaries, scholars and poets at his court as the patron of the Académie du Palais to discuss questions of moral philosophy, typically listening to short discourses on ethical questions such as whether intellectual or moral virtues were more laudable, whether joy or sadness was the more vehement passion, etc. These were oral events, and we are informed about the speeches delivered only through transcripts that are extant in manuscript, one of them having been ordered by Marguerite de Valois, who was among the participants of the early gatherings.

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4 Sue Farquhar has argued for a causal nexus between the meeting of the Estates General and the choice of anger as a topic, see Farquhar S.W., “‘Toutes passions mises an arrière…’: The Emotions in Legal Perspective: Montaigne and the Palace Academy in Blois”, Modern Language Notes 120/1 (2005) S124–S140. Farquhar interprets ‘the discourse on anger as an emergent grammar of rights, intrinsically linked to sovereign “liberties”’ (ibidem S126). In contrast, Robert Sealy simply explains the series of topics discussed in Paris and then in Blois with a view to the catalogue of virtues that Aristotle treats in the Nicomachian Ethics, see Sealy R.J., The Palace Academy of Henry III (Geneva: 1981) 39–81, here 61, as well as 59–81 on the court’s sojourn and the Academy’s sessions in Blois during the meeting of the Estates General.
In his discourse, held in the presence of the king, Pibrac, who was the entrepreneur or director of the Academy, complies with well-established patterns for showcasing one’s learning: first he compares a wide selection of definitions of anger, then he considers the cures for anger as found in the classical authorities. A discussion on rulers who managed to tame their passions leads up to his conclusion, warning that the stakes are high when a ruler acts en colère: ‘Mais celles [i.e. la colère] des Princes comme un grand ambrazement peut à l’instant destruire des villes de fons en comble, et allumer des guerres & dissensions immortelles.’7

As was the rule with the discourses pronounced at the Academy, Pibrac was not the only one to tackle the issue. Amadis Jamyn (1538–1592) contributed a piece that joined Pibrac’s in stressing the importance of taming the passion.8 And while the third and fourth discourse, both recorded in the manuscripts without attribution to a specific Academy member, take the opposing side in making the case for princely anger, they still concur with the first two in an important regard: all four speeches present nuances of the same maxim, that anger needs to be bridled.

The first unnamed discourse introduces a reflexion on social hierarchy that goes beyond Aristotle’s definition of anger as a reaction to a perceived insult committed by someone of lower rank.9 The speaker introduces a social gradation of anger with a view to usefulness: the anger of the ‘menu peuple’ does nothing for the public good but invariably ends in injury and manslaughter.10 The anger of a prince, however,

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8 A fifth discourse by Baïf has not been included in Fremy’s edition, but is extant in Marguerite de Valois’ album, see Rouget, “Les orateurs de ‘La Pléiade’ ” 29.

9 Aristotle, Rhetoric 11, 2. See below n. 43.

That anger is reined in by reason is thus not discussed as a problem, as was the actual task, but presupposed as a condition. This condition being fulfilled, anger appears to be a tonic that heats the body, that fuels courage in battle, that is a lubricant of leadership, virtually the cocaine of the powerful. It is what animates a prince, since without anger, he is ‘ung rocher’ (296), a lifeless rock.

Montaigne is in line with the tenor of the Academy discourses in that he also frames anger as a question of power. It has been variously noted that some of Montaigne’s early essays are dedicated to the very same questions debated at the Academy. Yet given that the ‘debate’ at the Academy is not really about confronting or opposing radical alternatives but rather about weighing the evidence provided by a canon of classical authors, the question of influence seems less pertinent than the question of which aspect is emphasised, how exempla are selected and combined, and which advice is derived from this deliberation and re-arrangement of well-known positions.

One marked difference, however, lies in the social context. Montaigne is not concerned with giving advice to a king but with reflecting on his own conduct as a ruler on a smaller scale: as the head of a household.

2 Managing a maison

Montaigne opens his reflections on anger with a paragraph on the education of children, relating a rarely endorsed argument from Aristotle’s Nicomachian Ethics: even the most civil governments were at fault in leaving the education of children to the parents, thus exposing them to the danger of being raised by foolish or unfit persons. This is supported by a first-person account by Montaigne, who confesses to his own impulse of putting on a show (‘farce’) of

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revenge for many a child who was subject to the rage and fury of its parents.\textsuperscript{13} The opening paragraphs set the tone and define the angle of Montaigne’s take on the topic: he does not focus on the king, the military leader, or the free citizen and his public demeanor, but rather on the management of a household and a father’s relations with those belonging to his \textit{ménage}, given that his judgement is constantly under threat by the anger provoked by the members of the household: ‘Il n’est passion qui esbranle tant la sincérité des jugements, que la cholere.’\textsuperscript{14} How should a man then govern those who are under his rule, the wife, children, and servants that make up his \textit{maison}?

Given that the education of children by others than the parents is advocated in the opening paragraphs, it is remarkable that the text itself shows that the problem is thus only shifted, not solved: entrusting a child to a schoolmaster means subjecting him to the teacher’s proverbial anger—Horace’s ‘plagosus Orbilius’ (\textit{Epistles} II, 1, 70–71) comes to mind. Thus there is no escape from anger. The text acknowledges this in asking why ‘fathers and schoolmasters’ (‘peres’ and ‘pedantes’) should be allowed to chastise children in their anger, ‘estans en cholere’.\textsuperscript{15} The phrase ‘in their anger’ appears to be crucial here: not the chastisement as such is conceived as a problem, but that it be administered while enraged.

Following the opening paragraph on the education of children, the text switches rather abruptly to the question of how to punish servants. Again, there is no questioning of the fact that servants need to be punished; the focus is rather on the mental condition of the master and the timing of a punishment: ‘Nous mesmes, pour bien faire, ne devrions jamais mettre la main sur noz serviteurs, tandis que la cholere nous dure […]’.\textsuperscript{16} The passage is in line with Seneca’s argument that anger and punishment should be strictly separated.

\textsuperscript{13} Montaigne Michel de, \textit{Les essais}, ed. J. Balsamo – A. Legros, Bibliothèque de la Pléiade (Paris: 2007) 750–757: II, 31, “De la cholere”, here 750: ‘Entre autres choses combien de fois m’a-il prins envie, passant par nos rues, de dresser une farce, pour venger des garçonnetz, que je voyoy escorcher, assommer, et meurtrir à quelque pere ou mere furieux, et forcenez de colere.’—‘How many times have I been tempted, among other things, to make a dramatic intervention so as to avenge some little boys whom I saw being bruised, knocked about and flayed alive by some frenzied father or mother beside themselves with anger.’


\textsuperscript{15} Ibidem. ‘We ourselves, if we would act properly, should never lay a hand on our servants as long as our anger lasts.’

\textsuperscript{16} Ibidem. ‘We ourselves, if we would act properly, should never lay a hand on our servants as long as our anger lasts.’
In book I of *De ira*, he responds to an imagined critic: ‘“What then?” you say, “is not correction sometimes necessary?”’ Of course it is; but with discretion, not with anger.\(^{17}\) The maxim for correcting wrongdoers is then spelled out in memorable brevity: ‘non sine castigatione, sed sine ira’—‘not without punishment, but without anger.’\(^{18}\) It is this situation of dominance and subordination that is the context for Montaigne’s reflection on what happens if anger seizes a master, rendering him, who is supposed to govern others, powerless: ‘C’est la passion qui commande lors, c’est la passion qui parle, ce n’est pas nous.’\(^{19}\)

Further adverse consequences of a passion unchecked are adduced: it is not only that anger tends to cloud one’s judgement, blowing a servant’s misdemeanour out of proportion and, as a consequence, resulting in a harsher punishment than actually merited. Crucially, punishments dealt in anger are less effective:

Et puis, les châtiements, que se font avec poix et discretion, se reçoivent bien mieux, et avec plus de fruit, de celuy qui les souffre. Autrement, il ne pense pas avoir esté justement condamné, par un homme agité et de furie: et allegue pour sa justification, les mouvements extraordinaires de son maistre, l’inflammation de son visage, les sermens inusitez, et cette sienne inquietude, et precipitation temeraire.\(^{20}\)

At the end of the introduction, an incident related by Suetonius is quoted without much of a contextualisation: it is about Caesar’s angry seeking of revenge even when he was himself in the position of a judge, and the fact that it was this comportment that most helped his victim, Caius Rabirius, when he appealed the case. This legal anecdote, I would suggest, should be taken as an allusion to Seneca’s call for the angry man to adopt the impartial stance of the law: ‘What!

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18 Seneca, *De ira* 1, 15, 1.
19 Montaigne, “De la cholere” 751. ‘Until then [i.e. until we have cooled off] passion is in command, passion does all the talking, not us.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 810.
20 Montaigne, “De la cholere” 751. ‘And then punishments applied after being judiciously weighed are more acceptable and more useful to the sufferer. Otherwise he does not think that he has been justly condemned by a man shaking with anger and fury; he cites in his own justification the extraordinary agitation of his master, his inflamed face, his unaccustomed swearing, his mental disturbance, and his precipitate haste.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 810f. (with my changes).
Think you the law is angry with men it does not know, whom it has never seen, who it hopes will never be? The spirit of the law, therefore, we should make our own—the law which shows not anger but determination.\textsuperscript{21}

Thus the anecdote about Caesar highlights, explicitly and implicitly, two extremes in dealing with anger: one, letting oneself go to the extent that even in the position of a judge, revenge is being sought; and two, a radical disengagement from any authentic emotion with the aim of emulating the letter of the law. What is humanely possible, one might conclude, is to navigate between these two poles, between the despicable and the unattainable.

That the punishment of children and servants is discussed indiscriminately (or at least without signalling a change of subject) mirrors the Ancien Régime notion of the family as being ‘un ménage composé d’un chef et de ses domestiques, soit femmes, enfans, ou serviteurs’.\textsuperscript{22} Before the eighteenth century, servants were defined rather by their membership of a household than as wage-earners, and accordingly, their work was extremely unspecified.\textsuperscript{23} Their common status as domestiques equally subjected children and servants to the disciplining authority of the head of the household, who disciplined both as a master, but was also responsible for the moral education of both as a father.\textsuperscript{24}

This means in turn that servants were conceived as immature and dependent like minors. Corporal punishment as a master’s right was not questioned as such, yet servants could and would demand that they not be beaten excessively or cruelly.\textsuperscript{25} And despite a gradual transformation of the concept of domestic service towards the end of the Ancien Régime, handbooks of the eighteenth century still recommended physical punishment ‘as a means of moral education while erratic or gratuitous violence was frowned upon as unchristian.’\textsuperscript{26}

\begin{thebibliography}{99}
\bibitem{seneca} Seneca, \textit{De ira} 1, 6, 6. ‘Quid? Tibi lex videtur irasci iis quos non novit, quos non vidit, quos non futuros sperat? Illius itaque sumendus est animus, quae non irascitur sed constituit.’
\bibitem{furetiere} Furetière Antoine, \textit{Dictionnaire universel contenant généralement tous les mots français, tant vieux que modernes, et les termes de toutes les sciences et des arts}, 3 vols. (Den Haag – Rotterdam, Arnout & Reinier Leers: 1690) vol. 2, 13 ff. (s.v. “famille”). See the discussion in Fairchilds C., \textit{Domestic Enemies: Servants and Their Masters in Old Regime France} (Baltimore: 1984) 5, where a translation of the passage is also provided: ‘a household composed of a head and his domestiques, be they wives, children, or servants.’
\bibitem{fairchilds2} Fairchilds, \textit{Domestic Enemies} 18, 23, 54f.
\bibitem{fairchilds3} Fairchilds, \textit{Domestic Enemies} 123.
\end{thebibliography}
treatment if the master showed clear signs of anger when punishing him, corresponds to widely accepted notions of good governance of a household. The position as a chef de ménage demanded a certain attitude from a man: he incorporated patriarchal society and was supposed to rule firmly yet justly, with authority yet without anger. The patriarch of a household will have to bridle his anger for his own sake, in line with an anthropology of anger that consistently warned against giving in to this violent passion; he is also supposed to serve an unwritten contract with his servants which demands that he avoid cruelty and let the fulfilment of his duties as a moral educator and just governor of his ménage not be tarnished by unbridled emotion.

3 Lessons from a Slaveholder Society

The core texts that Montaigne takes into consideration for the reflexion on how to treat servants, Seneca’s De ira and Plutarch’s De ira cohibenda, do not actually treat the question of servant-master relations but that of servitude. We must not forget that the admired classical authorities, the revered canonical texts of Renaissance humanism and early modern ethical thinking in general, stem from and bear testimony to a slaveholder society. What they have to say about punishment, even if they often do not mention it explicitly, presupposes a master-slave relationship. The advice on how to treat members of a household presumes that those serving the familiy are slaves, and that they are strictly and permanently distinguished from the ‘honourable’ members of society. Thus when early modern readers (and in our case Montaigne) engage with Roman authors, they engage with precepts that stem from an essentially different system, yet they effortlessly transpose them to the current situation.

The two main sources on anger management, Seneca’s De ira and Plutarch’s De ira cohibenda, while drawing themselves on the same sources and having been written within sixty years of each other, frame their topic differently. Seneca’s focus is on public life, on the demeanor of the citizen towards his peers; Plutarch, who choses the genre of dialogue to let his character Fundanus explain how he overcame anger himself, concentrates on handling

27 For historical gaps between theory and practice, see the excellent chapter on “The Psychology of Mastership” in Fairchilds, Domestic Enemies 137–163.

28 Drawing on Seneca’s De ira, Samuel Pufendorf, in his De officio hominis et civis iuxta legem naturalem developed a strict distinction between internal life, which was to be governed by moral theology, and external life, to be governed by natural law. See Samuel Pufendorf, On the Duty of Man and Citizen, ed. J. Tully, trans. M. Silverthorne (Cambridge: 1991) 9.
anger in privacy, towards family members, friends, and slaves. It is no coincidence that the first word of Montaigne’s reflection on anger is ‘Plutarque’,\(^{29}\) and it is certainly *De ira cohibenda* that inspires not only some central ideas, but the approach or angle in general.\(^{30}\)

Both authors concur, however, in how they discuss anger towards slaves. They both condemn angry punishments, but ‘with regard to the ethical state of the angry master, not out of concern for the slave’.\(^{31}\) The bridling of anger thus primarily serves one purpose: that of the wellbeing of the master—a line of argument that can be traced back to Xenophon.\(^{32}\)

This negligence of the slave’s condition mirrors the fundamental distinction that crucially informs Roman society: that between *dignitas* and *servitus*,\(^{33}\) between freedom and servitude. As a consequence, beatings were not only essentially reserved for slaves, they were also symbolically charged: while beating a freeman was limited to very special circumstances—such as punishment for a crime or establishing discipline in the military—, the castigation of slaves was a quotidian practice. Accordingly, Roman society knew a subtle hierarchy of instruments of punishment. Freeborn adults were, if at all, punished with rods (*virgae*), and in the military with clubs (*fustes*).\(^{34}\) Schoolmasters would

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\(^{30}\) In the *essai* that follows that on anger, *Defence de Seneque et de Plutarque* (11, 32), Montaigne famously claims that the whole book was ‘built entirely out of their spoils’ (‘massonné purement de leurs despouilles’). Cf. the discussion in Mathieu-Castellani G., *Éloge de la colère. L’humeur colérique dans l’Antiquité et à la Renaissance* (Paris: 2012) 345–372, here 353.


use a cane (ferula) with their students. The whip (flagrum or flagellum) was, as the most humiliating tool, exclusively reserved for the beating of slaves.\textsuperscript{35} What is more, being beaten was defined as the typical “activity” of a slave, a notion that is mirrored in the verb “vapulo”, an active verb with a passive meaning: being beaten.\textsuperscript{36} Since the term appears with particular frequency in Plautus’ comedies, William Fitzgerald concludes that ‘being beaten (vapulare) is one of the most important things that literary slaves do.’\textsuperscript{37}

One might ask, as William Harris does, why anger even played a role in an institution such as slavery that was built on vicious punishment.\textsuperscript{38} I have mentioned the focus on the master’s wellbeing, but there was also a pragmatic issue at stake: while physical violence was part and parcel of master-slave relations, it was excessive rage that was seen as a threat to the system. Since angry beatings could lead to a slave’s death in the most severe cases, there was the danger that the other slaves could turn against the master and kill him.\textsuperscript{39} It can thus be concluded that the calls for restraining anger are indeed concerned with the master’s psychological state, but that they are equally informed by a desire to run the slave system smoothly. One aspect was the prevention of rebellion by abiding to the norm and sticking to the habitual level of punishment; the other was, crucially, to project masterly authority and not betraying weakness by losing control in excessive bouts of anger—a consideration echoed in Montaigne’s arguments quoted above.\textsuperscript{40}

What Plutarch has to say about anger management responds precisely to these concerns, but connects them in a telling manner. Exercising control over one’s anger should be practiced and habitualised in the dealings with unruly slaves. These situations of establishing order in one’s household without resorting to unbridled ire should be considered a training opportunity for ethical behaviour in the public realm: ‘there is no passion that we can better learn

\begin{itemize}
\item[Cf. Quintilian’s discussion in Institutio oratoria 1X, 3, 7.
\item[Fitzgerald W., Slavery and the Roman Literary Imagination (Cambridge: 2000) 32.
\item[Harris, Restraining Rage 317.
\item[Ibidem 322.
\item[Ibidem 333f.
\end{itemize}
to control by practising on servants than temper’. The master_slave relation provides a type of laboratory that is devoid of social or status considerations ‘because of the absolute power we possess, there being no one to oppose or to prevent us’. With regard to slaves, anger does not figure as the social emotion as identified by Aristotle, namely as ‘a desire, accompanied by pain, for a perceived revenge, on account of a perceived slight on the part of people who are not fit to slight one or one’s own’. This definition, at first glance, perfectly grasps the root of anger towards slaves: since they are ‘not fit to slight one’, anger is a “natural” reaction to their insubordination. Yet Plutarch underlines a fundamental difference that is at work here: slaves do not pertain to the social realm in which relations are measured in terms of respect paid and demanded in terms of a careful negotiation of precedence and hierarchy—or of revenge in case of a perceived slight. With regard to slaves, these considerations simply do not apply, and it is in this sense that Plutarch stresses that ‘no envy or fear or rivalry enters into our relations with them’. Thus the master_slave relation can be taken as a kind of experimental set up that allows the master to work on his emotional economy—it is no coincidence that Cicero framed the master_slave relation as the model for the governance of desire in general. In De re publica he says that the mind rules the body as a king his citizens or a father his sons, but it restrains and crushes desire as a master would a slave.


42 Plutarch, De cohibenda ira 459B.


44 Plutarch, De cohibenda ira 459B.

With regard to the management of slaves, Plutarch has his character Fundanus relate his efforts to abstain from physical punishment entirely, rather granting forbearance or "shaming" slaves into subservience by refraining from an expected beating.\(^{46}\) If, however, a punishment is due, it should be inflicted 'with moderation, and in a useful and suitable manner.'\(^{47}\) Thus the physical violence needs to be separated from the emotion—just as Seneca also demanded—which is allegedly achieved by introducing a delay between the committed act and the ensuing castigation. One of the discourses presented at the Palace Academy, discussed above, took up this very recommendation, quoting the example of the Emperor Augustus:

> Le souverain remède est, quand vous sentez ceste première émotion qui n'a point encore totalement chassé la raison du logis, ne se haster pas, mais faire comme Auguste qui disoit deux foix les lectres de son alphabet, ou abaissait trois fois les yeulx contre terre.\(^{48}\)

Plutarch’s Fundanus, however, does not resort to calming techniques that are in themselves meaningless, but rather lets the slave plead for mercy,\(^{49}\) making use of the time to let his own anger subside before administering the castigation:

> I try to get rid of my anger, if possible, by not depriving those who are to be punished of the right to speak in their defence, but by listening to their plea. For both the passage of time gives a pause to passion and a delay which dissolves it, and also the judgement discovers a suitable manner of punishment and an adequate amount; furthermore, the man who suffers punishment has no pretext left for opposing the correction if punishment is inflicted, not in anger, but after the accused has been proved guilty; and finally, the most shameful thing is avoided—that the slave should seem to be making a juster plea than his master.\(^{50}\)

\(^{46}\) Plutarch, *De cohibenda ira* 459C.

\(^{47}\) Ibidem 459D.

\(^{48}\) “De l’ire. Troisième discours” in Frémy, *L’Académie des derniers Valois* 299. ‘The reliable remedy is, when you feel this first emotion has not yet entirely ousted reason, not to hasten, but to do like Augustus who said the letters of the alphabet twice, or dropped his gaze three times towards the ground.’ (My translation).

\(^{49}\) Cf. John Nassichuk’s discussion of Pontano’s *De obedientia* in this volume which examines the question of whether children should explain themselves to their angered father.

\(^{50}\) Plutarch, *De cohibenda ira* 459E. It should be noted that Jacques Amyot, whose translation of Plutarch’s *Moralia* Montaigne relied on, keeps switching between ‘esclave’, ‘serviteur’,
That the plea will not alter the slave's fate is obvious from the start: his apology is, to the master, just as meaningless as the letters of the alphabet would be, and it is only admitted in order to create a cooling down period for the furious master. At the same time, hearing the slave out serves the function of giving an air of justice to the whole process. After all, the slave has been heard before the whip is lashed at him—which is construed as inevitable, since a slave outarguing his master would be ‘the most shameful thing’. To sum up: gaining time between perceiving the slight and with it the first indices of a rousing anger and taking action was thus key to successful anger management. It is again Seneca who words the pertinent maxim: ‘Maximum remedium irae mora est.’

The question Montaigne asks with regard to these precepts is as simple as it was unusual in his time: did the philosophers follow their own precepts? Stating ‘[l]e dire est autre chose que le faire’, Montaigne introduces a reflection on the tension between theoretical takes on anger, moral precepts, and actual practices: He who does what he preaches is most credible. Conversely, a discourse is more convincing if it is backed by experience: a philosopher is not the most reliable source on wars; an orator lacks credibility with regard to bravery, thus: ‘J’apperçois, ce me semble, ès écrits des anciens, que celuy qui dit ce qu’il pense, l’assene bien plus vivement, que celuy qui se contrefaict.’

and ‘valet’, and he does so also in passages like the above quoted that clearly presupposes the slave’s lack of dignity: ‘on ne trouuera point que le valet chastié parle plus iustement que le maistre qui le chastie.’ Les oeuvres morales et meslées de Plutarque, translatées de Grec en François, par M. Jacques Amyot (Genève: Iacob Stoer, 1576) I, 8: “De la mansuetude, comment il faut refrenner la choler, en forme de devis”, 148–167, here 160.

51 Seneca, De ira 11, 29, 1. ‘The best corrective of anger lies in delay’. Francis Bacon, in his essay “Of Anger”, argues that the delay is easier achieved if it is introduced with the conviction that revenge is yet to come: ‘But in all Refrainings of Anger, it is the best Remedy to win Time; And to make a Mans Selfe beleive, that the Opportunity of his Revenge is not yet come: But that he foresees a Time for it; And so to still Himselfe in the meane Time, and reserve it.’ Bacon F., The Essays or Counsels, Civill and Morall, ed. M. Kiernan (Oxford: 1985) 171.


53 Montaigne, “De la cholerie” 752. ‘It seems to me that I can perceive from the writings of the Ancients that the man who says what he really thinks drives it home in a livelier way than he who only pretends.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 811.
These general statements lead up to an assessment of Plutarch’s credibility as an authority on anger, despite the fact that it is Fundanus whose views and experiences are presented in *De cohibenda ira*. Proof that Plutarch not only preached but that he arguably lived and acted according to his moral precepts is found in an anecdote conveyed by Aulus Gellius in the *Attic Nights* that Montaigne recounts at full length:

Un sien esclave mauvais homme et vicieux, mais qui avoit les oreilles aucinement abbreuvées des leçons de philosophie, ayant esté pour quelque sienne faute despouillé par le commandement de Plutarque; pendant qu’on le fouettot, grondoit au commencement, que c’estoit sans raison, et qu’il n’avoit rien faict: mais en fin, se mettant à crier et injurier bien à bon esclcnt son maistre, luy reprochoit qu’il n’estoit pas philosophe, comme il s’en vantoit: qu’il luy avoit souvent ouy dire, qu’il estoit laid de se courroucer, voire qu’il en avoit faict un livre: et ce que lors tout plongé en la colere, il le faisoit si cruellement battre, desmentoit entierement ses escrits. À cela Plutarque, tout froidement et tout rassis; Comment, dit-il, rustre, à quoy juges tu que je sois à cette heure esmeu? Je ne pense avoir ny les yeux effarouchez, ny le visage troublé, ny un cry effroyable: rougis-je? escumé-je? m’eschappe-il de dire chose, dequoy j’aye à me repentir? tressaulx-je? fremis-je de courroux? car pour te dire, ce sont là les vrais signes de la cholere. Et puis se destournant à celuy qui fouettoit: Continuez, luy dit-il, tousjours vostre besogne, pendant que cettuy-cy et moy disputons.54

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54 Montaigne, “De la cholere” 752f. ‘One of Plutarch’s slaves, a bad, wicked man whose ears had however drunk in a few lectures in philosophy, had been stripped for some crime by order of Plutarch; at first, while he was being flogged, he snarled about its not being right and that he had not done anything wrong; but in the end he started to shout abuse at his master in good earnest, accusing him of not really being a philosopher as he boasted, since he had often heard him say that it was ugly to get angry and had even written a book on the subject; the fact that he was now immersed in anger and having him cruelly flogged gave the lie to his writings. To which Plutarch, quite without heat and completely calm, replied: “What makes you think, you ruffian, that I am angry at this time? Does my face, my voice, my colouring or my speech bear any witness to my being excited? I do not think my eyes are wild, my face distorted nor my voice terrifying. Is my face inflamed? Am I foaming at the mouth? Do words escape me which I will later regret? Am I all a-tremble? Am I shaking with wrath? Those, I can tell you, are the true symptoms of anger.” Then turning towards the man who was doing the flogging he said, “Carry on with your job, while this man and I are having a discussion.”’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 812. Cf. Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae* 1, 26.
Thus Plutarch exemplarily fulfils his duty as a head of a household by having his slave punished while being himself aloof and cool in the process, helped, no doubt, by the fact that he delegated the punishing to another slave while being present and entering in a debate with the delinquent. An anecdote about Plato, often retold in the *discours* on anger of the period, takes a measure that hardly qualifies as anger management in terms of governing one’s passion: fearing that he was too angry to punish a slave, Plato delegated the task to Speusippus, thus of course foregoing the presumably sweet taste of revenge, but at the same time not submitting himself to a regime of taming the passion at all.55

4 He Who Loves his Son . . .

But let me return to the juxtaposition of servants and children at the beginning of the essay. True, the passages that deal with children are brief, but still, they are prominently placed in the opening paragraphs and are thus clearly significant. What is remarkable here is that both of Montaigne’s main sources do not discuss the disciplining of children under the rubric of anger. Plutarch did write a highly influential treatise on the education of children, and Montaigne took up the topic in his essay *De l’institution des enfans* (I, 25), adopting many a pedagogic view propounded by Plutarch, including the importance of encouragement and praise in the classroom. But in Plutarch’s treatise on anger, the disciplining of children and the appropriate level of anger is not a concern.

This is in line with Roman attitudes towards the punishment of children, in particular in comparison to that of slaves. Slaves and boys were both named “puer”, with the obvious difference that boys could grow out of the term and the status.56 While they were both treated as minors, it was precisely the beatings that supposedly underlined a categorial difference:

The servile spirit was one that had to be goaded by the lash; the servile back was one marked with scars from past whippings. Precisely because *uerbera* were fit for slaves and encouraged a servile mentality of grudging fear, such punishment was considered inappropriate and insulting for freeborn adult *filiifamilias*.57

56 Saller, Patriarchy 147.
Romans apparently did not usually beat their children beyond infancy;\textsuperscript{58} the imposition of discipline was rather delegated to schoolmasters. They, in turn, were practically expected to flog their pupils. Since these beatings were thought to fulfil an educational purpose, they were not seen as \textit{injur\^{i}a}, a categorisation that was, as I have indicated above, of crucial importance with regard to beatings.\textsuperscript{59} In the rare cases where pedagogical beatings were subjected to criticism, it was mostly with regard to dignity, reflecting the anxiety of differentiating between the freeborn and the slave.\textsuperscript{60}

At no point in the essay on anger does Montaigne say that children should not be beaten at all: rather, he warns against leaving children at the mercy of their parents, ‘tant fols et meschants qu’ils soient’. It is excessive cruelty that is cautioned here, and it may be conjectured that ‘fol’ refers to the madness as which anger is often described.\textsuperscript{61} And even in the essay on the education of children, Montaigne does not strictly reject school beatings, but rather frames them as a first step towards successful learning:

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\item\textsuperscript{58} Again, literature echoes the general consensus: in Roman comedy, fathers are never represented as beating their sons, see Saller, \textit{Patriarchy} 144. In general, the Romans were hardly interested in anger between relatives, compared to how much attention they dedicated to the discussion of anger between citizens as well as towards slaves. If at all, anger in father-son relations is framed as anger of adult sons towards their fathers, see Harris, \textit{Restraining Rage} 296–299, 311.
\item\textsuperscript{59} Fuhrmann, “verbera” 1596f.
\item\textsuperscript{60} Wilson R.M., \textit{A Study of Attitudes Towards Corporal Punishment as an Educational Procedure From the Earliest Times to the Present} (University of Victoria: M.A. Thesis, 1971), online at http://www.zona-pellucida.com/wilson01.html (last viewed: 13 February, 2015), ch. 2.6. Cf. e.g. Quintilian, \textit{Institutio oratoria} 1, 3, 14–17: ‘I disapprove of flogging, although it is the regular custom and meets with the acquiescence of Chrysippus, because in the first place it is a disgraceful form of punishment and fit only for slaves, and in any case an insult, as you will realise if you imagine its infliction at a later age.’ The translation is taken from Quintilian, \textit{Institutio oratoria}, trans. H.E. Butler, 4 vols., Loeb Classical Library (London – New York: 1921), my emphasis. And of course Plutarch: ‘This I also assert, that children ought to be led to honourable practices by means of encouragement and reasoning, and most certainly not by blows or ill-treatment, \textit{for it is surely agreed that these are fitting rather for slaves than the freeborn}; for so they grow numb and shudder at their tasks, partly from the pain of the blows, partly from the degradation. Praise and reproach are more helpful for the free-born than any sort of ill-usage, since the praise incites them from what is disgraceful.’ Plutarch, \textit{De liberiis educandis} 9A. I quote from the edition Plutarch, “The Education of Children (De liberis educandis)” in Plutarch, \textit{Moralia}, vol. 1, trans. F.C. Babbitt, Loeb Classical Library (London – New York: 1927) 1–69, my emphasis.
\item\textsuperscript{61} Cf. the discussion in n. 68 in Karl Enenkel’s contribution to this volume.
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What he speaks of here are not disciplining blows, but the schoolmasterly technique of embossing knowledge onto a pupil’s mind by fostering his memory through accompanying physical stimulation. Of course, schoolmasters equally administered beatings for disciplinary reasons, but the idea that pain would aid learning in particular of Latin and Greek was a mainstay of early modern pedagogy. These quotes do not vouch for an absolute rejection of educational and didactic beatings, but they do betray the usual caution towards affective excess, in particular with regard to anger.

Still, there is a difference to be observed between pedagogic and domestic punishment. While the schoolmaster’s virgae have been approved since antiquity, the assessment of parents beating their children had undergone radical change by the early modern period. It had been with the emergence of Christianity in late antiquity that attitudes towards parental punishment changed fundamentally.

There are two passages in the Old Testament that advocate the beating of sons as a sign of paternal love: ‘quem enim diligit Dominus corripit et quasi pater in filio conplacet sibi’ (Proverbs 3,12: ‘For whom the Lord loveth, he chastiseth: and as a father in the son he pleaseth himself’) and ‘quem enim diligit Dominus castigat flagellat autem omnem filium quem recipit’ (Hebrews 12,6: ‘For whom the Lord loveth he chastiseth: and he scourgeth every son whom he receiveth’). According to Augustine, who quoted these verses more than fifty times in his works and thus more often than any Christian author before him,
as Theodore de Bruyn has established, a father was thus not only entitled, but
virtually obliged to chastise a disobedient son.65

It is this (novel) definition of the father-son-relation on which the relation-
ship between God and man is modelled. It had essentially been developed by
Lactantius who conceives of God as “pater et dominus”, as a being that is to be
loved like a father and feared like a (slaveholding) master—thus being forged
precisely in the image of the Roman paterfamilias.66 The background of this
discussion is theodicy, i.e. the question of the relation between human suffer-
ing and divine providence. To justify human suffering, God is conceived of as a
paterfamilias; crucially, he is not simply identified with a slaveholder—rather,
in order to equally attribute mercifulness to him, he is at the same defined as
a loving father whose chastising is portrayed as an act of love.67 The Christian
believer’s relationship to his God was thus modelled upon the Roman house-
hold structure, yet with one crucial difference: while one was cast either in the
role of the son or the slave in a Roman domus, a Christian would have to con-
ceive of himself as both in relation to the angry God whom one was supposed
to love like a father. The passion of Christ provided the crucial narrative of the
intertwining of sonship and suffering.68

In turn, attitudes towards the actual punishment of sons changed as well.
“Flagellum”, once standing metonymically for the scourging of a slave, was
mostly used metaphorically in Christian discourse to indicate paternal punish-
ment in general. Once the cultural symbol of slavery, “flagellum” now becomes
the cultural symbol of sonship.69 Even if this reframing of paternal punishment
as a metaphor for the role of God in the world may not have corresponded
to an increase in the physical punishment of children in late antiquity,70 it
clearly engendered, in the long term, a change in the conception of the role of
the father.

65 De Bruyn Th.S., “Flogging a Son: The Emergence of the pater flagellans in Latin Christian
66 De Bruyn, “Flogging a Son” 256f. See Lactantius, Divine Institutes iv, 3. On the paterfam-
lias see also Wiedemann Th., Adults and Children in the Roman Empire (London: 1989)
67 De Bruyn, “Flogging a Son” 288; see also Garnsey P., Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to
68 De Bruyn, “Flogging a Son” 275.
69 Ibidem 259.
70 Ibidem 281.
That the domestic beating of children had become accepted practice in Montaigne’s time is not least evidenced by the education of Louis XIII, first heir of the Bourbon dynasty, born in 1601. This is not the place to engage more deeply with Louis’ fascinating story, but it should be mentioned that he was flogged intensively and regularly, both by his governess as well as his father, Henri IV. The early life of the Dauphin (as well as the early years as king after his father had been murdered in 1610) has been documented in abundant detail by his physician, Jean Héroard. His registre abounds with entries on Louis’ nurture, bodily functions, daily routines, education—and punishment. What makes the story even more interesting in the present context is the fact that rather than being disciplined out of anger it was mostly Louis’ own anger that merited harsh punishment. The first beating took place on 9 October 1603, when the child was 25 months old. In the following months, it is typically Louis’ “colère” that is countered with a flogging—to quote just one entry: ‘Éveillé à sept heures et demie, levé, déjeuné, colère mal à propos, fouetté très-bien.’ These beatings were ordered by the king himself, who famously wrote to the Dauphin’s governess:

[…] je veux et vous commande de le fouetter toutes les fois qu’il fera l’opiniâtre ou quelque chose de mal, sachant bien par moi-même qu’il n’y a rien au monde qui lui fasse plus de profit que cela; ce que je renconnois par expérience m’avoir profité, car, étant de son âge, j’ai été fort fouetté.

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71 Quint, “Letting Oneself Go” 130, hypothesises that the ‘plus cholere homme de France’ whom Montaigne mentions in “De la cholere” (754) may have been Henri IV, yet this conjecture has hitherto not been substantiated.


73 Journal de Jean Héroard vol. 1, v. “Introduction”. ‘I wish and command you to whip him every time he is stubborn or does something bad, knowing very well myself that there is nothing in the world that will do him more good than this; I recognise this from experience; it certainly did me good, because, at his age, I was properly beaten.’ (My translation). See Marvick E.W., Louis XIII: The Making of a King (New Haven – London: 1986) 30. The quotation is originally from Henri’s Lettres missives (14 November, 1607).
Tellingly, the king’s or the Dauphin’s handlers’ anger, which was clearly provoked by the unruly child, is not discussed by Héroard; yet the anger displayed by the young Dauphin can be—and was—explained from a variety of angles. First, children were in general seen as not being able to master their passions. Second, Louis appears to have been particularly irascible, which of course contradicted his supposed princely perfection. His doctor, Héroard, was thus keen to explain this unpleasant trait away by resorting to humoural-pathological theories: Louis simply suffered from an excess of yellow bile, his choler was thus to be judged as a physical given rather than a moral defect. Third, his elated position entailed issues of precedence and hierarchy which informed his life from very early on. On his father’s mandate, Louis was educated together with Henri’s natural children; as a consequence, he suffered severe anxiety of status, in particular as he grew older, and his choleric behaviour may well be explained with a view to the Aristotelian definition of status infringement as the common root cause for anger.

74 Cf., e.g., La Bruyère’s *Charactères* (1688), where children are painted as human beings who, not yet having been reined in by education, are characterised by all the negative traits of “natural” man: ‘Les enfants sont hautains, dédaigneux, colères, envieux, curieux, intéressés, paresseux, volages, timides, intempérants, menteurs, dissimulés, ils rient et pleurent facilement, ils ont des joies immodérées et des afflictions amères sur les très petits sujets; ils ne veulent point souffrir de mal et aiment à en faire: ils sont déjà des hommes.’ La Bruyère Jean de, *Les Caractères de Théophraste traduits du Grec avec Les Caractères ou les mœurs de ce siècle*, ed. M. Escola (Paris: 1999) xii, “De l’homme”, 416.—‘Children are overbearing, supercilious, passionate, envious, inquisitive, egotistical, idle, fickle, timid, intemperate, liars, and dissemblers; they laugh and weep easily, are excessive in their joys and sorrows, and that about the most trifling objects; they bear no pain, but like to inflict it on others; already they are men.’ *The Characters of Jean de La Bruyère*, trans. H. van Laun (New York: 1885) xii, 50.—The idea that children were pure and innocent is alien to the seventeenth century; the glorification of childhood ensued only in the wake of Rousseau’s writings in the eighteenth century, cf. Tremp P., *Rousseaus Émile als Experiment der Natur und Wunder der Erziehung. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Glorifizierung von Kindheit* (Opladen: 2000) esp. ch. 111 & 1iv.

75 In 1609, Héroard published the dialogue *L’Institution du prince*, which showed his persona discussing the education of the Dauphin, who was also the dedicatee, with Louis’ tutor, Gilles de Souvré. A modern edition can be found in *Journal de Jean Héroard* vol. 2, 320–392, the discussion of choler at 323.

The handling of the child’s anger was a complicated and contentious issue. While Henri IV swore by physical punishment, the Dauphin’s mother, Marie de Médicis, wanted blows to be only the last resort (which she considered to be an indication of the failure of those in charge). She cautioned that beatings must be administered ‘with such circumspection as to make sure that the anger he might feel as a result will not make him ill.’ Experience had shown that anger was a reaction the Dauphin regularly produced when whipped. But the classical authorities also warned against the contrary: in *De ira*, Seneca cautions about the paradoxical consequences of praise which Plutarch recommended as it supposedly incited children ‘toward what is honourable’. According to Seneca, praise lets the young spirit prosper, but at the same time breeds irascibility and arrogance. Since anger could thus follow from punishment as well as from praise, the adequate guidance of a child was more or less a question of trial and error. That this is even more true for an adult’s own anger management, is impressively demonstrated in the concluding paragraphs of Montaigne’s essay.

6 The Rhetoric of Authenticity

In concluding, Montaigne turns, in the 1588 additions to the essay (commonly referred to as the B text), to his own handling of his anger: ‘Et pour moy, je ne sçache passion, pour laquelle couvrir et soustenir, je peusse faire un tel effort.’ While the reaction to anger that is so hard to achieve for him personally is described as either ‘hiding it’ or ‘withstanding’—two entirely different things—, what he advises is contrary to both. Contending that anger takes hold of the body precisely when hidden (‘[o]n incorpore la cholere en la cachant’), he counsels ‘qu’on donne plustost une buffe à la joue de son valet, un peu hors de saison, que de gehenner sa fantaisie, pour representer ceste sage contenance’.

78 Plutarch, *De liberis educandis* 8F–9A.
79 Seneca, *De ira* 11, 21, 3.
80 Montaigne, “De la cholere” 755. ‘Personally I know of no passion of mine for which I could ever make so great an effort to hide and withstand.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 814.
81 Montaigne, “De la cholere” 755. ‘I would advise you to give your valet a rather unseasonable slap on the cheek rather than to torture your mind so as to put on an appearance of wisdom.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 814.
Montaigne thus does not find fault with venting one’s anger spontaneously through a quick slapping of a servant (‘une buffe’—modern French: “baffe”) instead of pretending to be calm. In a way, he does indeed contrast his own giving in to the first flush of anger with the restraint shown by Plutarch; but at the same time, this can be seen as an idiosyncratic adherence to Seneca’s advice that above all, one must avoid ‘falling into anger’ at all costs. Abusing the servant is thus a ‘cathartic’ manoeuvre to avoid precisely that anger “takes over”. It is still, however, contrary to the idealising notion of beatings serving the subordinates’ moral education, as it casually instrumentalises the servant in that he is not punished with a view to his moral correction, but for the master’s relief: hurt someone else before you hurt yourself: ‘Et aymerois mieux produire mes passions, que de les couver à mes despens: Elles s'alanguissent en s'esvantant, et en s'exprimant: Il vaut mieux que leur pointe agisse au dehors, que de la plier contre nous.’

But while the master of the house allows himself this liberty that is presented as a strategic relief with the clear purpose of managing anger by not letting it seize the body but rather venting in its early stages, he instructs the higher-ranking members of his household differently:

J’advertis ceux, qui ont la loy de se pouvoir courroucer en ma famille, premierement qu’ils mesnagent leur cholere, et ne l’espandent pas à tout prix: car cela en empesche l’effect et le poids. La criaillerie temeraire et ordinaire, passe en usage, et fait que chacun la mesprise: celle que vous employez contre un serviteur pour son larcin, ne se sent point, d’autant que c’est celle mesme qu’il vous a veu employer cent fois contre luy, pour avoir mal rinsé un verre, ou mal assis une escabelle.

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82 Quint, “Letting Oneself Go” 133.
83 Seneca, De ira 1, 8, 1.
84 This is Michael Paulson’s term, see Paulson M.G., *The Possible Influence of Montaigne’s Essais on Descartes’ Treatise on the Passions* (Lanham et al.: 1988) 107.
85 Montaigne, “De la cholere” 755. ‘I would rather make an exhibition of my passions than brood over them to my cost: express them, vent them, and they grow weaker; it is better to let them jab outside us than be turned against us.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 814f.
86 Montaigne, “De la cholere” 755f. ‘I advise those of my family who have the right to be angry, firstly to be sparing of their choler and not to scatter it abroad no matter what the cost, since that thwarts its action and its weight; even the anger you vent on a servant for a theft makes no impression then: it is the same anger he has seen you use against him a hundred times already, for a glass badly rinsed or a stool left out of place.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 815 (with my changes).
What is notable in this passage is first the attribution of the right to anger to only certain members of the household—this confirms again the asymmetrical nature of the anger as a social passion, one that befits only those in power. Second, the perspective shifts from the master’s wellbeing to the smooth running of the household: what is at stake now is the discipline of the servants who might get used to punishments dealt inconsiderately and get frustrated by those administered unproportionally. Thus these selected members of the household are instructed to strategically suppress their anger, yet neither with a view to their own well-being or peace of mind, nor for ethical reasons, but rather with a view to effect: anger has to be managed in correspondence with the severity of the offence by which it has been provoked. Anger is seen as scalable, and as translating directly into the relative abrasiveness of a punishment. Thus regulating anger equals regulating the severity of a punishment, reserving the harder beating for the greater misdemeanor.87

Yet Montaigne changes tack again when he gives another description of his own venting of his anger:

Quand je me courrouce, c'est le plus vivement, mais aussi le plus brièvement, et secretement que je puis: je me pers bien en vitesse, et en violence, mais non pas en trouble: si que j'aille jetant à l'abandon, et sans choix, toute sorte de paroles injurieuses, et que je ne regarde d'assoir pertinemment mes pointes, où j'estime qu'elles blessent le plus: car je n'y emploie communement, que la langue.88

It is almost as if Montaigne does not, despite the assertive tone and the generalizing character of the ‘when’ (‘quand’), indicating an iterated practice, describe his overall habitus, but rather a different occasion. While he had first claimed to be usually letting out his angry feelings quickly and lightly towards a servant, he now stresses his striving for privacy in moments of angry arousal. Here, he does again admit anger as an emotion, but allows himself to act it out only in

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87 Quint, “Letting Oneself Go” 133f. argues, contrary to my interpretation, that Montaigne practically does not seriously flog his servants at all, rather advocating a preference for clemency over justice that would converge with a general ethical stance characteristic for the Essays.

88 Montaigne, “De la cholere” 756. ‘When I get angry it is as lively, but also as short and as secret, as I can make it. I lose control quickly and violently, but not with such turmoil that I go gaily hurling about all sorts of insults at random and fail to lodge my goals pertinently where I think they can do the most damage: for I normally use only my tongue.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 815.
private. While he admonishes members of his household not to ‘get angry in the void’ (‘qu’ils ne se courroussent point en l’air’), he himself rants and rails in solitude. This is again contradicted in the following part of the phrase, where he says that he does not deliberately seek to wound with his words, which of course presupposes an addressee. And while he had first described a blow dealt to a servant as a quick remedy to mounting anger, he now claims that it is words, not deeds (or to be more precise: blows) that are his weapon of choice—a curious inversion of the earlier discussion of words and deeds.

In the concluding paragraph of the essay, the servants’ perspective is considered for the first (and only) time: they are supposedly better off with their master in the wake of grave incidents rather than small ones. The ‘petites occasions’ surprise the master, and as a consequence he is much more prone to uncontrolled anger. ‘Great occasions’, however, let him be forewarned and prepared: in these cases he manages to be ‘assez fort’ not to be carried away by passion.\(^89\) The danger lies in a surprising turn of events, when he does not manage to shield himself from the rousing emotion: ‘mais si elle me preocupe, et saisit une fois, elle m’emporte, quelque vaine cause qu’elle aye.’\(^90\)

This personal report, up to now, took up two lines of argument from the slaveholder discourse as discussed above: that of the wellbeing of the master and that of the smooth running of the household for which anger needs to be applied measuredly and efficiently. Yet being aware of precisely the effectiveness of anger in master-servant-relations, Montaigne takes the use of anger one step further. In concluding, he admits to occasionally feigning anger for the better governing of the house: ‘Par fois m’advient il aussi, de representer le courroussé, pour le reiglement de ma maison, sans aucune vraye emotion.’\(^91\) He does not only—again—contradict his earlier reflections on the desirable concurrence of words and deeds, but also engages with a proposition brought forward in one of the \textit{discours} presented at the Académie du Palais: that anger was the one emotion impossible to feign (‘Les autres passions se peuvent celler et dissimuler, mais la cholère, non’).\(^92\)

\(^{89}\) Montaigne here echoes the Stoic technique of premeditation, cf. Karl Enenkel’s discussion in this volume.

\(^{90}\) Montaigne, “De la cholere” 756. ‘But if it takes me unawares and once gets a hold on me I am carried away, no matter how trivial the cause.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 816.

\(^{91}\) Montaigne, “De la cholere” 757. ‘It sometimes happens that, without any real emotion, I put on an act of being angry in order to govern my household.’ Montaigne, “On Anger” 816.

\(^{92}\) “De l’ire. Troisième discours” in Frémy, \textit{L’Académie des derniers Valois} 295–299, here 299. This appears to be in line with Montaigne’s documented interest in making all signs doubtful, see Demonet-Launay M.-L., “‘Si les signes vous fachent . . .’: Natural Inference
Montaigne, who, in this last part of the essay, appears to grant an insight into his innermost feelings, here openly admits to feigning passions, which curiously contradicts the overarching rhetoric of authenticity. Since he had claimed at the beginning that those who speak out of experience are in a better position to forge a winning argument, it seems to be paradoxical that he would now advocate pretense and simulation. Yet if we bear in mind that there are actually two different speech-acts at stake here—one, the show that he puts on for his servants, and two, the confession to his play-acting—it follows that the statement well qualifies as convincing since he reports his true actions. Montaigne truthfully reports his deeds, which happen to consist in deceiving the members of his household.

But anger management has, from the beginning, involved techniques of dissimulation and disguise. Acting calm has been conceived as a remedy of anger, and the very disjunction of words and deeds—as illustrated in the anecdote about Plutarch himself, related by Aulus Gellius—has been promoted as the true sign of a passion kept in check. In turn, Seneca even counsels that feigned anger may be the best way to win over an audience:

“The orator,” you say, “at times does better when he is angry.” Not so, but when he pretends to be angry. For the actor likewise stirs an audience by his declamation not when he is angry, but when he plays well the rôle of the angry man; consequently before a jury, in the popular assembly, and wherever we have to force our will upon the minds of other people, we must pretend now anger, now fear, now pity, in order that we may inspire others with the same, and often the feigning of an emotion produces an effect which would not be produced by genuine emotion.93

The first word of the essay may have been ‘Plutarque,’ but it ends with a discourse of simulation that is revealed through, but cannot be reduced to the ‘writing of the self’ which has long been identified as the characteristic feature

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92, 95. Seneca, De ira 11, 17, 1. “Orator,” inquit, “iratus aliquando melior est.” Immo imitatus iratum; nam et histriones in pronuntiando non irati populum movent, sed iratum bene agentes; et apud judices itaque et in contione et ubicumque alieni animi ad nostrum arbitrium agendi sunt, modo iram, modo metum, modo misericordiam, ut aliis incutiamus, ipsi simulabimus, et saepe id, quod veri affectus non effecissent, effecit imitatio affectuum.” Cf. also ibidem 11, 14, 1.
of the essays. Naturally, this gesture informs the text, but it does not explain the specific take on anger that is offered in the concluding passages. Rather, I would argue, it should be read in the vein of Seneca’s counsel that frames the feigning of anger as a technique of power. ‘Wherever we have to force our will upon the minds of other people’, thus in situations of dominance and submission, the demonstration of anger is advised, and in line with the general consensus that the individual must not give in to the vicious passion, it better be feigned.

Anger management thus includes a game of showing and hiding, of control and submission, and of truth and deception. The personal account appears self-contradictory, but as such it mirrors, I would argue, the contradictory nature of anger as a passion and the general uneasiness in dealing with it: it may be beneficial if kept in check, but giving in to it was universally seen as highly dangerous, and the fine line between the two states was the subject of an extensive debate about methods of self-governance. By way of a personal account the essay explores various routes for coming to terms with both the benefits and the hazards of anger, uniting in one text the contradictory accounts that could be found not only in the classical sources, but also in contemporary debates. What is striking is the sense of defeat that is conveyed at the end of the essay which appears to mark a surrender to the passion’s violence, almost as if the whole text had been a depiction of a struggle that is lost after all: ‘elle [i.e. la passion] nous tient, nous ne la tenons pas.’ Still, apart from the personal reflexion and the laying bare of the individual’s struggle to control the passion, the essay engages with and endorses generally held beliefs about the nature, the sources, as well as the management of anger.

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94 There is an extensive literature on Montaigne as the writer of the ‘self’, for which Hugo Friedrich’s influential study and his happy turn of phrase “der bejahte Mensch” (Friedrich, Montaigne 140) has provided a seminal impulse.


Friedrich H., Montaigne (Tübingen – Basel: 31993).


———, Les œuvres morales et meslées de Plutarque, translées de Grec en François, par M. Jacques Amyot (Genève: Iacob Stoer, 1576) [I, 8: “De la mansuetude, comment il faut refrener la cholere, en forme de devis” 148–167].


Neostoic Anger: Lipsius’s Reading and Use of Seneca’s Tragedies and *De ira*

Jan Papy

*Quid ratio possit? Vicit ac regnat furor,*  
*potensque tota mente dominatur deus.*

*What can reason do? Passion’s conquered and reigns,*  
*And a potent god commands my whole heart.*

*Seneca, Phaedra, 184–185*

The Roman Stoic Seneca was omnipresent in the humanist Justus Lipsius’s scholarly career and life.¹ This life was situated in the middle of the terrors of the religious wars which tore Europe apart; this life was traumatized by the civil unrest and Spanish rule in the Low Countries.² In Lipsius’s time death was arbitrary, freedom of speech unthinkable, fear and anger daily experience. Stoicism, that philosophy always looked for in periods of crisis, was, so Lipsius argued, the welcome therapy and remedy.³ Seneca’s dramas and prose works staged death and how to face it courageously while, if possible, even strengthening one’s ability to maintain one’s consistent self-command when facing fate’s adversities and calamities.


Besides, in Lipsius’s view the Stoic recipe was not only welcome, it was also simple yet demanding. The individual had to train the Self in order to overcome emotional reactions by the power of reason (ratio). Simultaneously, everyone had to teach that nothing beyond our control, including death, wealth and sickness, is evil or good in se. Moral choices are good or bad, and the only aim of Stoic philosophy is to develop virtue (virtus), including steadfastness, courage, goodness. The key to happiness, so Lipsius followed the Stoic doctrine, is obedience to reason, not passion. Maintaining dignity and strength of spirit under oppression, facing death as the ultimate guarantee of liberty: this was the Stoic wise man's path of true virtue.4

Conversely, when reading Seneca’s “revenge dramas”, Lipsius could not but notice that passions and power corrupt and blind.5 Often, kingship trumps moral considerations, pursues revenge and spreads terror. Tragic heroes and kings, victim to their passions, seek power and control over others while forgetting Oedipus’s lines: “I abandoned the kingship gladly, but I keep the kingship over myself”.6 Yet, if the development of an internalised ability to eliminate passions was of central concern to Stoic philosophy and if the devastating effects of out-of-control passions, and especially furor or irrational savagery, have been visualised by Seneca in titanic figures of insatiable appetite for conquest and destruction,7 Lipsius could read the most extensive reflection on self-shaping and self-control in Seneca’s dialogue De ira (On Anger).8 In this dialogue, addressed to his brother Novatus, the provincial governor with virtually unlimited power over non-citizens in his jurisdiction, Seneca called for judgement (iudicium) and careful decisions (arbitria), especially when provocations might elicit over-reactions, while advocating a therapeutic

reflection upon anger and self-control. In political and judicial contexts control of anger is to be practised. Managing one’s passions has to be prepared by imposing on oneself a delay in one’s reaction. This process is a mental event. In dealing with provocations to anger, the wise man, remembering his own fallibility, will adopt a “second-orderness” of the will to consider and reconsider judgement in a quasi-judicial calm and control.9

Yet, if it seems easy to understand why Lipsius’s return to these Stoic recipes and this Stoic military life-style of self-control and virtue, based on Roman Stoicism especially and Christianity alike, enjoyed such an overwhelming success in the troubled times of civil and religious unrest, wars and tyranny, the question remains how he adapted this harsh Stoic line with Christianity’s demand of mild compassion. In order to put this question somewhat more sharply, we want to contrast Lipsius’s reading of Seneca’s ideas on anger with those of his contemporary Jesuit scholars—often involved in establishing a new Seneca themselves. As such, this contrasting approach might be a rewarding track to deepen our understanding of both Lipsius’s and the Jesuit interpretation of anger. Is anger to be understood in a restricted Senecan way? Or is the early modern psychological view adopted by the Jesuits—in general and especially when dealing with ancient Stoic ideas—a fierce reaction to Lipsius? For in the ongoing discourse on the passions in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, Lipsius’s studies on ancient Stoicism occupied a central position. Still more, the political writer Lipsius himself sought to function as a political advisor in the Low Countries. Applying his theories on passions both in his public lesson of 1599 and, later, in his Monita et exempla politica (1605) dedicated to Archduke Albert, Lipsius dealt, among others, with the Senecan idea of clemency. Yet, clemency and anger, so Seneca argued already, cannot be seen separately. Is the passion of anger on Lipsius’s political agenda as well?

1 Lipsius and the Reception of Seneca Tragicus

First it is important to see which Seneca the humanist scholar Lipsius read, and how Seneca had been read before him and in his own time. Although it is difficult to speak of a direct influence of Seneca’s works as a whole—a good deal circulated as excerpted sententiae or was bundled with the sayings of others—

Seneca the philosopher and Seneca *tragicus* knew a separate editorial history. Renaissance editions of his *Opera omnia* only comprised his philosophical work. No early modern reader would expect to have the tragedies included. Lipsius himself was no exception.

Already while at Rome as a young man, Lipsius was introduced to the study of Seneca by Marc-Antoine Muret (1526–1585), professor of eloquence at the Sapienza since 1563 and himself the author of a Senecan tragedy entitled *Julius Caesar* (1591). Thus the young Lipsius began his philological study of Seneca during his time in Rome, in 1569. With the intention of restoring his broken friendship with Muretus, Lipsius even planned to dedicate to him a work on the life and writings of Seneca. In fact, Lipsius’s *De vita ac scriptis Annaei Senecae* would never be published separately, but would become part of his major edition of Seneca, only published at the very end of his life, in September 1605. Obviously, Lipsius’s work on Seneca, which had begun in the early 1570s, would never really come to an end and would shift between philology and philosophy. Next to the publication of his highly successful Senecan

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dialogue *De constantia in publicis malis* (1584)\(^{16}\)—his first attempt to combine Stoicism and Christianity in a philosophy that would help the individual to live through the difficult period of the religious wars which were tearing Northern Europe apart—, Lipsius's philological achievement concerning Seneca's oeuvre marked his status as an exceptionally gifted humanist scholar.

As Lipsius had been the first to substantiate the division between Tacitus's *Historiae* and *Annales*,\(^{17}\) Lipsius was also the first to clarify the age-old confusion over the authorship of Seneca's works.\(^{18}\) In contrast to his textual emendations to the text of Seneca's tragedies,\(^{19}\) Lipsius's (philological) views on the Senecan plays in his *Animadversiones in tragoedias quae L. Annaeo Senecae tribuuntur* (Leiden, 1588) would soon be outfaced in the *Syntagma tragoediae latinae* (Antwerp, 1593) written by his Jesuit friend Martin Antonio Del Rio.\(^{20}\)

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\(^{18}\) In his *Electorum liber I* of 1580, reissued together with the second book in Lipsius's *Opera omnia critica* five years later, he made a definitive distinction between the two Senecas, assigning once and for all the *Suasoriae* and *Controversiae* to Lucius's father, Marcus. See also Machielsen, “The Rise and Fall of Seneca *Tragicus*” 72, who equally mentions (on p. 73) that in 1587 Nicolas Lefèvre (Nicholas Faber), invoking Lipsius, declared in his edition of both Senecas that it was now commonly accepted that the rhetorical works were by Seneca the Elder: ’Justus Lipsius, a man of great judgement and of the most rare erudition and learning, published the arguments which support this opinion at the beginning of the *Elector*.’


Whereas Del Río had minimized his debt to Lipsius, Lipsius dismissed the Senecan tragedies and returned to Seneca's philosophical work. Despite the fact that Erasmus, Pincianus, Muretus and Gruterus had published their editions or presented their annotations to Seneca's text and oeuvre, printed and reprinted by top-class printing houses such as Froben, Herwagen, Gryphius and Commelinus, and thus cut the ground from under his feet, Lipsius never gave up his project of publishing a new edition of Seneca's *Opera omnia*\(^{21}\) and also published two handbooks on Stoicism, the *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam* and the *Physiologia Stoicorum* dealing with Stoic moral philosophy and Stoic metaphysics respectively.\(^{22}\)

2  **Lipsius on Anger: From *De constantia* (1584) to the Edition of Seneca (1605)**

His whole life Lipsius promoted Seneca as a suitable basis for a new secular ethics that could be regarded as a true complement to Christian, biblical morality.\(^{23}\) In his *Animadversiones in tragoedias quae L. Annaeo Senecae tribuuntur* (1588), however, Lipsius showed himself not to be that great admirer of Seneca's tragedies, yes he even severely criticized their dramatic language.\(^{24}\) Unsurprisingly,
he did see the moral teaching implied in some of Seneca’s tragedies, yet the _Animadversiones_ offer no single reflection on the dramatic characters to be exemplifications of the Stoic theory of virtues and vices. Here, the humanist Lipsius stands in a long tradition and in the full sixteenth-century appreciation of _Seneca tragicus_: tragedy was seen as a matter of moral edification, and no better teacher than Seneca to show the fatal outcome of uncontrolled and uncontrollable passions. Yet, Seneca’s fame as tragic author was not due to his dramatic technique but to the _sententiae_ which also made his prose writings appealing and profitable to the reader. In Lipsius’s view, too, the _sententiae_, often excellent and miraculously acute, are to be approved, yet they might become mere “sententiolae”, obscure, meaningless, weak and feeble words.

Still, how did a Christian Neo-Stoic Lipsius read, interpret and use Seneca’s views on a topic of broad interest to Seneca such as anger? As clemency, constancy and benefices—all discussed with a Stoic voice by Seneca both in his dialogues, letters and drama—anger was central to Seneca’s correlation of self-command with self-control and rational reflection. ‘Anger makes you ugly,’ Seneca had introduced the very debate whether anger (and pity) have a useful function. Moreover, whereas anger is often self-frustrating, pity, unlike mercy, may impede you from helping. But, in late sixteenth-century Christian Europe Stoicism was already well spread in France and the Low Countries, Cicero and Seneca’s psychotherapy flourished vigorously in the writings of Neo-Stoics as Lipsius, Guillaume Du Vair, Pierre Charron and Joseph Hall, and a Stoic reading of Senecan drama had been introduced by Del Río. What to do with anger? How to use this new Stoic reading of Senecan drama?

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25 _Iusti Lipsi Animadversiones in Tragoedias quae L. Annaeo Senecae tribuuntur_ (Leiden: 1588) 8: ‘In aliis virtutes video, sed non sine mixtura vitiorum.’


28 Seneca, _De ira_, 2, 36, 1.

29 Seneca, _De ira_, 1, 9, 2; _De clementia_, 2, 5–6. See also Cicero, _Tusculanae Disputationes_, 4, 43–57.

Intellectuals had all read their Cicero and had absorbed his explanation of the Peripatetic point of view on human passions as being natural and beneficial so long as they remain ‘moderate’ and reason imposes a certain ‘measure’ on them. No need that they should be eradicated.  

Now, Seneca’s analysis and debate had a similar form, yet a contrasting point of view. His question was whether anger is in accordance with nature and whether it beneficial, and ought some measure to be kept?  

His answer is clear: anger is unnatural, it cannot be moderated and, in warfare and punishment, it is not merely useless but counterproductive in a positive sense. With ‘unnatural’ Seneca meant, it should be made explicit, the following: first, nature does nothing in vain, and second, ‘according to nature’ has to be interpreted as both ‘imposed by nature’ and unavoidable, and equally ‘prescribed by nature’ and therefore good. In this sense Seneca saw the “naturalness” of anger as: ‘What is milder than man when he is in his right mind? What is crueler than anger?’  

Anger is therefore “unnatural” because it is something which human beings who are properly human—and a priori the sage or sapiens as a paradigm of human nature at its best—does not feel. The opposite, so Lipsius added in his commentary, was to be learned by Peripatetic views on moderate emotions (metriopatheia). They are based on the well-known Aristotelian idea of “mean”: ‘anyone can be angry—that is easy; […] but to be angry with the right person, to the right extent, at the right time, for the right moment and in the right manner is not something which anyone is capable of.’  

According to the Aristotelians, anger is therefore justified in some circumstances. A certain consonance with the moral reality, and certainly extreme situations, make anger a right response, whereas the Stoic view opposes that no fellow human-being is worthy of one’s anger. Turning the debate on the passions into a debate about values, the Stoics bring in the “principle of correspondence”: emotions are justified if they correspond with what is really good or evil.

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31 Cicero, Tusculanae Disputationes, 4, 46.  
32 Seneca, De ira, 1, 5, 1: ‘nunc quaeramus an ira secundum naturam sit et an utilis atque ex aliqua parte retinenda.’  
33 Seneca, De ira, 1, 5, 2: ‘Quo quid est mitius, dum in recto animi habitus est? Quid autem ira crudelius est?’  
34 We refer to L. Annaei Senecae philosophi opera quae exstant omnia: a Ivsto Lipsio emendata et scholijs illustrata. Editio quarta, atque ab ultima Lipsi manu. Aucta Liberti Fromondi Scholiis ad Quaestiones Naturales, & Ludum de morte Claudij Caesaris (Antwerp: 1652) 5.  
Here, Lipsius connected, at least in his typical eclectic way. Above all, he clearly understood how any treatment of anger should equally be based on self-control.\(^37\) For, as Seneca had demonstrated in *De tranquillitate animi*, a self-conscious management of the relationship between self and others is crucial to achieving tranquility and is based on self-management, self-inspection and self-assessment. In addition, Lipsius also seems to have accepted the Platonic or Aristotelian psychological theory, albeit coloured by the Church Fathers. In his *De constantia*, in which he wanted to ‘adapt the ancient philosophy to Christian truth’,\(^38\) it is stated that passions and affections such as pain, sorrow or anger are not mere products or expressions of an erroneous reason, weakened or sickened by opinion, but, on the contrary, these passions should be regarded as independent (normative) feelings over which reason should rule or govern.\(^39\) In addition, Lipsius echoed Seneca that one should not permit the mind to be buffeted by every event and to suffer the stings of every misfortune.\(^40\) Nor should one give in to the ‘revenge theatre’, extensively illustrated by Seneca and widely imitated by sixteenth-century litterators all over Europe.\(^41\)

Lipsius’s acute awareness of the importance of our initial responses to provocation, and of the need to manage them rather than to deny them is entirely Senecan and fits well into his Neo-Stoic programme. As anger, in contrast to other emotions which still may have something calm about them, is all excitement, violent and raging, it needs a therapy even more than all other emotions. The more because revenge is looked after by the one who feels unjustly harmed. Here, Seneca accepted the Posidonian definition which calls anger a ‘burning desire’ (*cupiditas*) to punish him by whom you think yourself to have

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37 Inwood, *Reading Seneca* 144–5.
40 On Lipsius’s views on fate, see Beuth, *Weisheit und Geistesstärke* 82–121.
been unfairly harmed. Anger is thus a desire, not a pain. Moreover, anger illustrates a general aspect of the Stoic thought about emotion, viz. the relation between emotion and action. For, as emotions are excessive impulses, and any impulse (hormè) sets off an action, emotions cause a bodily movement. In defining the emotion, the action which is a result of it should be included. Anger is thus not a feeling as such, it is an emotion resulting in action (of revenge, retaliation). Revenge is desired (in the future) from the impression of something bad in the present. Contrary to other desires, where the agent relates to something good in the future and rushes towards it, the angry person both relates to something good in the future (the revenge) and at the same time to something bad in the present. This Stoic classification has its reasons. Discerning between pain and anger is imposed because the action which goes along with these emotions is different as well: whereas mental pain, annoyance, vexation—these being in fact milder forms of anger which arise from a perceived slight or offense—go along with a sort of contraction in the face of pain, anger sets off a rush towards retaliation. In his analysis Seneca countered the Peripatetic view on anger to whom anger primarily is a desire which goes along with pain. While we are excited of envisaging revenge, we also suffer from the pain that a perceived injustice brings. Emotions, as Aristotle described them, are accompanied by pain and pleasure; they are “secondary emotions”, whereas the Stoics considered them “primary” ones. And it is precisely here, as Seneca ascertained, that there is a problem: we generate emotions by assent to impressions. In the second book of De ira Seneca analysed the steps involved in anger. The first step, for which Seneca seems to follow Posidonius's views on propatheia, is a preparation for emotion; it is an

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involuntary movement (*motus non voluntarius*). Here again, Lipsius’s interest is attracted by Seneca’s sharp analysis: ‘Beautiful this! And to our own use we should note about this threefold distinction in the affects which step by step are born, grow up and mature.’ As a second step, further, comes one single judgment: in the case of anger, condemnation of what has been done. This judgment then, in a third step, is followed by action: the quest for revenge. The mind though has to assent, has to be involved before anger can be set in motion.

Interestingly, Lipsius referred the reader of this passage in Seneca’s *De ira* to his own *Manuductio ad Stoicam philosophiam*, viz. book III, chapter 7. There, Lipsius, obviously looking for an eclectic middle way and including some Peripatetic nuance, elaborated in more detail on Seneca’s views on passions, and more particularly on anger: ‘Without anger, there would be no courage; without fear, no prudence; without desire, no temperance; without joy, no knowledge of virtue.’ Besides, how could the wise man virtuously conquer anger if he would not possess this emotion?

To Lipsius’s view, wisdom does not come through the repression of emotion by reason, but through the cultivation of helpful passions—like plants in a garden, as he described in *Manuductio* III, 7. What he had learned from the Stoics is that human psychology was not divided in the way Plato and Aristotle had proclaimed. Human psychology was a unity of emotion and reason. Reason was not the opposite of emotion. It found its expression in certain good, helpful, beneficial emotions whereas irrationality was expressed in harmful ones. Passion, also anger, was thus necessary for rational action.

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45 Seneca, *De ira*, 2, 4, 1: ‘est primus motus non voluntarius, quasi praeparatio affectus.’
47 Seneca, *De ira*, 2, 1, 3: ‘haec non possunt fieri, nisi animus eis quibus tangebatur adsensus est.’
49 Lipsius, *Manuductionis ad Stoicam philosophiam libri tres* III, 7: ‘Nam si virtus est, Iram cohibere: quomodo faciet, qui Ira careat?’
Unsurprisingly, Lipsius also transferred these moral views to the political scene. In a political context, anger, as understood by both Aristotelian and Stoic thinkers, is an emotion strongly directed toward the future. Political anger is constructive as it aims at the righting of the wrongs done, at the correction of the imbalance created by the wrongful act.\(^{52}\) Whereas Senecan drama, as a lesson in morals, had given ample evidence of the negative, destructive consequences of ‘political anger’, Lipsius’s commentary on Seneca’s famous letter on slaves is telling:

That which annoys us does not necessarily injure us; but we are driven into wild rage by our luxurious lives, so that whatever does not answer our whims arouses our anger. We don the temper of kings. For they, too, forgetful alike of their own strength and of other men’s weakness, grow white-hot with rage, as if they had received an injury, when they are entirely protected from danger or such injury by their exalted station. They are not unaware that this is true, but by finding fault they seize upon opportunities to do harm; they insist that they have received injuries, in order that they may inflict them.\(^{53}\)

In his commentary to the passage ‘We don the temper of kings’ Lipsius is short but sharp in quoting Musonius: ‘why do we detest and condemn tyrants while we are much more depraved than them? For we have the very same impulses and emotions, though we are in a different situation.’\(^{54}\) As kings we are all enslaved, and we have to take the difficult journey toward self-possession. Not only do we have to free our soul from the body, and our mind from the externals (\textit{indifferentia}), we should also liberate our soul from pathological psychic stages.\(^{55}\) As the very idea of slavery highlights the difficulty involved in throwing off the grip of the passions, ceaseless vigilance is required, especially for passions such as anger (\textit{ira}), lust (\textit{libido}) and fear (\textit{timor}). The freedom that matters is that of the mind; true liberty is slavery to philosophy. Yet, the


\(^{54}\) Lipsius, \textit{L. Annaei Senecae philosophi opera quae exstant omnia} 463, n. 43: ‘Musonius: Cur tyrannos abiicimus et damnamus, ipsi longe iis deteriores? nam impetus affectusque eosdem habemus, etsi in dissimili fortuna.’

king-metaphor also echoes freedom in the political sphere. Those who pursued freedom, if necessary in committing suicide such as Cato the Younger,\(^56\) were regarded and esteemed as *exempla virtutis*, as Stoic heroes of freedom of mind and constancy. In *De ira* Cato was called a great soul because he was superior to injury.\(^57\) Lipsius’s comment on Cato’s reaction that ‘it was better to ignore the incident than to resent it’ again is short and condense: ‘Beautiful and ingenious! But for what purpose that beautiful?’\(^58\)

3  **Lipsius, Stoic Anger and Christian *miseratio***

As many before and after him, Lipsius noticed that passions such as *ira* and *furor* together with a specific style dominated the Senecan stage. The humanist Bartolomeo Ricci (Lugo 1490—Ferrara 1569), for instance, had emphasized the importance of Seneca’s sententiousness as a virtue enhancing the impact of tragic effect.\(^59\) Precisely because of their didactic value and “sententiousness”, Seneca’s tragedies and Neo-Latin drama written to the Senecan model were considered utmost appropriate for instruction both in rhetoric and moral philosophy. In Jesuit colleges the performance of plays, especially tragedies, became standard in the curriculum as they were considered beneficial for the young. Or, as Melanchthon put it, ‘both for preparing their minds for the numerous duties that life brings and the control of immoderate desires, and for giving them some training in eloquence.’\(^60\)

Still, if a moral reading (and staging) of Senecan drama was the overall goal in education, this possible function seems to have been discussed by Lipsius and Del Río alike, yet for different reasons. Del Río’s *Syntagma*, an impressive volume in which he had assembled all the fragments of Latin tragedy includ-

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\(^{57}\) Seneca, *De ira*, 2, 32, 2–3.

\(^{58}\) Lipsius, *L. Annaei Senecae philosophi opera quae exstant omnia* 36, n. 239: ‘Belle et ingeniöse, sed quo tam belle?’

\(^{59}\) *De imitatione libri tres* (Venice: 1545) 22v: ‘Tragoediae vero gravitatem, de qua nunc agitur, adiuvari imperimis gravitate sententiarum, nemo non intelligit.’ (‘Everybody knows that the weight of the tragedy […] is increased by the weightiness of the *sententiae*’). Quoted and translated by Binns, “Seneca and Neo-Latin Tragedy” 230.

ing Seneca’s plays, which are equipped with introduction and commentary, was designed for the students of the Jesuit colleges and universities. Not only did he attack Lipsius’s interpretation of Stoic fate, an interpretation which was far too radically ‘un-Christian,’61 he is also disturbed by Lipsius’s consent with the Stoic view of compassion (*miseratio*). Seneca, for instance, had contrasted pity, which he rejected as being an emotion, and mercy which he approved as compatible with clear thinking.62 Taking up this distinction, Lipsius had defended the Stoic paradox, first in *De constantia* (1, 12) and, much later in 1604, even more elaborately in his *Manuductio* (III, 7), that compassion is a weakness, a disease of the soul. Accusing himself of weakness in *De constantia* because he could not bear the atrocities and calamities which his fellow-citizens had to endure, Lipsius invoked Seneca’s *De clementia*, 2, 4, 4–5, 1 to create a distinction between *miseratio*, the feeling of pity, considered as bad, and *misericordia*, the virtuous disposition to alleviate suffering. Del Río’s commentary at *Troades*, 329 (= 330) ‘nunc misericors’, is not directed against Lipsius’s Stoic reading of Senecan drama in general, yet the more against Lipsius’s un-Christian distorting of *miseratio* and *misericordia*, on his attempt to abandon St Augustine and to propagate harsh Stoic doctrine instead:

But doing away with compassion is doing away with fellow-feeling. […] They condemn the Church, which praises, encourages and embraces compassion and pity, they condemn Our Lord who more than once felt compassion and pity for others’ misfortunes, more than once groaned and wept. ‘But’, they say, ‘we are talking about a feeling of the spirit.’ Learn then to practise a truer and safer philosophy: these affections and passions of the spirit are not in themselves good or bad, but take on the character of virtue or of vice as they are rightly or wrongly employed.63

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61 Mayer, *Personata Stoa: Neostoicism and Senecan Tragedy* 159–64.
It is no coincidence that Lipsius’s Neo-Stoic reading of Senecan and Stoic passions elicited fierce reactions from Catholic, and especially Jesuit contemporaries. Del Río’s own psychologizing and philosophical reading of Senecan tragedy—the result of an ostensibly Augustinian Christian approach in line with Petrarch and Calvin— is not only a Christian reading, it is an unmasking: not just rejecting Stoicism, but rejecting Stoicism in the name of Augustinian Christianity and justifying the reading of a pagan text. It should therefore not surprise that Del Río’s *Syntagma* has long been recognized as a ‘confessional project’, which aimed at presenting the Senecan tragedies as safe reading for young Christian boys.

It would take a century until a Christian spiritual rejection of pagan wisdom arose which at the same regretted that Lipsius and a long tradition of philosophical reading had ranked Seneca’s Stoicism among the highest achievements of human wisdom. Enlightenment and Romanticism would launch an “anti-Stoic attack”: for all its reasoning on nature and *ratio*, for all its analysing of passion and anger, Stoicism was unnatural and unreasonable because it was experienced as a pre-Christian version of Christianity’s harsh asceticism and self-denial. Yet, tragedies like *Thyestes* and *Oedipus*, in which *furor* and *ira* outreached their limits, were not the hardline materialists teaching that human actions (such as eating human flesh or having sex with a parent) could be called “properly good or bad” since good and bad could fall with human ethical choice. Lipsius’s early modern anger management had to be started over.

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64 Early modern tensions between Stoicism and Augustinianism in European culture have been studied by Bouwsma W.J., “The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought”, in *A Usable Past: Essays in European Cultural History* (Berkeley – Los Angeles – Oxford: 1990) 19–73.

65 Dréano, *Humanisme chrétien*.


Chapter 6

Descartes’ Notion of Anger: Aspects of a Possible History of its Premises

Michael Krewet

1 Introduction

It has often been said that with Descartes a new epoch of philosophy began.1 One reason that has been given for this judgement is that Descartes set his new doctrine against a long and powerful tradition of Aristotelian and scholastic thinking, with which he was very familiar from his education at the Jesuit College in La Flèche.2 On the other hand, it is generally believed that Descartes was not original in several points of his doctrine.3 To investigate what works and what philosophical doctrine or tradition might have influenced Descartes, however, is not an easy task because he does not usually cite his sources.4 Although we can trace some of his sources through his correspondence,5 it is generally difficult to identify his direct sources.6 Thus, it is also difficult to determine whether Descartes’ doctrine follows a certain philosophical tradition or whether a certain philosophical denomination can be ascribed to him.

The following contribution discusses Descartes’ notion of anger, in an attempt to determine which features characterize his notion of anger. I discuss Descartes’ conception of anger against the backdrop of his doctrine’s possible

4 Cf. Ariew, “Descartes and scholasticism” 79.
6 Cf. for possible sources of his work Passion de l’âme or at least for works that Descartes could have known: Hammacher K., “Einleitung”, in Descartes René, Die Leidenschaften der Seele, ed. K. Hammacher, (Hamburg 1996) xci et sq.
sources, as far as the origins of the systematic intellectual framework behind his conception of anger and emotion is concerned.

This contribution thus first describes Descartes’ explanation of the basic characteristics that define anger (II), particularly in the context of his Passions de l’âme. I will then (III) try to clarify this explanation in view of Descartes’ more systematic explanation of emotion, taking into account additional aspects of his portrayal of anger. Descartes’ systematic portrayal of the essence of an emotion provides a deeper insight into the basic features that characterize the intellectual framework underlying his conception of anger.7 On the one hand, the systematic framework developed in this section will make it possible (IV) to trace similarities between the doctrines of Descartes and those of his philosophical predecessors who did not support the scholastic tradition. I provide one example of such a thinker and follow the premises of his thought back to ancient philosophical theories. On the other hand, defining the systematic framework of Descartes’ doctrine and its probable origins will help to show that Descartes’ notion of anger is influenced by concepts of anger that belong to a humanistic, but not to an Aristotelian tradition.

2 Descartes’ Definition of Anger (colère)

For Descartes, anger is a subspecies of hate. According to him, hate is the opposite of love and arises in human beings when they consider a thing or an object to be bad or harmful.8 Descartes portrays in detail the physiology of hate,9 writing about the influence of small corporeal parts in the blood, which he calls esprits, on the human soul. In Descartes’ opinion, this corporeal activity can act as an incentive for the activity of the will—as an activity of the soul10—to


8 Cf. Descartes René, Passions de l’âme II, 56; AT XI, 374: ‘[…] & lors qu’elle nous est représentée comme mauvaise ou nuisible, cela nous excite à la Haine.’

9 Cf. ibid. II, 98; AT XI, 402: ‘Je Remarque, au contraire, en la Haine, que le poulx est inégal, & plus petit, & souvent plus vist; qu’on sent des froideurs entremêlées de je ne sçay quelle chaleur aspre & picquante dans la poitrine; […]’

10 On will as an activity that is located in the soul and that is in our power, see: Descartes, Meditationes Sec. Resp. Def. I; AT XI, 160; and further: Principia Philosophiae 1, 9; AT VIII-1, 7 and I, 32; AT VIII-1, 17.
be separated from those objects that appear harmful to the soul. Thus, in Descartes’ view, hate finds its origins in a corporeal activity or irritation.

The example of hate shows that, for Descartes, an emotion does not seem to be conceivable without a corporeal irritation that is caused by an object. This irritation can have an influence on the soul, and be the incentive for the soul’s evaluation of the object. This evaluation is connected with a motivation to join or avoid the object. The soul, in turn, can judge independently of such irritations whether to voluntarily join those things or objects that it evaluates as good, and to avoid those that it evaluates as bad or harmful. According to this view, the free will of the soul can evaluate objects that have caused corporeal activity and pass judgement on them.

Thus, at least two different phases can be discerned in emotions: (1) the corporeal irritation caused by an object, and (2) the judgement or the evaluation of the soul or free will that follows the corporeal irritation and that can influence the emotion. Anger as a subspecies of hate possesses the same general characteristics as hate. Descartes defines anger as follows:

La colère est aussi une espece de Haine ou d'aversion, que nous avons contre ceux qui ont fait quelque mal, ou qui ont taché de nuire, non pas indifferemment à qui que ce soit, mais particulierment à nous.

Moreover, Descartes perceives similarities between anger and another emotion that is also a subspecies of hate: indignation. According to Descartes, the distinguishing features of anger are found in the motivation that characteristically

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11 Cf. id., Passions de l’âme, II, 79; AT XI, 387: ‘Et la Haine est une emotion, causée par les esprits, qui incite l’ame à vouloir estre separée des objets qui se presentment à elle comme nuisibles.’
12 Cf. ibid. III, 211; AT XI, 486: ‘[…] & que ces mouvemens excitez dans le sang par les objets des Passions […]’.
13 Cf. ibid. II, 79; AT XI, 387: ‘Je dis que ces emotions sont causées par les esprits, affin de distinguer l’Amour & la Haine, qui sont des passions & dependant du corps, tant des jugemens qui portent aussi l’ame à se joindre de volonté avec les choses qu’elle estime bonnes, & à se separer de celles qu’elle estime mauvaises, […]’.
14 On free will, cf. ibid. I, 41; AT XI, 359: ‘Mais la volonté est tellement libre de sa nature, qu’elle ne peut jamais estre contrainte.’
15 Ibid. III 199 (AT XI, 477).
16 Cf. ibid. III, 195; AT XI, 475 defines indignation as ‘espece de Haine ou d'aversion, qu'on a naturellement contre ceux qui font quelque mal, de quelle nature qu'il foit.’
drives indignation, that is, the quest for revenge. The motivational component of anger makes it a more violent emotion than indignation, gratitude or favour, the emotions that Descartes mentions in the same context. Following his portrayal of hate and other emotions, he characterizes anger’s physiology and corporeal features in the following manner:

C’est le Desir joint à l’Amour qu’on a pour soy mesme, qui fournit à la Colere toute l’agitation du sang que le Courage & la Hardiesse peuvent causer; & la Haine fait que c'est principalement le sang bilieux qui vient de la rate & des petites venes du foye, qui reçoit cette agitation, & entre dans le cœur; où, à cause de son abondance, & de la nature de la bile dont il est meslé, il excite une chaleur plus aspre & plus ardente, que n’est celle qui peut y ester excitée par l’ Amour ou par la Ioye.

Descartes attributes a corporeal component to anger, and defines it as an emotion led by a quest for revenge. Moreover, he sees anger as having an evaluative component. When Descartes writes that a person’s anger is directed at those who have done harm to them, he presupposes that the person who is angry perceives an object or action as harmful.

3 Descartes’ Systematic Intellectual Framework Behind His Concept of Anger and Emotion

Descartes’ conception of emotion in general and of anger in particular become clearer when analysed against the background of his more systematic remarks on emotion and on the relationship between body and soul both at the beginning of his work Passion de l’Âme and elsewhere in his works.

Descartes advocates a monistic view of the soul, according to which the soul is the mind (and reason). His conception of emotion follows his view of the essence of the soul. While assuming this monistic view, he also discusses an alternative conception of the soul as being tripartite. This view can be

17 Cf. ibid. 111, 199; AT XI, 477: ‘Ainsi elle contient tout le mesme que l’indignation, & cela de plus, qu’elle est fondée sur une action qui nous touche, & don’t nous avons Desir de nous vanger.’
18 Cf. ibid.: ‘Mais elle [la colère] est incomparablement plus violente que ces trois autres Passions, à cause que le Desir de repousser les choses nuisibles & de se vanger, est les plus pressant de tous.’
19 Ibid. 111, 199; AT XI, 477–478.
found for example in scholastic texts, in the classical doctrines of Plato and Aristotle, and probably even in earlier archaic and classical Greek literature. Descartes rejects this theory, arguing that supporters of the tripartite model did not differentiate carefully enough between the soul and the body:

Car il n’y a en nous qu’une seule ame, & cette ame n’a en soy aucune diversité de parties: la mesme qui est sensitive, est raisonnable, & tous ses appetits sont des volontez. L’erreur qu’on a commise en luy faisant jouër divers personages, qui sont ordinairement contraires les uns aux autres, ne vient que de ce qu’on n’a pas bien distingué ses fonctions d’avec celles du corps, auquel seul on doit attribuer tout ce qui peut estre remarqué en nous qui repugne à nostre raison.

The assumption that reason or soul is strictly distinct from the body is characteristic of the substance dualism in Descartes’ thought, according to which the soul or reason is one substance, and the material body is another. This substance dualism is an important feature of the systematic framework that enables Descartes to explain emotions as initially being entirely corporeal and independent of an act, and then being subject to the evaluation or judgement or conscious activity of the soul. According to this view, a corporeal movement or activity can happen on its own without any interference of the soul. Only a monistic view of the soul, which assumes a strict separation between the substance of the soul and that of the body, enables, as far as systematic background is concerned, an explanation of emotions as primarily corporeal and initially independent of any active and conscious act of reason.

If, however, the soul is reason and, as Descartes adds, is also at the same time responsible for perception, it must perceive the corporeal irritation that is emotion. The ‘feeling’ of the emotion must therefore take place in the soul or at least be caused by it, which means that the corporeal irritation must influence or affect the soul.

As the ‘feeling’ takes place in the soul or is caused by it, Descartes’ explanation that the soul suffers the corporeal movement passively can be regarded

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20 On Descartes’ argument against a tripartite model, see Perler, Transformationen der Gefühle 289–293.
22 Cf. Descartes, Passions de l’âme I, 47; AT XI, 342.
23 Cf. ibid. I, 47; AT XI, 364: ‘[. . .] la mesme qui est sensitive, est raisonnable, [. . .]’
as a possible and logical conclusion. Although the emotion itself is primarily corporeal, the ‘feeling’ is not possible without the soul perceiving the corporeal irritation and being affected by it. The specific characteristic of emotions in comparison with other types of perceptions is that perceptions are usually only related to the soul (passions de l’âme), as Descartes demonstrates with the example of anger:

Les perceptions qu’on rapporte seulement à l’ame, sont celles dont on sent les effets comme en l’ame mesme, & desquelles on ne connoist communement aucune cause prochaine, à laquelle on les puisse raporter. Tels sont les sentiments de joye, de colere, & autres semblables, qui sont quelquefois excitez en nous par les objets qui meuvent nos nerfs, & quelquefois aussi par d’autres causes. Or encore que toutes nos perceptions, tant celles qu’on rapporte aux objets qui sont hors de nous, que celles qu’on rapporte aux diverses affections de nostre corps, soient veritablement des passions au regard de nostre ame, lors qu’on prend ce mot en sa plus generale signification: toutefois on a coutume de le restreindre à signifier seulement celles qui se rapportent à l’ame mesme. Et ce ne sont que ces dernieres, que j’ai entrepris icy d’expliquer sous le nom de passions de l’ame.24

According to Descartes, the soul is located in a small gland (petite glande) in the middle of the brain. From this seat, small corporeal particles (esprits animaux) can be sent out into the muscles and arteries to enable a movement or even an action corresponding to the emotion being felt.25

On the basis of the analysis presented above, an affliction of the soul can be described as follows: when a sense organ is affected by an object, this object causes a movement in the nerves. This movement is then forwarded through corporeal nerves and particles to the brain in the form of a sensible representation of the object. The corporeal particles serve as links or even messengers between the activity of the body and that of the brain.26 The different movements and irritations that are caused by different objects cause different

24 Ibid. I, 25.
sufferings of the soul. The movement in the brain sends a new movement by way of these *esprits animaux* into the muscles, thereby causing a movement of the body.\textsuperscript{27} It now becomes easier to understand Descartes’ general definition of emotion:

> Apres avoir considéré en quoy les passions de l’ame different de toutes ses autres pensées, il me semble qu’on peut généralement les définir: Des perceptions, ou des sentiments, ou des émotions de l’ame, qu’on raporte particulièrement à elle, & qui sont causées, entretenues & fortifiées par quelque mouvement des esprits.\textsuperscript{28}

Therefore, according to Descartes, a bodily movement can exist on its own, but can also have an effect on the soul. In the case of an emotion, such a physiological movement is primarily related to the soul that suffers and ‘feels’ it in this way. Thus, emotions are phenomena that force body and soul to stay in a very close relationship with each other. Descartes illustrates this principle further in reference to anger in his *Principia Philosophiae*, where he names the two highest *genera* of things. One is the *substantia cogitans* (or *mens*); the other the *substantia extensa* (or *corpus*). Descartes also mentions a third genus, which belongs to the *animi pathemata* and which cannot be subordinated to only one of them. He cites anger (*ira*) as one example of this third genus:

I do not, however, recognize more than two highest kinds (*summa genera*) of things; the first of intellectual things, or such as have the power of thinking, including mind or thinking substance and its properties; the second, of material things, embracing extended substance, or body and its properties. Perception, volition, and all modes as well of knowing as of willing, are related to thinking substance; on the other hand, to extended substance we refer magnitude, or extension in length, breadth, and depth, figure, motion, situation, divisibility of parts themselves, and the like. There are, however, besides these, certain things of which we have an internal experience that ought not to be referred either to the mind of itself, or to the body alone, but to the close and intimate union between them, as will hereafter be shown in its place. Of this class are the appetites of hunger and thirst, etc., and also the emotions or passions of the mind which are not exclusively mental affections, as the emotions of anger, joy, sadness, love, etc.; and, finally, all the sensations, as of pain,


\textsuperscript{28} Cf. ibid. I, 27; AT XI, 349.
titillation, light and colors, sounds, smells, tastes, heat, hardness, and the other tactile qualities.²⁹

According to this framework, perception and will belong to *substantia cogitans*,³⁰ whereas movement (and also irritation) belong to *substantia extensa*. As a human being unites both *substantia cogitans* and *substantia extensa*, and as emotions (*animi pathemata*) represent the soul's suffering from or being affected by a bodily movement, Descartes concludes that emotions are dependent both on the body and on the soul. Indeed, an emotion begins as a corporeal irritation caused by exterior objects and is then felt because of the suffering of the soul (perception) that is affected by it. Descartes strengthens his theory with an explanation of the importance of physiological mechanisms in the human *substantia extensa*. It is thus not surprising that Descartes, in his *Passions de l’âme*, talks about the body as a machine whose mechanisms proceed purely physiologically.³¹ Descartes conceives of the body as a system that regulates itself and that has to be separated from the activity of consciousness and the soul.³²

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²⁹ Descartes, *Principia philosophiae* 1, 48; AT VIII-1, 23 (English translation: Veitch J., *The Methods, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes* (New York: 1901) 319): ‘Non autem plura quàm duo summa genera rerum agnosco: unum est rerum intellectualium sive cogitativarum, hoc est, ad mentem sive ad substantiam cogitante pertinientium; aliud rerum materialium, sive quae pertinent ad substantiam extensam, hoc est, ad corpus. Perceptio, volition, omnesque modi tam percipendi quam volendi, ad substantiam cogitante referuntur; ad extensam autem, magnitudo, sive ipsam extensio in longum, latum & profundum, figura, motus, situs, partium ipsarum divisibilitas, & talia. Sed & alia quaedam in nobis experimur, quae nec ad solam mentem, nec etiam ad solum corpus referri debent, quaeque [. . .] ab arctà & intimà mentis nostrae cum corpore unione profiscuntur: nempe appetitus famis, sitis & c.; itemque, commotions, sive animi pathemata, quae non in solâ cogitatione consistunt, ut commotio ad iram, ad hilaritatem, ad tristitiam, ad amorem, & c.; ac denique sensus omnes, ut doloris, titillationis, lucis & colorum, sonorum, odorum, saporum, caloris, duritiei, aliarumque tactilium qualitatum.’

³⁰ Descartes’ assumption that the soul or the faculty of reason is strictly distinct from the body is characteristic of the substance dualism in his doctrine. The *substantia cogitans* is therefore equivalent to the soul, the faculty of reason and *mens*. The *substantia extensa* is equivalent to the body and *corpus*. Cf. Descartes, *Principia philosophiae* 1, 48; AT VIII-1, 23.

³¹ Cf. Descartes, *Passions de l’âme* I, 7; AT XI, 331–332. Descartes might have been influenced in his view of the body by Marin Mersenne, with whom he studied in La Flèche (cf., e.g., *Quæstiones Celeberrimae in Genesin* (Paris 1623)). Mersenne was a supporter of the modern natural sciences and was opposed to scholastic thinking.

³² Cf. Descartes, *Discours de la Méthode*, AT VI, 557ff. For a good account of this aspect of Descartes’ doctrine, see: Hammacher, “Einleitung” xxxff.
The importance of the emotions' corporeal element in Descartes' doctrine becomes even clearer in light of the role he attributes to the operations and activities of the soul or to the consciousness of an emotion. The activity of the soul—even of the will—cannot gain complete control over an emotion, as Descartes explains in the context of seeking possible remedies for emotions. If an emotion is caused by a corporeal irritation, which is separable from the soul's activity, it seems to be logical that the emotion can only subside when the corporeal movement of the *esprits animaux* subsides. If the mechanism of the body is a system that regulates itself independently from the activities of the soul, operations of the soul can hardly have a direct influence on physiological irritations.33

Nevertheless, Descartes recognizes the possibility that the soul's activity can, via the will, assent to (*consentir*) or dissent from an emotion's motivational component. If, for example, anger drives somebody to raise their hand to strike someone or something, this person's will can restrain their hand from striking. In this case, the person's will dissents from his or her corporeal movement and from the motivation caused by the emotion:

Le plus que la volonté puisse faire, pendant que cette émotion est en sa vigueur, c'est de ne pas consentir à ses effects, & de retenir plusieurs des mouvemens ausquels elle dispose le corps. Par exemple, si la colere fait lever la main pour fraper, la volonté peut ordinairement la retenir; si la peur incite les jambes à fuir, la volonté les peut arester, & ainsi des autres.34

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33 Cf. Descartes, *Passions de l'âme* I, 46; *AT* XI, 363–364: ‘Et il y a une raison particuliare qui empesche l'ame de pouvoir promptement changer ou arrester ses passions, laquelle m'a donné sujet de mettre cy deffus en leur definition, qu'elles sont non seulement causées, mais aussi entretenuës & fortifies, par quelque mouvement particulier des esprits. Cette raison est, qu'elles sont presque toutes accompagnées de quelque émotion qui se fait dans le cœur, & par consequent aussi en tout le sang & les esprits, en sorte que, jusque à ce que cette émotion ait cessé, elles demeurent presents à nostre penseé en mesme façon que les objets sensibles y sont presens, pendant qu'ils agissent contre les organs de nos sens. Et comme l'ame, en se rendant fort attentive à quelque autre chose, peut s'empescher d'ouïr un petit bruit, ou de sentir une petite douleur, mais ne peut s'empescher en mesme façon d'ouïr le tonnerre, ou de sentir le feu qui brusle la main: ainsi elle peut aysement surmonter les moindres passions mais non pas le plus violentes & les plus fortes, sinon apres que l'emotion du sang & des esprits est appaisée.’

34 Cf. Descartes, *Passions de l'âme* I, 46; *AT* XI, 364.
Thus Descartes recognizes an indirect way in which the soul and the will can gain influence over a corporeal irritation and the emotion it causes. This power can be defined as follows:

(a) Descartes supports the opinion that objects affect the sense organs. These objects appear to perception as representations or ideas that are evaluated as good or bad, useful or harmful. In other words, the perception of the soul is the phenomenal character of an intentional state. In this intentional state, evaluation is always applied to a representation of the object. The soul evaluates whether the object that is represented is good or harmful. One’s evaluation of an object as harmful or good in relation to oneself distinguishes a representation that is characteristic of an emotion from a representation that is a mere thought.35 This evaluation is also dependent on the person whose sense organs are being affected and whether this person feels an emotion,36 and, if so, what kind of emotion this person feels.37 The representation itself does not have to be a conscious one;38 it can arise from the sense organs being affected by an object and forwarding this affliction via the nerves to the brain.

If an emotion arises in this way, then the remedy for the emotion is also a representation. Although free will cannot directly influence a physiological irritation in the body causing an emotion, free will can, according to Descartes, at least gain influence on the emotion by creating an adequate representation to calm the irritation. In the case of fear, for example, the will can produce a representation that the object is not dangerous and therefore does not need to be feared.39

36 Another reason that Descartes gives is the different structure and nature of the brain in different persons. Cf. Descartes, Passions de l’âme I, 39; AT X1, 358–359.
37 Cf. ibid. I, 39; AT X1, 358 and II, 52; AT X1, 372.
38 Cf. in detail Perler, Transformationen der Gefühle 310. For a judgement, however, consciousness is a conditio sine qua non (cf. Descartes, Meditationes IV, 64–65; AT VII, 56–57).
39 Cf. Descartes, Passions de l’âme I, 45; AT X1, 362–363: ‘Nos passions ne peuvent pas aussi directement estre excités ny ostées par l’action de nostre volonté, mais elle peuvent l’estre indirectement par la representation des choses qui ont coutume d’estre jointes avec les passions que nous voulons avoir, & qui son contraire à celles que nous voulons rejeter. Ainsi, pour exciter en soy la hardisse & oster la peur, il ne suffit pas d’en avoir la volonté, mais il faut s’appliquer à considerer les raisons, les objets, ou les exemples, qui persuadent que le peril n’est pas grand; qu’il y a tousjours plus de seureté en la defense qu’en la suite; qu’on aura de la gloire & de la joye d’avoir vaincu, au lieu qu’on ne peut attendre que du regret & de la hont d’avoir fui, & choses semblables.’
(b) Descartes recognizes that the sudden and surprising attacks of particular unknown or unfamiliar objects or representations that lead to harmful emotions are dangerous. According to him, it is thus important to gain as much understanding and knowledge as possible and to practice consideration of everything that seems unfamiliar. Once more, it is the will that can create such considerations or even representations of unfamiliar objects.40

In summary, the will can only have an indirect effect on emotions. It can either have an effect on an already existing physiological irritation by influencing and changing the bodily movement with the help of an adequate representation, or it can prepare a physiological apparatus in advance via considerations or representations so that an object will not be able to cause a sudden and surprising representation.

Although Descartes considers most emotions to be dangerous, he identifies a purpose for them. Indeed, he believes that emotions are of much use in strengthening what is characteristic of human beings: the activity of the soul.41 Reason and will, as activities of the soul, allow a person to take up a definite position and inner constancy in relation to all exterior objects and representations—those same representations that would lead to dangerous emotions if the will consented to them. Rejecting such emotional representations is good for the soul in the long term. Thus emotions have a purpose as they create a right, strong and constant attitude in human beings that rejects these dangerous emotions.

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40 Cf. Descartes, Passions de l'âme II, 76; AT XI, 385: ‘Mais il arrive bien plus souvent qu’on admire trop, & qu’on s’estonne, en apercevant des choses qui ne meritent que peu ou point d’etre considerées, que non pas qu’on admire trop peu. Et cela peut entierement oster ou pervertir l’usage de la raison. C’est pourquoi, encore qu’il doit bon d’etre ne avec quelque inclination à cette passion, pour que cela nous dispose à l’acquisition des sciences, nous devon toutefois tascher par apres de nous en delivrer le plus qu’il est possible. Car il est aysé de suppleer à son defaut par une reflexion & attention particuliare, à laquelle nostre volonte peut tousjours oblier nostre entendement, lors que nous jugeons que la chose qui se presente en vaut la peine; mais il n’ay a point d’autre remede pour s’empescher d’admirer avec exces, que d’acquierer la connoissance de plusieurs choses, & de s’exercer en la consideration de toutes celles qui peuvent sembler les plus rarer & les plus estranges’.

41 Cf. Descartes, Passions de l’âme II, 74; AT XI, 383: ‘Or il est aysé à connoitre, de ce qui a esté dit cy deflus, que l’utile de toutes les passions ne consiste qu’en ce qu’elles fortifient & font durer en l’ame des pensées, lesquelles il est bon qu’elles conserve, & qui pourroient facilement sans cela en ester effaces. Comme aussi tout le mal qu’elles peuvent causer, consiste en ce qu’elles fortifient & conservent ces pensées plus qu’il n’est besoin; ou bien qu’elles en fortifient & conservent d’autres, ausquelles il n’est pas bon de s’arrester.’
From this point of view, Descartes also considers anger to be useful, because it is an emotion that can lead a person to develop the inner, constant strength to reject an offence or to distance himself from an insult that would normally cause anger, thereby avoiding a harmful excess of this emotion.\textsuperscript{42} In other words, if the corporeal irritation caused by an object in the form of a sensitive representation (such as an offence) is felt by a person as anger, this person can either consent to this representation or consciously reject it, if he or she has experienced this emotion before. Indeed, having already experienced this emotion allows the person to imagine the potentially harmful consequences that could derive from consenting to it and to the motivation of revenge that is anger’s characteristic feature. The reason why Descartes considers anger to be a subspecies of hate becomes quite clear at this point. Indeed, Descartes seems to differentiate two phases in anger as he does in hate: (1) the corporeal irritation, (2) the judgement or the evaluation by the soul or the will (as activity of the \textit{ego}) that follows the corporeal irritation and that can gain influence over the emotion.

Since, according to Descartes, arrogance or pride are in particular responsible for excessive anger, their opposites, noble-mindedness and magnanimity (\textit{générosité}) are the best remedy against such excess.\textsuperscript{43} The characteristic feature of noble-mindedness is that it regards voluntary freedom and control over oneself as the highest good, in that a noble-minded person will have gained the insight that all exterior goods can be lost, and will therefore attach no importance to such goods. Thus, Descartes once more asserts that the remedy against anger can be found in the voluntary activity of a human being’s soul,\textsuperscript{44} as far as it can influence physiological and corporeal emotional movements. According to Descartes’ doctrine as outlined above, it is conceivable that a person feeling anger has to imagine the potentially harmful consequences of excessive anger in order to realise that the only good activity of the soul is in this case to control oneself. And this activity consists in showing the right attitude towards a harmful or excessive emotion.\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{42} Cf. Descartes, \textit{Passions de l’âme} III, 203; AT XI, 481: ‘Au reste, encore que cette Passion [la colère] soit utile, pour nous donner de la vigueur à repousser les injures, il n’y en a toutefois aucune, don’t on doive éviter les excès avec plus de soin: pource que, troublant le jugement, ils sont souvent commettre des fautes, don’t on a par après du repentir.’

\textsuperscript{43} Cf. Descartes, \textit{Passions de l’âme} III, 203; AT XI, 481: ‘Mais comme il n’y a rien qui la rende plus excessive que l’Orgueil, ainsi je croy que la Generosité est le meilleur remede qu’on puisse trouver contre ses excés.’

\textsuperscript{44} Cf. ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} Cf. ibid. III, 211; AT XI, 485–488.
Therefore, Descartes regards many emotions as negative if a person’s will or *ego* uses these emotions in the wrong way, which is to say if a person shows the wrong attitude towards an emotion. Even the emotion “admiration,” which is portrayed by Descartes as having the highest potential to create a positive inner attitude, can also be negative. In the learning of science, for example, one must rid oneself of admiration as much as possible after the initial impetus to learn.\(^\text{46}\) Otherwise, Descartes believes that this emotion could pervert the use of reason.\(^\text{47}\) Descartes’ description of admiration is a good example of his opinion that the danger of emotions lies in their potential to pervert reason.

This view of the purpose of emotions also leads Descartes to his view of good emotions. Emotions of delight or a good form of pleasure are closely connected with acts that show psychological strength and constancy. As such, they indicate a perfect activity of reason.\(^\text{48}\)

Descartes expands on his own doctrine by explaining many individual emotions and their objects in careful detail. His aim seems to be the creation of representations for his readers, so that they can prepare themselves for the corporeal consequences of a sudden affliction and representation that might lead to a perversion of reason and therefore of the *ego*.

Showing a responsible and reasonable attitude toward emotions is not only in the hands of the individual, but rather seems to be the result of an active application of the individual’s free decision or will. This freedom represents, according to Descartes, an exception as it does not fall under the divine providence that otherwise controls everything.\(^\text{49}\)

\[\text{4} \quad \text{The Possible History behind the Premises of Descartes’ Conception of Anger}\]

In the following paragraphs I will show that Descartes’ doctrine of emotion relates to the long tradition of Stoic and Neo-Stoic philosophy. It is important

\(^{46}\) Cf. ibid. 1, 76; \textit{AT} XI, 385: ‘C’est pourquoi, encore qu’il soit bon d’estre né avec quelque inclination à cette passion, pource que cela nous dispose à l’acquisition des sciences, nous devons toutefois tascher par apres des nous en delivrer le plus qu’il est possible.’

\(^{47}\) Cf. ibid.: ‘Et cela peut entierement oster ou pervertir l’usage de la raison.’

\(^{48}\) Cf. ibid. 11, 91; \textit{AT} XI, 396–397.

\(^{49}\) Cf. ibid. 11, 146; \textit{AT} XI, 439: ‘Il faut […] sçavoir que tout est conduit par la Providence divine, dont le decret eternel est tellement infallible & immuable, qu’excepté les choses que ce mesme decret a voulu dependre de nostre libre arbitre, nous devons penser qu’a nostre égard il n’arrive rien qui ne soit necessaire & comme fatal, en forte que nous ne pouvons sans erreur desirer qu’il arrive d’autre façon.’
to note that Descartes’ doctrine seems to be based primarily on this philosophical tradition’s intellectual framework rather than on a thorough reception of the specific concepts. The intellectual framework that is also embedded in Descartes’ understanding of emotions limits the variety of possible explanations of emotions and only offers different explanations of certain points.\textsuperscript{50}

It seems evident that Descartes had direct contact with the works of the Stoic philosopher Seneca and the Neo-Stoic philosophical works of Justus Lipsius.\textsuperscript{51} Important works that Descartes was probably most familiar with are Seneca’s \textit{De ira}, Justus Lipsius’ \textit{De constantia} and \textit{Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam}. In the latter text, Lipsius cites passages from Seneca’s \textit{De ira}. Thus Descartes’ contact with these works and Stoic doctrines of emotion and also anger can hardly be denied.

The following analysis will thus focus on these works. I will begin with the aforementioned works of Justus Lipsius and end with a brief parallel of Descartes’ notion of anger with Seneca’s concept of anger in his work \textit{De ira} in order to corroborate my thesis that Descartes’ conception of emotion and anger is built on the tenets of the Stoic and Neo-Stoic traditions rather than on the Aristotelian tradition.\textsuperscript{52}

Lipsius’ indebtedness to Stoic thinking, particularly to Seneca, and the importance of his Neo-Stoic doctrine for the philosophical and political thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has been stressed by various scholars in recent decades.\textsuperscript{53} In the following I build on this work and outline the probable influence of key elements of Lipsius’ doctrine on Descartes’ theory of anger and emotion. Lipsius, of course, was not the only author to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} For a more detailed explanation see Krewet, \textit{Die stoische Theorie der Gefühle} 265–278 and 306–345.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Cf. Hammacher, “Einleitung” xc, who provides a list of philosophical works that Descartes knew. Works by Seneca and Justus Lipsius are included in this list. We know, e.g., about the widely disseminated French translation of this work from 1594 (\textit{Traité de la Constance de Just. Lipsius, auquel, en forme de devis familier, est discours des afflictions & principalement des publique, & comme il se faut résoudre à les supporter} [Tours, Claude de Montreuil et Jean Richer: 1594]), which was most probably also known to Descartes (cf. Hammacher, ibidem).
\item \textsuperscript{52} On the influence of Stoic philosophy on early modern discourses, see, in particular Abel G., \textit{Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit. Zur Entstehungsgeschichte modernen Denkens im Felde von Ethik und Politik} (Berlin – New York: 1978).
\end{itemize}
influence Descartes; it would be worthwhile to consider, for example, Marin Mersenne or William Harvey’s physiological descriptions of corporeal processes or Guillaume du Vair’s essays. Nevertheless, Lipsius’ *De constantia* highlights the relevance of the basic tenets of Stoic philosophy for Descartes’ notion of anger. A close examination also reveals that Descartes adopted an intellectual framework rather than concrete philosophical positions from Lipsius. Thus, Descartes’ early modern notion of anger cannot be called Stoic in a strict sense, but should rather be regarded as depending on premises that he shares with Stoic thinkers—premises that do not stem from the traditions of Aristotelian, scholastic or Thomistic doctrines. The novelty of Descartes’ notion does not lie in the originality of his premises, but rather in the way he develops his doctrine on anger within the boundaries of Stoic premises. Descartes’ doctrine therefore stands in a powerful tradition of Stoic and Neo-Stoic thinking, as I will briefly demonstrate in my concluding argument.

Justus Lipsius uses Langius, his partner in the dialogue *De constantia*, to emphasise the importance of the mind’s strength and, by extension, of a person’s activity that is independent from external influences. Lipsius calls this strength *constantia*.57

Lipsius defines strength (*robur*) as a firmness of the mind and relates it directly to a correct judgement of reason (*ratio*) as opposed to mere opinion (*opinio*). According to the wise Langius in Lipsius’ dialogue, patience (*patientia*) is the mother of *constantia*. Langius, as his partner in the dialogue, defines *patientia* as the voluntary and uncomplaining endurance of whatever befalls a person from outside. Virtue (*virtus*) is connected to the judgement of a firm

54 On William Harvey’s influence on Descartes, see Hammacher, “Einleitung” XXXII et sqq. On Guillaume Du Vair, see, e.g. *De la constance et consolation des calamités publiques* (1594), which was influenced by Stoic philosophy. The current contribution concentrates on the work of Justus Lipsius. On the Stoic influence on Guillaume Du Vair, cf. Abel, *Stoizismus und Frühe Neuzeit* 114–152.


56 We can conclude that the historic Langius was familiar with Stoic doctrine from the fact that he edited Cicero’s works *De officiis, De senectute* and *De amicitia*.

57 Cf. Lipsius Justus, *De constantia* 1, c. 4: ‘Constantiam hic apello, rectum et immotum animi robur, non elati externis aut fortuitis, non depressi.’

58 Cf. ibid.: ‘Robur dixi; & intellego firmitudinem insitam animo, non ab opinione, sed iudicio et recta Ratione.’

59 Cf. ibid.: ‘Quam [sc. patientiam] definio rerum quaeque homini aliunde accident aut incident voluntariam & sine querela perpessionem.’
mind; it chooses a middle way and avoids excess.\textsuperscript{60} The opposite of a judgement of reason is the activity of opinion, which Langius equates with deceptive judgement.\textsuperscript{61} Opinion is the advocate of the senses and bodily pleasures, and it confuses the mind. It leads to the evaluation of an excessive emotional irritation as good. It does not represent the ideal of a firm and strong mind and is therefore able to deprive a person of \textit{constantia}.\textsuperscript{62} An opinion is an act of the mind, but it is inadequate insofar as it does not properly represent nature.\textsuperscript{63} It does not provide clear insight, but only a dark and confusing representation. Furthermore Langius, Lipsius’ partner in the dialogue, believes that opinions are responsible for emotions; they distract us and allow vices to get the upper hand. Whereas the judgement of reason, \textit{constantia}, and firmness of the mind preclude excessive emotions in human beings, opinions foster excessive emotions that are extremely harmful. Humans must therefore avoid judgements of opinion by gaining knowledge and thereby strengthening their mind and faculty of reason.\textsuperscript{64} Consequently, it is also better to avoid emotions—or at least excessive emotions—that cause irritation.\textsuperscript{65}

Opinions are an inferior form of judgement that open the door to harmful emotions in people, but it is the weakness of the mind and will combined with a lack of understanding that are responsible for such emotions. For Langius, Lipsius’ partner in the dialogue, anger is one example of an emotion that

\textsuperscript{60} Cf. ibid.: ‘Virtus autem media via ingreditur. & caute cavet nequid in actionibus suis defiat, aut excedat.’

\textsuperscript{61} Cf. ibid.: ‘Opinio huic contraria, de iisdem futile iudicium ac fallax.’ Cf. also I, c. 5: ‘Opinio in nobis nascitur, quae non alid quam Rationis vana imago & umbra. Cuius vera sedes, Sensus.’ Cf. further: \textit{Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam} III, diss. 7.

\textsuperscript{62} Cf. Lipsius, \textit{De constantia} I, c. 5: ‘Vana eadem, incerta, fallax, male consulens, male iudicis, Constantia inprimis animum spoliat.’

\textsuperscript{63} For the ideal of a life according to nature that means a life according to reason and virtue cf. Lipsius, \textit{Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam} I, diss. 2–4.

\textsuperscript{64} Cf. particularly: Lipsius, \textit{De constantia} I, c. 5. Only a few sentences shall be quoted here: ‘Atque ut oculus, qui per nebulam aut aquam inspicit, res metitur falso modo: sic animus, qui per Opinionis nubem. Haec homini, si consideras, malorum mater. Haec auctor in nobis confusae & perturbatae vitae. Quod curae nos exerceant, ab hac est: quod affectus distrahan, ab hac, quod vitia nobis imperent, ab ista.’ Cf. further: \textit{Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam} I, diss. 7.

\textsuperscript{65} There are various instances of similar testimonies in Lipsius’ work. Cf. e.g. I, c. 12: ‘Quae ipsa [sc. miseratio] tamen spermenda a sapiente & constante.’ or: I, c. 13: ‘Cum omnes igitur affectus, Lipsi, qui vitam humanam varie incurrrunt & turbant, a dementi mente sint: […]’
results from such a weakness.\textsuperscript{66} From Langius’ perspective, it seems plausible that the remedy for harmful emotions can be found in wisdom and, by extension, in knowledge. According to him, it is wisdom that can result in virtue and \textit{constantia}.\textsuperscript{67}

If a person has the possibility and responsibility to acquire wisdom, and if a lack of wisdom leads to an inferior judgement of opinion that opens the soul to harmful emotions such as anger, it depends on that individual person and the quality of his or her judgement whether he or she is moved by harmful anger or not.

Thus emotions—including anger—serve a purpose in Langius’ argument in the dialogue. They allow people to acquire \textit{constantia} and make them judge and act according to their faculty of reason. All of life’s adversities, including harmful emotions, exercise the soul to adopt the proper and firm attitude whose actualization is in the hand of every human being.\textsuperscript{68} According to Langius’ line of argument in the dialogue, mishaps must be experienced in order for a person to be able to develop an inner resistance to them. Indeed, if a helmsman is always granted favourable wind, he can never show his steering ability. Similarly, a person needs storms and accidents to exercise his or her character and to show its firmness. Only through voluntary judgement towards mishaps or harmful emotions, or towards what could become a harmful emotion, can a person prove that his or her character is not weak. A person who never faces such temptations cannot show his or her \textit{constantia}.\textsuperscript{69}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{66} Cf. Lipsius, \textit{De constantia} II, c. 6: ‘Ira, vindicta, ultio humani adfectus nomina sunt: & nata ex imbecillitate, cadunt tantum in imbecillos.’
\item \textsuperscript{67} Cf. Lipsius, \textit{De constantia} II, c. 4: ‘Sapientiam convertere, quae mores tibi corrigat, quae animum turbidum sordidumque tranquillet & illustret. Illa est quae virtutem imprimere, quae \textit{Constantiam} suggerere potest: ilia sola, quae templum tibi aperire Bonae mentis.’
\item \textsuperscript{68} Cf. e.g. ibid. c. 8: ‘Sunt enim ex iis, quos satis certo comprehendere & signare posse videor: […] E certis hi tres: Exercendi, Castigandi, Puniendi. Pleraque enim ista immissio cladium, si attendis, aut Bonos exercet; aut Lapsos castigat, aut Improbos punit. eaque omnia nostro bono.’ Moreover ibid.: ‘Firmant clades igitur, & ut arbores ventis agitatae, altius radices agunt: sic boni in virtute magis comprehendunt, impulse aliquotes adversitatatum flabris.’
\item \textsuperscript{69} Cf. ibid. Cf. further: \textit{Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam} III, diss. 7: ‘Quid [Stoici affectus] tollerent? Utiles censebant, & a Natura ad Virtutem datas. \textit{Nam sine iis} (aiebant) \textit{languebit omnis actio}, & \textit{vis ac vigor animi resolvetur} [Seneca, \textit{De ira} I, 8]. Sine Ira, Fortitudo non erit; […] Quis autem [affectus] cultura? Ratio, aiebant.’
\end{itemize}
Although Lipsius is a Stoic and acknowledges the omnipotence of divine providence,\(^{70}\) which governs and determines everything,\(^{71}\) he does not perceive this providence as ruling out the possibility of free will, nor does he think it erases a human being’s responsibility toward his or her emotions. Lipsius defends Stoic doctrine against objections,\(^{72}\) and offers detailed explanations demonstrating that it is possible to believe in divine providentia, fatum and human liberum arbitrium without contradiction.\(^{73}\)

Moreover, like Descartes, Langius in the dialogue supports the doctrine of a strict separation of the body and soul (or mind). The soul, he argues, represents reason and the mind. It is the divine part in a human being and its activity is opposed to the corporeal movements of the body.\(^{74}\) Thus, whether a person is moved to anger depends primarily on this person’s mind and its activity when making a judgement. The corporeal aspects of an emotion seem to be taken for granted, although their importance is not stressed as much as it is in Descartes’ doctrine.

Like Descartes, Lipsius’ Langius considers emotions—with few exceptions—to be harmful because they irritate a person’s soul, pervert reason and prevent rational thinking.\(^{75}\) Langius offers anger as an example of a harmful emotion.

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70 For a definition of providentia, cf. Lipsius, De Constantia 1, c. 19: ‘Nam providentiam non aliter capio aut considero, quam ut in deo vis sit et potestas omnia vivendi, sciendi, gubernandi.’


72 Cf. Lipsius, De constantia 1, 18: ‘Et indissolubils illa catheca nexusque caussarum, quo Omnia & omnes ligant, vim facere non obscure videtur Arbitrio humano. At germani tamen verique Stoici, aperta fronte professi numquam ista. Aut si quid tale ipsis elapsum in calore illo, ut fit, scribendi sive disserendi: verbis id magis comperies, quam re & sensu.’

73 Cf. Lipsius, De constantia 1, c. 18–22. His explanation is similar to Alexander of Aphrodisias’ portrayal of Stoic doctrine and of divine fatum and human free will (cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, De fato 181,13 et sqq.) Lipsius seems to have read Alexander’s work. Cf. De constantia 1, c. 18, where he refers directly to Alexander’s work De fato.

74 Cf. Lipsius, De constantia 1, c. 5. In this chapter, Lipsius refers explicitly to Seneca. Lipsius, Physiologiae Stoicorum 1, diss. 5.

75 Cf. also: Lipsius, Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam 111, diss. 7: ‘Est vera & haec tot descriptio & propalatio Stoici sensus. Primûm, non aliud a Ratione Affectum esse: Ratione nempe prava, quae Opinion dicitur. Item, non esse duorum differentiam: id est, in una, quae
According to him, human beings are responsible for their emotions, including anger, and have to exercise control in order to minimize the danger of being excessively affected by harmful emotions. While Descartes describes emotions in more corporeal and physiological terms and only refers to the soul’s passive perception of bodily movements, he also believes that these movements’ effects can worsen if a person voluntarily consents to corporeal irritation. It must be noted that voluntary consent here stands for the evaluation of an object as good or bad for oneself. Whereas for Descartes this evaluation can occur unconsciously, for Lipsius an opinion seems to represent a conscious evaluation of the judgement.\footnote{Cf. Lipsius, \textit{Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam} 111, diss. 7, where he refers to Seneca, \textit{De ira} 11, 2 and 1, 3 and says that the first bodily irritations are only ‘principia proludentia affectibus’. Cf. ibidem: ‘Affectus omnes in Rationali parte esse, ideoque cetera Animalia iis carere.’}

According to Descartes’ doctrine, the body as a machine can evaluate foreign objects in a natural way. Nevertheless, he also acknowledges the possible influence of the mind on corporeal judgements.

Langius as Lipsius’ dialogue partner in \textit{De constantia} shares Descartes’ opinion concerning the remedy for a harmful emotion such as anger. Langius believes that the remedy can be found in an activity exercised by the mind, and he also agrees that emotions are necessary to acquire a strong and firm mind, i.e., \textit{constantia}, and hence for arming one’s own character against harmful emotions.\footnote{Cf. Lipscius, \textit{Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam} 111, diss. 7, where he refers to Seneca, \textit{De ira} 11, 2 and 1, 3 and says that the first bodily irritations are only ‘principia proludentia affectibus’. Cf. ibidem: ‘Affectus omnes in Rationali parte esse, ideoque cetera Animalia iis carere.’} Furthermore, Langius suggests that gaining broad knowledge allows one to fight harmful emotions—particularly if that knowledge is relevant to showing oneself as being constant.

Following his doctrine of the body as a machine, Descartes stresses the corporeal and physiological component of emotions more than does Langius in the dialogue. Compared to Lipsius, Descartes grants very little importance to the influence of free will and the soul on emotions. According to Descartes, the importance of the soul is limited to three things: its perception (‘feeling’) of corporeal irritations, its sending out of \textit{esprits animaux} that are responsible for corporeal movements, and its ability to either calm an emotion or to worsen it. As explained above, for Descartes a human’s influence on corporeal movements can only be indirect and via \textit{imaginationes}. His assertion that an emotion is not conceivable without the soul’s perception of the physiological

\begin{quote}
Ratione haec nasci, sed aliter atque aliter affecta. Seneca lucem faciet istis, & capiet: \textit{Non enim, ut dixi separatas ista diductasque sedes suas habent: sed Affectus & Ratio, in melius peiusque mutatio animi} est [Seneca, \textit{De ira} 1, 8].\footnote{Cf. Descartes, \textit{Passions de l’âme} 1, 45; AT XI, 362–363; 11, 74; AT XI, 383; II, 76; AT XI, 385; 111, 203; AT XI, 481.} \end{quote}
movements in the nerves does not alter the fact that the machine of the body can be thought of independently from the soul and its activity. This basic dualism is also implicit in Lipsius’ doctrine. Otherwise, reason would not have the power to hold back an emotion that begins with a corporeal affliction.

As outlined above, Descartes’ notion of anger and his understanding of emotions in general are not so different from Lipsius’ explanations as it might seem. The similarities between them outweigh the differences. These similarities are found in the intellectual framework that differentiates strictly between a mechanistic irritation of the body on the one hand and the activity of the soul on the other. This strict separation of body and soul requires an explanation within the boundaries of substance dualism. So there remains only the possibility of explaining emotions by a (cognitive) activity of the soul (e.g., reason / free decision) or by a bodily movement that is independent of such an activity of the soul. Within these boundaries and limits, there are conceivable intermediate stages, such as that while the origin of an emotion is corporeal, the soul, as Descartes believes, perceives the physiological irritation. In this case, the emotion is explained as a kind of unitary function of body and soul, which are usually thought to be strictly separated. Or it is generally possible to think that some emotions are corporeal only and that others cannot exist without a conscious judgement or evaluation of an object. Although there are differences between these doctrines, it seems quite probable that they derive from the same intellectual framework and premises.

Based on this assumption, it is also likely that Descartes discerns a fight between a person’s will and the movements of his or her body. Thus, Descartes distances himself from the Aristotelian, scholastic and Middle-Stoic traditions that support, in various ways, the tripartite model of the soul, according to which one part of the soul in particular consists of anger (l’irascible or pars irascibilis). This difference makes it quite probable that Descartes’ intellectual framework is not scholastic but Neo-Stoic or Stoic. Moreover, it is very

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79 Cf. Krewet, *Die stoische Theorie der Gefühle* 152–201 (on Aristotle’s doctrine of emotions and the presuppositions in his psychology); 201–265 (on Thomas Aquinas as an example of a scholastic doctrine of emotions that stays within the tradition of Aristotelian doctrine) and 102–133 (on Poseidonios as a representative of the Middle-Stoic doctrine who uses a different tripartite model of the soul than the tripartite model prevalent in the Aristotelian tradition). Cf. Descartes, *Passions de l’Ame* 11, 68; AT XI, 379, where Descartes is probably distinguishing his position from the opinions of scholastics: ‘Car ils tirent leur denombrement de ce qu’ils distinguent en la partie sensitive de l’ame deux appetits, qu’ils nomment, l’un Concupiscible, l’autre Irascible.’ Concupiscible and irascible correspond to Aristotele’s ἐπιθυμία and θυμός. That these two parts are conceived as being themselves
plausible that this framework had an important influence on Descartes’ notion of anger.

The link between Descartes’ framework and the tenets of Stoic and Neo-Stoic philosophy can be ascertained by referring to only a few important examples from Seneca’s Stoic portrayal of anger in his work De ira, which Lipsius knew very well. Seneca defines anger as a representation of an injustice, without specifying at the beginning whether this representation needs the conscious consent or evaluation of the soul or mind or not. The first is the Old Stoic, and the latter the Middle-Stoic position. In his detailed analysis of anger, Seneca then discusses the question whether anger needs a (conscious) assent of the mind or not. Seneca takes the view that it is indispensable for anger that the mind approve of the representation of injustice and voluntarily seek revenge.

According to Seneca, this voluntary consent to such a representation is only the second phase in the emergence of anger. Before this consent, the human being suffers an inevitable corporeal affliction from an outside object. It is not in the person’s power to alter this affliction and the affliction alone, without a voluntary consent, is not yet the emotion according to Seneca. These corporeal afflictions are only the prelude to an emotion (principia

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80 Cf. Lipsius, Manuductio ad Stoicam Philosophiam 111, diss. 7 and e.g. above, notes 69 and 75.

81 Cf. Seneca, De ira 11, 1,3: ‘Iram quin species oblatae iniuriae moveat non est dubium; sed utrum speciem ipsam statim sequatur et non accedente animo excurrat, an illo assenti- ente moveatur quaerimus.’


84 Cf. ibidem: ‘nam speciem capere acceptae iniuriae et ultionem eius concupiscere et utrumque coniungere, nec laedi se debuisse et vindicari debere, non est eius impetus, qui sine voluntate nostra concitatur.’

85 Cf. Seneca, De ira 11, 2,1: ‘Omnes enim motus qui non voluntate nostra fiunt invicti et inevitabiles sunt, ut horror frigida aspersis, ad quosdam tactus aspernatio; ad peiores nuntios subriguntur pli et rubur ad improba verba suffunditur sequiturque vertigo praerupta cer- nentis; quorum quia nihil in nostra potestate est, nulla quo minus fiat ratio persuadet.’
proludentia affectibus). Thus Seneca also views the body and the soul as being strictly separated.

Moreover, in Seneca's view, anger is a harmful emotion that perverts the reasonable soul and must be avoided. Seneca also believes that reason, in its perfection, is not responsible for the judgement that opens the soul to this emotion; it is rather opinions that are responsible.

Finally, it must be mentioned that Seneca assumes constantia of the mind to guarantee a virtuous and happy life. This virtue and, by extension, constantia, is acquired when a person's will follows his or her reason.

Descartes' notion of anger differs from Aristotle's as well as from a great part of the scholastic theory of emotions. His abandonment of this philosophical tradition is accompanied by a falling back on the basic premises of various Stoic and Neo-Stoic philosophical traditions with which he was probably familiar from the works of Seneca and Justus Lipsius, among others. The premises of Stoic philosophy seem to provide the building blocks of Descartes' systematic framework, within which he develops his notion of anger.

The systematic intellectual framework of Stoic and Neo-Stoic philosophy can be summarized as follows: the Stoic doctrine sees the essence of an object in its material structure. Thus the object can only be perceived in a natural way via small corporeal particles emanating from these objects that afflict the soul of human beings and show themselves in the form of a dark and confused

86 Cf. in detail: Seneca, *De ira* II, 2,3. On Lipsius' direct reference to this passage above, see n. 76.

87 Cf. Seneca, *De ira* I, 8.

88 Cf. Seneca, *De ira* II, 2,2: ‘Ira praeeptis fugatur; est enim voluntarium animi vitiosum, non ex his quae condicione quadam humanae sortis eveniunt ideoque etiam spientissimis accidunt, inter quae et primus ille actus animi ponendus est, qui nos post opinionem injuriae movet.’

89 Cf. e.g. Seneca, ep. 92,3: ‘Quid est beata vita? securitas et perpetua tranquillitas. Hanc dabat animi magnitudo, dabat constantia bene iudicati tenax. Ad haec quomodo pervenitur? si veritas tota perspecta est; si servatus est in rebus agendis ordo, modus, decor, inoxia voluntas ac benigna, intenta rationi nec unquam ab illa recedens, amabilis simul mirabilisque.’ On the importance that Seneca attributes to constancy and firmness of the mind, see *De prov.* II, 1, 2, 4, 8, 10; III, 10; IV, 5–7; V, 3; VI, 3, 5–7 and *De const. sap.* I, 3–5; IV, 4–7; VI, 7–8; IX, 1–3; X, 1; XI, 1–3; X, 1; XIX, 1–4.

representation of the object. The perceiver only realises that something has left an impression in his or her soul. In order to gain knowledge about the object, he or she must illuminate what was previously dark. A conscious, active and structuring representation clears up the first dark impression and representation, in which the object appeared dark and confused. Then, this conscious representation evaluates the object in its context. When the object of this second representation has become clear or evident, the judgement of the soul can realise that the represented object is the one that affected the soul. The criterion to ensure a true understanding of the object is the evidence or clarity of the representation. This clarity can only be acquired by every single characteristic part of the object being represented in its proper place. Thinking, understanding and evaluating—the so-called cognitive act in its purest sense—are at the core of this active and conscious representation.

The object itself is something external to the soul. The activity that is in the power of the subject consists in taking a stand or attitude towards an affliction that has taken place mechanistically and corporeally, and in clearing up the object or evaluating it consciously. Although this activity of the soul is dependent upon the external object, the strict separation of the activity of the soul and of the corporeal mechanisms of the body paves the way for a dichotomy

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91 On the Stoic doctrine, see Sextus Empiricus, *Adversus Mathematicos* VII, 253–258. On similarities to Descartes’ doctrine, see for example his statement on sense objects: *Meditationes* III, 45–46; AT VII, 43: ‘caetera autem, ut lumen & colores, soni, odores, sapores, calor & frigus, aliaeqque tactiles qualitates, nonnisi valde confuse & obscure a me cogitantur, adeo ut etiam ignorem an sint verae, vel falsoe, hoc est, an ideae, quas de illis habeo, sint rerum quarundam ideae, an non rerum.’


94 Cf. *Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker* [FDS] 1, 255.

95 Cf. FDS I 279: ἄναιρουμένων τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐξ ἁνάγυς ἁπειρείται πᾶσα νόησις.
of body and soul or a substance dualism. The monistic view of the soul as pure reason, which is supported by the old and young Stoa, finds its origin in these premises.

Thus, according to this philosophical tradition, understanding means ‘clearing up’ something that is simply there. If an emotion can be felt, it can be considered as simply there; that is, it is conceived as something external to the subject’s activity of thinking, as an external force. Consequently, the emotion has to be thought of as something that in its origins is corporeal, belonging to the body, or as a capacity or part of the soul that is strictly separated from the activity of reason, as it is found in the doctrine of the Middle Stoa. In order to understand the emotion, it has to be ‘cleared up’ by representing all its characteristic components. If these characteristics are thought to be ‘simply there’ as something corporeal in a material substance that is external to the activity of reason, an analysis of the emotion must include the ‘clearing up’ of all characteristic corporeal features and movements of a single emotion.

Moreover, if the activity of reason provides a clear representation, an impression made by an external object or force such as an emotion like anger can be regarded as the cause of a corporeal irritation that impedes further clear impressions and representations as well as reasonable thinking. Following the premises of this intellectual framework, it logically follows that an ideal life is one free from harmful emotions like anger, or from other excessive emotions. Against the backdrop of the dichotomy of soul and body, of the activity of reason and the physiological mechanisms of the body, an emotion (or at least excessive emotion) can impede and pervert reason. Thus, a wise person

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96 This becomes clear when Descartes explains that human beings feel the first and direct representations of the objects in their proper sense and immediately (‘proprie & immediate’) and as something that is completely different from thinking, namely as corporeal things in which the ideas (= representations) find their origin (cf. Descartes, Meditationes VI, 92–93; AT VII, 75: ‘Nec sane absque ratione, ob ideas istarum omnium qualitatum quae cogitationi meae se offerebant, & quas solas proprie & immediate sentiebam, putabam me sentire res quasdam a mea cogitatione plane diversas, nempe corpora a quibus ideae istae procederent’). These sensible ideas (= representations) befall a person without his consent (cf. ibidem: ‘experiebar enim illas absque ullo meo consensu mihi advenire, adeo ut neque possem objectum ullum sentire, quamvis vellem, nisi illud sensus organo esset praesens, nec possem non sentire cum erat praesens.’).


98 Cf. SVF II, 60; and Sextus Empiricus, Adversus mathematicos VII, 242ff.
is one who is constant in fighting the intrusion of harmful emotions into his or her soul. A wise person would reject the emotion, because he or she knows this emotion’s context and sees the danger of perversion for his or her soul. Other, less wise people who render a judgement because of an opinion and not because of reason,99 open their souls to harmful and excessive emotions.

This systematic intellectual framework limits the number of possible explanations of emotions. According to the notion of a body and soul dichotomy, emotions can either be explained by their corporeal and non-cognitive aspects or by their cognitive aspects. Emotions in general can either be seen primarily as physiological irritations or as evaluative consents or evaluations of something corporeal. These aspects can be explored in greater detail by employing different approaches. As Descartes’ notion of anger shows, an approach that follows the basic premises of a Stoic epistemology remains restricted by these basic categories. Descartes’ respect for this dichotomy in his discourse shows that his position must be understood within the Stoic tradition. His position thus differs from the Aristotelian tradition and from various important scholastic explanations of emotions,100 which base their concept of emotion and anger on a different epistemology, according to which thinking does not consist in representing an object, but in distinguishing (ϰρίνειν or diiudicare) it.101

It seems evident that Descartes’ notion of anger and emotion is built on the premises of the Stoic tradition. Among other elements of this tradition, he borrows substance dualism, which enables him to explain anger first as a corporeal irritation that affects the soul and then as an emotion perceived by the soul as anger. He also borrows the idea of representation, the two phases of a passive affliction by this representation and the possible judgement of the soul or independent will of this affliction via a conscious representation. Finally, he embraces the notion of the immense danger of emotions in general and of anger in particular, and the ideal of a life without emotions accompanied by a proper and constant attitude of the mind toward harmful objects. Thus, although Descartes’ doctrine differs from strict Stoicism according to which an emotion arises from a conscious consent to corporeal irritation, his intellectual framework remains the same as the framework already put forward by Seneca in De ira.

99 Cf. SVF I, 67; I, 60; II, 90.
100 Cf. in detail: Krewet, Die stoische Theorie der Gefühle 141–278.
101 Cf., e.g., Aristotle, De anima 427a20–21; Alexander of Aphrodisias, De anima 78, 10–21. Cf. also in detail Schmitt, Die Moderne und Platon. For this concept in scholastic philosophy, see also the example of Thomas Aquinas (cf. Krewet, Die stoische Theorie der Gefühle 201–265).
Descartes' notion of anger therefore does not constitute a completely new beginning. It seems new and modern because it breaks with the familiar Aristotelian and scholastic traditions. However, in order to distance himself from this weighty tradition, Descartes falls back on Stoic and Neo-Stoic concepts that themselves have a vivid history. It is characteristic for Descartes' doctrines not to copy earlier positions. Instead, he builds on them—also by referring to other contemporary theories—without abandoning their premises, within the boundaries that result from a certain but not natural and necessary intellectual framework.

It is also this systematic background with its substance dualism that he borrows from the Stoic and Neo-Stoic tradition which enables Descartes to work out more precisely the corporeal irritation of an emotion and integrate into his theory, e.g., physiological doctrines—such as those of Marin Mersenne or William Harvey—\(^\text{102}\)—that stress that the body resembles a machine. Following as it does the Stoic and Neo-Stoic doctrines of the Renaissance and their systematic and intellectual framework, Descartes' notion of anger can be regarded as humanistic. The peculiarity of his own concept of emotion and notion of anger can be seen particularly in his inclusion of the physiological theories of his contemporaries at those points where the inherited systematic and intellectual framework provided room for it. Because of this inclusion of the physiological doctrines of his contemporaries and his detailed elaborations of the physiological side of emotions, Descartes' concept of anger appears as more nuanced than the Stoic and Neo-Stoic notions of anger as far as physiology is concerned. Emphasising the ways in which Descartes' notion of anger represents a break with an important part of the scholastic concepts of emotion and integrates contemporary physiological doctrines, suggests that he also ushered in a new epoch of thinking about emotions.

It was one purpose of this contribution to show that, on the other hand, there are good reasons for assuming that the systematic and intellectual framework of Descartes' notion of anger are part of a long non-scholastic, but Stoic and Neo-Stoic—and therefore also humanistic—tradition of thinking about anger. Therefore, Descartes' notion of anger does not represent a break with this tradition but rather a more nuanced elaboration of the physiology of an emotion within the adopted systematic framework.

Descartes did not remain alone in this tradition with his concept of emotions and his attitude towards them, as Immanuel Kant's statement shows: ‘Das Prinzip der Apathie: daß nämlich niemals im Affekt, selbst nicht in dem des

\(^{102}\) On the influence of Mersenne's and Harvey's physiological studies on Descartes' description of emotions, cf.: Hammacher, “Einleitung” XXXII et sqq.
Mitleids mit den Übeln seines besten Freundes, sein müsse, ist ein ganz richtiger und erhabener Grundsatz der stoischen Schule; denn der Affekt macht (mehr oder weniger) blind.  

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Chapter 7

Holy Desperation and Sanctified Wrath: Anger in Puritan Thought

David M. Barbee

William Haller, the eminent American historian of Puritanism, wrote that Puritan preachers intended ‘to find means to stir imaginations, induce emotional excitement, wring the hearts of sinners, win souls to the Lord, in other words to make themselves understood and felt.’ Although Haller’s comment points toward the centrality of the emotions in Puritan thought, relatively little research has been conducted regarding Puritan views on emotion. In the standard bibliographic resource for the study of emotion and religion, only a handful of studies are listed that are connected to an examination of the role of emotions in Puritanism. Most of the sources catalogued focus upon more pious feelings concentrated on the experience of conversion. Only one study—an unpublished dissertation—addresses anger in Puritan thought in any detail.

This is not because Puritans neglected to discuss anger. In fact, anger is a multifaceted issue that demanded analysis from a number of perspectives. Discourses of anger functioned on three levels in Puritan thought and practice. First, the question was broached initially by considering the expression of divine anger. Christological doctrine gave the matter a finer point by compelling Puritans to discuss the question of Christ’s perfected human emotions. This foreshadows the final layer wherein Puritans celebrated anger as a concern for spirituality. These themes will be addressed utilizing the eminent Elizabethan divine William Perkins as an entry point while engaging later Puritan literature to show basic lines of continuity. The topic of anger provides a different perspective on traditional Puritan concerns related to soteriology and the assurance of salvation.

Expressing Divine Anger

In his discussion of how to apply doctrine in his homiletical handbook, William Perkins instructs future preachers to distinguish between law and gospel. The law serves ‘to declare unto us the disease of sinne, and by accident to exasperate and stirre it up: but it affords no remedy.’ He adds that the law ‘speaketh of Perfect inherent righteousness, of eternall life given through the works of the Law, of the contrary, sinnes, and of the curse that is due unto them.’ This is all characterized as preparation for the reception of the gospel by the auditors. Perkins is exhorting preachers to employ the traditional Reformed third use of the law. He articulates this more clearly in his *Golden Chaine*. He describes the third use of the law as to pronounce ‘eternall damnation for the least disobedience, without offering any hope of pardon. This sentence the law pronounceth against offendours, and by it, partly by threatening, partly by terrifying, it raigneth and ruleth over man.’ Perkins is inculcating a sense of the immanence of divine judgement based upon the sinfulness of human nature.

This is communicated initially as divine justice. Perkins subjects the divine attributes to extensive analysis in his *Golden Chaine*. He distinguishes between three divine attributes—wisdom, will, and omnipotence. It is the divine will that concerns us here. He acknowledges that the divine will is expressed by different terms and settles upon two sets of analytical categories—love or hatred and grace or justice. The latter term of each dichotomy is pertinent. ‘The Hatred of God,’ he declares ‘is that by which he distilleth and detesteth his creature offending for his fault.’

Divine justice is more thoroughly schematized. Perkins defines it at the outset as ‘that by which he in all things willeth that which is just.’ He maneuvers through several further bifurcations—between dispensing and rewarding justice as expressions of justice in deed. The former is that by which God is free to order all things and the latter rewards the creature according to his or her works. Perkins’ discussion ultimately culminates in a division

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4 Perkins William, *The Art of Prophecying*, in *The Workes of that Famous and Worthy Minister of Christ in the Universitie of Cambridge, Mr. William Perkins*, 3 vols. (London, John Legatt: 1526–31) vol. II, 664. All citations to Perkins’ writings will be drawn from this edition of his works and will be cited according to volume and page number.
8 Ibidem 13.
between the definition of divine justice as either gentleness or anger. ‘Gods Anger,’ he concludes, ‘is that by which he willeth the punishment of the creature offending.’\(^9\) When one works through Perkins’ framework, divine anger is ultimately an expression of divine justice issued against those who have broken the law by sinning. To preach divine justice thus corresponds to preaching divine anger.

Later Puritans followed suit in equating justice with anger. John Owen, for example, presents an equally descriptive account of divine anger along similar lines. Most broadly, the ‘anger of God’ in scripture refers simply to the effect of anger in the form of vengeance.\(^10\) Second, anger ‘denotes a constant and immutable will in God of avenging and punishing, by a just punishment, all injuries, grave crimes, and sins.’ This is based on Owen’s reading of Romans 9:22 where he understands wrath to be divine ‘justice or constant will in punishing sinners.’\(^11\)

How, then, is one to understand this notion of divine anger in relation to the traditional doctrine of divine aseity? Perkins defines God’s immutability as part of his essential nature. Divine immutability ‘is that by which (God) is void of all composition, division and change.’\(^12\) Perkins essentially redefines the problem as a matter of semantics. He flatly denies that hatred, for instance, can be taken for a passion incident in God as it occurs in humans, but ‘if it be taken for a worke of Gods providence and justice, it is in God & that in three respects.’\(^13\) First, hatred in scripture, Perkins explains, ‘signifies a deniall of love & mercy.’ Second, in a different sense, God hates iniquity in a more active manner. Finally, God is said to hate insofar as he punishes those who offend him by sinning.\(^14\) It is ultimately not the case that God is angry. God is just, Perkins claims, and human experience of divine justice is encountered as anger. ‘God is said to repent,’ he asserts, ‘not because hee changeth either nature or will, but because he changeth by actions of mercie and love into effects of anger, after the manner of men.’\(^15\) This distinction functionally removes emotions from the divine domain while also providing a descriptive account of human religious experience.

Owen offers a slightly different account of divine anger in the light of divine immutability. ‘That God should be conceived angry after the manner of men,
or with any such kind of Passion,' Owen writes, ‘is gross Anthropomorphisme; as bad, if not worse then the assigning of him a bodily shape.\textsuperscript{16} Instead of expounding divine anger solely in terms of justice, Owen adds a middle term to explain the issue. While it is an effect of justice, the ‘Anger of God is a pure Act of his Will, whereby he will effect, and inflict the Effects of Anger.’\textsuperscript{17} Owen simply assumes that God’s will is unchanging. In this way, he shifts divine anger away from being a passion that seizes control of a person and toward a more comprehensive analysis of the problem.

The kind of preaching Perkins describes in which the weight of the law is pressed down upon the listener develops into a distinct literary genre with a specific intended audience. He identifies the audience as those who have knowledge, but who are not humbled as of yet. In those instances, the ‘ministry of the Law’ should be deployed to ‘beget contrition of heart, or the horrors of conscience’ so that the proud may become humbled and teachable.\textsuperscript{18}

The Westminster divines identified one specific form of homiletical application intended for just the kind of audience Perkins identified. They labelled this genre as dehortation, reprehension, or public admonition. In this task, the preacher is to ‘not only discover the nature and greatness of the sin, with the misery attending it, but also shew the danger his hearers are in, to be overtaken and surprised by it, together with the remedies and best way to avoid it.’\textsuperscript{19} Puritans considered this style of preaching to be a necessary prerequisite for the conversion of a sinner.

Perhaps the best known Puritan sermon of this genre is Jonathan Edwards’ \textit{Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God.}\textsuperscript{20} Preached in July 1741, Edwards goes

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} Owen John, \textit{Of the Death of Christ} (London, Peter Cole: 1650) 37.
\item \textsuperscript{17} Ibidem. Stephen Charnock moves in a similar direction without discussing anger specifically. Charnock writes that, first of all, God is spirit and, as such, cannot feel passions. When scripture speaks of God showing affections, it should be understood either as an accommodation to human language or an outward expression of his will. See Charnock Stephen, \textit{Several Discourses Upon the Existence and Attributes of God} (London, D. Newman – T. Cockerill – Benjamin Griffin – T. Simmons – Benjamin Alsop: 1682) 224–6. For a fascinating comparative study of Perkins and Charnock on the divine attributes, see Lee H., \textit{Trinitarian Theology and Piety: The Attributes of God in the Thought of Stephen Charnock (1628–1680) and William Perkins (1558–1602)} (Ph.D. diss., University of Edinburgh: 2009).
\item \textsuperscript{18} Perkins, \textit{The Art of Prophecying} vol. II, 666.
\item \textsuperscript{20} By some definitions, Edwards may not qualify as a Puritan. He was active far after many historians would date the end of Puritanism, and he was not a member of the Church
\end{itemize}
into great detail to convey to his audience both the degree of God's wrath and the severity of punishment in hell. Wicked men 'deserve to be cast into hell'; in fact, 'justice calls aloud for an infinite punishment of their sins.' The unconverted, Edwards claims, 'are now the objects of that very same anger and wrath of God that is expressed in the torments of hell.' Indeed, God is angrier at those who are living sinfully than at those who already reside in hell. The fierceness of God's anger compels him to 'inflict wrath without any pity.' It is only the pleasure of an angry God that prevents the unregenerate from falling into the pit of hell this very moment. Edwards defines the use of this teaching as an awakening to the pervasive danger of judgment that encircles the sinner. Edwards' *Sinners in the Hands of an Angry God* is the epitome of the 'fire and brimstone' sermon practiced by Puritans.

While Edwards' sermon is focused upon the conversion of the individual sinner, the jeremiad is another homiletic genre that addresses many similar themes, but is centred upon communal repentance instead. David Minter draws out the substance of the ideology behind the jeremiad when he notes first that 'sin was linked with judgment, judgment with repentance, repentance with forgiveness, forgiveness with hope, and hope with reform,' but also that, contingent upon fulfillment of the communal covenant with God that 'God specifically would bless New England, giving her peace and prosperity within, influence and power without [...] betrayal of the agreement would be met not only with eternal fire but with present visitations of God's wrath.' Jeremiads


2 Ibídem 413.

3 Ibídem 409.

served largely the same function corporately as the ‘fire and brimstone’ sermon does for the individual. Both decried the moral or spiritual state of the corporate body or individual, respectively and sought reform or renewal so as to prevent the unleashing of divine justice expressed as anger in judgment.

The doctrine of divine providence was a means to explicate the potential for judgment on a personal level. Perkins identifies two components of providence: knowledge and government. In turn, government is the manner in which God orders all things and directs them toward good ends. This is variable according to one’s moral status, that is, whether something or someone is good or evil. Evil is either sin or the punishment for sin. Perkins describes the latter as ‘the execution of justice, and hath God to be the author of it.’ William Ames, Perkins’ protege, described providence as ‘that Efficiency whereby (God) provides for his Creatures now made, in all things, according to the counsell of his owne Will.’ He distinguished between ordinary and usual or extraordinary and unusual providence. As a part of God’s special government of intelligent creatures, God exerts this rule morally through making and establishing of a law by promising or threatening. One could expect to experience guilt and punishment as a result of evil actions. The former is ‘the binding of the Sinner to undergoe just punishment for his fault’ and the latter is ‘an evill inflicted upon the Sinner for his Sinne.’ In the act of punishment, God exhibits holiness, righteousness, and mercy amongst the other divine attributes. Again, Ames articulated this in terms of divine justice expressed in degrees of wrath, fury, judgment, and vengeance. The connection between providence and divine justice naturally lends itself to recounts of sin punished immediately. Borrowing from Foxe’s Acts and Monuments, Perkins illustrated how a Protestant can die well, and, conversely, how a Catholic can die badly, as well as the prompt judgment a person can experience from a wrathful God. For instance, Perkins recites a story from Foxe in which a young girl named Dennis Benfield called God ‘an old doting foole.’ Shortly after this, half of the

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26 Perkins, An Exposition of the Symbole vol. 1, 155.
27 Ibidem 156.
30 Ames, The Marrow of Sacred Divinity Bk. 1 Ch. xii ¶ 2 and 10.
31 Perkins, A Treatise Tending unto a Declaration vol. 1, 398.
girl’s body turned black, she lost the power of speech, and subsequently died.\textsuperscript{32} Insofar as preaching was central to Puritan culture and Puritans were to live constantly aware of the threat of divine justice, anger may be seen to encompass the Puritan.

\section{Anger in the Incarnation of God}

Puritans believed that divine anger was assuaged through the substitutionary penal death of Jesus. The incarnation of Christ itself provides an interesting perspective on the question of anger in Puritan thinking. Puritan adherence to traditional Christological doctrine hedged in their reflections on the topic on two fronts. First, the doctrine of divine immutability would seem to imply that Christ ought not feel emotions while in human form. On the other hand, the belief that Christ was also fully human and shared in the human experience in its totality suggests that he also ought to be capable of feeling emotions in a way similar to every other human being. Scripture itself contains passages where Christ is described as feeling one kind of human emotion or another. The conviction that Christ was both fully human and fully divine had the potential to both elicit initial ruminations upon the nature of emotion while also suggesting the proper role of emotions in religious practice.

Of course, these are questions that theologians had been wrestling with for centuries prior to the Puritans. Traditional theological treatises and scriptural commentaries provided ample resources with which the Puritans could engage. In the third book of the \textit{Sentences}, Peter Lombard affirms that Christ took on all of the defects of the human soul.\textsuperscript{33} However, Christ did not experience things like fear and sadness as humans normally do. Due to sin, humans are subject to these defects and they exist in humans according to both propagation and passion. In Christ, they only exist as the former. This means that while a person may feel these emotions, they do not divert them from righteousness or contemplation of God.\textsuperscript{34} In his discussion of human defects assumed in Christ, Thomas Aquinas goes into much greater detail than Lombard in the \textit{Sentences}. Aquinas flatly denied that there was sin or even the potential for sin

\begin{footnotes}
\item[34] Ibidem Bk. 111. dist. 15 ch. 2.
\end{footnotes}
in Christ on the grounds of his immaculate conception.\textsuperscript{35} This did not mean, though, that Christ could not feel passions. On the contrary, Christ’s soul felt passions by necessity of his humanity, but these passions operate differently in Christ. Aquinas claims that Christ’s passions are always directed toward the proper end, remain under the control of reason, and never disorder the soul.\textsuperscript{36}

This serves as a preface to a discussion of specific emotions in Aquinas. He viewed anger as the effect of sorrow combined with a desire of the sensitive appetite for revenge. At this point, Aquinas has already established that Christ could feel sorrow. He distinguishes between a desire for revenge that overthrows reason, making it sinful, and a desire that is controlled by reason, making it praiseworthy. This is better termed as zeal.\textsuperscript{37} In fact, this is how Aquinas’ Franciscan peer, Bonaventure, interpreted a passage in John 2 in which Jesus forcibly removes moneychangers from the temple in Jerusalem. When asked if Christ was angry during this event, Bonaventure replies negatively. If zeal implies anger and anger perturbation, Bonaventure reasons, then Christ clearly did not possess zeal. He finds the second meaning of zeal, that of fervent love, more palatable.\textsuperscript{38}

Puritans adhered to these traditional lines of argument regarding Christ’s dual nature and the feeling of human emotion. Perkins affirms that the two natures in Christ ‘remaine distinct without composition, mingling, or conversion.’\textsuperscript{39} Christ’s human nature, though, was entirely purified by the Holy Spirit. For Perkins, this was necessary for the accomplishment of human redemption.\textsuperscript{40} In the incarnation, Christ possesses two complete and distinct natures.\textsuperscript{41} The complete union of natures means that, for Perkins, Christ was susceptible to four specific infirmities. The third of these defects is anger. This is corroborated by Mark 3:5 where the text explicitly states that Jesus was angry. Perkins hedges these infirmities with three qualifications. First, they only affected his human nature. Second, they were limited to general maladies such as thirst or weariness and not specific ailments like leprosy or blindness. Finally, Christ was subject to these infirmities of his own free will, not


\textsuperscript{36} Ibidem III q. 15 a. 4.

\textsuperscript{37} Ibidem III q. 1 a. 9.


\textsuperscript{40} Ibidem 25.

\textsuperscript{41} Ibidem.
by necessity of his human nature.\textsuperscript{42} In his commentary on Galatians, Perkins commented that Christ assumed ‘the powers of life, sense, motion, the facultie of reason, will, and affection.’\textsuperscript{43} But, again, the perceived infirmities are limited to potentialities and not construed as sins.\textsuperscript{44}

William Ames discusses the relationship of the two natures with a bit more concision than his mentor. He states that the union of natures ‘doth ad nothing, but a certaine relation: but in the humane nature it maketh a change, whilst by this meanes it is elevated to highest perfection.’\textsuperscript{45} Through the principle of the \textit{communicatio idiomatum}, Ames develops a way to speak of things that properly refer to only one portion of Christ, but by the communication of properties, they are assigned to Christ in his entirety. He offers the example of Christ’s death. God cannot die, so this is either nonsensical or refers primarily to the human portion of Christ. Through the communication of properties, it can be assigned to all of Christ.\textsuperscript{46} The comprehension of human emotions is a result of Christ’s subjection to the power of darkness. Only because of this does Christ feel things like sadness, fear, dread, and agony in his soul.\textsuperscript{47}

This remains rather speculative as it pertains to anger. Perkins has little to say about any anger Christ may have felt and Ames even less. Perkins observes that ‘Christ was angrie with the Jews’ for their unbelief, but this was mixed with sorrow for the very same reason.\textsuperscript{48} In fact, Perkins suggests that Christ was ‘oftimes angrie with the Jewes.’\textsuperscript{49} Ames does not mention Christ’s anger.

In theological treatises devoted to Christology, later Puritans like John Owen and Thomas Goodwin elaborated upon the themes presented very succinctly in Perkins and Ames. Both men assign the passions to Christ’s human nature, but generally refrain from discussing anger in favour of grief and sorrow.\textsuperscript{50} Owen builds from the foundational assumption of Christ’s dual nature.\textsuperscript{51} He explicitly states that the passions of human nature are assumed by the divine

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{42} Ibidem.
\bibitem{43} Perkins, \textit{Exposition upon the First Chapters of the Epistle to the Galatians} vol. 11, 272.
\bibitem{44} Ibidem.
\bibitem{45} Ames, \textit{The Marrow of Sacred Divinity} I, xviii, §17.
\bibitem{46} Ibidem I, xviii, § 23.
\bibitem{47} Ibidem I, xxii, § 11.
\bibitem{48} Perkins, \textit{The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience} vol. 11, 122.
\bibitem{49} Perkins, \textit{A Godly and Learned Exposition of Christs Sermon in the Mount} vol. 111.1, 45.
\bibitem{50} Traditionally, these emotions were of greater interest than anger to theologians. See Madigan K., \textit{The Passions of Christ in High-Medieval Thought: An Essay on Christological Development} (Oxford: 2007) 63–71.
\bibitem{51} Owen John, \textit{Christologia, or, A Declaration of the Glorious Mystery of the Person of Christ, God and Man} (London, Nathaniel Ponder: 1679) 296–7.
\end{thebibliography}
person in Christ.52 Owen then moves to a discussion of how specific scriptural passages relate to the two natures in Christ in a manner akin to Ames. He quotes Isaiah 53:3, 'A man of sorrows and acquainted with grief.' Such statements, Owen remarks, 'are spoken of the Person of Christ, but are verified in Humane Nature only.'53 Owen refers to Mark 3:5, where Christ is described as angry, for evidence that Christ assumed all that was required to be a perfect human, including affections, but he does not elaborate upon Christ's anger.54

Goodwin provides a different perspective in his Christological treatise, *The Heart of Christ in Heaven*. He argues that it is simply the nature of the Son to be loving. Like the Father, ‘it is naturall to shew mercie' for the Son.55 This does not change because of the incarnation, but rather human nature is refined to bring it into greater coherence with divinity. Goodwin emphasizes Christ's meekness and his unwillingness to judge sinners.56 Later in the text, Goodwin presents a standard explanation of scriptural passages that imply divine emotional immutability—such statements are accommodations to human language and ought to be understood metaphorically since God is without passion. This includes God incarnate, as Goodwin contends that descriptions of Christ’s affections pertain only to his human nature.57 During the incarnation, Christ was subject to fear, sorrow, and all other manner of ‘passionate overflowings.'58 This would seem to include anger. Goodwin queries, 'And why may it not be thought (Christ) is truly angry as a man, in his whole man, and so with such a wrath as his body is affected [...] seeing he hath taken up our whole nature?'59 He immediately qualifies this claim by asserting that Christ's affections function differently than other humans insofar as his body is more spiritual.60 Christ's perfection 'corrects and amends the imperfection' of the affections.61 In fact, if Christ lacked these putative defections, it would signal an imperfection.62 In that spirit, Goodwin believes that human sins provoke Christ ‘to pittie more then to anger.'63 These authors help to reveal how Christ

52 Ibidem 300.
53 Ibidem 313.
54 Owen John, *Dr. John Owen’s Two Short Catechisms* (London, William Marshal: 1700) 28.
56 Ibidem 56.
57 Ibidem 111–2.
58 Ibidem 123.
59 Ibidem 125.
60 Ibidem.
61 Ibidem 127.
63 Ibidem 137.
might feel anger and they admit he did, but they neglect to really grapple with the question.

Puritan exegetes were more directly provoked by Christ’s anger which caused greater elaboration on the point. John Downname addresses directly the question of Christ’s capacity for human emotion in his ruminations on Mark 3:5. He writes that when people are wronged, they become angry with ‘sinnefull affec tion: but Christ is angry without sinne […] because he is angry onely at sinne.’

This has suggestive implications. In his commentary on Mark 11:15, Downname describes Christ as ‘the revenger of the abuses of the temple.’ However, in his reflections on the same event recorded in the gospel of John, the text appears to prompt Downname to take a different line. He defines the word “zeal” used in John 2:17 as ‘the heat of indignation conceived at any thing unworthily done or attempted, against those we love.’ One of the possible permutations of zeal is listed as anger. Downname rejects this interpretation on the grounds that Christ was without sin; instead, Christ had ‘an holy zeal to the service and honour of God his Father.’

In his practical commentary on the gospel of Mark, George Petter qualifies Christ’s anger described in Mark 3:5. He correctly observes that the verse describes Christ as feeling both anger and grief. He unpacks what Christ was angry about in this passage. Christ ‘was inwardly moved with Anger and Displeasure,’ against the Jews, Petter alleges, ‘for their malice shewed in seeking to accuse him wrongfully.’ Christ’s anger is simply ‘a part of that holy Zeal which should be in us for God’s Glory.’ Christ’s clearing out of the temple is a further manifestation of his religious zeal. This violent act ‘shewed his zeal and indignation against their sin.’ For Petter, ‘zeal for God’s glory is a mixt affection’ by definition, composed of ‘holy anger and displeasure against sin; and partly, of a holy grief, because God is dishonoured by it.’

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64 Downame John, Annotations upon all the Books of the Old and New Testament (London, Evan Tyler: 1657), Mark 3:5. Downname's work is unpagedinated, so I have cited according to the scriptural passage from which I quote.
65 Downame, Annotations upon all the Books of the Old and New Testament, Mark 11:15.
67 Ibidem.
68 Petter George, A Learned, Pious and Practical Commentary, upon the Gospel according to St. Mark (London, J. Streater: 1661) 137.
69 Ibidem.
70 Ibidem 835.
71 Ibidem 839. John Trapp’s commentary on the story of Christ’s clearing of the temple provides a much different angle on the question than either commentary of Petter or Downname. Trapp describes the motivation behind Christ’s actions as zeal for the house
The practical orientation of Petter’s commentary naturally compels him to apply his observations on Christ’s anger to Christian praxis. He concludes that Christ’s actions demonstrate that Christians should not be ‘altogether without humane affection of Anger, Grief, Joy, Fear and the like.’\textsuperscript{72} The simple fact that Christ had such feelings shows that they are not sinful in and of themselves. Instead, Petter observes that they must ‘be moderated and restrained, so as they break not forth beyond due measure.’\textsuperscript{73} In the case of anger, Christians are permitted to be angry, but not to sin because of anger. In fact, Petter contends that ‘there is a good and holy kind of Anger, which is not onely lawful but necessary to be found in Christians.’\textsuperscript{74}

\section{Diagnosis and Treatment of Human Anger}

The ruminations of exegetes like Downame and Petter mirror discussions of Christ’s example of holy anger in Puritan casuist literature. Puritans offered different initial definitions of anger. Perkins offers a hybrid definition of anger as ‘nothing but the flowing of choler in the gall and in the stomacke: but the truth is, anger is more than choler. For it riseth first of a debilitie of reason and judgment in the minde,’ as well as from evil affections.\textsuperscript{75} Ames gives a more functional definition as ‘the duty of justice, or charity, whereby a man is bound to admonish, chide, and punish an offender.’\textsuperscript{76} Owen quotes from several ancient philosophers, all of whom denotate anger as the quest for punishment or vengeance.\textsuperscript{77} Richard Baxter defines it as ‘the rising up of the heart in of God, as was common, but he characterizes the act as ‘altogether divine.’ It is unclear whether Trapp means that Christ’s action stems from the divine part of his person or whether the act itself is simply holy. Either interpretation is possible from the commentary alone. See Trapp John, \textit{A Commentary or Exposition upon the Four Evangelists, and the Acts of the Apostles} (London, A. M.: 1647) 503.

\textsuperscript{72} Petter, \textit{A Learned, Pious and Practical Commentary, upon the Gospel according to St. Mark} 137.

\textsuperscript{73} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{74} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{75} Perkins, \textit{The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience} vol. II, 124.


\textsuperscript{77} Owen, \textit{Diatriba de justitia divina} 103. Although Owen cites classical philosophers with approval here, other Puritans distanced themselves from their views on the passions. Perkins rejects the view that virtues can be adequately described as a kind of ‘meane or mediocritie of affection’ on the grounds that such pagan virtues are still ultimately sinful.
passionate displicency against an apprehended evil, which would cross or hinder us of some desired good. These definitions tend to assume the disorder of anger when emotion overthrows reason.

Broad definitions quickly give way to more precise taxonomies of anger. Perkins provides one of the most comprehensive analyses of anger within the Puritan tradition. His most extended discussion of anger is found in his *Cases of Conscience*. He explores under what circumstances anger is good and lawful and when it is to be considered vicious, evil, and unlawful. He dissects the topic with considerable precision. According to Perkins, there are three initial criteria for anger to be expressed properly. First, anger must be felt for a ‘just and weightie’ reason, specifically in response to a manifest offence to God. Second, anger must be the result of ‘counsell and deliberation.’ ‘Counsell ought to bee the foundation of all our actions, Perkins observes, ‘and therefore much more of our affections, which are the beginnings of our actions.’

Finally, anger ‘must bee kindled and stirred up by good and holy affections, as namely by desire to maintaine the honour and praise of God, by the love of justice and vertue, by hatred and detestation of vice, and of all that is evill.’

Perkins also considers the objects of one’s anger. There are two factors to consider on this point. Anger must be directed toward the sin itself and not...
toward the person who committed the act. Perkins admits that there is scriptural evidence for anger directed at individuals by holy people, but these are dismissed as exceptional cases and easily misunderstood instances wherein a servant of God was angry at the enemies of God with pure motives. Of course, anger must also be directed against those who offend God only and not against those who offend another individual person.

Finally, anger must be properly conceived to be just. Once again, Perkins outlines three factors. First, anger must ‘be mixed and tempered with charitie & love.’ It must also be combined with a feeling of sorrow about the offence. Just anger ‘must be contained within the bounds of our particular calling and civill decencies.’ This simply means that just anger must be moderated in accordance with one’s roles within and the norms of society.

While Perkins tended to speak only of just anger, other Puritans went further in emphasizing its utility. Perkins’ peer, Richard Greenham, writes that anger can be sanctified and ruled by scripture at which point ‘it is a dutie commanded; and we ought to bring it foorth as a fruit of the Spirit.’ He proceeds to outline five points that can be used to ascertain whether one is feeling holy anger—why one is angry, how quickly one becomes enraged, the object of wrath (either sin generally or one’s own sin), and whether anger is spiritually destructive. Thomas Adams characterizes anger as ‘the gift of God […] a spurre intended to set forward Vertue.’ Anger could easily be virtuous under the right circumstances.

Perkins treats vicious anger with greater celerity. He elucidates five instances in which anger is unjust, most of which are simply the converse of acceptable anger—when it is hastily conceived, conjured for a slight offense, when the response of anger is justified, but expressed disproportionately to the cause, when it causes one to neglect one’s duties to God and others, and, finally, when one is angry about personal injustices instead of the cause of God. Greenham treats it even more briefly, stating only that if ‘it is ruled by

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86 Ibidem.
88 Ibidem 204–6.
our corruption, it is evill, and is forbidden in the word, as a worke of the flesh. Adams does not even refer to this species of anger as anger, but as madness. Baxter produces a list of nine qualifications that echo many of Perkins’ concerns, although Baxter’s list is divided up a bit more precisely. The brevity with which these authors treat vicious anger suggest that it was much easier to identify than just anger.

The distinction between a holy and justified anger and a vicious and illegitimate anger is not a Puritan innovation, but rather a traditional Christian argument formulated initially in the patristic era and continued in the medieval era. For instance, in De civitate dei, Augustine expresses disinterest in the simple fact that an otherwise holy person is angered, but concern over why said person is angry. Gregory the Great forged a clearer distinction between two species of anger. The first is prompted by impatience and is vicious and debilitating, ultimately leading to self-destruction if left unchecked. The latter is initiated by zeal and, when properly guided by reason, can actually serve to sharpen a person spiritually. In the thirteenth century, Aquinas retained this basic distinction in De malo. Although he relies heavily on patristic authorities in the initial framing of the question, Aquinas sides with a reading of Aristotle over and against Stoicism in declaring that not all anger is sin. For Aquinas, the intention of angry appetitive movement entirely defines anger’s moral worth. This is not say that this is the only Christian response to the problem of anger prior to the Puritans. An alternative tradition of thought, represented by figures such as John Cassian, Lactantius, and Benedict of Nursia, and prominent amongst monastic authors, sought to root out anger entirely and replace it with virtuous patience. Puritans who elected to baptize a species of anger clearly placed themselves within a trajectory of thought.

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91 Greenham, The Workes of the Reverend and Faithfull Servant of Jesus Christ M. Richard Greenham 204.
92 Adams, Diseases of the Soule 12–6.
97 Ibidem q. 12 a. 2.
99 Although more attention has been paid here to patristic and medieval traditions than to the legacy of earlier Protestants, it ought not be assumed that the Puritans somehow
Unjust anger demanded an antidote. Perkins tries to address it with a series of internal and practical remedies. The former are centred upon considering the feeling of unjust anger on three levels: from the perspective of one’s relationship to God, others, and oneself. He outlines six points regarding one’s relationship to God. God strictly forbids rash anger, whether it remains merely a feeling or whether it is expressed outwardly, and commands love instead. Any injuries one experiences must also not be considered evil, but intended for good according to the doctrine of divine providence. The elect must also imitate God’s mercy on four fronts. First, God is long-suffering and merciful in neglecting to punish sins and, secondly, God actively forgives manifold sins every day. At any rate, it is God’s prerogative to avenge injustices. Finally, Perkins compares the suffering of Christ endured in his death and crucifixion with that which a person experiences, finding that the former outweighs the latter considerably, suggesting that one should follow Christ’s command to repay evil with love.

deviate from or repudiate the views of the first generations of Protestants. Rather, early Protestants employed similar strategies in treating the question of divine anger and the explanation of Jesus’ behavior in cleansing the temple. For instance, Martin Luther denied that God is ever angry and insists that this is merely our perception. In fact, those who believe God is angry have not actually seen God. Following the text of the gospel of John, Luther attributed Jesus’ actions to zeal, which he defined as a commendable form of jealousy or ‘jealous love’ (‘neidische liebe’). In the Institutes, though he does not offer a precise definition, John Calvin seems to equate divine anger with justice. In his harmony of the synoptic gospels, Calvin simply attributed Christ’s deeds to zeal (‘zelum’) and further commends his action to those who observe pollution in worship. The point here is not that Puritans were radical innovators, but that they participated in a larger intellectual tradition that antedates Protestantism, but also includes Protestants. See Luther Martin, “Vorlesungen über die Psalmen 2, 51, 45” in D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe, 73 vols. (Weimar: 1883–) vol. 40, pt. 2.342–3; Luther Martin, “Predigten des Jahres 1530” in D. Martin Luthers Werke vol. 32.328–9; Luther Martin, “Auslegung des ersten und zweiten Kapitels Johannis in Predigten 1537 und 1538” in D. Martin Luthers Werke vol. 46.743; Calvin John, “Institutio” in Baum W. – Cunitz E. – Reuss E. (eds.), Corpus Reformatorum, Ioannis Calvini opera quae supersunt omnia, 59 vols. (Braunschweig: 1863–1900) 3.4.32 (OC vol. 2 col. 483–4); and Calvin John, “Commentarius in Harmoniam Evangelicam” in Baum W. – Cunitz E. – Reuss E. (eds.) Corpus Reformatorum vol. 45 col. 580.

Although Baxter emphasizes the fact that anger is contrary to human nature insofar it is irrational and he places more interest in using one’s standing in society as means to curb anger, much of his meditative advice is similar to Perkins, albeit less well-categorized. See Baxter, A Christian Directory vol. 1, 341–2.

Perkins’ meditations on one’s relationship to others are much shorter. Those who commit sin must be viewed as siblings made in the image of God so as to stir feelings of compassion.\textsuperscript{102} Second, Perkins asks one to think of one’s self-interest in treating others as one would like to be treated when one sins.\textsuperscript{103}

This serves as a preface to Perkins’ suggestion for remedying anger internally by considering an individual’s circumstances. He lists six points. A person must remember that he or she is subject to God’s wrath if he or she fails to forgive. Similarly, the requirement to love one another demands long-suffering and forebearance. His third observation is more circumspect, insisting that one cannot know another person’s motives and, consequently, one ought not overreact. Fourth, Perkins points out that anger disrupts a person’s capacity for spiritual exercises. Along similar lines, anger has deleterious affects for one’s physical being as well, as it ‘annoyes the brain & pulses, it causeth the gall to flow into the stomack & the bowels, it killeth and poisoneth the spirits.’\textsuperscript{104} Finally, Perkins asks his reader to think about the physical causes of unjust anger, suggesting that one to consider whether one’s anger is entirely physiological.\textsuperscript{105}

Perkins then provides a list of practical strategies to prevent the circumstances that might provoke anger.\textsuperscript{106} He advises, first, restraining the expression of anger so that it is not immoderate, as well as avoiding people and places that are likely to arouse anger. Perkins’ last two points are spiritual. He reminds his reader that they sin daily and ought to focus their anger on their own sin. Finally, he recommends prayer as a means to purge sinful affections. His advice is geared toward the cultivation of a lifestyle that extinguishes anger before it has a chance to enflame. ‘Such persons, when their mindes bee quiet, must often read and meditate of the foresaid remedies,’ Perkins comments, ‘and by this meanes they shall bee able to prevent hastinesse.’\textsuperscript{107} Of course, Perkins was realistic enough to admit that anger can sometimes seize a person even if

\textsuperscript{102} Ibidem 123. Greenham makes a similar point, suggesting that anger with another person’s sin should be joined with compassion and pity. See Greenham, \textit{The Workes of the Reverend and Faithfull Servant of Jesus Christ M. Richard Greenham} vol. 206.

\textsuperscript{103} Perkins, \textit{The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience} vol. 11, 123.

\textsuperscript{104} Ibidem 124. The effect of sinful anger was also used as a deterrent in Burroughs, \textit{Four Books on the Eleventh of Matthew} 320–58. Although Burroughs’ discussion is much more elaborate than Perkins’, he retains a basic categorization of the damage anger does to the self, other people, and God.

\textsuperscript{105} Perkins, \textit{The Whole Treatise of the Cases of Conscience} vol. 11, 124.


one follows his advice. In these instances, it must be purged like poison from
the body as quickly as possible.108 Perkins' treatment of anger is a comprehen-
sive diagnosis of the kinds, causes, and remedies for anger. It should not be too
surprising that his views resonate with other Puritan theologians who revered
him as a great physician of the soul.

This effectively returns us to our initial point of entry—Puritan concern
with whether God is 'angry' with them. Much has been written about Puritan
battles over incertitude and the quest for assurance of salvation,109 but most
of it has tended to examine the question in terms of doubt and confidence
or material well-being as principal barometers for answering the question.
Yet, Perkins writes that the 'sanctity of affections' is part of the third and final
degree of the declaration of God's love for the elect as a part of the larger pro-
cess of sanctification.110 Seen from this view, anger expressed in the right cir-
cumstances to the correct degree and in the proper manner could be used as a

Talcott Parson (Tübingen: 1905; reprint, New York: 1958) is in the distant background
of the scholarly debate. More recently, the argument has taken on the shape of pitting
Calvin against later generations of Reformed theologians, as seen in Kendall, R.T., Calvin
and English Calvinism to 1649 (Oxford: 1979). Kendall's thesis has been applied to the
Scottish Calvinists by Bell, M.C., Calvin and Scottish Theology: the Doctrine of Assurance
(Edinburgh: 1985). A lot of work has been done in this regard and a number of texts
that address the question of continuity attend to the matter of assurance of salvation.
See, for instance, Beeke J., Assurance of Faith: Calvin, English Puritanism, and the Dutch
Second Reformation (Berlin: 1994); Beeke J.R., "The Assurance Debate: Six Key Questions",
in Haykin M.A.G. – Jones M (eds.), Drawn Into Controversie: Debates Within Seventeenth-
Century British Puritanism (Göttingen: 2011), 263–83; and Muller R.A., Calvin and the
Reformed Tradition: On the Work of Christ and the Order of Salvation (Grand Rapids: 2012),
244–76. Insofar as English Puritanism has been researched separately from the develop-
ment of Reformed scholasticism, there are some studies that have appeared independ-
ently of a response to Kendall. See Winship M.P., "Weak Christians, Backsliders, and
Carnal Gospeler: Assurance of Salvation and the Pastoral Origins of Puritan Practical
Divinity in the 1580s", Church History 70 (2001) 562–81; Beeke J., "William Perkins and
His Greatest Case of Conscience: 'How a Man may Know Whether he be the Child of
of the pardon of sinne and life everlasting': The Doctrine of Assurance in the Theology
Nuttall G.F., The Holy Spirit in Puritan Faith and Experience (Oxford: 1946), 34–61; and von
Rohr, J., “Covenant and Assurance in Early English Puritanism", Church History 34 (1965)
195–203.

sign of one’s election. Kari Konkola observes that whatever religious anger may have ‘meant in practise, it is clear that some sort of hostility and revulsion were emotions which were acceptable, indeed required of the godly in early modern England.’ To be fair, while authors like Perkins discuss changes in affections as a sign of election, they generally eschew anger and other affections that more readily tend toward vice in favor of emotions that are more overtly religious emotions like love, hope, and anguish over sins. The closest Perkins ever came to explicitly mentioning a kind of anger as a sign of election is in his commentary on Hebrews 11, where he writes that ‘if a man be angry, it shall be with moderation’ due to the power of true faith. Although Puritans generally refrained from positing anger as a sign of election, it is a logical conclusion drawn from their views on the sanctification of human emotions.

4 Conclusion

One might naturally wonder how normative Puritan views on the emotions generally and anger more specifically fit within those of their peers. The anxiety provoked by divine anger in Puritan preaching easily manifested itself in a more secular context in literary works by non-Puritans. For his part, Konkola concludes that ‘the most important English factions, Anglicans and Puritans, agree fully about the meaning of the sinful passions.’ (Indeed, the popularity of [Robert] Parsons shows that the agreement on the meaning and functioning of the sinful passions reached beyond the Protestants to include—at least—the stricter branches of Catholicism.) Konkola also finds that the popularity of the works of Pierre de la Primaudaye and Jean de l’Espine on the sinful passions implies English acceptance of their ideas, although specific Puritan indebted-

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112 Perkins, A Golden Chaine vol. 1, 83.
113 Perkins, A Clowd of Faithfull Witnesses, Leading to the Heavenly Canaan: Or, A Commentarie Upon the 11 Chapter to the Hebrews vol. III.II, 136.
ness remains unclear. Puritan attitudes toward anger and the emotions represent a participation in a broader intellectual milieu and a longer tradition of reflection on the topic. The difference, perhaps, is in the diligence with which Puritans policed and the precision with which they monitored their affections.

This reading of Puritanism and anger would seem to call into question some aspects of Norbert Elias’ argument regarding the civilizing process and the development of the political state in the early modern period. Simply put, Elias claims that the repression of individual emotion to conform to the mores of courtly culture was connected to the formation of political states and the monopolization of power therein. The rise of the state as the central holder of power in the early modern period constituted a ‘whole reorganization of human relationship’ which ‘had direct significance for the change in the human habitus, the provisional result of which is our form of “civilized” conduct and feelings.’ The monopolistic institutions of society create an environment conducive to the practice of self-restraint, particularly amongst members of the lower strata of society seeking an identity within these new structures. Specifically with regard to the feeling of anger, Elias may have looked in the wrong place. Instead of looking toward the development of central authority in the state, he may have been better served examining the advent of Protestantism and the subsequent dissolution of monasticism as an elite religious practice. Lester Little and other scholars of the medieval period have suggested that the expression of anger was at least more permissible, if not virtuous, for those who were admittedly not striving for religious perfection while it was forbidden to monks (although, they, too, had culturally appropriate avenues for anger). Protestant rejection of the distinction between precepts binding upon all believers and counsels of perfection reserved for members of monastic orders does not entail moral laxity for all, but rather a heightened rigor with the ideal of instilling a kind of Protestant version of monastic sanctity in all Protestants. In theory, all Protestants were subject to the same ethical standards, including proper emotional restraint. Puritans

116 Ibidem 27.
119 See the marginal nature of the antinomian movement as analyzed in Como D.P., Blown by the Spirit: Puritanism and the Emergence of an Antinomian Underground in Pre-Civil War England (Stanford: 2004).
were a manifestation of that spirit with their attempt to master every sin. Functionally, their religious beliefs played a role similar to that which Elias attributes to the state. The state may contribute to the civilizing process, but Elias does not seem to give due weight to the impact of religion, specifically Protestantism.

If a working definition of Puritans as ‘the hotter sort of Protestants’ can be accepted, then Puritan views on anger outlined here may help to explain the Puritan ardor that ultimately fomented the English Civil War. One of the more prominent recent attempts to explain the conflict between Puritans and conformists that identifies religion as a significant factor characterizes the difference as a contrast between two styles of piety. On the one hand, conformists celebrated a kind of worship that emphasized more traditional ornate sacraments as a reflection of God’s glory. On the other, Puritans found this to be monstrous and whorish, preferring a more simple worship style that placed greater weight on preaching. From the Puritan perspective, this was not simply a conflict over aesthetic affinities, but rather an intolerable threat to the purity of the gospel that could provoke divine wrath. Since the cause of God was at stake, Puritan anger, better understood as zeal, was wholly justified by their own standards. In fact, some Puritans explicitly connected zealous anger with the practice of continual reformation of the church. In his commentary on Christ’s cleansing of the temple in Mark, Petter writes that ‘it is not enough to begin the work of Reformation in the Church, but to continue and perfect it from time to time afterward.’ In their actions, Puritans may only have been imitating Christ in his casting out of the moneychangers from the temple. Obviously, one must tread lightly when one begins to engage in psychological analysis to discern unspoken motives of individuals long since passed away, but Puritan views on anger do seem to be instructive when thinking about the origins of the English Civil War. Further research into anger and other neglected emotions may still yield further insight into the development of Puritanism.

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122 Petter, A Learned, Pious and Practical Commentary, upon the Gospel according to St. Mark 835.
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PART 2

Learned Debates about Anger
Chapter 8

Anger and its Limits in the Ethical Philosophy of Giovanni Pontano

John Nassichuk

Giovanni Pontano's civic and ethical treatises present a wide-ranging, philosophical reflection on themes of prudent government, public order and human behaviour, incorporating in their various descriptive and often argumentative stances an impressive array of ancient sources from works of both poetry and prose. Although his writings do not contain a single essay dedicated to the subject of anger per se, topics such as prudence, fortune, splendour, obedience, generosity, magnificence and cruelty allow the humanist to make inventive use of thematic developments encountered in his sources and models of predilection. It is unsurprising that the vantage of these developments should vary somewhat with each treatise, in accordance with the topic’s distinct requirements. In certain treatises, such as the De obedientia, the author adopts the large perspective of civic governance, in which all considerations serve the purpose of collective and social harmony; in others, such as the De fortitudine, the principal object becomes the character and behaviour of man himself, outside of his often complex relationship to civic authority. Such variety of perspective offers the benefit of presenting the humanist’s thought on several different facets of themes such as happiness, gratitude, and anger. It also reveals, at times, a certain juggling of sources and references as determined by this same variety of topics. F. Tateo has shown Pontano’s debt as an ethical thinker to the Aristotelian concept of mediocritas, wherein temperance and the avoidance of excess constitute an unwavering moral principle.1 He nevertheless allows that certain writings, in particular the final treatise entitled De immanitate, describe objects that fall well outside the scope of Aristotle’s philosophy of moderation and even invite descriptions reminiscent of certain passages in Cicero’s civic orations and Seneca’s De ira.2 The present study sets out to characterize, in a representative way, the portrait of anger that emerges at

1 Tateo F., Umanesimo etico di Giovanni Pontano (Lecce: 1972) 163–164.
2 Tateo, Umanesimo etico 182: “La discussione prende anche qui le mosse dallo schema aristotetico, ma per illustrare un tema assolutamente nuovo, che proprio in quello schema non riesce ad inserirsi.”

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several key moments of Pontano’s voluminous prose corpus. As such, I hope to provide a general account of the humanist’s treatment of this central and ancient topic. Instead of giving a detailed analysis of his debt to the works of Aristotle, Cicero and Seneca, this preliminary work will furnish a more synthetic appraisal of Pontano’s reflection on the theme of anger in the context of the contemporary preoccupation with the nature, image and likeness of mankind. Two recent articles by G. Capelli have well demonstrated that the Neapolitan statesman’s *De obedientia* constitutes an example of organicism—the representation of society as an organic body, a significant tendency in late-medieval ethical philosophy. Beginning with a study of anger as it appears in that treatise, our examination shall here extend itself to the *De fortitudine* and the *De immanitate*, seeking to show that the former of these two discusses anger as it manifests itself in the individual person, while the latter evokes in graphic detail the furthest consequences of its unbridled excess. This study thus aims to construct a holistic portrait of Pontano’s treatment of choleric passion, one that is consequent with *Quattrocento* discussions of human misery and dignity.

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1 **De obedientia** II, ix ‘An irato patri respondere liberi debeant’

In book two of the *De obedientia*, Pontano addresses the question of whether children should (*debeant*) offer some reply to their angered father, in defensive opposition to his wrath. The humanist begins this chapter by reminding his reader that discretion and modesty both greatly facilitate obedience. And what, he asks, could be further from these fine qualities than to behave in a brazen and insolent manner toward one’s parents? Still one may inquire as to whether replying to a father’s anger in order to assuage it, and so to lessen a hurtful scolding, oversteps the bounds of filial obedience. Pontano places this ethical consideration squarely within the larger context of civic duty and

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5 *De obedientia* II, ix, “Quamobrem dubitari potest, an irato patri et objurganti respondere filius unquam debeat: atque ut verecundi, moderantisque proprium esse videatur, nihil omnino respondere tamen salva etiam lege verecundiae et moderationis, placet quaerere, an sit contra obedientiam respondere illi, et maledicta dilliure.”
allegiance to principles determined by the interest of the common good. In order to measure the weight of the question, he offers up a parallel example, one which illustrates by contrast the importance of familial piety. He asks whether a person who is willing to brook the justified anger of a teacher, out of respect for the authority and respectable civic status of that profession, could refuse to abide the wrath of their own father.\(^6\) Pontano’s reply to this question, in the context of his reflection upon civil obedience, is to affirm the unshakeable authority of paternal rule. No matter how strong and indeed excessive a father’s anger might seem, his offspring’s reaction should be one of obedience, even when to reply seems less a defence of self than a defence of the Truth. Great indeed are the rights of parents over children—so great, in fact, that their actions are justified even at moments when they seem to abandon the limits of common temperance.\(^7\) In this case, even the declaration of witnesses that a parent’s anger has exceeded the bounds of temperance should not alter a child’s conviction that his father is behaving in accordance with the legitimate authority of a parent, “especially when [he] is concerned with moral education and teaching proper manners.”\(^8\) Under certain circumstances, of course, children may react to, or rebuke their parents, but in these extraordinary cases the laws of obedience are such that “even though they may, this does not necessarily mean that they should”.\(^9\) Hence it appears that in the \textit{De obedientia}, Pontano’s attitude toward parental governance betrays a conservatism that remains little tolerant of resistance to paternal authority. “And even though the children might know that their case is the stronger in the judgement of those who hear it, they must remain mindful that they are the sons and [the others] are the parents, and that their greatest and most urgent duty is to be keepers of respectful obedience toward their father, and that no thing is more urgently wished by them than that they themselves should have most dutiful sons.”\(^10\) Here, of course, the nexus of familial obedience and order

\(\begin{align*}
6 & \quad \text{Ibidem. “Nimirum qui grammatici ferulae non irascitur, et increpantem praecessorem fert, et quoniam magna est praecessoris autoritas, qui civem aliquem, de quo magna sit opinio gravitatis ac continentiae, recte, meritoque castigantem moleste non fert, is aut non feret iratum patrem, aut corripientem gravabitur?”} \\
7 & \quad \text{Ibidem. “Magna sunt parentum jura, ac majora multo, quam ut ipsi videri debeant in objurgandis liberis modum abjecisse.”} \\
8 & \quad \text{Ibidem 11, ix, 52: ‘[…] praesertim ubi ad optimam spectat animorum institutionem, recteque vivendi usum.’} \\
9 & \quad \text{Ibidem: ‘[…] ac nihilominus quoniam obedientia plurimas habet cautiones, aut non idcirco debeant quia liceat […]’} \\
10 & \quad \text{Ibidem 11, ix, 52–53: ‘Et quamvis liberi ipsi sciant parteis suas illorum etiam qui audiant, judicio potiores esse, memores tamen esse debent, filios esse se, illos vero parentes,}
\end{align*}\)
is presented not within the context of situational ethics, but within that of the succession of generations. From father to son, from son to grandson, the relationship of defined authority envisioned by Pontano guarantees a certain familial stability and orderly continuity.

In this context of familial order conceived over several generations, preserving the natural disposition of succession and legitimacy is of the utmost importance. More crucial than any consideration of personal dignity or pride, for the author of the *De obedientia*, is the preservation of civic order. For this reason, the proper attitude to be adopted in the face of fatherly wrath is that of resigned submission. At times, Pontano explains, a father, exasperated by a son’s recriminations, will become agitated to excess and even moved to brandish the whip. Here again, the son’s main concern should be to conduct himself honourably, showing no sign of pain or trepidation, and to diffuse the situation not by fleeing out of fear of the lash, but by retiring modestly lest his father become inopportune ‘vanquished by anger’ (*nequid victus ira*). Even so, admits the author, an angered father may also become incensed even at this kind of pious, filial obedience. Thus one must always take care to avoid paternal wrath and indeed seek to assuage an angered parent whenever possible.

If Pontano stresses this point, his principal concern is for the preservation of a symbolic familial order in which he perceives a fundamental paradigm of civic peace. Harmonious conduct of the kingdom’s affairs outside of the individual household depends upon a family’s dutiful obedience to its ruling *paterfamilias*. This, of course, is especially true within the ranks of the aristocracy and most particularly inside the royal family itself. He notes in the conclusion to chapter II, ix, that the unravelling of royal families has become an unwholesome trend—a veritable contagion (*pestis*)—in recent times, often leading to great public chaos. ‘Would that, indeed,’ he exclaims, ‘kingdoms themselves in our generation and in that of our fathers were not toppled and laid low by the restless impatience of sons, as they prove incapable of putting up with

nulliusque rei majores se atque aciores patronos esse debere, quam in patres obedientiae, nihilque magis ab ills desiderari, quam ut filios habeant quam reverentissimos.’

Ibidem II, ix, 53: ‘Excandescentur tamen ipsi nonnunquam, et adeo incenduntur ira, ut inclamationibus parum contenti, verbera expediunt.’

Ibidem: ‘Quo casu tacitum decret filium e paterno conspectu abire, nullum praeseferentem doloris indicium, ut qui non patrem fugiat, sed patris excandescentiam, vereaturque non illius flagellum, sed nequid victus ira pater praeter modum agat, supraque quam deceat.’

Ibidem II, ix, 54: ‘Haec enim pestis intra regios penates perniciosius debacchari consuevit.’
their parents’ ire.

Hence anger manifests itself at the very heart of Pontano’s meditation on the principles of public order, where uncontrolled wrath is featured as a destructive force to be avoided through proper education and even military discipline.

In order to illustrate this delicate point of filial piety and obligation even in the face of unreasoning, and often abusive or blindly erroneous paternal anger, Pontano adduces an example of father-son negotiation on this theme from the recent events of Naples’ Aragonese dynasty. A previous chapter in the same second book of the *De obedientia* asks the question of whether children must always obey parental orders, even when these are clearly iniquitous, or somehow proffered in direct contradiction to Nature’s laws. At the chapter’s outset, the humanist boldly declares that a parent may encourage (hortari) their offspring to embrace the monastic life, for example, or to remain unmarried, but they may not positively order them (cogere non potest) to follow a path so contrary to nature and to normal human impulse.

A healthy filial disobedience is conceivable in this context, also concerning a son’s reaction to the orders of his angered father. Here Pontano evokes a remarkable anecdote from the Aragonese court. He describes how a favourite courtier of King Alfonso, named Peter Cases, incurred the King’s ire by becoming angered himself with prince Ferrante, Alfonso’s son and heir. Ferrante, instructed by his father to punish the presumptuous offender, chooses rather to let his anger subside than to bring harm upon a man who has previously held such claim to Alfonso’s affection. All of this presents a situation where competing forces of anger must be weighed by the young prince. In this exemplary narrative, Ferrante is suddenly obliged to consider his father’s conflicting emotions as well as his own:

There was a certain Peter, of the family name Cases, who figured among the dearest to Alfonso. Having risen to considerable stature because of his liberal and caressing manner in dealing with the King, he began to become angered with Ferrante for the most frivolous reasons, at first secretly, then indeed openly, until finally he even dared attack him with

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14 Ibidem 11, ix, 53: ‘Utinam autem ne vel regna ipsa et nostris et patrum nostrorum temporibus eversa et prostrata essent filiorum impatienlia, dum parentum ferre iracundiam nolunt.’


16 Ibidem 11, vii, 45: ‘Namque ut in coelibatu vivat, aut ut monachum profiteatur, hortari quidem filium pater potest, cogere non potest: quae si ab invito fieri velit, justa esse desinunt, cum in his humano etiam generi fiat injuria.’
curses and strong reproach (for he was by nature an epileptic), sparing no insults and letting himself be carried away to height of delirium. When Alfonso learned of these things—Peter, though having been admonished frequently, still had not tempered his outbursts—he called his son to him and ordered that he have Peter punished to the fullest extent of the law and in accordance with his own desires. Yet Ferrante was so far from obeying this paternal order, honourable and legitimate though it was, that, as Alfonso’s anger subsided, he even tried to restore Peter in his father’s good graces. His reply to Alfonso’s injunction is worthy of being recorded for memory and for the approval of posterity. ‘I, ô best of Fathers’, he declared, ‘have never at any time though that anything could be greater or more worthy of me as your son, than to comply with your will and to follow your orders, such that nothing in me should be lacking of true obedience to you. Indeed, I should wish that the glory I pursue, that of my faithful piety in your regard, be transmitted most especially through the record of this testimonial. But, I ask with all due respect, what kind of example shall it be if, even though it is lawful and done upon your order, I give free rein to anger concerning those men whom I know to be dear to you? Far may this error remain from Ferrante’s piety, since it is my role rather to lavish kindness upon your disciples and servants and to surround them with affection.’ In order to make good on this by his actions, having recommended Peter to his father, he, too, received him in friendship, and from that time was on good terms with him and continues to be so even today.17

17 Ibidem 11, vii, 46: ‘Erat Alphonso in primis charus Petrus quidam cognomento Cases, is quod rege et facillimo, et indulgentissimo utebatur, elatior factus, coepit ob levisissimas causas irasci Ferdinando, clam primo, post vero et palam, donec et maledictis et opprobriis (erat enim suapte natura convitiator) ausus est illum incessere, nullisque tandem contumeliiis parcere, et ad ultima deliramenta ferri. Ferdinandus ea aequo animo ferre, et ingenium hominis magis misereri, quam maledicta curare. Haec Alphonso renunciata cum essent, Petrusque quamquam saepe monitus, nihilo minus linguæ nihil temperaret, vocato ad se filio, jussit id de Petro supplicium sumeret, quod et per legem liceret, et ipse vellet. Huic paterno imperio quanquam honesto et legitimo, tantum tamen abhuit ut pareret Ferdinandus, ut ira lenita, in gratiam patris Petrum fuerit revocare conatus. Quid autem Alphonso haec imperanti responderit, dignum est quod probatur posteris, mandeturque memoriae. Ego, inquit, pater optime nihil unquam neque pluris feci neque me filio tuo dignius esse duxi, quam ut tuae semper obsequiar voluntati, jussisque tuis ita paream, ut nihil requiri in me ipso a te possit, quod ad veram pertineat obedientiam. Quam quidem laudem tantopere assequi cupio, ut pietatis erga te meae hoc praecipuum testimonium traditum iri monimentis velim. Sed, quod pace dictum sit tua, et quale hoc
This complex, anecdotal portrait of young Ferrante's filial virtue provides an illustration of the kind of principled, deliberative thinking that may reasonably uphold the authority of paternal anger in the face of an indirect challenge. By displaying such rash anger toward Ferrante, Peter challenges the dignity not of Alfonso himself, but of his son, the presumptive, though highly controversial, heir to the throne of Aragonese Naples. In countering this display, Ferrante first lets his father's anger subside (*ut ira lenita*), then responds, not to the offending courtier, but to Alfonso himself, explaining that his own decision hinges entirely upon consideration of Alfonso's royal dignity and good pleasure. Implicit in this instance is the idea that to punish a man who has been received into the monarch's friendship, not for any slight upon the person of the monarch himself, but for his ill-tempered behaviour towards the King's son and heir, suggests the existence of some perceivable difference of opinion and allegiance within the royal family. Ferrante's remarkable forbearance is expressed only after he respectfully yields place of expression to his father's royal anger. He then disregards Peter's rash anger entirely, even going so far as to take him into his own friendship as proof of sincere solidarity with the judgement of his father. Here, then, the supreme moral (and civic) value of paternal anger is maintained even in the face of what appears to be an ulterior modification of Alfonso's initial judgement of character. Ferrante displays skills in diplomatic reasoning which allow him to uphold his father's earlier opinion by gently inducing the hot-tempered Peter to modify his own behaviour and opinions. His lasting friendship with Peter after this episode serves as a confirmation of the ultimate harmony between father and son, and of peaceful continuity at the head of the State.

Ferrante's behaviour in this episode recounted by Pontano also nicely illustrates the responsible, finely-nuanced attitude towards anger that characterizes the perspective of a legitimate prince. Placed by his father in a position to decide Peter's fate, Ferrante resists the temptation of vengeful punishment. As such, he proves himself a worthy exemplar of what Pontano defines as “fortitude” in an important later treatise. The refusal to give in to anger already figures as part of the definition of personal moral strength in the *De obediencia*. Here the humanist declares that just as the man of honour must avoid yielding to the fear of death and punishment in trying circumstances, so too

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*futurum est exemplum, si quanquam per leges licet, et a te jussum est, iram in illos exer- cuero, quos tibi charissimos esse sciam? Absit a Ferdinandi pietate culpa haec, quin meae partes sunt, familiares atque alumnos tuos et beneficentia prosequi et amore complecti. Quod ut opera comprobaret, commendatum Alphonso Petrum ipse in amicitiam suam recepit, et ex eo familiarissime usus est, atque hodie utitur.*
must he refuse the temptations of facile indulgence in more auspicious times, when Fortune is smiling upon him. ‘What could be more disgraceful’, he asks rhetorically, ‘than that he, whom adverse fortune was unable to break, should be broken by good fortune? Or that he who has not yielded to death, despite the glory it brings, should give in to anger, to desire, to the temptation of unwonted severity or cruelty?’

In the *De obedientia*, anger is referred to as a force which must be managed properly with a view to preservation of the social order. Insofar as the family constitutes the organic nucleus of civil society’s general structure at the level of city and kingdom, paternal anger requires careful attention. Thus a father’s ire—especially that of a royal father—is to be respected and even feared, but it also constitutes an almost sacred object of deliberation and tactful emotional adjustment. Less important here is its status as a measure of personal character, susceptibility and fortitude. These moral considerations appear with greater clarity in the *De fortitudine*, on the theme of personal strength and courage.

2  *De fortitudine I, xix: ‘De fortitudine heroica, deque viris fortibus’*

In May of 1481, Neapolitan forces led by the Duke of Calabria laid siege to the fortress at Otranto which had been captured a year before by a Turkish army under the supreme orders of Mehmed II. Despite fierce resistance on the part of the usurpers who had made their way across the Adriatic from Albania, the fortress fell back into Christian hands at the end of that same month. During the period spanning from November 1480 to June the following year, Pontano found himself in the presence of the Duke, Alfonso II. It was probably at this time of considerable upheaval and military initiative, that he composed the treatise in two books, entitled *De fortitudine* and addressed to the Duke who, by several accounts, had conducted himself admirably during the conflict.

Whereas in the earlier *De obedientia* Pontano discussed anger primarily with

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18 Ibidem II, vii, 47: ‘Quid enim turpius, quam quem adversa nequit fortuna frangere, eum frangat secunda? aut qui morti, quae cum decore futura sit, non cesserit, cedat irae, libidini, inclementiae, crudelitati?’


ANGER IN PONTANO’S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY

A view to its general effect upon the organisation of civic life, in the De fortitudine, he seeks to describe the types of behaviour that may qualify an individual as genuinely courageous. Here this sharpened moral perspective, with emphasis on individual merit, leads to a more precise consideration of the diverse shades of human character, the intimate motivations of which may often play a determining role in men’s choices of action and the events in which they play a part. Within this spectrum of human attitudes systematically reviewed by the humanist, anger constitutes one of the most dangerous passions, since it often escapes the bounds of temperate prudence. One of the central exigencies of moral courage is self control and the ability to rein in the impetuous movements of passions such as anger.

In the nineteenth chapter of the De fortitudine’s first book, Pontano describes the qualities that make up heroic fortitude, and derives some general conclusions regarding the qualifying attributes of the vir fortis. He opens this chapter, which is to be heavily-laden with mythological examples, by declaring that ‘heroic excellence and virtue’ constitute a manifestation of fortitude, for the hero is someone who willingly endures the greatest perils in the name of honour, braving even death itself.21 Indeed, the heroic figure not only confronts life’s most daunting tribulations, he even flourishes whilst vanquishing them and emerges strengthened and generally grander from the trial.22 The heroic figure’s defining virtue is perhaps his ability to conquer Fortune’s uncertainties and surprise movements, placing her beneath himself ‘as though she were nothing’,23 since all the accidents that beset mankind are accepted with equanimity by the true hero. Such triumph over the violence worked by perpetual change represents at once a mastery of external events and an extreme level of personal courage. In defining both the hero and the man of strength—particularly the latter—Pontano insists upon the qualities of temperance and lucid judgement. While recognizing Hercules’ status as the consummate hero

21 De Fortitudine I, xix: ‘Excellentem atque heroicam quandam virtutem esse fortitudinem plane constat, siquidem in maximis maximeque difficilibus versatur periculis, mortemque contemnit decoris adipiscendi gratia.’
22 Ibidem: ‘Eadem labores, qui per se molesti sunt, non modo patitur, verumetiam perpetuitur, in quibus perpetiendis exultat, majorque existit.’
23 Ibidem: ‘Adversa quoque ita fert, ut fortunam infra se positam habere videatur, omniaque quae possunt homini evenire sic contemnit, ut quasi pro nihil ducat, habita tamen eorum ratione atque delectu.’
in matters of prowess and boldness,\textsuperscript{24} he also considers the cases of more temperate heroes, ones less given to the emotional extremes of rage and grief.

Pontano reserves especial praise for the moral fabric of strong men (and women) as they are described by Virgil, the Roman poet whom he refers to as \textit{egregius fortitudinis pictor}. Virgil’s major characters exhibit splendid powers of self control, if not always flawless prudence, in situations of duress. The humanist refers admiringly to the great poet’s description of Turnus as \textit{surridens sedato pectore} at the outset of a decisive battle. He then comments that such restraint and temperance are necessary for Turnus to acquit himself well in the stress of armed conflict.\textsuperscript{25} Turnus restrains both his facial expression and his inner turmoil in order to maintain the appearance of calm mastery and to steel himself in the face of danger by exhibiting his disdain (\textit{onus ipsum quodam modo contemnere}) for the peril that surrounds him on all sides.\textsuperscript{26} This kind of near-stoic self-restraint comes to emblematize the moral virtue of courage as Pontano conceives of it. Whereas the Greek hero Hercules exhibits prodigious qualities of strength and bravery, at times falling afoul of the all-important rule of temperance, the Roman poet’s stronger characters are admirable precisely because they are veritable exemplars of honour and pious constancy. Their moral fabric is the type that discourages wild swings of temperament. According to this view, courage is to be discovered and admired in people who surmount their own natural weakness in exhibiting extraordinary qualities of strength and endurance.

Among the principal weaknesses of character to be controlled in this way is anger. The signal danger of this passion is that it leads its object to become “carried away” and hence estranged from the healthy mean separating timidity and excessive audacity that Pontano describes in several of the chapters preceding I, xix.\textsuperscript{27} Instead of defeating all obstacles in heroic fashion after the manner of an enraged Hercules, the true \textit{vir fortis} will avoid the sort of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibidem: ‘Hos Graeci ‘ηρώεις dixerunt, quorum honoratissimum Herculem faciunt, ob toties exantlatas erumnas, totque monstra perdomita […]’.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibidem: ‘Et profecto ni sedato sit animo, necesse est inter congregaridium turbari eum atque confundi.’
\item \textsuperscript{26} Ibidem: ‘Eundem quoque vultum atque animum in tolerandis malis retinebit, ut non solum non appareat cedere eum, ac veluti pondere pressum labascere, sed placide etiam ac sedate ferre, et onus ipsum quodam modo contemnere, atque ex ipso contemplu sese intendere ad firmitatem.’
\item \textsuperscript{27} See in particular I, iv, ‘Fortitudinem in mediocritate esse positam’; and I, iii, ‘Quas affectiones fortitudo moderetur’: ‘Etenim fiducia effectus est, audacia vitium. Et ob audaciam quidem vituperamur, cum ex fiducia nec laus manet, nec vituperatio.’
\end{itemize}
impassioned excesses that rob him of his lucid judgement and powers of reason. He shall thus steer clear of the pitfalls of uncontrolled anger:

He shall also reject the kind of anger that makes his mind, judgment and finally even his reason veer from the straight, true path, and in extreme cases even send him into madness. For this reason, one who is angered or stabbed by the prick of fury may not be considered a courageous man.28

Anger is a weakness that guides a person’s judgement (consilium) away from the straight paths of truth and justice. Its energetic vehemence makes its victim veer dangerously close to the sundry and volatile afflictions of folly. Anyone who finds himself ruled by this passion becomes enfeebled in his actions and decisions to such an extent that he is excluded by definition from the category of the vir fortis. Even the sheer force of energy fostered by anger is insufficient compensation for this weakening of one’s mental and moral faculties.

Indeed, Pontano suggests that the passion of anger is so far removed from any laudable moral virtue that it should be avoided whenever possible. Such avoidance of anger is already reminiscent of Seneca’s recommendations in the De ira.29 Yet in the De fortitudine, Pontano describes a force of character founded upon the Aristotelian principle of mediocritas. Exceptional heroes such as Hercules may certainly stray from this golden mean thanks to their overpowering strength and unconquerable determination, but such cases clearly set themselves apart from the general model of fortitude laid out by the humanist author. Hence it follows that anger is a less desirable source of strength than the associated moral qualities of prudence and temperance.

As with any strong passion, anger even carries a significant risk of destructive excess. Pontano situates anger and fury in a continuum of uncontrolled passions which often degenerate into various forms of horrific cruelty, most notably during times of war. Constant reference to Virgilian and Statian epic is significant in this treatise, since poetically-narrated warfare often serves as the setting of various exempla of fortitude adduced by the author through quotation and paraphrase. Life-threatening situations of martial conflict oblige the vir fortis to overcome natural feelings of trepidation and the fear of death. But

28 De fortitudine 1, xix: 'Iram quoque abjiciet illam, quae mentem atque consilium, rationem denique ipsam a vero, rectoque detorquet, atque ubi vehementior fuerit, prope ad insaniam impellit. Quamobrem iratus aliquis, aut fororis stimulis percitus, virum fortem praestare nequit.'

when an army finds itself victorious on the battlefield, humanity also requires that the conquering warrior restrain his surging, adrenaline-induced impulses of blood lust, for to do otherwise would be to sink below the standards of common humanity. In commenting upon a passage from Statius’ *Thebaid*, Pontano notes that anger is the originating impulse of a barbaric cruelty which must always be held in check:

Nor indeed does a courageous man rejoice in slaughter, and just as he may delight in bloodshed, which is the behaviour of an angry or furious man in battle, nevertheless he kills to obtain victory, and not for the sake of murder, a fact that is confirmed by Livy when he declares: “hence the slaughter of fleeing enemy troops, is the kind of action which is governed more by anger than by strength.” Do you not see how he distinguishes between anger and strength? Such bloodiness is therefore a characteristic of beasts.30

Despite the difficulties inherent to the military context, such neglect of the principle of temperance is considered by Pontano to be a serious flaw of character. The topic of battlefield cruelty was one of primordial interest to the humanist, who refers to it several times in his writings, most notably in the late treatise on cruelty (*De immanitate*). Here, quoting Livy, he notes the irrecoverable separation between anger (*ira*) and courageous virtue (*virtus*), drawing between these two qualities a distinction commensurable with that which separates beast and human. Anger is characterized in this case as a purely negative force, one which must be countered by the tempering force of reason. Whereas the example of Hercules serves perhaps as an example of anger viewed positively, in a manner similar to Aristotle’s characterization of *thumos* (θυμος),31 Pontano generally makes little provision for this viewpoint, especially when discussing the extreme examples of criminal activity and battlefield conduct.

In order to underscore the crucial point that anger is a dangerous force which draws men close to the limits of their humanity, Pontano produces examples of the moderation of anger other than those found in ancient history or Latin epic. He reminds his readers of the tragic death, in October 1438, of Pietro d’Aragona, the younger brother of King Alfonso Magnanimo, founder

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30 *De fortitudine* i, xix: ‘Neque enim vir virtis caede laetatur, et tanquam saginatur cruore, quod irati est ac furentis in acie, quanquam enecat, victoriae, non necis gratia, quod etiam Livius confirmat, cum ait: “Caedes inde fugientium, qualis ubi ira magis, quam virtute res geritur.” Vides, ut ab ira virtutem separat? Itaque ferarum est ista sanguinolentia.’
of the Neapolitan Aragon dynasty, during a raid on the city by the invading Aragonese forces in opposition to those of René d’Anjou and the feared condottiere Jacopo Caldora.32 When he finally conquered Naples, in June 1442, Alfonso made an impressive show of clemency toward his defeated opponents, in spite of the grief he had known at his brother’s death before the city’s walls less than four years earlier.33 Pontano invokes this familiar and striking example, the description of which owes much to the laudatory character portraits of Alfonso and Ferrante published by the humanist’s elder contemporaries Lorenzo Valla34 and Antonio Beccadelli,35 as proof of the suggestion that anger is counterproductive and thus to be avoided in the aftermath of even the most bitter conflict.36 The persuasive efficiency of this anecdote is of course founded in part upon the fact that at least some of the author’s first intended readers, themselves members of the native Campanian aristocracy, would have benefited from the Aragonese conqueror’s leniency.

In De fortitudine, Pontano deploys numerous examples encountered in ancient poetry, historiography and in recent, local memory. Less concerned with the description of a functioning social hierarchy than with that of a specific human character trait, he adduces several illustrative quotations that convey direct, colourful impressions of the many-nuanced emotional shades


33 Pontieri, Alfonso il Magnanimo 50.


36 De fortitudine 1, xxxiv: ‘Alphonsus parci Neapolitanis jussit, atque a direzione capitae per vim urbis statim contineri, fraternae necis oblitus. Mumius, qui Achaicus est cognominatus, non sine magna etiam nota Corinthum sustulit. Quocirca post victoriam nullus irae, nullus cupiditati locus permittendus est. Temperandi sunt animi, neque insolescendum ob res ad voluntatem cedentes.’
evoked by the author in his study of courage. When anger is mentioned, it generally is described as a dangerous passion that poses a considerable threat to the balance of reason. The quality of self-control, which is presented as one of the cardinal attributes of a strong, courageous person, faces a most difficult test in the thrust of anger’s impetuous, often overpowering movements. Pontano’s principal concern, with anger as an individual character trait, resides precisely in its often irresistible force. When moral fortitude is superseded by choleric passion, it tends to undermine the subject’s—or the soldier’s—judgment, even in the name of public duty. The example of Alfonso’s personal courage, when confronted by the very people who caused his brother’s death, links the battle for moral temperance with the direct interests of the State. Lurking behind this description of the Aragonese monarch’s dignified and judicious behaviour of 1442 is a fear of mankind’s real proclivity for the opposite type of deportment, one which leads triumphant combatants, raging with adrenaline as they seize their defeated enemy at the end of a skirmish, to abandon all form of self-control. Just as the judicious resistance to anger heightens the possibility of dignified, well-tempered conduct, so too, often, does the loss of such control send mankind into the depths of what Pontano refers to as immanitas, or “inhumanity”.

3 De immanitate

The late treatise entitled De immanitate, composed in all likelihood during the final years of the fifteenth century, describes the outer limits of what in several arenas may be considered acceptable human behaviour. Here anger is characterised as one primary cause of a level of cruelty so extreme as to exceed the boundaries of common humanity. Unchecked anger, suggests the author, is one significant origin of depraved and unnatural acts. At this point, the aging humanist foregoes nearly all reference to civic order as he evokes a realm of conduct that is far removed from—and profoundly inimical to—any kind of peaceful public body. Whereas the De fortitudine, with its numerous examples taken from ancient epic poetry, illustrates a moral quality seen as optimal for the efficient and harmonious conduct of collective life, the De immanitate, conversely, traces the portrait of a destructive trait which may be considered a negative opposite of the moral strength required for judicious, even-tempered self-government.

In the opening chapter of the De immanitate, Pontano describes the object of his treatise in terms that place it outside of all recognizably human attributes.
A stark, binary distinction between vice and virtue here establishes the moral criteria which are to serve as a foundation for the enquiry regarding an excess of cruelty or violence so extreme that it falls outside the limit of all acceptable human impulses. This firm distinction is itself erected upon a notion of the “dignity” of man which, in the decades preceding the composition of Pontano’s late treatise, received the scrupulous attention of Quattrocento humanists such as Poggio Bracciolini, Giannozzo Manetti and Giovanni Pico della Mirandola in their collective reaction to the continuing strength of the De miseria hominis tradition which had received great impetus from the famous essay of Innocent III.37 Hence when Pontano describes “virtue” in the chapter’s opening lines, he does so with explicit reference to the notion of human dignity.38 Similarly, his characterization of “vice” in the same chapter also evokes the familiar themes of mankind’s excellentia and dignitas.39 So fundamental is this framework of good and evil to the further development of the De immanitate, that the author even reminds his readers that virtue is nearly always an object of praise, while vice is generally the target of blame.40 It then also follows, according to Pontano, in what is perhaps a reminiscence of the first Psalm, that to seek virtue—and to shun vice—is to walk the path of reason itself. Yet there are many to be found who daily abandon this simple way of virtue and, stripping themselves of their humanity, take on the mores and indeed the very nature of wild beasts.41 To pursue the ways of vice to their extreme end is thus to quit the realm of human “nature” and to acquire the savage “ferocity” of an untamed animal. Such people, declares Pontano, are best characterized by substantives like truculentia and immanitas, words which usually apply to savage, inhuman

38 De immanitate 1, i: ‘Virtutem qui de ea scripsere, adversari vitio volunt: quippe quae honestatem sequatur, quaeque homine dignae sunt actiones ac negotia, seque in rebus administrandis omnibus, perinde ut recta dictet ratio, publice, privatimque et instituat, et informet.’
39 Ibidem: ‘Longe autem secur vivum, cum ad inhonesta quidem delabatur, ac turpia, rationem ipsam vel aspernetur, ac defugiat, ut parum omnino obediente, vel insultet illi, improbeque inscectetur eam, ut violentum, et insolens: ut quantum illa hominis excellentiae, dignitatis adjungat ac nominis, tantum hoc de laudibus eius demat, adijciatque infamiae.’
40 Ibidem: ‘Quocirca laudari virtutem, et pleno passim ore commendari videmus: contra, improbari vitium, ut homine indignum, ac naturae eius nullo modo consentaneum […]’
41 Ibidem: ‘Caeterum et inventi sunt, et inveniuntur quotidie, atque utinam non singulæ pene domus iis essent referatae, qui relieta rationis via, hominem ipsum exuunt, ac mores induant, naturamque ferarum.’
creatures. Even here, Pontano seeks to distinguish between metaphorical “beastliness” (truculentia) or “savagery” (saevitia) and the truly monstrous, abject behaviour that he refers to only as immanitas:

Yet somehow truculent beastliness (truculentia) should be attributed to savagery, whereas inhumanity (immanitas) includes everything that is abhorrent to humanity itself and is found only in beasts, who, because they are carried away by instinct without the benefit of any reason—a quality which nature has not attributed to them—, are referred to as animals and beasts. Indeed, these acts are belong only to pillaging and violence that are characteristic of wars.

Now, the very frame of reference established by Pontano in these opening lines reveals a certain proximity of his language and reasoning to that which characterizes the Quattrocento debate on the misery and dignity of man. Pico’s celebrated declaration that man can either rise to a state of near-divinity, or descend into the troughs of bestial abjection, lays out in a continuum the relative stations of dignitas also tacitly recognized by Pontano who deploys nearly identical terms.

An important aspect of this wide variability of states available to humanity in Pico’s description of the dignity of man is the characteristic of efficacious will leading to self-determination. Man, according to Pico’s rather optimistic view of the matter, is among all creatures the only one capable of choosing his own station in life. Pontano, on the other hand, develops a rather different perspective on the question of humanity’s role in determining its ontology. In his description of character traits that reside at the very limit of what may legitimately be referred to as “human”, the Neapolitan humanist founds his analysis upon a distinction of word-meanings. Dedicating an entire chapter (I, v) to the comparison of the words crudelitas and immanitas, he postulates that one

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42 Ibidem: ‘[…] profecto qui ad beluarum naturas, feritatemque prolabuntur, alia quam vitosiorum sunt hominum appellatione aut objurgandi, aut insectandi: cum vita ipsa hominum tantum sint, ferarum vero truculentia, atque immanitas.’

43 Ibidem: ‘Sed nescio quomodo truculentia magis ad saevitiam referenda est, immanitas ea cuncta magis complectitur, quae humanitate ab ipsa abhorreant, insintque tantum beluis, quibus quod impetu solum ferantur, ignorata prorsus ratione, quae nulla illis a natura tributa est, feris sint nomen inditum ac beluis, quippe quae rapinis tantum inhfent ac violentiis quae bellorum sunt proprie.’

44 The importance of this general theme in Pontano’s civic treatises has been justly recognized by Francesco Tateo in the third chapter of his early, seminal work on the humanist’s ethical philosophy. See Tateo, Umanesimo etico 133–186.
semantic difference between these two substantives lies in what each of them suggests about the passivity or activity of their human object. Thus despite the apparent similarity between the two terms, he is careful to point out that they are nonetheless to be distinguished by a significant difference in connotation. Whereas *crudelitas* often refers to the deliberate (*nec electione sit vacua*) pursuit of vengeance or the intentional, premeditated infliction of punishment, *immanitas* evokes something quite different, for it describes the spontaneous gesture of someone who, overcome by wild impulse, no longer controls their own behaviour.\(^{45}\) Cruelty (*crudelitas*) represents by all accounts an appalling transgression of all human law and honourable custom (*ritusque […] honestos*). Savage *immanitas*, on the other hand, goes one step even further than this, since it crosses the boundary of all humanity and marks the moment where mankind descends into the realm of “monstrous beasts” (*ad bestias etiam monstrosas*).\(^{46}\) Pontano’s use of passive forms in describing this mechanism (*vero impetu potius rapiatur sponteque feratur sua*) aptly reveals the limitations of human agency in the workings of *immanitas*. It also recalls similar use of the passive verbal form in his description of paternal anger in the *De obedientia* (I, xix: ‘victus *ira*’) as well as Seneca’s well-known characterisation of anger’s effects in the beginning paragraphs of the *De Ira*. Given the nature of the topic, and the proximity in treatment of anger (*ira*) and *immanitas* which includes even the very formulations used by the author, one is hardly surprised to find an entire chapter devoted to the theme of anger in the later half of the treatise.

In chapter I, xiii of the *De immanitate*, Pontano cautions his reader against the excesses of both anger and the desire for vengeance. ‘Anger itself,’ he declares, ‘and the thirst for revenge should therefore never be so great that we forget our nature and human society.’\(^{47}\) Citing the ancient example of Mithridates, he confirms the link between this essay on savagery (*immanitas*) and the line of thought on strength and heroism developed in the *De fortitudine*, when he observes that ‘thus by all means, this fury (*furor ille*)—or, more properly speaking, this rage (*rabies*)—should be tempered and completely

\(^{45}\) *De immanitate* I, v: ‘Quoniam autem magna quaedam inesse videtur immanitati cum crudelitate communitas, praetereundum non est, quibus in rebus haec ab illa differat: quippe cum crudelitas vindictam magis sequatur, nec electione sit vacua, haec vero impetu potius rapiatur sponteque feratur sua in praeceps.’

\(^{46}\) Ibidem: ‘Ad haec crudelitas legem humanam ritusque tantum honestos transgreditur, cum per immanitatem ab homine desciscatur, fiantque ad bestias etiam monstrosas, atque ad illarum rabiem transitio sitque haec ipsa immanitas in quibusdam feritate etiam major ac violentior.’

\(^{47}\) Ibidem I, xiii: ‘Ira igitur ipsa libidoque ulciscendi nunquam tant esse debet, ut naturae obliviscamur, humanaeque societatis.’
held in check, for such is the character of a great and excellent mind.\textsuperscript{48} Here again, statements of principle and examples from Antiquity are accompanied by illustrations taken from local history and even from personal memory. Pontano recounts the heroic behaviour of his great-grandmother, Aurienta, who met her death protecting two young boys with whom she was sequestered, along with many other women and children, during the hostilities of rival factions in Spoleto, Umbria.\textsuperscript{49} Her death by fire and suffocation was made all the more horrible by the fact that the enemies responsible for it were none other than two of her own brothers (\textit{fratres germani}). Not only were these savage men insensitive to the frailty and helplessness of youth, old age and the feminine sex, they were also willing to traverse the boundaries of Nature herself by the murderous desecration of their own blood.

A second example of savage cruelty in this same chapter comes from Pontano’s childhood memory of anecdotes recounted by his grandmother, Leonarda, a ‘matron of rare example’ who told her young grandson of the rivalries between local factions, the conflicts of which often led to appalling violence. In describing the outer limits of anger, the humanist adduces a particularly gruesome tale of murder followed by vengeful cannibalism. Pontano describes an episode of monstrous cruelty reminiscent of the infamous event which stained the house of Pelops:

As a boy I heard my grandmother Leonarda, a matron of rare example, tell, though not without a great many tears, how the enmities between certain families, as they feuded amongst themselves, were realized with the greatest hatred. One man she told of who was captured from a rival faction and cut into the very smallest pieces. His liver, having been spared this treatment initially, was thrown upon burning coals by the faction’s leaders and cut into fine, bite-sized pieces, then offered as breakfast to his family members who had been invited for that express purpose.\textsuperscript{50}  

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\textsuperscript{48} Ibidem: ‘Omnino igitur furor ille, seu rabies rectius dicatur, temperanda est, vel compescenda penitus: quod magni est, ac summi excellentis animi.’

\textsuperscript{49} Ibidem: ‘Ibi infelix matrona, quanquam supra sexum fortissimo pectore, in abditiorem sese locum includens cum utroque filiolo, fumo ac flammis enecta exuritur, caruitque fraternam ob impietatem, factionisque immanes animos sepulchro.’

\textsuperscript{50} Ibidem: ‘Aviam meam Leonardam rarissimi exempli matronam, non sine multis lachrimis puer audiebam referentem, cum inter digladiantes quasdam inter se familias inimici tiae summis exsercarentur odii, captum quempiam factione ex altera, eunque e vestigio concisum in minutissima etiam frusta, moxque exemptum illi iecur in primis, cande-dissimisque carbonibus ab factionis eius principibus tostum, perque buccellas minutim dissectum, inter cognatos ad id invitatos, in jentaculum distributum.’
\end{flushright}
This grotesque illustration of inventive cruelty, which by raising the spectre of cannibalism seems to exceed the very boundaries of common humanity, becomes the object not of a dispassionate analysis, but of a strong emotional reaction. ‘In what does the breathless rage of wolves’, exclaims the humanist, ‘or the fury of the tigress whose children have been removed, exceed this?’ Here again, the analogy of bestial rage follows the descriptive anecdote. Upon further observing that the partakers of this unholy feast digested it amid laughter and general good humour, not without drinking of the victim’s blood in honour of the gods, Pontano declares that he knows of nothing worse than this event which he qualifies as positively ‘foreign to human nature’.

The numerous anecdotal narrations of cruelty contained in the De immaniitate introduce a facet of anger which remains entirely unaccounted for in Aristotle’s discussion of the nature, varieties and control of irascible passions. Beyond any “moral scheme of excess, moderation and deficiency” lies a realm of abuse and cruelty that Pontano is quick to characterize as inhuman. Here the golden principle of mediocritas is no longer applicable, as though the humanist author’s very definition of humanity were somehow grounded upon the Stagirite’s ethical median. What does emerge, in these pages written at a time of sombre reflection and civic violence, is a portrait of anger’s outer limits which serves to contextualize the reflections on the choleric passion’s place in civic life (De obedientia) and on its manifestations in the behaviour of the individual man (De fortitudine).

Selected Bibliography


51 Ibidem: ‘Quae aut luporum tam exanhelata rabies, aut saevientis pro erepta prole tigridis, hanc ipsam superavit?’
52 Ibidem: ‘Quod hic exclamem, nihil habeo, ni forte immaniora his, et ab natura hominis alieniora subjunxerim.’
53 Harris, Restraining Rage 94.


1 Introduction

When the seventeenth-century antiquarians of Scandinavia looked into their past, they were looking for themselves, though in the light of a glorious history and with the aim of providing a suitable prehistory for their great national life in the present. Unfortunately the material brought to light by the first historians of early Scandinavian history was often less apt for adorning national origins with heroic deeds than they had hoped at the start of their work. Their forefathers’ well documented human sacrifice had long been firmly ignored, and the extensive raiding trips of the Vikings were euphemised by the earliest antiquarian researchers as the colonisation strategy of a marginal region, but other phenomena could not be dealt with by a simple revaluation, for they were quite simply baffling. In the early modern period, as will be shown here, one such phenomenon was the berserkers, the elite warriors, mentioned repeatedly in the saga literature, whose ecstatic rage knew no bounds and was of equal danger to friend or foe. Who were these frenzied fighters? Their anger must have seemed doubly irrational to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: not only did the berserkers’ radical fury, as a passion, run wholly counter to the self-discipline of early modern society and its civilising mission, but also—and more troublingly—its causes were entirely unknown.

1 I would like to thank the University Library of Göttingen, the Royal Library of Copenhagen and esp. Orla Mulholland for their kind support.

2 It is not the aim of this study to add further material to the long debate on the true character of berserkers. See beside many others e.g. the recent studies, including large bibliographies, of Samson V., Les Berserkir. Les guerriers-fauves dans la Scandinavie ancienne, de l’Âge de Vendel aux Vikings (VIe–XIe siècle) (Villeneuve d’Ascq: 2011) 38–40 on the early modern discussion; more popular Näström B.-M., Bärsärkarna. Vikingatidens elitesoldater (Stockholm: 2006) 49–54 on early modern debates; Oitana L., I Berserkir tra realtà e leggenda (Alessandria: 2006), and further Dillmann F.-X., Les magiciens dans l’Islande ancienne. Études sur la représentation de la magie islandaise et de ses agents dans les sources littéraires norroises (Uppsala: 2006) 238–268; Ström Å.F., “Berserker und Erzbischof—Bedeutung und Entwicklung des altnordischen...
As I aim to show, the simplest answer to the riddle of the berserkers was offered by demonology, by removing the irrational into the realm of the *causae secundae*, spiritual powers like angels or demons. Just as every form of pagan religion was dismissed as idolatry and its lived experience was literally demonised, so also the emotional extremes of the past could be assigned to the sphere of the demonic. Was Medea not a magician, and had not her possessed state, too, been articulated in senseless anger, as seventeenth-century commentators noted? It is astonishing how long this explanatory approach persisted and how easily philology submitted to theology, but by the early eighteenth century the equation of idolatry with demonic paganism could no longer be maintained. A new cause was hence needed also for the radical passion of the berserker. The second part of this study will show how, thereafter, the berserker’s fury first became pathologised and then, once this physiological approach became less plausible, as we will see at the end, a third explanation appeared, namely drug-induced intoxication. The berserker’s anger became a chemically generated trance, paralleling the similar ecstatic experiences and soul flights of the Siberian shamans.

2 Odin and Satanic *furor*

The world of Latin letters had known of the berserkers long before it became familiar with Old Norse literature, for the Danish historian Saxo Grammaticus had described them in his *History of the Danes*. Saxo told how the seven sons of Sigvard Svennson were crazed by blind rage when they went into battle; in their frenzied state they bit through their shields and neither fire nor iron could halt them. Saxo applied the same description to the giant Harthleben, whom the hero Halfdan had challenged to single combat. ‘Repentino afflatu correptus’ (‘seized by a sudden burst of fury’), this warrior went into battle against his adversary, leapt into a fire, swallowed coals and was evidently invulnerable. Saxo gave no firm explanation of these figures’ *furor repentinus*, but he regarded *veneficia*, witchcraft and sorcery, as a probable cause of their behaviour.\(^3\) The examples from the *Historia Danorum* passed into the most important encyclo-
paedia of the Northern world, the *Historia septentrionalis* of Olaus Magnus, which was relied on into the eighteenth century; it reported both these cases in its discussion of the heroic deeds of the ancient Nordic kings.⁴

Saxo Grammaticus and the last catholic bishop of Uppsala, Olaus Magnus, were presumably well known to the first Scandinavian antiquarians of the early modern period,⁵ but in the early seventeenth century a different authority took centre stage, Snorre Sturluson, the author of the *Prose Edda* and the *Heimskringla*, the great Norse world chronicle. Moved by patriotic enthusiasm, the pioneers of Norse studies had begun to translate into Swedish, Danish or Latin the first examples of old Norse literature to reach them from Iceland.⁶ Within a few decades the early history of the Danish and Swedish nations, for so long known only from Saxo, would be filled with new significance, though admittedly on the basis of sources that were rich in myths and vivid imagery but in which truth and legend were hard to tell apart. In 1633, in the circle of the Danish Royal Antiquary, Ole Worm, who had been entrusted by the king with the task of deciphering runic literature,⁷ the first Danish version of the *Chronicon Norvegiae*, or *Heimskringla*, appeared, translated by the Norwegian Pedar Claussen.⁸ The opening chapters of its first part, the *Ynglinga saga*, describe the emigration and resettlement of the principal Germanic god,

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⁷ On Ole Worm as antiquarian see e.g. Randsborg K., “Ole Worm and Early Field Archaeology in Denmark”, in Badou E. (ed.), *Rannsakningar efter antikviteter: ett symposium om 1600-talets Sverige* (Stockholm: 1995) 125–146. On Odin’s invasion and his magical skills see Worm Ole, *Danicorum monumentorum libri sex e spissis antiquitatum tenebris et in Dania ac Norvegia extantibus ruderibus eruti* (Copenhagen, Joachim Moltke: 1643) l. 1, c. 4, 11–14; c. 6, 24–27.

Odin, the king of the Æsir. Around the time of the birth of Christ, according to Snorre, Odin left Asia and his old fortress Asgard and, together with his companions Thor, Freya and the other Æsir, he travelled to the West. After temporary halts in Saxony and Denmark, he settled in Sweden and founded the city of Sigtuna. But, as Snorre reports in the Ynglinga saga, Odin was far more than just a historical military leader: he was a magician. In his old homeland of Asia Minor he had used occult powers to gain the rank of a god and in Sweden he and his consort Freya established a cult celebrated in Uppsala. He could converse with the head of the giant Mimir, he kept two ravens that brought him all the news and, as Snorre continues, he could change shape into any kind of creature, be it a fish or a snake. As Snorre adds, he could also bestow similar powers on his followers. Odin struck their enemies blind or reduced them to terror and made their swords become blunt. Even when his followers had no weapons, as Snorre related, Odin gave them the power to change into rapacious hounds or wolves, to bite through their shields and to become as strong as a bear or a bull. Neither fire nor copper nor iron could harm Odin's warriors, for they had the furiositas of berserksgangur.

An interpretation of the berserkers was thus already offered in the very first translations of Snorre. Their frenzy involved an element of magic and it had to be accepted that they were closely linked to the cult of Odin. Already in 1644 a scholar from Sorø, Stephan Stephanus, in his commentary on the Historia

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Danorum, had made a direct connection between Snorre and Saxo’s accounts. According to Stephanius, Odin was an archmagician, a dominus lemurum, and he must have been responsible for the abilities of the berserkers that Saxo had described in his history. The interpretation of the mysterious and boundless fury of the berserkers was thus fitted into an explanatory framework that had not lost its power and scope in the seventeenth century, namely demonology, into whose ambit fell all religious but non-Christian ecstatic phenomena. Martin Schoock, to give only one example, in his 1661 standard work on ecstasy distinguished three forms of rapture: ecstasis religiosa, or religious rapture, ecstasis praeternaturalis, or pathological ecstasy, and ecstasis diabolica. Whereas God was responsible for the out-of-body experiences of Adam, Moses or Paul and for the visions of the saints, the pathological experiences of rapture were forms of mania, of mental illness; as Schoock explains, the latter were caused by an excess of melancholy or mental confusion and at times by narcotica like opium which, so the Groningen scholar believed, could produce a similar ecstatic experience. Every form of pagan ecstasy, on the other hand, be it the Pythia at Delphi or the prophet Merlin, was the work of demons. They intervened in the human imaginative faculties and implanted in them phantasmata that gave people the impression of no longer having control over their bodies, indeed of leaving their bodies altogether. Sometimes, says Schoock, the powers of darkness enter directly into the body of the supposed ecstatic as a motor principle and move it directly. Schoock’s division of ecstasies into religious, pathological and diabolical variants recurs in many similar works. Johannes Frommann in his 1674 Tractatus de fascinatione and the Göttingen physician Hieronymus Jordan in his work Quod est divinum in morbis both cite diabolical ecstasy, the rapturous transport generated by the devil, in the same breath as lycanthropy. Here too the possessed persons have the impression, write Frommann and Jordan, of having left their own body and taken on a new form, and here too this impression is due to the phantasms, the imagines, that

12 Saxo Grammaticus, Historiae Danicae libri xvi (Copenhagen, Joachim Moltke: 1644) l. 1, nota 9, 14; l. vi, nota 16, 136–141. The “notes” were published first independently as Stephanius Stephan, Breves notae ac emendationes in nobilissimum rerum Danicarum scriptorem Saxonem Grammaticum Saelandum Danum (Leiden, Elzevier: 1627).
13 Schoock Martin, De ecstasi tractatus singularis, quo plurima hue pertinentia, et ab aliis praeterita non modo tractantur; sed et varia quaestiones, qua theologicae, qua philosophicae, & medicae umeris discutientur (Groningen, Jacob Siepkes: 1661), Thesis secunda, 81–115.
Satan has caused to flow into the imaginative faculty of the supposed werewolf, the object of self-illusion.\textsuperscript{16}

Against this background it is no surprise that other details in the \textit{Ynglinga saga}, such as Odin’s power to change into an animal, were immediately related to the phenomenon of the berserker. From the 1660s onwards, proponents of Swedish Gothicism, especially Olaus Verelius and Jacob Isthmén Reenhielm, now set alongside the \textit{Heimskringla} new editions of the ‘sagas of ancient northern history’,\textsuperscript{17} the \textit{fornaldarsögur}; these were often simply the manuscripts that had ended up in the university’s possession through purchase or through the Danish-Swedish War.\textsuperscript{18} Most of these editions were equipped with an extensive apparatus of glosses that was also designed as a patriotic commentary. When the editors come to the berserkers, their interpretation follows the maxims of demonology.

In 1664 Verelius produced an edition of \textit{Hrólfs saga Gautrekssonar}, which tells of the battles and bridal quest of Hrólfr Gautreksson. The question of what going berserk meant was answered by Verelius in a long footnote within his ‘\textit{notae}’ in the second half of the work. The berserkers derived their name from their style of fighting, as they fought naked, “bar-serk”, \textit{sine lorica}. At first sight, says Verelius, it would hardly be possible to tell whether their \textit{furor}, which was to be pitied, arose from a natural cause or a supernatural one, but enormous physical strength was a characteristic shared with ordinary demonic possession and there was, furthermore, a second significant parallel. Once the ecstatic state departed from the berserker, he was left, according to Norse lit-

\textsuperscript{16} Frommann Johannes C., \textit{Tractatus de fascinatione novus et singularis} (Nürnberg, Wolfgang Mauritius Endter: 1674) pars iv, sectio 1, c. 3, 562–565; Jordan Hieronymus, \textit{De eo quod divinum aut supernaturale est in morbis humani corporis, eiusque curatione Liber} (Frankfurt, Johannes Gottfried Schönwetter: 1651) c. 17, 66–70.

\textsuperscript{17} A new edition and translation of the \textit{Heimskringla} was prepared by Johan Peringskiöld, see Snorre Sturluson, \textit{Heims Kringla, eller Nordländske Konunga Sögor} (Stockholm, Wankiff: 1697), on Odin’s invasion and skills c. 2–8, Old Norse and Latin 2–10.

erature, in a weakened, almost lethargic state. Does not a possessed person present a similar picture once the *malignus spiritus* departs? Verelius goes into more detail about the berserkers in his large commentary on the *Hervarar saga*, the story of the children of Hervar and Heidrek and their long internecine strife. In the saga’s numerous fights a central role is played by berserkers like Arngrim and Agantyr, but also by magic swords such as Tirsing, forged by dwarves. Here too, notes Verelius, the ecstatic warriors were left *tamquam homines ineptissimi*, like dismantled people, once their battle rage passed, even though the blood on their swords would never dry. Could an organic disposition have led to their actions? Could boiling blood, *sanguis ebulliens*, produce this fury that went far beyond even the madness of the bacchants? Verelius recalls the berserkers described by Saxo: it took twelve fighters to chain the warrior *Harthbenus ab Helsyngia* when the *rabies* overcame him, to stop him from going marauding and raping through the land. Surely this man’s extreme *furor* must derive from demonic influence. This was a more plausible explanation than any other.

Verelius’ grand editorial project was continued by his contemporaries, who firmly favoured the demonic option. In 1680 Jacob Isthmén Reenhielm, who inherited Verelius’ position as Swedish Royal Antiquary, produced an edition and translation of *Þorsteins Saga Vikingsonar*, which tells the journeys and battles of Þorstein, his brothers and his marriage to the king’s daughter, Ingeborg. The rage of the berserkers that confronted Þorstein was a diabolical fury, Reenhielm concludes: its bearers had surrendered to magic and the *hostis humani generis*, the enemy of mankind, in order to rout their enemies all the more effectively. Why would they lie around like the dead after battle if a demon had not previously been steering their movements? In the saga the hero Þorstein faces a series of occult events, the work of the magician Jokul; this allowed Reenhielm to establish a connection to shape-changing magic. Odin, the ultimate founder of berserkism, might have given people the impression of having experienced a metamorphosis such as those depicted by Ovid or Apuleius. Surely his followers, too, would have had the power to turn people into invulnerable warriors? Reenhielm also had a historical argument for the diabolical nature of the berserkers. *Grettis saga*, which was then available only in manuscript, revealed that the *comes Norwegiae Ericus*, Eric Jarl, had banished...

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berserkers from his territory after two of them,22 Thorir Paunch and Ogmund the Evil, had raped women and plundered estates.23 Why would Eric have done so if going berserk did not depend on the practice of black magic?24 Much the same the view was taken, finally, by Petrus Salanus in his 1683 edition of a saga full of berserkers, *Egils saga einhenda ok Asmundur berserkjabana.*25

3 The Academic Debate on Berserkers before 1720

A survey of antiquarian literature up to the early eighteenth century shows that the interpretation of berserkers that was established in the late seventeenth century at first underwent no changes. Thomas Bartholin the Younger, of the dynasty of the Bartholins and holder of the position of Royal Antiquary in Copenhagen, was the first scholar able to profit from the major manuscript collections of Arni Mágnusson. Bartholin discussed the berserkers in the only work he published in his own lifetime, the *Antiquitatum Danicarum de causis a Danis contemptae mortis libri.*26 Even though Bartholin was able to draw on a far larger corpus of literature than his predecessors, the berserkers remained for him exponents of black magic. The social rejection of going berserk and the evidence for its compulsive character were weighty arguments. Once the frenzy passes from the warrior Kveldulf in *Egils saga*, he lies feebly on the ground and is hardly able to move; he is no longer master of himself.27 When Þorir, one of the characters of the *Vatnsdæla saga*, goes berserk, the main character, Þorstein, chides him and tries to free his brother from this irrational *furor*. It is

23 The text of the *Grettis saga* was first published in eighteenth century Iceland by Björn Markussón, *Nockrer Marg-Frooder Søgu-thaetter Islendinga, til Lefelegrar Skemturnar og Daegra-Stittingar, thessa Lands Iubyggiurum aa Prent settir* (Hoolum, Halldorn: 1756), *Saga af Gretti Asmundsyne*, c. 21, 97.
24 Reenhielm Johann Isthmén, *Thorstens Vâikings-Sons Saga, pä gammal Göthskaf en âldrigt manuscripto afskrewen* (Uppsala, Henricus Curio: 1680) c. 1, 13–15; c. 2, 25–26, on shape-changers see also c. 5, 57–58.
26 Bartholin Thomas, *Antiquitatum Danicarum de causis contemptae a Danis adhuc gentilibus mortis libri tres* (Copenhagen, Johann Philipp Bockenhofer: 1689) l. 11, c. 5, 344–350.
27 The *Egils-Saga*, attributed to Snorri himself, was published in Iceland in 1782 anonymously as *Sagan af Egle Skallagrimms Syne* (Hrappsey, Magnus Möberg: 1782) c. 1, 1. See on this episode Kanerva, "Hyvää ja paha viha" 221–226.
said that his honour has been badly harmed by this rage. Only when Þorstein is prepared to take on the office of goði for the children of Þorir is he no longer prone to the frenzy.

Verelius was right, Bartholin concludes: the berserkers were possessed persons who had surrendered to a spiritus malignus. The question of which diabolus was ultimately responsible was revealed by the Edda, in the Ethica Odin, or Hávamál, which, it was believed, had been personally composed by Odin. The archimagus had promised his followers praestigiae (sorcery): ‘An eleventh I know: if haply I lead / my old comrades out to war, / I sing ’neath the shields, and they fare forth mightily / safe into battle, / safe out of battle, / and safe return from the strife.’ Bartholin’s harsh judgment was shared by the founder of Norwegian historical writing, Thormond Torfaeus, in his Historia rerum Norvegicarum, but also by a German antiquary such as Trogillus Arnkiel, whose Cimbrisches Heindentum was the first German-language treatment of Scandinavian antiquities. Odin, the master of the dark arts, who had brought his customs with him from Asia, as Snorre had shown, had also been the originator of berserk frenzy.
Two works on the topic bring into the eighteenth century this curious amalgam of demonological survivals and an almost euhemeristic concept of history that followed Snorre in explaining the gods as historical figures. In 1710 the Dane Friedrich Lysholm devoted a special treatise to the *furor gigantum septentrionalium*. Lysholm, who was noted above all as an antiquary and who knew the cases collected by his predecessors, attempted to combine demonology with a physiological approach. The anger of the berserker seemed to differ from common anger in quantity, but not in its quality, in its manner. Was *sanguis ebulliens* enough, as Verelius had suggested, or could another organic factor have called forth such unbridled aggression? Perhaps other means were used to promote ecstatic states, such as music, which had sent even Alexander the Great into a battle rage? If the saga literature was to be believed, noted Lysholm, a magical act often occurred at the start of the frenzy. Heidrek first acquires the magic sword Tirsing before killing his brother Agantýr: surely the weapon must have been bewitched by an *incantatio*. When Porstein faces his adversary Otkul, he does not omit to ask for help from the dwarf Sindre, a dark *genius*, as Lysholm recalls. Surely the *diabolus* Odin stood behind all these occurrences. Lysholm ends his treatise with a definition of going berserk: its frenzy included both a physical component and an occult one; Satan himself concentrated the humours in the body of the fighter and caused the *spiritus animales* to race through the nerves, producing a grotesque rage. This was precisely how God had managed the trick in a Nazarite like Samson, whose ecstatic battle rage was unquestionably comparable to that of the berserkers.

In 1725 the Professor of History at Uppsala, Laurentius Arrhenius, and his respondent, Eric Ramelius, addressed the phenomenon of berserkers. Though Arrhenius does not give the same emphasis to his verdict that it involves a

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35 On Lysholm’s research see also his disputation Lysholm Friedrich – Hammer Erasmus (resp.), *Certamen pro virgine Thora Borgarhiortur, susceptum ab Augustissimo Danorum rege Regnero Lodbrog, illustrator hac dissertatione Antiquario-Heraldico-Critica, quam pro Saxone Grammatico, contra Meursium, Loccenium, Johannem Magnum aliosque defendere conatur* (Copenhagen, Georg Matthias Wering: 1711) passim.

36 Lysholm Friedrich – Hammond Thomas (resp.), *De furore gigantum septentrionalium, Berserksgangur dicto, dissertatio antiquario-physica* (Copenhagen, Georg Matthias Wering: 1710) § 3. 5–6.

37 Ibid. § 4. 6.


39 Lysholm – Hammond, *De furore gigantum* § 5, 9–10.
priest of black magic, the picture of the berserker has nonetheless not changed for these two disputants. Arrhenius was able to profit indirectly in his work from the manuscripts collected by the royal translator from Old Norse, Eric Julius Börner. Arrhenius, too, believed that the abilities of the berserkers far exceeded all human bounds. Were they not able, as the Svarfdæla saga reports, to walk through walls of fire unharmed or, according to Hrólf’s saga, to stamp up to their knees into the ground? Had not instruments like the swords Risamot, Angurvadal or Tirsing been fashioned for them by dwarves or by magically skilled smiths like the famous Voland in the Wilkina saga? Arrhenius, too, stresses that the berserkers had to pay for their fury through social ostracism. The majority regarded them as a useless element of society that could only harm the community by their frenzy. Had not Herraud, the main character of Herraud’s saga, for that reason declined to let the sorceress Busla transform him into a berserker? Like his predecessors Arrhenius lays the historical blame on the military leader and magician Odin, who had imported the rite of furiositas into his new homeland. For Arrhenius, Odin himself must have been responsible for the spread of berserkers in the North.

4 Going Berserk as Pathology

In the following period, the historical king of the Æsir would repeatedly be made responsible for the diabolical nature of the furor berserkicus. In his
1772 ecclesiastical history of Iceland, Finnur Jónsson recounts a curious episode from the *Kristni saga*, which relates the spread of Christianity in Iceland. Bishop Thorkill faces two berserkers who, in his presence, prove their strength by walking through a fire prepared for the purpose. When Thorkill sprinkles the flames with holy water, they are both burnt to death. Could there be a better proof, says Finnur Jónsson, that the berserkers' powers depended on the support of the devil? Nonetheless, from the mid-seventeenth century scholars had begun to question the established definition of the berserker. Should a berserker really be classed with the possessed? In 1707 Olof Celsius, in his work *De magia hyperboreorum*, drew attention to some significant parallels. Was the phenomenon of going berserk and the ecstatic state associated with it not similar to the shamanistic rituals practised by sorcerers in Lappland? Were the Sami shamans not also said to be able to change into animals through a trance? Sven Lagerbring, perhaps the most important Swedish historian of the mid-eighteenth century, investigated this question in a special study. Should the magical rituals ascribed to Odin in the form of *berserksgangur* not be viewed in a wider framework? Did Odin's ability to change into an animal and the phenomenon of going berserk correspond to the soul flight of the Lapp shamans?

The decisive step in this reassessment of the berserker was made by the Icelander Jon Eiriksson in a long treatise on berserkers appended to Hannes Finnson's edition of the *Kristni saga*. He succeeded in establishing a new explanation for the events that had been demonised by Finnur Jónsson. Like Bartholin, Eiriksson had been able to use the manuscript archives of Arnim Magnussion, but as an Icelander he also had the option of drawing on

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49 Celsius Olof – Hamwell Olavus (resp.), *Dissertatio academica de magia Hyperboreorum veterum* (Uppsala, Werner: 1709) c. 4, §§ 1–5, pp. 45–54.


51 Eiriksson Jón, "De Berserkis et furore berserkico", in Finnsson Hannes, *Kristni saga, sive Historia religionis christianae in Islandiam introductae, nec non Þattraf Isleifi bisopi, sive Narratio de Isleifo episcopo* (Copenhagen, Friedrich Christian Godiche: 1773) 142–156, and see the episode of bishop Thorkill fighting the berserks ibid. 15.
the Icelandic editions of saga literature that had appeared a few years earlier. Thanks to his new set of sources, Eiriksson provided the most thorough treatment yet of the *furor berserkicus* and reached a quite different conclusion from that of his predecessors.

Eiriksson first refutes the view maintained by Verelius and Reenhielm. There was no doubt, according to Eiriksson, that berserkers suffered from a form of *impotentia animi*. Halli and Leikner, two figures of the *Eyrbyggja saga*, had both previously been quite friendly people, as the saga reported; matters were very different when they fell prey to the *canina rabies* and went berserk. A similar process occurred with Ljot the Pale, an adversary of Egil Skallgrimsson in *Egils saga*; or with the adversaries of Bui, a figure of the *Kjalnesinga saga*. Was it thus a form of *dementia*, such as might at times befall people who had been accustomed to violence from their childhood on and which, as Eiriksson stressed, could still be observed in this form among the rural population of Iceland? A potential argument against this interpretation of the *rabies* was, at first sight, the fact that many sagas explicitly equipped the berserkers with magical instruments and linked them to magical practices. *Grettis saga* and the *Landnámabok*, the account of the settlement of Iceland, spoke of *trölldom* when they mentioned going berserk and used the term *trollauknir* of berserkers. They were thus people who had increased their strength by means of magic. When the berserk powers leave the berserker Klaufi in the *Svarfdæla saga*, he can no longer even lift his club from the ground, as Eiriksson conceded. And the phenomenon of going berserk was suppressed when

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54 *Egils saga* in the edition of 1782 as *Sagan af Egle Skallagríms Syne* c. 65, 125–130.
58 Jón Eiriksson, “De Berserkis” 148–149. Also Jón Eiriksson had to use the *Svarfdæla saga* (c. 13–15) in a manuscript version. On this example already in his famous dictionary of
Christianity was introduced. The warrior Þorleif of Eilifsdal, who suffered from furor giganteus, was released from his frenzy by baptism, as was reported by the Landnámabok; the same was true of the berserker Prand the Strider, as could be learned in the Eyrbyggja saga.\(^5^9\) Had early Norse Christianity not suppressed the berserkers because they had been guilty of black magic? If not, why had Eric banished them from his realm in Norway?\(^6^0\)

Despite these arguments, Eirikssón did not accept that the berserkers owed their powers to demonic aid. Too much evidence suggested a different picture of these crazed persons. They were people who were simply carried away by a pathological superabundance of passions because they possessed an unfortunate character disposition and a calamitous imbalance of humours. Perhaps Þorstein's brother Þorir in the Vatnsdæla saga had not, as Bartholin had believed, pleaded to be freed from an evil spirit, but simply for the inner peace that his character had hitherto denied him.\(^6^1\) There was also an interesting passage in the *Ius Vicensium*, the old Norwegian ecclesiastical law that Grímur Jónsson Thorkelin had published a few years previously: a woman had been excused for her violent acts because she pleaded that she had done them in a berserk state. Would such a plea have been accepted if berserkers were not driven by involuntary passions?\(^6^2\) There were episodes in the saga literature that made such a view plausible.\(^6^3\) When Egil, the hero of *Egils saga*, composed by Snorre himself, and his playmate Þord competed in a game against Egil's father Skallagrim and threatened to defeat him in the match, Skallagrim became enraged and struck Þord with such passion that he was nearly killed, the saga reported.\(^6^4\) When Skallagrim then wanted to turn on his son Egil, Egil's nurse Þorgerdr Brak stepped between them to hold Egil back. From sheer anger, Skallagrim chased the old woman and, as she attempted to swim out of the way of his frenzy, he hurled a deadly boulder between her shoulders. Surely

\(^{59}\) Sagan Landnama c. 12, 14; Islands Landnamabok c. 18, 24; Eyrbyggja saga sive Eyranorum historia c. 61, 304–307; and see in addition Jón Ólafsson, Syntagma historico-ecclesiasticum de baptismo sociisque sacris ritibus, in boreali quondam ecclesiae usque ad reformationem observatis (Copenhagen, August Friedrich Stein: 1770) c. 3, § 2, 34–35.


\(^{61}\) Ibid. 153–155.

\(^{62}\) Thorkelin Grímur Jónsson, *Ius Ecclesiasticum vetus sive Thorlaco-Ketillianum constitutum an. Chr. MCXXII* (Copenhagen, Pelt: 1776) c. 16, Old Norse and Latin, 76–79.

\(^{63}\) Jón Eriksson, “De Berserkis” 156–159.

such a furor, which acknowledged neither friend nor family, was a temperamental malfunction rather than a sign of demonic possession?\textsuperscript{65} It was said of Ketil Trym, one of the figures in the \textit{Droplaugarsona saga}, that he had been a peaceable and inquisitive child but at times, the saga told, he suffered shivering fits, gnashed his teeth and threw himself to the ground. This behaviour was followed by boundless fury that threatened to destroy everything around him and forced his family to remove all objects out of his reach.\textsuperscript{66} Was this not surely a fault in the \textit{temperamentum}?\textsuperscript{67}

A further argument against the diabolic interpretation of going berserk was, as Eirikssón continued, the fact that the lethargy of the berserkers after their frenzy could be healed again by simple remedies and did not indicate any traits of demonic possession.\textsuperscript{68} The berserker Fróði, a figure in \textit{Hrólf’s saga kraka}, was brought back to life by a drink of blood; when the warrior Böðvar was dazed and unresponsive, his companion Höttr returned him to strength with a similar remedy.\textsuperscript{69} The failure to react to fire or iron, finally, was not necessarily the result of an occult protective magic: perhaps in the time of Harald Fairhair there were natural remedies that could strengthen the \textit{durities} of the skin. And there was an additional detail that had been ignored in previous treatments, but which unambiguously argued against a diabolical nature of the furor berserkicus: many berserkers were killed; they were not invulnerable. When Grettir in \textit{Grettis saga} fights with the berserker Snoekoll, he inflicts massive injuries on him, as on the berserkers from Halogaland.\textsuperscript{69} The same happens to the berserker Agaut in \textit{Víga-glums-saga}.\textsuperscript{70} Their \textit{rabies}, Eirikssón concludes, must have a natural cause.\textsuperscript{71}

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{65}] Sagan af Egle Skallagríms Syne c. 40, 62–65.
\item[\textsuperscript{66}] The \textit{Droplaugarsona saga} (see c. 1) was available only in a manuscript version. On this episode see also Güntert, \textit{Über altisländische Berserker-Geschichten} 12.
\item[\textsuperscript{67}] Jón Eiriksson, “De Berserkis” 159–162.
\item[\textsuperscript{69}] Björn Markussón, \textit{Nockrer Mary-Frooder Søgu-thaetter Islendinga, Saga af Gretty Asmundsyne} c. 21, 97–100.
\item[\textsuperscript{70}] Gudmundur Pétursson, \textit{Viga-glums saga sive Vita Viga Glumi} (Copenhagen, August Friedrich Stein: 1786) c. 4, Old Norse and Latin, 18–25.
\item[\textsuperscript{71}] As an ultimate option Jón Eiriksson, “De Berserkis” 159, suggests a kind of intoxication by consuming vomit, inspired by an episode taken from the \textit{Saga of Olof Tryggvason}, see as his source Thóðr Thóðlaksson, \textit{Saga Pess halóplega Herra Olafs Tryggvasonar Noregs Kongs}, 2 vols. (Skalholt, Snorrasyne: 1689–90) vol. 2, 32.
\end{itemize}
5 Trances and Drugs

Just as lycanthropy began to be interpreted as an extreme form of melancholy in the eighteenth century and no longer as a form of possession or black magic, the phenomenon of going berserk had thus undergone a pathologisation and lost its diabolical nature. But Eirikssón’s hypothesis was not the last word, of course. The next step on the path to an enlightened interpretation of the berserker was made possible by the notion that both Celsius and Lagerbring had put up for debate, i.e. the proximity of berserkers to the rites of Finno-Ugric shamans, both of which involved a calculated trance.

Since the mid-eighteenth century knowledge of the Finno-Ugric, Samoyedic and Altaic peoples of northern Eurasia had increased drastically. Major expeditions, undertaken not least by officers dispersed by the Northern War, such as Philipp Johann Tabbert von Strahlenberg, brought back to Sweden knowledge of the customs and rites of the indigenous peoples of the Russian empire.72 The ethnic and cultural ties between the Mordvins, Udmurts or Mari and the inhabitants of Lappland had become clear. All these peoples had a phenomenon in common that was termed shamanism already in the mid-seventeenth century.73 At the start of the eighteenth century it had also come to the attention of antiquaries that drug-taking might explain out-of-body experiences, visions and trances, though this option had been categorically ruled out by Martin Schoock, as we have seen above. The Danish chemist and philologist Ole Borch had wondered if intoxicating vapours emanating from the ground had perhaps been responsible for the prophecies of the Pythia at Delphi.74 The Mennonite Antonin van Dale in his famous and, in its day, highly controversial work on oracles had gone a step further. Intoxicating drugs like cannabis or opium, he argued, could perhaps have been the ultimate cause of the trances of ancient seers and had perhaps also played a part in the witches’ sabbaths and


diabolic possessions of the past. Trances and drug-taking had perhaps gone hand in hand in pagan religions. In Sweden Carl Linnaeus and his students Georg Eberhard Georgii and Olof Reinhold Alander had compiled catalogues of natural drugs that, as *inebriantia*, would be effective in inducing visions, trances and anaesthetic effects, such as alkaloids like thorn apple, deadly nightshade and poison darnel, *lolium temulentum*, but also hemp and opium.

It was a student of Linnaeus, Samuel Oedmann, who in 1784 combined the two components shamanism and natural drugs in a single treatise and who, so he believed, thus solved the riddle of berserk fury. Oedmann was familiar with the hypotheses presented by his predecessors to explain the frenzy, but for him they were no longer significant. All the indications—the paroxysms, convulsions, rage and aggression, but also the subsequent total exhaustion—were unambiguous indications of intoxicants. Engelbert Kämpfer, Prosper Alpinus and, after them, Johann Jacob Dillenius had described the effects of opium and cannabis. The effects, as Kämpfer had observed, did indeed compare closely to the fury of the berserker. None of the affected persons could recall their actions afterwards. Samuel Gmelin had discovered during his

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75 Van Dale Antonius, *De oraculis veterum ethnicorum dissertationes duae, quorum prior de ipsorum duratione et defectu, posterior de eorumdem auctoribus* (Amsterdam, Henricus et Theodor Boom: 1700) Dissertatio I, c. 6, 137–140. On this matter see also Heyne Christian Gottlob, “Religionum et sacrorum cum furore peractorum origines et caussae ad loc. Strabonis de Kuretibus”, in *Commentationes Societatis regiae scientiarum Gottingensis* 8 (1785/86), *Commentationes historicae et philologicae* 3–24.


78 Ibid. 242–245.


travels in Russia that plants like *Atropa Belladonna* and *Datura Stramonium*, i.e. deadly nightshade and thorn apple, were boiled down to a stock and administered as an intoxicant to induce an ecstatic state.  

Indeed, as Oedmann noted, there was a natural drug that would even more effectively dissolve boundaries and induce trances, the *flug-svampen*, i.e. the toadstool or fly agaric, *agaricus muscaria*. Various ethnic groups, including the Ostyaks, Yukaghirs and peoples of the Tunguska area and Kamchatka used this mushroom, under various names, as had been shown in the accounts of explorers like Philipp von Strahlenberg, Georg Steller or Stepan Krasheninnikov. As Oedmann reported, it was mixed and diluted, often following instructions from shamans, with extracts of willowherb, *epilobium*, or other plants in order to induce visions and ecstatic transports. The price of these trances were rapid heartbeat and characteristic convulsions; the intoxication was often accompanied by amnesia and frenzy. Why should this drug-induced fury not also have given rise to the phenomenon of going berserk? Had not Odin, the postulated founder of berserkism, come to Sweden from Asia? Could he not have brought this shamanistic ecstatic technique from his north Eurasian, Scythian homeland, in order to make his warriors invulnerable in their euphoria? Had he perhaps granted them, through their drug-induced trance, the chance to glimpse the beauty of Valhalla?
6 Conclusion

Odin, the dark magician and lord of demons, had within a few decades turned into Odin the shaman herbalist; the devilish berserker who ran marauding through villages had turned into a junkie high on mushrooms who was more of a danger to himself than to those around him. It is striking that no antiquarian hit on the idea that the berserkers could simply be a literary fiction, no different from the ice giant or the magically skilled dwarves who populate the saga literature. Ultimately the historical authority of the sagas was too great. Rather than denying the reality of the phenomenon, the scholarly texts show a gradual transformation. The same commitment to the written word that had, through good and ill, maintained Odin as king of the Æsir and founder of the ancient Swedish social order, also needed to legitimise his products in a way acceptable to the science of the time. The fact that demonology was replaced first by psychiatry, as we saw, and then by a hypothesis drawn from natural science, rather than by a search for literary motifs or concretisations of myth, was just a logical consequence of this commitment to the written word.

It was only with figures like August Ludwig von Schlözer that, at the end of the eighteenth century, saga literature, too, came to be treated primarily as a literary genre and the highly influential foreword to the Heimskringla came to be seen as a text laced with literary commonplaces.86 By the nineteenth century, when Sir Walter Scott discussed berserkers in his paraphrase of the Eyrbiggja saga, he saw themselves simply as ‘champions’ who where ‘wont to work themselves into a frenzy’, and whose tendency to aggression ran only slightly counter to the social norm; they should be classified alongside unappealing contemporaries who were not the sort one would invite to a tea party.87 Everything else was poetic license.88 Henry Holland, who travelled to Iceland in the same period, went so far as to discredit the berserkers as ‘men of weak
judgement and a depraved imagination,' most of whom had to be classed as ‘merely impostors’. The fundamental otherness of demonic anger had now arrived in the empathetic society of early romanticism, which saw the berserker as a social outsider and approached him with the understanding concern of a social worker.

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Chapter 10

Anger and the Unity of Philosophy: Interlocking Discourses of Natural and Moral Philosophy in the Scottish Enlightenment

Tamás Demeter

Summary

By exploring various theoretical discourses of anger in Enlightenment Scotland I intend to show that various branches of philosophy exploited the same conceptual resources while discussing phenomenon in natural, moral and religious contexts. Relying on the same concepts, various branches of theoretical inquiry were intertwined so that different layers of discourse exerted a mutual influence on one another: physiological discourses were filled with hidden moral meaning and religious content, and vice versa. Therefore, the discourses of the natural, psychological, social and transcendent aspects of human beings exhibited a remarkable conceptual unity in this period, just before they started to develop into specialized fields of knowledge. The present paper offers a case study as to how these conceptual interconnections worked within the Scottish Enlightenment’s sphere of intellectual influence in the particular case of anger.

1 Introduction

Anger is at the forefront of theoretical interest in eighteenth-century natural and moral inquiry in Scotland:1 it serves as a standard illustration in the medical, moral and theological discussions of fevers and violent active passions. As such it receives acute attention in connection with various physiological phenomena, like e.g. circulation, the animal spirits and raging fevers. In the descriptive and explanatory “science of man”, which can be understood as a

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1 It is also in the forefront of interest in the Enlightenment in general. For a discussion of the developments on the Continent, one however that leaves out the physiological context, see Coleman P., Anger, Gratitude, and the Enlightenment Writer (Oxford: 2011). However, the Scottish context deserves special attention, because as Coleman (ibidem 417) points out ‘we do not find French equivalents to Hume’s or Smith’s reflective analysis of particular passions as part of an overall moral philosophy’. 
middle-range theory mediating between physiological and normative (ethical and theological) considerations, anger is discussed in connection with benevolence, love, and other passions motivating actions, tempers and various appetites, as well as its role in art and poetry. In ethical contexts it is discussed, in a typically condemning manner, as a moral fault, in the context of corrupting the mind; and in theological contexts, it is considered as a passion demolishing humility. But sometimes it is also painted with more appealing colours as a state of mind necessary for the exercise of certain social virtues and self-preservation.

In this paper I will argue that these discourses of the Scottish Enlightenment are not independent of one another, quite to the contrary: various moral and natural philosophical discourses penetrate each other, linking moral philosophies to then-contemporary medical theories, and *vice versa*, lending medical theories moral and theological significance. Therefore the discourses of anger in this period are eminently suitable to illustrate the thesis that there is an intimate and remarkable connection between the discourses of natural and moral philosophy in the period.

This thesis has significance in the context of present-day historiographies of both science and philosophy that are still inclined to treat their canon separately.² By exploring the interconnections of various discourses of anger, I wish to illustrate by a case study the fundamental unity of natural and moral philosophies in the early modern period. As I will argue, the discourses of anger in these different fields are conceptually congruent and these discourses frequently merge in a rather intricate manner: physiological theories are influenced by implicit normative and religious motivations, the phenomenological psychology of the “science of man” is informed by physiological considerations and also by implicit normative agendas.

2 Visions of Disciplinary Unity and Interaction

Ever since C.P. Snow’s famous essay on the ‘Two Cultures’ (1959), it has become a commonplace to refer to the divide separating the sciences and the

humarities. This divide did not exist for those working on the questions of anger in various discourses of the Scottish Enlightenment. Instead, the participants saw themselves as contributing to a joint enterprise that could potentially converge upon a unified account of human phenomena encompassing physiological, moral and theological approaches. While the unifying character of this enterprise was considered as a matter of course, philosophy was not preoccupied with reconciling the ‘scientific’ and the ‘manifest’ image of man, as Wilfrid Sellars’ happy phrase has it, but aspired to a comprehensive explanatory understanding of human beings from their natural, cognitive and affective constitution to their moral and transcendent ends.

Early modern philosophers formulated various visions of the unity of philosophy. At one end of the early modern epistemological spectrum, Descartes’s influential vision of the sciences, in his Principles of Philosophy (1644), as branches growing out of metaphysical foundations represents one version of how unity could be conceived. Descartes’s original vision of method that underpinned this unity prescribed starting from intuitively clear and infallibly known metaphysical principles, the world’s basic constituents, ‘simple natures’, through which deductive knowledge in physics and other fields of knowledge was attainable. At the other end of the spectrum, David Hume’s foundational project in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739/40) aspired to empirical knowledge about the limits and prospects of human cognition, a basis upon which a ‘compleat system of the sciences’ could be erected.

In late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century Scotland the unity of the sciences was typically conceived of in a Newtonian framework that postulated the primacy of experimental natural philosophy. Following the summary of his method of analysis and synthesis in Query 31 of the Opticks (which first appeared in the 1706 Latin edition), Newton formulated his legacy for moral philosophy in a much-quoted sentence: ‘if natural Philosophy in all its Parts, by pursuing this Method, shall at length be perfected, the Bounds of Moral Philosophy will also be enlarged.’ According to Newton, this enlargement

7 Newton Isaac, Philosophical Writings (Cambridge: 2004) 140.
should proceed through the perfection of natural philosophy, which consists in its increasing contribution to our knowledge of the attributes and intentions of God:

> For so far as we can know by natural philosophy what is the first cause, what power he has over us, and what benefits we receive from him, so far our duty towards him, as well as that towards one another, will appear to us by the light of nature.⁸

This self-understanding of natural philosophy was quite unlike that of modern science: it did not aspire exclusively to a descriptive, explanatory and secular knowledge of nature, but it also had intrinsic moral and theological content and implications.⁹

For Newton, the derivation of moral and theological knowledge from knowledge of nature was possible because the laws of morality, unlike the laws of nature, did not depend on God’s volition. As Peter Harrison puts it, for Newton God ‘wills good things—[and] things are not good because God wills them’;¹⁰ As Newton himself says, God is ‘freely willing good things [...] and constantly cooperating with all things according to accurate laws, as being the foundation and cause of the whole of nature, except where it is good to act otherwise.’¹¹ Therefore, not the presupposition of God’s inexplicable will, but his goodness should be our guide in understanding nature. Newton’s inquiry is all about God’s creation: it is an inquiry by which we find out about his intentions and thus about our own duty. Through the analysis of phenomena we find the laws of physics, and as these laws reflect God’s will and God wills good things, a fortiori, the laws of physics must concur in the production of good effects.

Newton did not take decisive steps toward the fulfilment of his vision for disciplinary unity, but he clearly formulated the task and the framework for Newtonian philosophers: to refine moral philosophy within the

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⁸ Ibidem.


methodological and theological framework that his natural philosophy had set. And this was a persistent heritage for Scottish natural and moral philosophers: most of them were willing with David Fordyce to '[c]onsider nature or the World as the Volume or Book of God in the meanest page of which his perfections are legible'.\textsuperscript{12} Having been committed to this understanding of the world, Colin Maclaurin in his influential mid-century introductory text to the ideas of Newton’s \textit{Principia} (1748) also insisted on the representation of natural philosophy as an enterprise ‘subservient to purposes of a higher kind, and is chiefly to be valued as it lays a sure foundation for natural religion and moral philosophy’.\textsuperscript{13} The elaboration of the implications, as well as the critique, of Newton’s programme for moral philosophy was left to the next generations, and many Scottish moral philosophers were willing to take up the Newtonian torch.\textsuperscript{14}

One of the most self-conscious Newtonians, George Turnbull, in his \textit{Principles of Moral and Christian Philosophy}, published in two volumes in 1739/40, makes an attempt to set the principles on the basis of which moral philosophy can be made out to be continuous with the programme of Query 31.\textsuperscript{15} Turnbull’s central idea is this: regular and orderly appearances are due to the fact that nature is governed by laws whose physical explanation is given if an effect is shown to be arising from those laws. Some of these laws are such that they produce ‘good, perfection and beauty’ in the material world,\textsuperscript{16} and an effect is thus instantly accounted for morally once it is shown to be produced by such laws. Explaining phenomena in this way is the \textit{part} of natural philosophy that can be called moral philosophy. Just as Newton envisaged, the perfection of this part can proceed only through the refinement of natural philosophy, and our knowledge of the final causes that it provides. Probably writing under the influence of Colin Maclaurin, Turnbull proclaims that

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all the conclusions in natural philosophy, concerning the order, beauty, and perfection of the material world, belong properly to moral philosophy;
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\textsuperscript{13} Maclaurin Colin, \textit{An Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries} (London, J. Nourse [etc.]: 1775 [1748]) 3.


\textsuperscript{16} Ibidem.
being inferences that respect the contriver, maker, and governor of the world, and other moral beings capable of understanding its wise, good and beautiful administration, and of being variously affected by its laws and connexions. In reality, when natural philosophy is carried so far as to reduce phenomena to good general laws, it becomes moral philosophy; and when it stops short of this chief end of all enquiries into the sensible or material world, which is, to be satisfied with regard to the wisdom of its structure and oeconomy; it hardly deserves the name of philosophy in the sense of Socrates, Plato, Lord Verulam, Boyle, Newton, and the other best moral or natural philosophers.17

Thus moral philosophy begins where the conclusions of natural philosophy are reached. The conclusions themselves are already part of moral philosophy, because they are related to the order (beauty, good, and perfection) of the material world. Precisely for this reason they have constitutive reference to moral laws, just as they are bearers of theological content with respect to the design and government of the universe.

The unity of various branches of philosophy so conceived amounts to more than a mere congruence of vague methodological pronouncements: it arises from the very nature of the subject matter common to these branches. As Turnbull himself puts it, unity arises from ‘the nature of things’ as the material world had been created purposively ‘for the sake of the moral world’, so that they ‘make one strictly, connected system’.18 On the basis of this view of the world Turnbull even goes almost as far as endorsing a view akin to Berkeley’s idealism when he says that the material world ‘considered apart from its effects upon perceptive beings, hath no existence’—and he only slightly qualifies this strong metaphysical commitment by adding the proviso that ‘at least, [it] cannot be said to merit existence’.19 There is thus a constitutive reference of the material world to the world of perceptive and moral beings, a reference without which the material world cannot be accounted for.

It is thus not a bottom-up unity that Turnbull envisages for philosophical disciplines that is secured by the foundational disciplines of natural philosophy. Instead, in his vision, natural, moral and religious insights have a mutual reliance on one another: the study of the natural world presupposes perceptual and psychological capacities that can be studied both as phenomena of physiology and as distinctively human phenomena of a ‘science of man’.

17 Turnbull, Principles 1: 52–53.
18 Turnbull, Principles 1: 440.
19 Turnbull, Principles 1: 441.
The unity and mutual dependence of these aspects of the world as studied in natural, moral and theological branches of philosophy are underpinned by the fact that the world is fit for purpose—that it is adapted to a certain end.

This teleological unity of the world is also reflected in Francis Hutcheson’s 1742 lectures on moral philosophy that prescribe search for the purposes in our constitution for which God and nature ‘has formed us’. Hutcheson also finds a motivation for natural philosophy in studying what ‘these things are which our natural senses {or perceptive powers} recommend to us’, and his vision of unity is consonant with Turnbull’s. And so is Fordyce’s influential *The Elements of Moral Philosophy* (1754) in which he introduces philosophy as a descriptive enterprise that aspires to the knowledge of things ‘whether natural or artificial, by observing its Structure, the Parts of which it consists, their Connection and joint Action’. This descriptive knowledge of the ‘Constituent Principles’ that things follow in the course of their normal functioning directly leads to knowledge of their ‘Office and Use’, which in turn leads to knowledge of the ‘common Effort or Tendency of the Whole’.

Thus the dominant vision concerning the unity of philosophy conceives the union of various branches of knowledge against the background of final causes with theological and normative aspirations. In this context David Hume’s account of human nature is outstanding because his vision of unity avoids theological aspirations altogether, and aims primarily at a secular and explanatory ‘science of man’. For Hume, the unity of philosophy is conceived primarily by the means of method, and not against the background of final causes or teleological considerations. Yet, for the world of living organisms he retains some of the rhetoric of the mutual dependence of parts for a common purpose, and due to his commitment to the methods of anatomy while exploring human nature, this functionalistic and synoptic outlook is characteristic of his account.

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24 Ibidem, 2.1.12.2.
The resulting knowledge of the anatomy of human nature is largely independent of its actual physiological realisation, but physiology is not irrelevant to reaching conclusions in the science of man: lessons from optics, for example, can be useful in exploring sensation, a faculty whose study belongs equally to moral and natural philosophy. Hume also turns to a physiological explanation of mistakes in reasoning couched in terms of animal spirits, and argues from the analogies between human and animal anatomy and physiology towards the conclusion that the mental capacities of animals must be similar to those of humans, and they are different mostly in degree and not in kind. These conclusions allow for drawing further conclusions about what is good or useful for this particular constitution called human nature, and this can result in normative considerations on how to act in various situations, or how to change the circumstances so as to ensure the desirable action of those involved in a given situation. But it certainly does not allow for drawing conclusions concerning the nature or intentions of the deity.

The unity of philosophical inquiry was just as popular an idea among natural philosophers and physiologists as it was with moral philosophers. As part of a wider European tendency, vitalistic ideas increasingly populated various branches of natural philosophy in Scotland from the early decades of the eighteenth century. As a consequence the sharp distinction that mechanical philosophies had drawn between mind and matter was blurred, a development that could provide further support for the thesis that various branches of philosophy are united by the intricate connections among their respective subject matters. It is in this context that John Gregory could conclude in 1770 that ‘[t]he laws of union between the mind and body, and the mutual influence

26 See e.g. Hume, Treatise 2.2.8.6. and 1.9.3.11. See also 2.1.1.2 where Hume proclaims that the task of his science of man with respect to sensation ends where the task of anatomy and natural philosophy begins.
29 This is the lesson of Hume, Enquiry, Section 8/2, and Section 11.
they have upon one another [...] is one of the most important enquiries that ever engaged the attention of mankind, and almost equally necessary in the sciences of morals and of medicine.\textsuperscript{32}

The search for the laws of psychophysical unity connected the field of human physiology to morals and religion. In very much the same manner as Maclaurin understood natural philosophy as being subservient to purposes of a higher kind, George Cheyne, the fashionable Scottish doctor, proclaimed in 1724 that ‘[t]he infinitely wise author of nature has so contrived things that the most remarkable rule of preserving life and health are moral duties commanded us, so true it is, that “Godliness has the promises of this life, as well as that to come.”’\textsuperscript{33} Thus conceived, medical research contributes to fulfilling our moral duty and transcendent aspirations by preserving our health in accordance with God’s commandments, and it also helps us understand the world better by explaining what our creator has actually intended to us.

The interconnections among various branches of philosophy are thus not ensured by one-way influences, but rather, as most authors emphasize, they constitute a system of mutual dependencies. Irrespective of the widespread reference to a theological framework, the central point of these visions, as is commonly acknowledged by natural and moral philosophers, is an aspiration to knowledge of ‘the nature, laws & connections of things, [...] & from thence deduce rules for the conduct & improvement of human life’\textsuperscript{34}—that is a comprehensive account of the world of dead and living matter, of morals and, for most philosophers, of God. The aim is thus a coherent account of the world, where coherence is not primarily a logical property of theories. Instead, it is used in the context of terms like “connection” and “order”, the bestowing of which upon the variety of things being the main task of philosophy. This is, as Adam Smith puts it, ‘the science of the connecting principles of nature’. Philosophy is responsible for ‘representing the invisible chains which bind together all these disjointed objects, endeavours to introduce order into this chaos of jarring and discordant appearances’.\textsuperscript{35} The success of this enterprise is partly measured by the coherence various theories forge in a world of disordered phenomena.

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item \textsuperscript{33} Cheyne George, \textit{A Treatise on Health and Long Life} (London, William Kidd: 1787) 4.
\item \textsuperscript{34} Fordyce, “A Brief Account” 166.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Let us now turn to the question of how the coherence of the natural, moral and divine world is established when inquiry is conducted with the acute awareness of the relevance of one discipline to the larger scheme of the sciences.

3 Anger as a Disease of Body, Mind and Society

Anger is probably ideal for the illustration of how a phenomenon can travel through various disciplines and find its way into various descriptive and normative discourses, at the same time revealing a remarkable unity among them. Physiology and the “science of man”, understood as a theory of the mind and society of moral beings, aspire to a descriptive and explanatory account of what anger consists in and how it is situated among other phenomena of the human condition. In normative moral and theological contexts, the questions concern the moral standing and the proper attitude toward anger, and its place in God’s creation. These discourses, as one might expect on the basis of what we have seen above, penetrate each other: prima facie descriptive discourses are filled with moral significance and theological connotations, and at the same time physiological ideas also enter moral and religious contexts.

That physiology and descriptive psychology are mutually relevant was obvious to many, once vitalistic ideas concerning the union of mind and body became common currency. It was gradually acknowledged that living bodies should be studied differently from the non-living parts of nature, because animal economy is not just mere mechanism, and living bodies are not Cartesian automata for which an iatromechanical outlook could be the proper approach and neither could the activity of human bodies be derived exclusively from some mental substance. It was increasingly acknowledged that ‘mechanism takes Place and operates in it self only, on dead Matter’.

Thus it seemed natural to approach the activity of the mind as being united with the internal activity of living matter, and to build theories of human functioning with the commitment that ‘the Works of Imagination and Memory, of Study, Thinking, and Reflecting, from whatever Source the Principle on which they depend springs, must necessarily require bodily Organs’. And vice versa: in order to understand phenomena of life, recourse must be taken to a ‘Self-active Principle’ to which bodily mechanism is subordinated in ‘organized bodies fit

37 Cheyne, *The English Malady* 53.
for *Animation* and living Functions'. The psychological discussion of cognitive functions was therefore underpinned by, and conjoined with, the physiological discussion of living functions, and eventually it would drive toward a unified account of mental and physiological aspects of human beings that left behind the image of man advocated by substance dualists.

This approach may have seemed even more appropriate for affective functions and faculties, simply because more than cognitive faculties they were perceivably accompanied by bodily symptoms and processes. Anger is a phenomenon that aptly illustrates the mutual dependence of the affective and physiological realm because it has a place both in the physiological category of “raging fevers” and in the psychological category of “violent passions”. From a physiological perspective, anger in its primary form was typically conceived as an acute disease. As Cheyne put it:

Hatred, for example, anger and malice, are but degrees of a frenzy, and a frenzy is one kind of a raging fever. From all which it is plains the violent and sudden passions, are more dangerous to health, than the flow and Continued, as acute diseases are more destructive than chronical.

Anger is thus represented as a condition with destructive consequences for the human body. If people are concerned about leading a healthy life, then excesses of passions should be avoided because these excesses are as dangerous to ‘the preservation of integrity of their intellectual faculties, or the bodily organs of them’ as are the ‘excesses in high food, or spirituous liquors’. Cheyne had an explanation of the destructive consequences of anger primarily in terms of bending and stretching the nervous fibers, which violently speeds up the circulation of blood and bodily juices, and blocks secretion. This line was also followed several decades later by William Cullen when he proclaimed that ‘[a]mong the causes increasing the force of the Circulation, anger and other violent active passions are to be reckoned’ which is due to the influence of the brain’s energy upon the heart. This process can have potentially destructive consequences ‘in urging not only previous determinations

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38 Cheyne, *The English Malady* 95. This is an idea characteristic for Enlightenment vitalists, see Reill, *Vitalizing* 128–132, 148–154.
39 See Wright, “Function versus Substance Dualism”.
40 Cheyne, *Treatise* 125.
41 Cheyne, *Treatise* 124.
43 Ibidem 2: 366.
with violence, but also in urging to excess inequalities, otherwise innocent.\textsuperscript{44}

The physiological consequences of anger can be so excessive that they constrain conscious agency by limiting ‘the power of reasoning or choosing means to ends’,\textsuperscript{45} but Cullen doubts that this disease typically entails a lasting or ‘desperate’ condition of the brain.\textsuperscript{46}

Richard Mead, who was not of Scottish origin but belonged to the sphere of Scottish intellectuals,\textsuperscript{47} devoted his Medica Sacra (published posthumously in 1755) to the enlightenment project of naturalizing the spiritual diseases as represented in the Bible. His central point is that ‘the divinity ought not to be made a party concerned in imposing diseases, which may possibly have natural causes’.\textsuperscript{48} He undertakes the task of ‘removing vulgar errors, especially those related to religion’\textsuperscript{49} by giving medical explanations and suggesting cures for Biblical diseases, most importantly for ‘daemoniacks’, i.e. demonic possession. According to Mead’s diagnosis, the symptoms associated with this condition are just those of \textit{madness}, ‘a disease of an injured imagination, which derives its origin from the mind, having been too long a time fixed on any one object’.\textsuperscript{50} Anger, whose physiological description in Mead is also couched in terms of increased circulation,\textsuperscript{51} is a principal cause of madness, because as he says elsewhere, ‘inordinate affections, dwelling long on the mind, frequently become tedious diseases’, which reflect their respective natures, and if

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item[44] Ibidem 2: 214.
\item[45] Ibidem 1: 107.
\item[46] Ibidem 1: 566–567.
\item[49] Ibidem 444.
\item[50] Ibidem 471.
\item[51] See Mead Richard, “Mechanical Account of Poisons” in idem, \textit{The Medical Works of Richard Mead} (Dublin, Thomas Ewing: 1767) 3–113, 52. This essay was written in 1702 under the influence of Pitcairne without much mathematics but under the ideology of turning medicine Newtonian.
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\end{footnotesize}
untreated, ‘anger ends in fury and madness’.52 Thus anger comes in two forms, and for Mead, unlike for Cheyne, it is more dangerous in its chronic than in its acute version because the former has a capacity to develop into a serious mental disorder.

The typical tone in which moral philosophers discuss anger is in tune with the medical discourse in emphasizing its destructive consequences for body, mind and society. Turnbull concurs with the physiological discourses of anger when he describes it as a ‘boiling, scorching fever’.53 As such it is a source of misery of the body, and it also belongs to the group of ‘evil passions, which sadly degrade and corrupt the mind’.54 Thus anger is both a moral and a medical condition that cries for a cure. Hutcheson also agrees that these passions are ‘immediately uneasy and tormenting’, ‘we are the worse for them’,55 and therefore it is a duty towards ourselves to restrain these passions.

Anger is also a disease of society, and not only of the individual mind and body. The anti-social consequences of anger and similar violent passions are at the forefront of theoretical interests on the threshold of the Scottish Enlightenment. Gershom Carmichael, accepting the Stoic understanding of anger as a ‘short insanity’, emphasizes that anger has the most ‘unsocial’ consequences, and recommends refraining from action ‘in a state of blazing’ and diligence in ‘restraining our anger’.56 Carmichael’s legacy is reflected in Hutcheson’s approach; he defines anger as a violent ‘Propensity to occasion Evil to another, arising upon apprehension of an Injury done by him’.57 As such anger is essentially an anti-social, ‘Selfish Passion’, whose satisfaction yields ‘Pleasures opposite to those of the publick Sense’.58 Anger therefore drives us in the opposite direction than benevolence, which is for Hutcheson the central cohesive force of the social world analogous to Newton’s gravity in the natural

54 Ibidem 2: 552.
58 Ibidem 31, 95.
world. Nevertheless, Hutcheson warns against taking the presence of such selfish passions as an indication that due to ‘the great and good’ God’s intentions ‘men have not been equipped by nature for social life’. Anger and related passions arise only in the context of ‘conflict of interests, rivalry, jealousy, or by some thought of previous injury or cruelty,’ so albeit destructive of social bonds, these passions are only secondary to natural benevolence.

Because we are aware of its potentially destructive consequences, anger is thought to preclude a sympathetic response of bystanders. Although sympathy is a faculty of human nature that facilitates the communication of affections, it works in the reverse way with anger and the like passions precisely because they are anti-social. As Adam Smith explains in his *Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759):

> The hoarse, boisterous, and discordant voice of anger [...] inspires us with either fear or aversion. We do not fly towards it [...] It is the same case with hatred. Mere expressions of spite inspire it against nobody, but the man who uses them. Both these passions are by nature the objects of our aversion. Their disagreeable and boisterous appearance never excites, never prepares, and often disturbs, our sympathy.

For this reason the imitations of anger and similar passions can hardly be exploited in artistic creation, as it could facilitate at most a ‘very strange entertainment’. Lord Kames explains the underlying mechanism in greater detail his *Elements of Criticism* (1762): imitations of anger are ‘so far from causing any emotion similar to themselves, to incite a spectator to imitation, that they have an opposite effect’ even if it is moderate. In Kames’s account this feature of anger arises from the fact that its expression puts the audience on the defensive, and therefore the one expressing anger invites a negative moral judgment: he is duly condemned for abandoning the standards of good taste and stepping outside the community of amiable men—a social consequence best avoided by a preventive cure.

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The Cures of Anger

Due to its potentially destructive consequences for body, mind and society, anger needs to be treated, but the suggested cures differ according to the outlook and temperament of the therapist. We have seen that anger is both a medical and a moral condition, it is as much a fever as an evil or selfish passion. As such, it is a vice for which the agent is to be held responsible, and consequently he loses our sympathy. ‘Sudden passionate motions of anger’ are listed in Hutcheson’s *System of Moral Philosophy* as middle-range vices, less vicious than original malice, impiety or selfish design, but more vicious than partiality, or weakness when facing temptations or threats.\(^{64}\) Therefore it is immoral to cure acute anger by unleashing it for taking revenge, and it is also psychologically inadvisable because anger and revenge, as Turnbull points out, ‘when their end is accomplished, what else is it but a short-lived relaxation from the most tormenting pain, which is quickly followed by remorse and just fears?’\(^{65}\)

The suggested cures for anger also depend on the guise under which it is represented in various discourses, but one consensual way to avoid anger as a violent passion is preventive: one should have ‘well regulated affections’ which can save us from vice, the mind’s ‘greatest enemy, as well as debaser’ and which can keep ‘its health and peace’.\(^{66}\) Thus anger, considered as a psychological problem, can be prevented if we ‘strengthen as much as possible, by frequent Meditation and Reflection, the calm Desires’.\(^{67}\) An alternative route could lead through

\[t\]he love of God, as it is the sovereign remedy of all miseries, so, in particular, it effectually prevents all the bodily disorders the passions introduce, by keeping the passions themselves within due bounds; and, by the unspeakable joy, and perfect calm, serenity and tranquility it gives the mind, becomes the most powerful of all the means of health and long life.\(^{68}\)

Preventing anger is the best way of avoiding all the unwelcome consequences of this condition, and it also has the side effect of strengthening the mind and body in general.

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\(^{65}\) Turnbull, *Principles* 1: 195

\(^{66}\) Ibidem.

\(^{67}\) Hutcheson, *Essay* 111.

\(^{68}\) Cheyne, *Treatise* 135.
If prevention proves to be unsuccessful, then some rational reflection can help in acute cases, at least in Hutcheson’s understanding. Given that anger is a self-centred passion, it can be cured if one realises that it often arises from a ‘partial View of publick Goods’, i.e. a biased misrepresentation of intentions, actions and their consequences.⁶⁹ If put in the proper light, it becomes apparent that anger typically arises from ‘ignorance or accident’:⁷⁰ if we ‘force our Minds to examine the real Springs of the resented Actions’⁷¹ and contemplate our selfish passions by giving ‘just ideas of their objects’,⁷² we will find, more often than not, that the action giving rise to our anger is not due to malice but to ‘selfish Temper’ for which the author of the action is to be pitied rather than hated, as it is ‘really more pernicious to himself than to others’.⁷³ Thus the reasons for anger largely disappear if the action that gives rise to it is contemplated from a broader, moral point of view.

Mead is more interested in chronic and pathological cases for which he suggests both psychological and medical treatment. From the medical angle the task is to reduce increased circulation, because the right treatment requires the ‘disorderly motion of the animal spirits […] to be calmed’. This can be achieved by blood-letting, blisters, setons or the cooling of the head, but in more severe cases taking medication like myrrh, galbanum, camphor or niter can also be suggested. As for its psychological treatment, Mead suggests not to investigate the causes of anger, quite the contrary: the patient should turn his attention to ‘thoughts directly contrary to those, which possessed it [i.e., the mind] before’ in order to bring his mind out of the state of anger.⁷⁴

The emphasis in all these suggestions falls on therapies and techniques that could foster a physiological and affective equilibrium in individuals that live in a social world of conflicting interests and aspirations that provides ample occasions for anger. Coleman’s point about the enlightenment debates on anger on the Continent can be driven home in the Scottish context as well: these theories directly relate to practical issues about the range of behaviours that are compatible with a cohesive society, about how people respond to one another, and how they understand themselves.⁷⁵ The therapies that facilitate the maintenance of a harmonious inner world serve the purpose of peaceful

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69 Hutcheson, *Essay* 76 see also 126.
72 Hutcheson, “Reflections” 104.
75 Coleman, *Anger* 29.
and virtuous social coexistence. From this perspective, physiological, psychological and sociological diagnoses are subservient to, and are unified with, moral, social and sometimes religious agendas.

5 Anger as Natural and Virtuous

It is precisely the awareness of the social and religious significance of anger that eventually leads to a more balanced account of the phenomenon in several authors. Despite the overwhelming negative rhetoric of anger as a disease, mental disorder, vice and threat to the sociability of mankind, the very same authors are frequently sensitive to the function of anger in society and in God’s creation.

In his *Treatise of Human Nature*, David Hume discusses anger as a natural ingredient of human affective constitution. He is not concerned with an evaluative account of anger as a vice or as a threat to society; instead he provides a naturalistic and phenomenological account of how anger is related to other passions, what role it plays in the motivation of action, and what its functions are in the context of human coexistence. For Hume, moderate anger is a normal and necessary part of our moral constitution:

> We are not, however, to imagine, that all the angry passions are vicious, tho’ they are disagreeable. There is a certain indulgence due to human nature in this respect. Anger and hatred are passions inherent in our very frame and constitution. The want of them, on some occasions, may even be a proof of weakness and imbecility. And where they appear only in a low degree, we not only excuse them because they are natural; but even bestow our applauses on them, because they are inferior to what appears in the greatest part of mankind.\(^76\)

Maybe because Hume primarily aspires to a naturalistic theory, and he has no normative moral commitments that precede his descriptive account of human nature,\(^77\) he refrains from a condemning tone on anger. As a consequence, he does not see a problem with communicating anger, just like any other passion,

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\(^76\) Hume, *Treatise* 3.3.3.7.

\(^77\) Or at least normative moral content is derivative in Hume’s descriptive and explanatory enterprise. See Demeter, “Morals before Objectivity”.
via sympathy: unlike for Kames and Smith, anger for Hume is a passion whose communication ‘takes place among animals, no less than among men’.\textsuperscript{78}

Hume is not alone with this insight: Hutcheson and Turnbull are even more detailed in explaining the potentially positive role anger plays in the context of human sociability. The core idea, as Hutcheson puts it, is that ‘[o]ur Anger itself is a necessary Piece of Management, by which every pernicious Attempt is made dangerous to its Author.’\textsuperscript{79} This idea is also implicit in the passage from Hume quoted above, but Turnbull explains it in greater detail in terms of its teleological, one could almost say: evolutionary, function. For him anger is a useful ‘instinct’ that is ‘in reality the necessary operation of self-defence’. Anger in its primary form is ‘momentary’, it is a reaction against ‘natural evil’ or someone’s intention to harming us. As such it operates without reason, and it should be so because without government there is no time to deliberate when ‘sudden resistance is the only security’.\textsuperscript{80}

Reason itself can give rise to a different kind of anger when contemplating injustice. This kind of anger is a reaction to ‘moral evil’, and in this sense it has ‘an inseparable connexion with the sense of virtue’, because it is a desire of having the vice punished—and it is, as Turnbull warns us, is ‘by no means malice’. In this sense anger is not at all a threat to society, quite the contrary: ‘it is one of the common bonds by which society is held together: a fellow-feeling which each individual has in behalf of the whole species, as well as of himself.’\textsuperscript{81} This moral anger is however weaker than the natural because the latter is induced by harm intended towards ourselves, and our regard for ourselves are much greater than our regard for society or mankind.

Thus anger for Turnbull is a phenomenon with many faces. It is true that it is a medical and psychological condition, a fever that corrupts the mind, and it is also an evil passion that must be constrained, but at the same time, it is a natural means of self defence under the relevant social circumstances (i.e. without central government), and in its higher form can even be genuinely moral—and taken as such it is a genuine virtue and not a vice. Moral anger, however, is not a selfish passion, it arises from the violation of public good, and its aim is not taking revenge but due punishment.

Although Turnbull’s account is evolutionary in the sense that it explains why and how anger is necessary for survival and the moral stability of society, it is thought to function under the auspices of divine providence. Turnbull

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{78} Hume, \textit{Treatise} 2.2.12.6.
\item \textsuperscript{79} Hutcheson, \textit{Essay} 119.
\item \textsuperscript{80} Turnbull, \textit{Principles} 2: 764–765.
\item \textsuperscript{81} Turnbull, \textit{Principles} 2: 765.
\end{itemize}
alludes to God’s design by emphasizing that there is a ‘reason and end’ for which ‘men was made liable to this passion’, namely ‘to prevent and remedy […] injury’. For Hutcheson, too, anger is part of human nature due to divine contrivance, and as such it responds to the needs of living in a society of conflicting interests arising from the self-love of individuals. Under such circumstances ‘[t]here could not […] be a wiser contrivance to refrain injuries than to make every mortal some way formidable to an unjust invader, by such a violent passion.’ Anger has thus found a way from the discourses of a disease and vice to the discourse on the signs of divine providence.

6 Conclusion

Anger is a phenomenon that travelled back and forth between various discourses on human nature in the Scottish Enlightenment. As Thomas Dixon have pointed out, the concepts and categories of these discourses, in our case ‘passions’, ‘affections’, ‘self-love’ and so on, are common currencies of physiology, moral philosophy and theology. Due to the common conceptual resources, these disciplines not only studied the same phenomena, but they discussed them in the same language, and as a consequence they drove toward a unified account. Thus anger is a ranging fever, but as such it was not only a physiological and psychological phenomenon, but it also had moral significance as a violent passion, which quickly turned into a vice disagreeable to God and society.

Cheyne is perhaps an ideal example of integrating all these aspects in a single account: he conceives of anger as an acute disease, avoiding it is a moral obligation, a duty toward ourselves, and the love of God is its best preventive cure. But even those not dwelling on all aspects of anger are aware of the various contexts in which the same language is applied. Turnbull, for one, seems to be equally well versed in the physiological, psychological, moral and religious discourses of anger, and paints a fairly balanced picture of it, albeit hardly discussing its physiological facets. But the same language is spoken by those not especially sensitive to the moral and religious implications of physiological processes, like Cullen.

82 Ibidem.
83 Hutcheson, Essay 46.
Anger is thus a phenomenon through which a remarkable conceptual unity among early modern disciplines of human functioning can be illustrated. Due to this unity various aspects of human functioning had been represented as aspects of an organized unity. One consequence of this representation was the increasing tendency of naturalizing the spiritual, moral and psychological aspects of human beings by showing the physiological correlate of these aspects. For most authors the proper significance and meaning of this naturalization was revealed in the context of Newtonian natural theology: by exploring the various aspects of the human frame and their interconnections the design and intentions of God could be explored. Mead illustrates this stance clearly; he thinks that his naturalizing project should not erode belief in divine power, as it is not less ‘manifested by the cure of the most grievous diseases, performed in an instant at his command; than by the expulsion of evil spirits’. Restoring ‘firmness and flexibility to relaxed and contracted nerves’ or ‘changing the properties of the elements’ testify both God’s omnipotence and presence in the world.85

At the same time, the continuity of these discourses also provided an inspiration in the opposite direction, namely that of secularisation. In the present context, Hume and Cullen are interested in naturalisation without aspiring for religious consequences. Hume made explicit the epistemological reasons of his refusal to extend the conclusions of either moral or natural philosophy to implications on transcendent matters: our cognitive apparatus is so limited that we cannot expect epistemic benefits from such inquiries.86 Hume’s ideas influenced Cullen’s methodology and metaphysics for chemistry and physiology, and as a possible consequence he also refrained from drawing moral or religious conclusions from natural inquiry.87 This reluctance is reflected in the telling irony in his explorations of the possible causes and treatments of gout. Although Cullen also mentions the ‘passions of the mind’ among the occasional causes of gout, he refuses to speculate on possible therapies in this case, because ‘[h]ow they are to be avoided I must leave to the philosophers, or, if you will, to the divines.’88

85 Mead, “Medica Sacra” 443.
Hume sees the role of his descriptive anatomy of human nature quite distinct from that of the normative discourse of the moralist, and Cullen similarly, but in a more reserved tone, separates his physiology from the questions of normative ethics and theology. Thus despite the language they share with those forging a common framework for human phenomena from natural philosophy to theology, Hume and Cullen turn away from normative and religious connotations of the study of human phenomena. By distancing the discourses of anger and other passions from theological considerations, they implicitly challenged the foundations of conceptual unity. Thus beside the conceptual unity of the discourses of anger, the tendencies to dissolve this unity and the drive toward disciplinary differentiation received a crucial impetus.

Selected Bibliography

PART 3

Anger in Literary Discourses: Epic and Drama
1 Introduction

Aeneas is an angry man. Or so, at least, he might appear to the reader, who is left astonished after having shared the hero's company for about 10,000 lines of verse of Augustan epic poetry, of which the first ca. 9,990 showed the man developing into a hero (virum) who takes great pains not to have his personal emotions interfere with whatever the gods might have in store for the greater fate of a Roman Empire yet to come.1 This, of course, is an oversimplification of the one great master narrative our Western civilization has besides the Bible. It is, however, the overall impression that two millennia of Virgil’s exegetes, admirers and apologists had to cope with once they had come across the idea that what Aeneas does in the last eight verses of the epic by slaying the already defeated Turnus after a fair duel severely damages most of what he had done, or not done, before. Virgilian scholarship, past and present, then found more instances of the hero succumbing to ira and other negative affects at the cost of his pietas.2 Over the decades, these readings of Virgil have encountered

2 Although not within the scope of this contribution, it should be mentioned that a significant starting point for discussions of Aeneas’ anger in Virgil’s epic has, for some time, come from the so-called “Harvard School” which claimed to perceive two distinct “voices” in the Aeneid: a “public” one celebrating the establishment of what would be the starting point of Augustan imperium, and a private one mourning the destruction and suffering inflicted on any person or people standing in its way. Soon, particular attention was given to Aeneas’ acts of ira and furor which supposedly shed a negative light on his otherwise praised pietas. Parry A., “The Two Voices of Virgil’s Aeneid”, Arion 2 (1963) 66–80 was crucial to the establishment of this line of interpretation for the Aeneid. The studies of Boyle A.J., “The Meaning of the Aeneid: A Critical Inquiry”, Ramus 1 (1972) 63–90 and Putnam M.C.J., “Pius’ Aeneas and the Metamorphosis of Lausus”, Arethusa 14 (1981) 139–156 focussed on Aeneas’ ira and furor as a starting point for revising Virgil’s conception of his hero. Boyle puts particular emphasis on the tenth book, where he sees Aeneas as not living up to the demands of pietas and falling
criticism: according to Galinsky, even to this day scholars have regularly walked into a sort of trap laid out by the early Christian writers and humanist critics of the *Aeneid*, who had exclusively applied the moderation of Stoic philosophy or Christian *clementia* to the epic and its hero’s actions.\(^3\) Galinsky interprets Aeneas’ behaviour in the final scene of the *Aeneid* against the background not only of the epic’s wider context,\(^4\) but also of a broader bandwidth of philosophical schools and traditions which would have been accessible to Virgil,\(^5\)

\[\text{back into the fury and anger that characterized him when still at Troy (67–68). Adding to that, "[b]ook 12 […] presents clearly an unambiguously collapse of the imperial ideology." (69) Putnam takes the same direction when he states that, with Lausus, Aeneas slays a man who is presented as a specimen of the very *pietas* he himself is supposed to show (145–146) and that *ira* is the fuel of the final scene (153–154). This theory is far from being universally accepted. Still, a shadow has been cast on the *Aeneid* that will hardly be removed any time soon and that pervades a lot of specialized studies on Virgil. Cf. e.g. Adler E., *Vergil’s Empire* (Oxford: 2003), who argues that the *Aeneid* stages a struggle between Epicurean philosophy as the actually more favourable and valid philosophical doctrine and the necessities of exercising power on the inhabitants of the Roman Empire, which would be undermined by Epicurean truth. More or less recent comprehensive criticism of the “voices” in the *Aeneid* can be found in Minson R.A., “A Century of Extremes: Debunking the Myth of Harvard School Pessimism”, *Iris* 16–17 (2003–4) 46–53, who disapproves of the term “Harvard School”, and Holzberg N., *Vergil. Der Dichter und sein Werk* (Munich: 2006) 60–61. Scholarship on the slaying of Turnus has been summarized by Burnell P., “The Death of Turnus and Roman Morality”, *Greece & Rome* 34 (1987) 186–200. This critical stance towards literature that is supposed to support Western imperialistic ideology is echoed, among others, in Waswo R., *The Founding Legend of Western Civilization: From Virgil to Vietnam* (Hanover: 1997), who, although sometimes overstretched his point to virtually every aspect of Western cultural history, quite convincingly traces the story of a steady civilizing urge to the West maiming all indigenous culture standing in its way as the basic narrative of occidental culture, cf. ibid. 3–63. Analogous to Waswo’s findings, Kallendorf C., *The Other Virgil: Pessimistic Readings of the Aeneid in Early Modern Culture* (Oxford: 2007) 77–100 shows a critical stance towards imperialism in Ercilla’s *La Araucana*.

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3 Galinsky K., “The Anger of Aeneas”, *The American Journal of Philology* 109 (1988) 321–348, 322: “The one-sided use of Stoic doctrine as the only criterion is as unsatisfactory as the opposite pole of the recent scholarly debate, i.e., the argument for ‘moral ambiguity.’”

4 Galinsky, “Anger” 323–325 takes into consideration the *Aeneid’s* own mechanics and grid of moral prerequisites.

5 Galinsky, “Anger” 326–328 discusses the rhetorical and jurisdictional tradition with an emphasis on the concept of δικαία ὀργή. He shows that Aeneas’ action in the final scene of the *Aeneid* is in accordance with how any philosophical school, be it Platonic, Aristotelian, Epicurean or Stoic, would have evaluated the situation (329–340). Only in orthodox Stoicism would slaying Turnus as an act of *ira* have been reproachable, but, according to Galinsky, in that philosophical tradition it would also have been wrong to show *clementia* by leaving an opponent alive who obviously deserves death, thus resulting in a paradox.
and offers a new evaluation of the hero’s moral conduct, in which ‘his impassioned action can be considered as unequivocally moral.’

Renaissance humanist neo-Latin poets were not so lucky to have access to Galinsky’s elucidating paper, but had to deal with precisely that critical tradition inherited from the Church Fathers that modern philology succeeded in doing away with. The unleashing or constraining of Aeneas’ anger, as viewed by humanists, forms the basis of two substantial contributions Craig Kallendorf made to understanding the reception of potential ambiguities in the hero’s character. In his 1989 book *In Praise of Aeneas*, Kallendorf shows that the epideictic view of poetic narratives, which was derived from humanist rhetoric, was the dominant perspective on the *Aeneid* for most humanists. He bases his findings not only on theoretical writings by humanists such as Boccaccio and Salutati, who claimed that poetry in general and epic in particular must praise the virtuous and condemn the vicious by making the former achieve victory and the latter suffer defeat, but also illustrates his findings with humanist poetry that has adapted these theoretical views. Given these recommendations, it would have been obvious for a humanist (court) poet, even if he lacked aspirations of imitation and emulation concerning the classical models, why epic was the proper choice for the deeds of “his” prince and vice versa.

As Kallendorf shows, the poets were quite conscious of the fact that Aeneas

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8 The former of which, as Kallendorf, *Praise* 67 states, followed Petrarch in “a conception of rhetoricized poetry that embraces epideictic rhetoric.” Even before the cited theorists, Petrarch had betrayed doubts concerning the *Aeneid’s* succinctly epideictic design by separating, in his *Africa*, the literary, Virgilian Dido from the historical one, while at the same time modelling the character of Sophonisba on Virgil’s Dido (he does not make her Scipio’s lover, however) cf. ibid. 41–48.

9 For Kallendorf, *Praise* 21, Scipio Africanus in Petrarch’s *Africa* is a case where the epideictic technique humanists saw at work in the character of Aeneas was made even more explicit.

10 On epic as the literary genre worthy of rulers, cf. also Hardison, *Monument* 71–84.
could hardly be the perfectly virtuous hero while slaying the already defeated Turnus who is begging for mercy.11 Thus for example Maffeo Vegio, in his supplemental thirteenth book to the *Aeneid*, which found wide acclaim from contemporary and later humanists, took great pains to mend this moral flaw in that he shows Aeneas as a benign conqueror and the Rutuli as deserving losers who admit their own defeat.12 As an addition, somewhat counterbalancing his findings in the first book, Kallendorf published *The Other Virgil*, where he presents examples of neo-Latin (and later vernacular) epic poetry that actually did not try to mend the moral ambiguity established by the *Aeneid* and its humanist critics,13 but embraced it as a means to provide subversive undertones to their own narratives. The foremost Latin example of this strand of tradition is Francesco Filelfo’s (1398–1481) *Sphortias*,14 an epic poem for Francesco Sforza that, originally intended as laudatory, Filelfo never succeeded in finishing and which mirrors the poet’s ambivalent relationship to Sforza and Milan. Kallendorf’s reading of the epic’s third book, which treats the battle and sacking of Piacenza in 1447, shows how the author adapts the moral failure (to restrain *ira* and *furor*) of the classical model to Sforza’s failure in controlling his mercenaries’ rage against the sacked city, which resulted in mass looting and rape. This hit Filelfo’s hero where it hurt, i.e., his core competency as a military leader.15

11 Cf. also, among others, Giovanni Pontano, who in his treatise *De morali disciplina* states: ‘Quamobrem iratus aliquis, aut fervoris stimulis percitus, virum fortrem praestare nequit.’ Cited in Kallendorf, *Other Virgil* 43f.

12 Kallendorf, *Praise* 100–117. The opening scene of the supplement is directly connected to the last verses of the *Aeneid* and shows an Aeneas whose anger and rage have ceased altogether. He speaks to the Rutuli, not only affirming that his *furor* has disappeared, but also arguing that it was their rage that brought his vengeance upon them. Cf. Vegio, *Liber XIII* 30–1 and 46–8. In another speech, Drances acknowledges Turnus’ *furor* as the reason for his defeat (cf. ibid. 41f). A reprise of his analysis of Vegio can be found in Kallendorf, *Other Virgil* 41–42.

13 In this vein, there is also a remarkable shift towards rehabilitating Turnus as a hero who can manage his anger, cf. Kallendorf, *Other Virgil* 48f.

14 The poem is not preserved as a whole in one manuscript and remains unedited, though an *editio princeps* is nearing completion by Jeroen de Keyser whom I thank for this information. Diana Robin edited the third book for her study *Filelfo in Milan. Writings 1451–1477* (Princeton: 1991), on which Kallendorf’s analysis is also based.

15 Kallendorf, *Other Virgil* 54–55 argues that in the sack of Piacenza, “*furor* (‘rage’), *ira* (‘anger’) and *rabies* (‘madness’), the negative value-words from the *Aeneid* are associated with the Milanese […].” Although Filelfo at first appears to try and detach Sforza from the moral failings of his troops, “[i]n the end, then, he is a flawed leader, bound to his troops and their ‘impietas’ at the same time as he grieves at their excesses.” Kallendorf builds
Unfortunately, there has been hardly any further scholarship on this important aspect, both in terms of the reception of Virgil in humanist literature as well as of the literary strategies of panegyric humanist poetry. In what follows I will try to shed light particularly on the practical applications of the humanists’ attitude towards epic anger in the panegyric epic poetry of the fifteenth century, thereby of course drawing on the valuable contributions made by past scholarship on the topic, while nonetheless adding a crucial aspect to it.

There is, in Kallendorf’s important findings, a notable gap between the fact that fifteenth-century humanists generally considered Aeneas’ anger as something to cope with and the very particular case of one humanist whose frustrated professional ambitions and insults to his person made him exploit the—actual or supposed—subversive undertones of the raging epic hero for his personal intellectual revenge. In panegyric epics, which formed one or the major part of Latin epic poetry in the Quattrocento, there was in fact ample space to have the hero or other characters show anger, either to an appropriate measure or in such an excessive way as to deliberately taint the epic decorum, and thus comment on the political events of which the particular epic tells.

This paper is meant to fill that gap for fifteenth-century panegyric epic. I want to focus on three major panegyric epics of the fifteenth century that, each in its own way, use displays of anger to comment on the events described and to guide the reader’s assessment of (then) contemporary history. By doing so, a both supplemental and complementary perspective may be added to Kallendorf’s findings and broaden our view towards seeing literary depictions of anger as an important and effective poetic device.

It should, however, be taken into consideration that there is a substantial difference between the literary characters of the classical model as embodied by Aeneas and the heroes of panegyric epics in the Quattrocento: the latter existed as real and visible persons of political import at the same time the epics were published.\footnote{Cf. the short and striking assessment of Tissoni Benvenuti that “il virgilio quattrocentesco” was rather “poeta di corte di Enea” than of Augustus, cf. Tissoni Benvenuti A., “La letteratura dinastico-encomiastica a Milano nell’età degli Sforza”, \textit{Publications du Centre Européen d’Etudes Bourguignonnes (xivè–xviè s.)} 28 (1988) 195–205, here 195.} Therefore, their actions in epic poetry were first and foremost evaluated by the rules and conventions of poetic probability, albeit not

\footnote{upon Diana Robin’s study that shows convincingly that the \textit{Sphortias’} description of the sack of Piacenza in 1447 was far from being an advertisement for Sforza’s abilities as a captain (67–81). Robin does not connect these findings to the moral ambiguities of the \textit{Aeneid}, which she nonetheless considers the main model for the \textit{Sphortias}.}
exclusively so: the epic narratives condensed and rearranged real-world political events, without, for the most part, literally reproducing them. So, while the actual depictions of the hero having an angry outburst might resemble that of a Homeric or Virgilian character, the reasons for and consequences of this anger were tied back to a political and diplomatic framework. The characters’ actions were also to be evaluated against the backdrop of (medieval) conventions of princely behaviour, conventions according to which anger was not per se a moral flaw, but, as a prerogative of the ruling class, could at times be a just device for exercising power. In discussing high and late-medieval conceptions of rulers’ public displays of anger, Stephen D. White stresses the strong link between lordly anger and political consequences, thereby implying that a ruler’s anger cannot be considered just if the ruler lacks the means to have his outburst followed by political (i.e., often, military) consequences. Therefore, the literary depiction of someone’s anger is a cornerstone of the general evaluation of that person’s character.

Harnessing Anger or Succumbing to it? The *ira* of Sigismondo Malatesta and King Alfonso in Basinio’s *Hesperis*

As for literary representations of anger management, one of the most notoriously ill-tempered and bad-mannered human beings of the Quattrocento is also the hero of our first epic: Sigismondo Malatesta. Rashness and disloyalty in his political relationships won him an *aere perennius* by Pius II; one entire

17 Rosenwein B., “Introduction”, in eadem (ed.), *Anger’s Past. The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca – London: 1998) 1–6, here 5: ‘Thus anger in the Latin West had a privileged place: it was a sin, but a sin that could be turned into a virtue, monopolized by an aristocracy.’

18 White S.D., “The Politics of Anger”, in Rosenwein B. (ed.), *Anger’s Past. The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages* (Ithaca – London: 1998) 127–152, 150–151: ‘[…] between displays of anger and uses of force against others there is often a gap that must be filled with more than the violent personality of the eleventh-century knight. The gap usually includes a lot of time, a lot of planning […]. In other words, anger and acts that we would probably classify as violent are mediated by political processes that are marked by displays of emotion and colored by emotion talk but are not reducible to emotions or expressions of emotional impulses.’

19 White, “The Politics” 150: ‘Representing another person’s anger is never a neutrally descriptive or politically neutral act […]. Whether or not all writers viewed anger in the same way, they took it for granted there were conventions about what forms it could take and how and when it should be displayed.’
chapter of abuse in his *Commentaries*, where Malatesta is characterised, next to being a rapist, murderer, thief, sodomist, blasphemer, traitor and overall scoundrel, as *quietis impatiens* and entirely given to his most basic instincts, be it greed, bloodlust or sexual desire.\(^{20}\)

Not surprisingly, Basinio da Parma (1425–1457), Sigismondo’s chief court poet from 1449 on, draws a very different image of his lord and patron. Virtually any inquiry on humanist panegyric epic needs to start with Basinio’s *Hesperis*. This oft-cited (but seldom read) Latin poem of about 7,000 lines of verse praising Basinio’s employer, Sigismondo Malatesta of Rimini, was probably written before 1455, but certainly earlier than 1457, when the poet died an untimely death at the age of 32. It marks the first and also one of the most elaborate attempts at a synthesis of classicising Virgilian and Homeric epic, including a full-scale apparatus of pagan deities with a narrative treatment of recent political and military events.\(^{21}\)


Basinio stages Sigismondo’s services as mercenary leader for changing (and interchangeable) employers as a veritable clash of civilizations between the one Italian people and a multitude of barbarian tribes led by the Aragonese king. By its own standards, one of the poem’s main achievements is that it succeeds in presenting its hero on the same political rank as the leaders of the major powers in fifteenth-century Italy, particularly Alfonso of Aragon. It does not admit that originally, in 1447, Sigismondo was supposed to be employed by Alfonso as a condottiere; then, after the contract had already been signed, he shifted loyalties towards Florence and, worst of all, never refunded Alfonso the 16,000 ducats he had received in advance (half of the condotta agreed upon).

To detach the epic’s narrative from petty day-to-day diplomacy and multilateral politics, Basinio introduces diffuse anger as the fuel behind conflict and discord in Italy:

Indomitum quae causa lacessere martem
suasit, et amborum populos, aeterna subegit
exercere odia, ac tantas consurgere in iras?

What reason led them to provoke war and induced both peoples to exercise their neverending hate, and to rise to such anger?
(Basinio, Hesperis 1,8–10)

Hinc fluere urgenti semper discordia fato
longius, et stimulus agitatae ingentibus irae
misceri, totisque furor crebrescere terris,
Romanosque duces vani indignantur Iberi
extremas populasse plagas;

Thence discord oozed ever forth, driven by fate, merged with whipped-up anger, and fury spreading all over the earth, and the Spaniards resented the Roman leaders pushing on to the furthest lands.
(Basinio, Hesperis 1,16–20)

most attention. The only edition is Basinio da Parma, Opera praestantiora (Rimini, Typographia Albertiniana: 1794).

Basinio’s main application of *ira*, though, is in shaping the characters of the main protagonists. After having established their basic equality in political import, one of Basinio’s means of underlining Sigsimondo’s moral (and general) superiority is, next to a complex narrative of divine interventions, the depiction of how the two leaders deal with anger. Aside from the general mood in Basinio’s description of Italy, *ira* comes into play almost exclusively when Sigismondo and/or Alfonso enter the stage. In a duel scene that is clearly modeled on the final fight between Aeneas and Turnus in the *Aeneid* (and even more clearly never actually took place), Sigismondo shows *ira*, though rather as a source of energy he can switch on and off, and this capability actually allows him to inflict the decisive blows on Alfonso.

non ipse caduco
ense, nec amissis juvenis deterritus armis
saevior ingreditur pugnam, et se se horridus ira
suscitat, ac Regem dextra petit alta minantem
vulnera; tum manibus perstringit guttura junctis,
nunc galeam tenet, et conum premit; ille nec auras
nec caelum potuit captis haurire sub armis,
sed trahitur manibus Sismundi digna potentis
praeda, sed attonitus dubiis effatur in umbris.

Deterred neither by his fallen sword, nor by the loss of his armour, the young man enters battle even fiercer, and arouses himself, terrible with rage, and attacks the king with his bare hand, threatening to inflict deep wounds; then he chokes his throat with joint hands, holds his helmet and presses it down; the king, in his captured armour, can neither lift himself up nor gasp for air, and is drawn by the hands of mighty Sigismondo as a deserving prey, and speaks atoned in doubtful shadows. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 1,625–633)

The *umbrae* with which the quotation ends are another reminiscence of the *Aeneid*, whose last verse actually ends in *umbras*. The mere fact that the epic continues beyond this point connects Basinio’s depiction of Sigismondo’s *ira* to the humanist discourse on ambivalence at the end of the *Aeneid*, which culminated in supplements like Vegio’s thirteenth book. Basinio thus gives his hero the opportunity to surpass Aeneas by leaving his opponent alive, whereas Aeneas’ *ira* makes him kill Turnus.

23 Vergil, *Aeneis* 12,952.
Just as Sigismondo can summon himself to anger and rage, he is able to turn it off, if needed. As a result of divine conspiracy, reminiscent of the events in Iliad’s fourth book,\textsuperscript{24} the hero is pierced by an arrow, which invalidates the previous agreement of settling the conflict by single combat. Although he is the main victim of what appears as perjury, he restrains his troops who are enraged by the events.

\begin{quote}
Desinite, ac differte minas, iramque sequacem ponite dum redeant vires, dum tela lacertus saucius hic vibret, qui vulnere pressus acerbo me prohibet victum violato in foedere regem huc huc ante duces mediis subducere Celtis.
\end{quote}

Let go of the threats, leave them for another time, and put down the tenacious anger, until our powers return, until this wounded arm will throw spears again, that now, stricken with a wound, hinders me from tearing the defeated king, defeated in his own perjury, right from the middle of his Celts hither before the leaders of ours. (Basinio, \textit{Hesperis} 2,12–18)

After being healed by Paeon on Apollo’s request, Sigismondo can prove his mastery of \textit{ira} once more, when he summons it again as an instrument of warfare:

\begin{quote}
Obstupuit visis Pandulphi maxima proles, ardet in arma magis, totamque in proelia mentem arrigit, et curis manifesta subire deorum maxima coepta ratus, multa se suscitat ira, exsuperatque animis ingentibus; […]

talis in Alphonsum regem Pandulphius heros aestuat ingenti furiarum flumine et ira terribilis, […]
\end{quote}

Pandolfo’s great offspring, stupefied at what he sees, is ardently willing to fight, and puts all his mind to the battle, and, deeming it the greatest of endeavours to obey the gods’ workings, he arouses himself to great anger, and by enormous courage he prevails; […] thus (sc. like a wounded lion after having recovered) the hero, son of Pandolfo, is inflamed by the

\textsuperscript{24} Homer, \textit{Ilias} 3,85–4,100.
massive stream of furies and terrible with anger against King Alfonso, [...]. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 2,295–306)

Haec dum cuncta gerunt Itali, Celtaeque superbi, interea Ausonidum ductor fortissimus arma induit, ingentesque animos attollit, et iram.

While all this is being done by the Italians and the proud Celts, the valiant leader of the Ausonian people grasps his weapons, and lets his spirit rise, as well as his anger. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 2,479–481)

With the liberation of the besieged Piombino in 1448 and the Aragonese escape by sea, the first of two decisive battles that form the narrative backbone of the *Hesperis* has been won. After a lengthy intermission, which among other episodes sees Sigismondo sail westward to the Elysian fields in order to meet his deceased father on a descent into the underworld, war breaks out again. The main opponent has changed (now it is Alfonso’s son Ferdinand in charge of the Aragonese troops), while Sigismondo’s mastery of *ira* has not.

nec minus Ausonidum ductor fortissimus arma induit, irarumque animis permittit habenas.

[...] haud secus Ausonidum ductori fervida gliscit ira super magno Pherinante [...].

The leader of the Ausonians puts on his arms, as well, and allows his mind some anger. [...] Thus (like a lion) hot anger against great Ferdinand bursts out in the Ausonian leader [...]. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 12,3–12)

The divine actors of the *Hesperis* are also assessing Sigismondo’s *ira* as morally justifiable and, moreover, as a necessary instrument of his campaign: Jupiter speaks of Sigismondo as the last in a lineage of Roman heroes both mythical and historical.

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25 Thereby fitting perfectly within the findings of Waswo, *Virgil*.
27 Basinio, *Hesperis* 12,3–12. There are several more occasions in which Sigismondo’s anger is displayed in a very similar fashion, too many to account for here. Cf. e.g. 12,251–3 and 404–6.
nec non Pandulphius heros
Hectoreus ductor, patris Sismundus in armis,
qui pius infestos detrudere litore Iberos
Tyrheno, justa juvenis contendit in ira.

And especially our young hero, son of Pandolfo, a leader like Hector, Sigismondo wearing his father’s arms, he, who dutifully strives to chase away the troublesome Spaniards from the Tyrrhenian shore in righteous anger. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 12,3–12)

This is not the only case of Sigismondo’s *ira* being marked as *iusta*. This phrase, that goes back to Lucanus’ *Pharsalia*, and beyond that, to the classical concept of δικαία δργή, sets Sigismondo’s anger even further apart from that of his enemies, such as in the case of the siege of Monteluro, where he faces Niccolo Piccinino:

Non tulit aerias scandentem maximus arces
dux Pandulphiades, totamque in proelia mentem
arrigit, ac justas animis immiscuit iras
[…].

The great leader, son of Pandolfo, could’t bear the sight of the enemy climbing the lofty stronghold, and he directs all his mind to the battle, mixing his spirit with anger. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 4,388–390)

Analogous to that, the Italians’ *ira* is that of a people righteously defending what is their own rather than an expression of moral deficiency. This can be seen when Jupiter speaks about the Aragonese army on the verge of falling victim to the vengeful rage of the people of Piombino, which is in all instances referred to as *Populonia* (the ancient Etruscan *Fufluna*) in the *Hesperis*, thereby evoking notions of primordial Italy and linking these notions to Sigismondo’s war against the *barbari*. Jupiter, as patron of that Italy, afterwards nonetheless sends Apollo to save King Alfonso.

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28 Lucanus, *Pharsalia* 8,234, in a letter by Pompey, regarding the Roman’s desire for vengeance after the defeat of Carrhae.

Phoebe, genus nostrum, Latonae ac lucida proles, quae fuga jam, victis patuisset libera Celtis?
Ni premat a tergo justas Populonia in iras gens accensa, gravi dudumque obsessa tumultu, barbarae cui patrios pulsabat machina muros.

Phoebus, shining offspring of Latona's and my kin, what flight would still have been open to the defeated Celts? If only the people of Populonia did not thrust onward from behind, inflamed with righteous anger, after long siege and conflict, that saw its city walls smashed by barbarian machinery. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 3,376–380)

Alfonso, on the other hand, also has to face anger several times. But, unlike Sigismondo, he seems unable to gain control of it. Rather, it makes him appear a powerless victim of the events and, sometimes, the caricature of a physically furious person, e.g., in the battle of Piombino:

Tantus in obsessos heros Taraconius hostes fertur, ut ira graves animis immiscuit ignes felle tumente jecur, furiisque aspersus amaris terribilem rutilo succensus lumine frontem evolat, et nebulis, et pulveris obrutus umbris, […]

Thus the hero from Tarragona is swept against the besieged, as anger inflames his mind, and bile makes his liver swell, and he rushes imbued with bitter fury, terrible to behold with a red face, covered with steam and dust, […]. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 2,341–345)

Tum vero Alphonsus subitas exarsit in iras, rursus in arma magis fremit, indignansque furenti corde tumet, fortesque volans impingit Iberos moenibus:

Then Alfonso, burst in anger that had suddenly come unto him, lets his urge to fight resound again, his heart swelling angrily, and hastily makes the brave Spaniards clash against the walls. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 2,441–444)

Similarly, Alfonso is raging after he has been informed of Sigismondo's journey to the west.
At ferus indomito languentia corda furore tunditur, et varias Alphonsus inardet in iras, tristia perpetuis absumens pectora curis.

But he is wildly stricken with untamed fury in his sore heart, and is inflamed with much anger, devouring his sad soul with unending sorrows. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 7,243–245)

On other occasions, Alfonso’s anger is a straightaway symptom of defeat, such as when he is abducted from the battle of Piombino and taken to his ship and is thereby saved by Apollo, like Virgil’s Turnus by Juno:

Ipse malis turbata novis et pectora fluctu curarum ingenti perculsus, ad aethera magna voce fremens miserum subitas exarsit in iras.

Disturbed by new sorrows and his heart stricken with a flow of great dismay, he burst out in anger, that had suddenly come unto him, loudly cursing the heavens. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 3,416–418)

Later on, still on his ship, the anger won’t cease. There is, however, a striking disparity between the gnawing anger of the defeated and his utter inability to mend his situation.

[... ] victoremque omnia victo intentant simulacra, metusque iraeque pudore permixtae variant animum.

The defeated imagines the victorious everywhere, and his mind is befallen now by fear, now by anger, now by shame. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 4,5–7)

This lack of both self-control and power is presented as systemic in the literary depiction of the Aragonese army of *barbari*. Helplessness in the face of their anger is characteristic also of Alfonso’s troops, who are overwhelmed by negative affect at the mere rumour of Sigismondo’s presence:

Sed jam fama volans saevos implerat Iberos adventare ducem magnum, felicior alter quo neque in Italia praesenti marte, nec usquam.
multis quippe dolor stetit imis ossibus ardens,  
multis ira modum super addita, multus ubique  
clamor, ubique vagans agitat discordia vulgus.

But rumour had already spread quickly among the Spaniards that the  
great leader was coming, whose success was surpassed by none in the  
current Italian war, nor ever had been. Searing pain, for sure, many felt  
down to their bones, many anger beyond any measure, there was clamour  
everywhere, discord arousing the crowd. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 1,333–338)

In these cases, Alfonso and the Aragonese are befallen by *ira* suddenly (*subita*)  
or in such a way that they are unable to control the effect of the emotion on  
their minds and actions. Alfonso appears helpless in the face of his rage, nei-  
ther able to see it coming nor to harness it to heroic deeds. Sigismondo, on the  
other hand, is also beset by sudden anger, *subita ira*, yet he is able to turn the  
effect into action rather than raging along without control over his situation.  
He exhibits this control, for instance, upon hearing about the king’s “escape”  
before he finds out that it has occurred by divine force. Sigismondo’s anger is  
directed at the fact that justice cannot be done for the king’s perjury now that  
he is gone.30

Exarsere animi, subitamque accensus in iram  
magnanimus Pandulphiades vocat agmina magna  
voce tonans.

His mind burst out, inflamed with anger that had suddenly come unto  
him, and the great son of Pandolfo summons his armies resounding his  
voice loudly. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 3,447–449)

Close to the poem’s end, one of Sigismondo’s faithful captains targets the dis-  
ability of the Aragonese (as that of their king) to turn their anger into action.  
He taunts the Aragonese army for being unable to act when the right time for  
harnessing their anger to deeds of war has come.

Taracone profecti  
Italian pugnate viri! quid turribus altis

30 Additional passages presenting Alfonso’s anger in a similar fashion are 10,411–413 and  
11,190–192.
adstantes, bello totas non funditis iras?
Quo fugere minae vobis, et inania dudum
verba, leves Celtae? Quo summa potentia regis
Alphonsi? Pherinas ubi nunc?

Now, men, that you have come here from Tarragona, fight against Italy!
Why are you standing on your high towers instead of unleashing all your
anger in war? Where are your threats and empty words now, petty Celts?
Where has the great power of your King Alfonso fled? Where is Ferdinand
now? (Basinio, *Hesperis* 12.533–538)

Two other historical characters in the *Hesperis* display anger. On his ship,
Alfonso is accompanied by Apollo, who tries to soothe the king’s dismay by
telling him of Sigismondo’s earlier deeds. Back then, Sigismondo had to face
Filippo Maria Visconti, the duke of Milan, whose consternation and anger in
the face of his opponent’s military success resembled that of the king.

Nec major tuus iste dolor, quam cura Philippi
acris erat; quoties fugientes repulit hostes
magnanimus Pandulphiades, ducis atra superbo
incidit ira animo toties.

Your grief is not greater than Filippo’s sorrow was fierce; every time the
great son of Pandolfo pushed the enemy to flight, the duke’s proud mind
was befallen by anger. (Basinio, *Hesperis* 4.217–220)

Francesco Sforza, Visconti’s son-in-law and also condottiere in his service, was
Sigismondo’s opponent in the battle for Gradara in 1446. The poet tries to treat
him kindly anyway. He makes him a descendant of the sea god Phorcus, whose
vengeance is blamed for the sinking of Sigismondo’s ship in a later mythologi-
cal episode. In addition, and unlike Alfonso or Visconti, Sforza at that point in
his life is still a condottiere, whose military prowess can be praised indepen-
dently of its political ties. Moreover, at the time when the *Hesperis* was being
written, Francesco Sforza had become duke of Milan following the death of
Visconti and was now a power to reckon with. Similar to Sigismondo in his
duel with Alfonso, Sforza puts his anger to use in order to rise to battle once
again.

Sed non, Phorciades idcirco moenia pulchrae
Gradivae cessat saxo pulsare rotanti,
accenditque animum furiis, et suscitat iras terribiles, fractisque iterum se tentat in armis.

But Sforza does not cease to smash the walls of beautiful Gradara with whirling rocks, he inflames his mind with fury and arouses terrible anger within himself, and once again he tries to fight in arms already broken. (Basinio, Hesperis 5.63–66)

By condensing the complex military operations and diplomatic developments into a clash of epic heroes, Basinio renders invisible the “gap” White recognizes in literary representations between individual anger and its political consequences.31 For our analysis, one crucial observation is therefore certainly that for Sigismondo (and his “Italian” allies, though to a lesser extent), ira is an instrument available to him in crucial moments of battle, that contributes to his prowess as warrior and general, while his opponents, i.e. King Alfonso and his troops, are merely subject to ira as an emotionally destabilizing force symptomatic of their lack of self-control. History, however, begs to differ: the only outburst of rage guiding someone’s hand in a way that had an enduring political impact was Alfonso’s stern intention to make all of Italy’s powers exclude Sigismondo from the treaty of Lodi in 1454, and thus to isolate him systematically—the starting point for the decay and loss of most of what Sigismondo’s indisputable military skills had won him.32

3 Infernal vs. Righteous Anger—Federico da Montefeltro in Naldi’s Volaterrais

Naldo Naldi (1439–ca.1513)33 suffered much abuse from contemporary and modern critics for his adulatory poetry, whilst he was also little appreciated by most

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31 White, “The Politics” 150.
32 A recent compact, but still very concise, account of the complex development that led to Sigismondo Malatesta’s political isolation can be found in Turchini, I Malatesta 99–112.
of his patrons.\textsuperscript{34} One remarkable example of his professional failures as a panegyric poet at the same time bears witness to his literary talent in adapting classical models to his quickly changing encomiastic requirements: the \textit{Volaterrais}, a rather short epic in four books (ca. 1,500 lines of verse) celebrates the siege and sack of Volterra in 1472 by Federico da Montefeltro in Florence's service. The sack of Volterra is, next to that of Piacenza in 1447, which in Filelfo's \textit{Sphortias} exemplifies Francesco Sforza's failings as a military leader, the most notorious exception to the rule that sieges in the fifteenth century basically went without bloodshed and the mercenaries refrained from atrocities.\textsuperscript{35} The conflict between Volterra and Florence arose from competing economic interests—alum, a mineral then indispensable for the textile industry, had been found near Volterra and mining entrepreneurs from both cities laid claim to it—and was one of the first touchstones for Lorenzo de' Medici's position as first man in Florence.\textsuperscript{36} Lorenzo acted quite hesitantly and tried to leave the road of clemency and reconciliation open for the people of Volterra as long as possible, but in the end the conflict had to be resolved by military means.

The \textit{Volaterrais} is dedicated to Federico da Montefeltro, although Naldo Naldi was in Florentine service when he began writing it. The poet's relations with the Medici had started to cool since the death of Piero, and the \textit{Volaterrais}, although perhaps originally intended as a panegyric poem for Lorenzo, can be seen as a tentative application for the position of court poet in Urbino. Unlike Filelfo, who was present at Piacenza when the sack took place,\textsuperscript{37} Naldi was not an eyewitness to the events. He knew the details of the battle mainly from two short historic monographs by the local writers Antonio Ivani and Biagio Lisci,\textsuperscript{38} much of which he merely versified and expanded with a mythological narrative modeled upon Claudian's \textit{In Rufinum}.\textsuperscript{39} In the poem, the forces of the


\textsuperscript{35} Robin, \textit{Filelfo} 64.

\textsuperscript{36} The events are summarized with special regard to Lorenzo de’ Medici’s role by Fubini R., \textit{Quattrocento fiorentino politica diplomazia cultura} (Ospedaletto: 1996) 130–139.

\textsuperscript{37} Robin, \textit{Filelfo} 68.


\textsuperscript{39} Cf. the respective chapter in my PhD thesis (to be published in 2015) Peters C., \textit{Alte Götter – neue Helden. Mythologie und Politik im neulateinischen Epos}.
underworld, the Furies, are growing impatient with the prospering world they are forced to see, especially Florence. During a concilium inferorum they come up with the idea of disturbing serenity and happiness in the mortal world by whipping up the ira of the people of Volterra against Florence.

Hanc mihi da veniam, Cocytia virgo, roganti mortalis quisquam ne temnere numina nostra audeat atque tuos pariter ridere furores. Effice ne cives concordi pace fruantur usque Fluentini, sed tristibus undique pugnis inter se certent: Odis fera corda tumescant, ut pater, ut populus rabidas consurgat in iras.

Grant me, infernal virgin, that no mortal shall ever dare despise our divine power any more or laugh at your furies, either. Make that the people of Florence won’t ever be living in peace and harmony any more, but struggle in sorrowing battles with each other: Their hearts shall swell wildly with hate, so the father, so the people will burst into raging anger. (Naldi, Volaterrais 1,62–68)

Nec tamen abstinuit (tanta est sibi cura nocendi) quominus invisas tristissima Diva per auras sese proripiat Tyrrheni ad moenia Lydi, quominus et populum nigris suffecta venenis cogat in horrendos actum gravis ira furores.

Still the gruesome goddess wouldn’t be kept (such is her desire to harm) from rushing through the detested air to the walls of the Tyrrhenian Lydian, and have anger force its people, poisoned with black venom, into horrible rage. (Naldi, Volaterrais 1,152–6)

It is tempting to discard this narrative set-up as a mere allegory of civic discord and unrest in a classicising disguise, but the ira whose seeds are sown by the infernal actors can only be fully understood when set against that of their human opponent, Federico da Montefeltro. After several attempts at diplomacy and reconciliation by Lorenzo, the situation is basically stuck. Only when Federico is called upon as condottiere do things start to move. During the unrest instigated by the furies, an unnamed young man from Florence falls victim to the ravaging mob and his body gets brutally mutilated.40 The way in

40 Naldi, Volaterrais 3,36–40.
which his gruesome death is depicted links the incident to Virgil’s account of the brutal and insidious murder of Polydorus by the King of Thrace.41

Tum vero Urbinas iustas exarsit in iras, 
cum Florentina de nobilitate creatum 
hostibus accepit crudeli morte peremptum, 
hancque Fluentino Dux vim pro nomine monstrat 
hos animos laeso, […]

But then the hero from Urbino became inflamed with righteous anger, when he heard that a Florentine nobleman had suffered a cruel death, and the leader showed that valour, that spirit for the impaired name of Florence. (Naldi, Volaterrais 3,41–5)

We can see that in Naldi’s Volaterrais there are explicitly two types of *ira*: the first provokes the conflict and leads to ungratefulness towards the benign signorial power of Florence and to misinterpreting its policy, while the other resolves the conflict in the end by providing the hero with the power to inflict defeat upon a deserving enemy. At the same time, these two instances of anger displayed by the poem’s characters are closely intertwined with its narrative macrostructure. The two halves of the Volaterrais are composed in a parallel fashion. Order, manifest in Volterra’s subordination to Florentine and Medici power, gets disturbed by the *ira* of the infernal forces at the beginning of the first book and results in a second book of unresolved conflict with a rather weak Lorenzo de’ Medici who does not heed the gods’ advice not to be mild and lenient towards the uprising.42 The same order is restored by the *ira* Federico displays at the beginning of the third book. It breaks out when the hero faces an incident that recalls a case of utmost *nefas* in the *Aeneid*, and the restoring of order results in a fourth book full of unambiguous rhetorical praise in a long speech by the Florentine *priore* Bartolomeo Scala. Thus, despite all accusations of adulatory shallowness, Naldi was well aware of how he could creatively turn the scholarly standards of interpreting Virgil into a means of panegyric. What he did not realize, to his own disadvantage,43 however, was the fact that the story of the brutal sack of a minor Tuscan town, brought about by him in someone else’s service as a mercenary leader, was probably the last thing Federico

42  Naldi, *Volaterrais* 1,355–466.
43  This disadvantage being a furter setback in his professional struggle against poverty. Cf. Crimi, “Naldi” 670.
da Montefeltro, who had just been made duke by the pope, wanted to hear or read, let alone to be heard or read by others.

4 The Time of No Anger Evermore—Borso d’Este’s Golden Age in Strozzi’s Borsias

So far, we have seen examples of human characters, soldiers and generals, either being driven by their anger into amoral behavior or showing their moral superiority by applying their anger in a righteous manner and on a justified scale. I shall now turn towards an epic poem in which the Olympian gods’ attitude towards and their dealing with *ira*, both present and past, plays a major role in shaping the image of the praised recipient of the poem. Tito Vespasiano Strozzi’s *Borsias* is an epic which its author (1425–1505) actually never succeeded in finishing.44 The process of writing the *Borsias* accompanied two thirds of Strozzi’s life, was interspersed with periods of no poetic activity at all and, most importantly, was subject to changing political interests, new developments in the diplomatic and political field and demands for signorial representation following the death of the epic’s actual addressee. The books of the *Borsias* that were written during Borso d’Este’s lifetime (1413–1471) all clearly convey an ideology that the Este themselves, for whom Strozzi worked all his life, used in their propaganda: the notion that the Este reign in Ferrara was a refuge of peace and justice in an otherwise warlike and disharmonious Italy.45 Strozzi gives a mythological and metaphysical dimension to this image in his epic poem. Saturn turns to Jupiter in dismay: not only is the world in a miserable state since the end of the—Saturn’s—Golden Age, but, worse, the mortals blame all their misery and misfortune on him, while he is the only god not wielding his personal anger against the mortal world:

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{Nec vero quemquam ex istis quos numina caeli} \\
\text{appellant, pater, incuso, quod saepius atris} \\
\text{cladibus affligunt terras, mortalibus ipsi} \\
\text{infensi, dum quisque suas ulciscitur iras.}
\end{align*}
\]

I do not blame, though, anyone of the ones they call the gods of the heavens, father, for striking the earth with disaster all too often, hostile to the mortals, until every one of the gods has avenged their anger. (Strozzi, Borsias 1,60–3)

Dissent stirs among the gods Saturn assaulted (not calling them by name, though). Minerva speaks up against him:

Irarum stimulis surgensque his vocibus orsa est:
Thus she raised her voice, aroused by spurs of anger:
(Strozzi, Borsias 1,114)

Jupiter, however, sides with Saturn, thereby showing not only that the efforts of someone driven by *ira* must be frustrated, but also explicitly reprehending what the Olympians did for so long. He also reminds Minerva that he knows for sure whom Saturn had had in mind:

Non Agamemnonias in saxa Capharea puppes ventorum incertus tulit impetus; affuit illic ira dei neque me fallit quo numine freta.

The wind was not haphazard that drove Agamemnon's fleet into the Capharean cliffs; the anger of a god stood by, and I know very well on whose divine will it relied. (Strozzi, Borsias 1,194–196)

Jupiter is presented as critical of his own past behaviour. From now on, *pietas* shall have the upper hand against *ira*.

Humani quondam generis delicta perosus bis terras hominesque, dei, tum quicquid ab alto despicitur caelo, mersi fatalibus undis; nec Phaethonteos ignes restrinximus, ante maxima quam mundi pars deflagraverit aestu. paulatim sed me pietas revocavit ab ira, quaeque novas iterum coherent animantia terras restitui nec non revivescere mollia iussi gramina et in ramis virides coalescere foetus.

Gods, and whatever looks down from the heavens, disgusted with the crimes of mankind I drowned the earth and all mortals in deadly waves
twice; and I did not put a halt to the fires of Phaethon until most of the world had been set ablaze and swept away. But then, kindness gradually made me restrain my rage, and I restored whatever animals were to inhabit the earth, and made soft grass come to life again and green shoots grow in the branches. (Strozzi, Borsias 1,331–339)

The Golden Age Saturn wanted to see restored does not come into being, of course. Instead, Jupiter decides to send the perfect man into the mortal world, as a vision of what it could be without anger and conflict.46 The gods agree, except for Mars, who sees his very raison d’être endangered by the prospect of a world without conflict (also: of an epic poem that has no use for him). Using erotic manipulation, Venus calms Mars’ wrath. This, however, only sedates the actual conflict rather than resolving it.

Audiit haec absens, Cyprumque ubi pulchra reliquit, 
continuo precibus Venus est aggressa furentem 
ac suadet parere Iovi et componere mentem. 
Hortatur blandisque amplexibus oscula iunxit 
atque truces iras dulci dea lenit amore.

Fair Venus, who was not present, heard this and as soon as she had left Cyprus, she straightaway turned to the raging god with entreaty, and tries to convince him to obey Jupiter and calm his mind. The goddess cheers him, adds kisses to her flattering embrace and soothes his savage anger with sweet loving. (Strozzi, Borsias 1,425–429)

Thus the road is paved for the gods to get Borso’s conception and birth underway in new-found unanimity: Venus and especially Juno actually forgetting (oblitae) their anger towards each other is nothing short of a sensation in the workings of the classical Pantheon.

Ast illae veterum, quibus exarsere tot annos, 
Irarum oblitae parent Stellamque ferentes 
In iussum posuere thorum, dum somnus amantem 
Ignarum aetherei monitu Iovis altus haberet.

46 Ludwig, Borsias 242 noticed the analogy to Alanus’ Anticlaudianus. Still, Strozzi’s Borso is less modeled on Alanus’ allegorical perfect man than he is an actual Anti-Rufinus, see e.g., his announcement by Jupiter in 1,360–376.
But the two goddesses, forgetful of their anger, with which they had burned for so many years, obey and carried Stella to the bed that had been designated and laid her down, until, by a mandate of heavenly Jupiter, sleep captured the lover at unawares. (Strozzi, Borsias 2,346–349)

Tito Strozzi depicts the Duke of Ferrara as a bringer of peace and reconciliation not only for the Italian states of his time, but also on the level of the Olympian gods, whom, by making them bring peace, he helps to move on from their own classical identity that was largely characterised by discord, intrigues and competing factions. Without abandoning their well-known role as deus ex machina, they turn towards a more Christian identity with Jupiter as God and the other numina as allegories of certain aspects of his dealings with the mortal world. The Olympians revolting against Saturn as a kind of original sin, Jupiter claiming that although it would be just to punish mankind once more, he was rather inclined to show mercy instead, announcing a new Golden Age coinciding with the birth of an at least nearly virgin-born child (Borso) announced by a divine messenger—aspects less of precise allegorisation of Christian doctrine than of oblique allusion to it, but Strozzi makes it hard for his reader not to think of those parallels. Still, the wheel of time may not be turned back, the instances when both gods and men have wronged each other not be undone, yet their anger towards each other may cease in favour of a new Golden Age, where there is no more ira separating the celestial beings. Imagery of pagan prehistoric mythology and Christian salvation history merge in order to praise the here and now of Este Ferrara.

5 Concluding Remarks

All three texts discussed here lay out, or at least imply, a framework of what type of anger is appropriate for whom: Volterra bursting out in anger against the regional superpower Florence must lead to its utter defeat and therefore clearly must have been instigated by infernal forces. King Alfonso’s anger comes to nothing, while the lordly display of righteous anger can be witnessed on his opponents’ side. Finally, the divine intervention against the ira raging between the Italian cities that alerts the gods in the Borsias sheds unfavourable light on all those who still quarrel instead of uniting against the Turks—

47 This becomes even more evident when compared, e.g., to Jacopo Sannazaro’s biblical epic, completed in 1526, De partu virginis, where God explicitly makes the celestial hosts put aside their ira on the eve of the new age that is marked by the birth of Christ (3,89–92).
i.e., everyone except for the Este, who in turn, give a glimpse of what a higher power considers appropriate anger.

Seeing anger at work in panegyric neo-Latin epic poetry not only sheds additional light on humanist critics’ evaluations of anger as a driving force and its moral implications in classical epics, it also gives insight into the ways humanist poets creatively adapted that evaluation in order to serve their encomiastic needs. We have encountered various applications of *ira* to epic characters, both mortal and divine, on different levels of abstraction and cosmic import: first, Sigismondo Malatesta and Alfonso of Aragon, who plainly prove their prowess as warriors or lack of it by being able or unable to control their anger and harness it to action; then, Federico da Montefeltro, who resolves a conflict that had been aroused by *ira* instilled in men by the forces of the underworld and that had proven gridlocked due to the hesitancy shown by Federico’s employer Lorenzo de’ Medici; finally, from Lorenzo de Medici’s passivity to the ceasing of all *ira* even among the gods as a means to lift Borso d’Este’s reign to a cosmological dimension instead of having to admit that he was just not much of a warrior-prince (the kind of hero one would expect in an epic poem, a *carmen heroicum*). To be sure, none of the epics discussed here are about anger as fuel for heroic and atrocious deeds, yet they show how their authors worked contemporary discussions about anger in the *Aeneid* into the fabric of their writings. At the same time, these works echo medieval conceptions of righteous and vicious anger when those characters are successful in harnessing anger whose princely virtues make it their prerogative to display anger in the first place.48 While they may not have acquired a holistic approach to the philosophical dimensions of anger in the *Aeneid* which modern scholarship has worked out, all three of these poems still found a way of innovatively turning their own age’s criticism of anger in ancient epic into a malleable literary instrument to fulfill their own (and their patrons’) requirements—regardless of how angry a man Aeneas actually is.

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Epic Anger in *La Gerusalemme liberata*: Rinaldo’s Irascibility and Tasso’s *Allegoria della Gerusalemme*

Betül Dilmac

With *La Gerusalemme liberata* (1580), Torquato Tasso created a literary monument that went on to enjoy a highly productive reception history. The impact of the text was quickly felt beyond the boundaries of the literary domain. It was in particular the text’s emotionally loaded episodes and scenes that inspired composers and painters to adapt the material and cause it to enter into the cultural memory of Europe. The importance that Tasso attached to his representation of human emotions would also be a determining factor in the importance and reception of the text in the field of literature. It was above all the theme of love in *La Gerusalemme liberata* that met with the greatest response from artistic posterity. The memorability of Tasso’s text may indeed be largely due to this theme, yet focusing on this feature of the reception history alone conveys a one-sided impression of the text. As much as Tasso wished to pay tribute to his audience, accustomed as it was to indigenous poetry (*romanzo cavalleresco*), by giving special attention to the theme of love, his desire to embrace the cultural heritage of classical antiquity and the Aristotelian notion of the epic is equally indisputable. In view of this second intention, Tasso’s text can hardly be limited to the representation of individual love stories. The actual narrative center of the text is located rather in the representation of a historically important project worthy of an epic. This project (with its successful outcome) is not for nothing mentioned in a prominent place, i.e., the title.

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This title introduces the thematic field of battle and enmity, which is not only constitutive of the text, but above all defines the domain in which anger, the subject of this article, has been located since time immemorial as a historicocultural phenomenon and the subject of artistic treatment.

It may seem natural to assume that the phenomena of anger depicted in *La Gerusalemme liberata* arise in the first place between the opposing parties of heathens and Christians, whose armed conflicts in the context of the First Crusade Tasso describes in his epic poem. The actual relevance of anger for the plot is located, however, prior to the conflict between heathenism and Christendom: it arises from phenomena of anger that emerge within the Christian camp and that endanger the collective unity of the Christian army as a whole and thus the success of the epic project. Only the solution of the internal conflicts within the Christian army will make the conquest of Jerusalem possible. It is this process of unification of the Christian army that is textually foregrounded and at the same time makes phenomena of anger the basis of an implicit reflection on the collision of different heroic ideals as well on problems of absolute rule. The relevance of anger on the collective and plot level of the text is put in concrete terms primarily with the Christian hero figure of Rinaldo, who, while he is (so providence has decreed) indispensable for the conquest of Jerusalem, must, however, first enter on a path of moral development. His path consists in bringing his outstanding personal characteristic, irascibility, into a balanced relation with his other dispositions and in placing it, above all, in the service of what is right, i.e., the Christian cause.

This article focuses on the character of Rinaldo, in whom the individual and collective roles of anger are interlocked. I begin by discussing anger as a negative, destructive power opposed to rational action, as it seems to be presented in connection with the duel between Gernando and Rinaldo and the latter’s desertion with its serious consequences for the Christian collective. Second, I consider the fact, until now neglected in the research, that anger also appears in Tasso’s text as a positive force and as such is embedded in a reflection on warlike as well as reproductive manhood. Before I demonstrate this in relation to Rinaldo’s maturation process, I discuss Tasso’s *Allegoria della Gerusalemme*, which provides further insight into Tasso’s conception of anger.

If Rinaldo’s anger is here given special relevance with regard to the plot, it is already clear that Rinaldo cannot be a secondary character in *La Gerusalemme liberata*. While the proem of *La Gerusalemme liberata* presents the Christian leader of the army, Goffredo di Buglione, as its protagonist, the text in fact depicts a complementary pair of protagonists consisting of Goffredo and Rinaldo: it is Rinaldo who is destined not only to found the family of Este and to revenge the death of Sveno, but also to make the taking of Jerusalem possible in the first place (by passing the test in the enchanted forest). At the beginning
of the plot, God chooses, however, not Rinaldo but Goffredo as the leader of the Christian army. Among the eligible princes he is the only one whose actions are motivated solely by zeal for the faith. The election of Goffredo propagates a new, i.e., Christian heroic ideal, which, however, is not easily compatible with the value system of knighthood and individual striving for honor and power, as is characteristic of many of Goffredo’s comrades-in-arms. In fact, in the past it was the individual interests of the Christian warriors that compromised the success of the army. This is why electing a leader became necessary. The words

4 Accordingly it is said in reference to Goffredo, when God looks at the Christian army: ‘vide Goffredo che scacciar desia / de la santa città gli empi pagani, / e pien di fé, di zelo, ogni mortale / gloria, imperio, tesor mette in non cale’ (1.8.4–8). (‘He saw Godfrey, who longs to drive the wicked pagans from the holy city, and full of faith, of zeal, makes no account of any mortal glory, or empire treasure.’) On the other hand, Rinaldo, for example, is indeed depicted as a tireless fighter, but especially as thirsting for glory: ‘scorge in Rinaldo e animo guerriero / e spiriti di riposo impazienti; / non cupidigia in lui d’oro o d’impero, / ma d’onor brame immoderate, ardenti’ (1.10.3–6). (‘He finds in Rinaldo both a warlike mind and a spirit impatient of rest. No lust for gold or for power in him, but an immoderate burning thirst for honor.’) The new Christian heroic ideal finds its expression, e.g., in the words Goffredo addresses to the troops in his first speech: he holds out the prospect not of worldly goods as a reward for the liberation of Jerusalem, but of a heavenly reward and a heavenly empire (see 1.21–28). On the new Christian heroic ideal propagated in the Liberata, see, e.g., Benedetti L., La sconfitta di Diana (Ravenna: 1996) 97f. (All English translations of citations from secondary sources are mine unless otherwise indicated.): ‘The Liberata marks an important change in the epic tradition. The Christian faith is of course also present in the earlier texts, yet it did not characterise the entire work and did not allow the world to be divided into two parts. The good and the bad were evenly distributed on both sides of the front […] and the laws of knighthood outweighed all other considerations […] In the Liberata the situation changes drastically. Tasso is not interested in the training of the perfect knight, but of the soldier of Christ, who must leave behind the traditional principles of knighthood (the defense of women and the weak, the search for adventure as the means of individual growth) in order to follow the cause unconditionally.’ (‘La Liberata segna un cambiamento importante nella tradizione epica. La fede cristiana era ovviamente presente nei poemi precedenti, ma non impongiva l’intero lavoro, non permetteva di dividere il mondo in due parti. Il bene e il male si distribuivano in maniera uniforme sui due fronti […] e le leggi della cavalleria prevalevano su ogni altra considerazione […] Nella Liberata il quadro cambia drasticamente. A Tasso non interessa la formazione del perfetto cavaliere, ma del soldato di Cristo, che deve abbandonare i tradizionali principi della cavalleria (difesa delle donne e dei deboli, ricerca dell’avventura come mezzo di crescita individuale) per aderire incondizionatamente alla causa.’) See also, e.g., Zatti S., L’uniforme cristiano e il multiforme pagano: Saggio sulla Gerusalemme liberata (Milan: 1983) 12, 17–19. On the context of this development, see Prosperi A., “Il miles christianus nella cultura italiana tra ’400 e ’500”, in Hempfer K.W. (ed.), Ritterepik der Renaissance. Akten des deutsch-italienischen Kolloquiums, Berlin 30.3.–2.4.1987 (Stuttgart: 1989) 47–60.
of Piero the hermit, who calls on the army to choose Goffredo, make this clear: the Christian army, in the past often divided, would through the election of Goffredo become unified like a body and in the future only be directed by one head (1.31). In conclusion, Goffredo is called upon to rule as follows:

Imponga a i vinti legge egli a suo senno,  
porti la guerra e quando vòle e a cui;  
gli altri, già pari, ubidienti al cenno  
siano or ministri de gl'imperii sui. (1.33.3–6)

La Gerusalemme liberata documents a break with the customary state of things, the necessary surrender of freedoms and the abandonment of the individual pursuit of honor and power, in favor of the order and stability of the collective. The former pari are degraded to ministri, who owe absolute obedience.

The body will, however, in spite of the election of one head, prove to be refractory. That the army already at the beginning of the plot is called upon to divest itself of its innermost passions is instructive in this context: while the leader Goffredo embodies reason and mastery over passions, the greater part of the army is not able to control its passions. On the one hand, extraordinary passion, ‘smoderanza degli affetti’, may for Tasso be the prerequisite for heroism as such. On the other hand, the excessive anger and love—‘l'eccesso de l'ira e de l'amore’—typical of the hero is not easy to integrate into the new, specifically Christian heroism. Thus the internal difficulties of the Christian army can be attributed in essence to love and the misdirected as well as excessive

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6 ‘He is to impose laws on the conquered according to his judgment; he is to carry the war to whom he wishes, and when; the rest, who were formerly his peers, are now to be the instruments of his will, obedient to his command.’
7 In regard to Tasso’s contemporary context it should be noted that both freedom and the individual pursuit of honor and power were categories that played a central role in the sixteenth century in the conflicts between a centralising state power that was asserting itself and the feudal nobility insisting on its privileges.
8 ‘sgombri gl’inserti, anzi gl’innati affetti / di sovrastar, di libertà, d’onore’ (1.32.5–6). (‘clear away the ingrafted, or rather inborn, passions of sovereignty, of freedom, of honor’).
10 Tasso is referring to the heroic conception of Flaminio de’ Nobili: Tasso Torquato, Lettere. Edizione Guasti, ed. A. Quondam (Rome: 1997) 75.
anger of the knights. That the inappropriate behavior of the crusaders runs contrary to the project that is actually to be pursued, and which is religious, is already clear in the proem of *La Gerusalemme liberata*: ‘Il Ciel gli [Goffredo] diè favore, e sotto a i santi / segni ridusse i suoi compagni erranti’ (1.1.7–8).\(^\text{11}\)

The “santi / segni” refer both to the army banners that indicate allegiance to Goffredo’s command and to the cross that is displayed upon the banners: the political errancy of Goffredo’s recalcitrant knights is equated with a spiritual, religious error.\(^\text{12}\)

While the majority of the knights are disloyal to the Christian cause because of love, the case is different for Rinaldo. In contrast to most of the knights, who are aflame for the seductive Armida and want to follow her and leave the army, Rinaldo does not really fall for her (at least at first); the arrow of Cupid only reaches the outer layer of his heart (5.12.5–6). If Rinaldo’s worth before his desertion is at all diminished, then by his ambition and especially his excessive anger. It is irascibility and a susceptibility to excessiveness in the condition of anger that recurs like a leitmotif as characteristic of Rinaldo and explains his *qualité différencielle* vis-à-vis his comrades-in-arms. Despite this characteristic, Tasso still tends to describe Rinaldo in more positive terms than his comrades, who are in the first place vulnerable to love.\(^\text{13}\) Rinaldo’s irascible disposition is, however, in a no less pronounced degree a threat to the Christian cause; when, for example, Dudone, the leader of the troop of *aventurieri*, succumbs in the battle with the heathen, the enraged Rinaldo immediately incites his comrades to revenge Dudone’s death. The time and place for this are not propitious, however, so that Goffredo, to avoid unnecessary losses, has to intervene and hold back the impetuous Rinaldo through a messenger (3.52–53).

The blindness through excessive anger that causes Rinaldo to fail to recognize the inopportuneness of the hour and his scarcely concealed wrath (3.53.8)

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\(^\text{11}\) ‘Heaven granted him favor and brought back under the holy standards his wandering companions.’


\(^\text{13}\) See on this point the explanations of anger and love following Plato’s model of the tripartite soul in Tasso Torquato, “Il Forno overo della nobiltà” 53: ‘Love is an emotion that heroes can be stricken with: if one compares it with ire, it is nonetheless of lesser nobility, for the irascible part stands in first place after the rational part and the concupiscible part takes the last place.’ (‘L’amore à affetto che può cader ne gli eroi: nondimeno, paragonandolo all’ira, è di minor nobiltà, percióché la parte irascibile doppo la ragionevole tiene il primo luogo, e l’ultimo è tenuto dalla concupiscibile.’)
in regard to Goffredo’s order point ahead to the decisive scene in which Rinaldo will no longer be able to bridle his anger: this is the scene of the duel between Gernando and Rinaldo and the latter’s subsequent disobedience to Goffredo in the form of military desertion. This scene is exemplary for an entire series of plot situations in which there is a conflictual collision between individual-knightly ideals and interests on the one hand and the newly propagated heroism, based on dominant religious values that are addressed to the religious collective, on the other. Rinaldo’s duel scene stands out conspicuously in this series of actions: first, the nexus of insult, anger and revenge becomes the subject of an extensive discussion on the legitimacy of Rinaldo’s action. Second, the question of the punishment for the duel is the basis for further anger from Rinaldo, which is now, however, channeled into his desertion, the beginning of his errare, with its momentous consequences for the plot. Let us look at the duel scene more closely.

Once again the death of Dudone is the basis for the action. When, shortly after his death, a successor has to be determined and Rinaldo is shortlisted, this displeases the Norwegian knight Gernando. Himself of royal origins, he wants to have this honor for himself and is incensed to the extent that he loses all ragione and thus becomes vulnerable to diabolical insinuations (5.16–22). Thus incited, Gernando voices his reservations against Rinaldo as the new leader and slanders him publicly (5.23–25). When Gernando also slanders Rinaldo in his presence, Rinaldo is unable to bridle his anger. The admonitions of the others and their attempts to hold back Rinaldo are in vain. Rinaldo clears his way through to Gernando, accuses him of falsehood and thus initiates a duel, which is actually forbidden in the Christian camp (5.33.7) and will end fatally for Gernando.14 ‘The right hand of the Christian body, Rinaldo, rages with his own hand of justice and honor against another member of that body’:15

Or quivi, allor che v’è turba piú folta,
pur, com’è suo destin, Rinaldo accusa,
e quasi acuto strale in lui rivolta
la lingua, del venen d’Averno infusa;
e vicino è Rinaldo e i detti ascolta,
né pote l’ira omai tener piú chiusa,
ma grida: – Menti –, e adosso a lui si spinge,

14 On the fact that Rinaldo behaves according to the common ideas of a duel in the sixteenth century, see Erspamer F., La biblioteca di Don Ferrante: Duello e onore nella cultura del Cinquecento (Rome: 1982) 191.

15 Savoia “Notes on the Metaphor of the Body” 61.
e nudo ne la destra il ferro stringe. (5.26)

[.. .]

Ma per le voci altrui già non s'allenta
ne l'offeso guerrier l'impeto e l'ira.
Sprezza i gridi e i ripari e ciò che tenta
chiudergli il varco, ed a vendetta aspira;
e fra gli uomini e l'armi oltre s'aventa,
e la fulminea spada in cerchio gira,
si che le vie si sgombra e solo, ad onta
di mille difensor, Gernando affronta.

E con la man, ne l'ira anco maestra,
mille colpi vèr lui drizza e comparte:
[.. .]

Né cessò mai sin che nel seno immersa
gli ebbe una volta e due la fera spada.
Cade il meschin su la ferita, e versa
gli spiriti e l'alma fuor per doppia strada.
L'arme ripone ancor di sangue aspersa
il vincitor, né sovra lui piú bada;
ma si rivolge altrove, e insieme spoglia
l'animo crudo e l'adirata voglia. (5.29–31)16

Embodied in this scene in an almost exemplary way is the idea of anger that was valid from classical antiquity into the early modern period: anger that is provoked by an affront to one's honor and brings with it the desire for revenge

16 'Now here (as is his fate) when the crowd is thickest he still is accusing Rinaldo and turning his tongue against him like a sharp arrow, infused with poison from Avernus. And Rinaldo is nearby and hears his words, nor any longer is able to keep his wrath held in, but shouts—"You lie"—and thrusts himself right against him and is grasping in his hand the naked steel. // [... ] // But the violence and wrath in the insulted warrior is slowed not at all by the words of the rest: he pays no attention to shouts and defenses and anything that tries to block his way, and to vengeance he aspires: and rushes on past men and weapons and sweeps his blazing sword in a circle so that he clears a path and (to the shame of a thousand defenders) alone confronts Gernando. // And with a hand of masterly skill even in his wrath he aims and delivers a thousand blows on him [... ] // Nor did he ever give over until he had bathed the fierce sword once and again in his breast. The poor man falls on his wounds and pours out breath and spirits through a double way. The victor sheathes again his weapon stained with blood, and tarries over him no longer but betakes himself elsewhere, and at the same time divests himself of his cruel spirit and his wrathful will.'
The intensity of Rinaldo’s outbreak of anger and violence seems to correspond with his inordinately pronounced sense of honor, which, already at the beginning of the plot, had disqualified Rinaldo as a possible leader of the army (‘d’onor brame immoderate’, 1.10.6). The commensurateness of Rinaldo’s deed, which resulted from this immoderate sense of honor, is called into question by the statement that Rinaldo’s fighting arm was also skillful in anger. The anger that overwhelms Rinaldo in this situation (‘né pote l’ira omai tener piú chiusa’, 5.26.6) appears thus less as a supporting, but rather as an impairing and thus negative force, which ultimately also caused him to forget the ban on duels in the Christian camp.

In fact, however, the judgement of Rinaldo’s deed turns out to be much more ambivalent. On the one hand, his disregard of the ban on duels is publicly condemned even by his advocates who speak up after the incident (5.36, 5.59.3–4). On the other hand, this condemnation only takes place in front of Goffredo. The following intercession for Rinaldo by Guelfo seems more representative of the opinion of large parts of the army, whose members are not for nothing prepared to follow Rinaldo into exile (5.51.5–6):

Anima non potea d’infamia schiva voci sentir di scorno ingiuriose, e non farne repulsa ove l’udiva. E se l’oltraggiatore a morte ei pose, chi è che meta a giust’ira prescriva? chi conta i colpi o la dovuta offesa, mentre arde la tenzon, misura e pesa? (5.57.2–8) 
[. . .] A ragion, dico, al tumido Gernando fiaccò le corna del superbio orgoglio. (5.59.1–2)18

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18 “His spirit intolerant of slander could not listen to the biting speeches of malice without making their rebuttal, right where he heard them. And if he put to death the man who insulted him, who is it that can set a bound to righteous anger? Who counts the blows or while the struggle blazes measures and weighs the offense that ought to be taken? // [. . .] // With reason, I say, he cropped for the swelling Gernando the horns of his haughty pride [. . .].”
It is true that Rinaldo at a later point in time will regret his deed (‘pianse i superbi sdegni’, 18.9.2) and the view of Goffredo and Hugo, who both trace his deed to excessive anger, will be confirmed (5.54.2, 14.17.2–3). Yet Rinaldo’s remorseful statement only takes place under the seal of confession and not in front of the army; in this way Rinaldo is able to relieve his conscience before God, but his honor and his reputation in the world of the army, with its sympathy for his reaction to Gernando, remain intact. Erspamer notes that it can be assumed that Tasso himself as well as his contemporaries would also have approved of Rinaldo’s behavior. The ambivalences within the text in regard to Rinaldo’s deed can thus be understood as testimony to the ambivalent attitude of Tasso himself; on the one hand he was still attached to the values and the idea of honor of the old knighthood, while on the other hand he had to conform to the repressive ideology of the period of the Counter-Reformation, in which he lived and worked.19

Rinaldo’s disobedience to Goffredo’s regime does not end with his disregard of the ban on duels. In connection with his punishment for his offense, Rinaldo’s anger rises up again, which has drastic consequences for the Christian army and makes the problems and weaknesses of Goffredo’s absolute rule clear, if they have not already been so. Goffredo insists on this rule (5.37–38) when Rinaldo’s advocates, Tancredi (5.36) and Rinaldo’s uncle Guelfo (5.57–59.4), wish to dissuade Goffredo of the necessity of putting Rinaldo on trial, which in the worst case could lead to his execution (5.34.1). But for Goffredo, Rinaldo’s deed does not appear to be justified; nor is he ready to give Rinaldo special treatment because of his rank. Rather he believes that he can trace the deed back to a liability to excessiveness considered typical for Rinaldo as soon as he flies into a rage. In his conversation with Guelfo, Goffredo demands that Rinaldo voluntarily give himself into custody:

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19 In view of Tasso’s contemporary context, the ban on duels can be understood as pointing to corresponding attempts to enforce a state monopoly on violence, which among other things found their expression in the prohibition of duels. See Angelozzi G., “Das Verbot des Duells – Kirche und adliges Selbstverständnis”, in Prodi P. – Reinhard W. (eds.), Das Konzil von Trient und die Moderne (Berlin: 2001) 211–240, 222: In the mid-sixteenth century, a major problem in dealing with the ethos of the soldier was ‘how traditional values such as loyalty to the sovereign and the church [and] discipline […] could be protected from tendencies to embrace a false, individualistic and subversive concept of honor, which was widespread among the Italian soldiers, who often held the leadership roles in the armies of the Catholic church.’
Veracemente, o Guelfo, il tuo nepote troppo trascorre, ov'ira il cor gli sprone, e male addursi a mia credenza or pote di questo fatto suo giusta cagione. Ben caro avrò ch'ella ci rechi tale, ma Goffredo con tutti è duce eguale; e sarà del legittimo e del dritto custode in ogni caso e difensore, serbando sempre al giudicare invitto da le tiranne passioni il core. Or se Rinaldo a violar l'editto e de la disciplina il sacro onore costretto fu, come alcun dice, a i nostri giudizi venga ad inchinarsi, e 'l mostri.

A sua retenzion libero vegna: questo, ch'io posso, a i merti suoi consento. Ma s'egl sta ritroso e se ne sdegna (conosco quel suo indomito ardimento), tu di condurlo a proveder t'ingegna ch'ei non isforzi uom mansueto e lento ad esser de le leggi e de l'impero vendicator, quanto è ragion, severo. (5.54–56)²⁰

Goffredo seems to be right in his judgement of Rinaldo (5.56.3–4): when Tancredi, already knowing of Goffredo's decision (5.37–39), seeks out Rinaldo and communicates to him Goffredo's intention to call him to account, Rinaldo indeed resists:

²⁰‘Truly, Guelph, your nephew goes too far when wrath is spurring his heart: and now in my judgment he is ill able to bring forth just cause for this his deed. Very dear will I hold the man who can bring us forth such cause: but Godfrey is leader equally over all, // and will be in every case defender and preserver of the lawful and right, keeping his heart at all times in his judging unvanquished by the tyrant passions. Now if, as some say, Rinaldo was forced to violate the edict and the sacred honor of the discipline, let him come to submit himself to our judgment, and demonstrate it. // He may come to his detention free of constraint; this I allow to his merits, as I am empowered. But if he remain forward and scorn us (for I know that untamable ardor in him) you use your wit to bring him and to see to it that he does not force a man of gentle action and deliberate to be (so far as is right) the harsh avenger of the laws and of authority.’
Sorrise allor Rinaldo, e con un volto
in cui tra 'l riso lampeggiò lo sdegno:
– Difenda sua ragion ne' ceppi involto
chi servo è – disse – o d'esser servo è degno.
Libero i' nacqui e vissi, morrò sciolto
prima che man porga o piede a laccio indegno:
usa a la spada è questa destra ed usa
a le palme, e vil nodo ella ricusa.

Ma s'a i meriti miei questa mercede
Goffredo rende e vuol impregionarme
pur com'io fosse un uom del vulgo, e crede
a carcere plebeo legato trarme,
venga egli o mandi, io terrò fermo il piede.
Giudici fian tra noi la sorte e l'arme:
fera tragedia vuol che s'appresenti
per lor diporto a le nemiche genti. –

Ciò detto, l'armi chiede; e 'l capo e 'l busto
di finissimo acciaio adorno rende
e fa del grande scudo il braccio onusto,
e a l'arme splende.
Marte, e' rassembra te qualor dal quinto
cielo di ferro scendi e d'orror cinto. (5.42–44)²¹

²¹ ‘Rinaldo smiled at this end and, with a countenance in which scorn flashed amid the smile—“Let those (he said) who are slaves, or worthy to be slaves, make defense of their motives while set in the stocks. Free was I born and lived free, and freely will I die before I set hand or foot in shameful snare. This arm is used to the sword and used to the palms, and it rejects the vile knot. // But if Godfrey returns me this reward for my deserts, and wants to imprison me as if I were only one of the general crowd, and if he thinks to drag me in chains to a common prison, let him come or send, I shall hold my foot planted firm. Weapons and the fates will be our judges. It is a bloody tragedy he means to present to the enemy troops for their pleasure.” // This said, he calls for his armor, and head and breast adorns with the finest steel, and burdens his arm with his great shield and hangs the fatal sword at his side; and in countenance magnanimous and commanding, he shines forth in his armor like a thunderbolt. Mars, he looks like you when you descend from the fifth heaven clad in steel and horror.’
Rinaldo is again enraged, grasps his weapons, and is now even ready to duel with Goffredo himself. Rinaldo insists on his individual freedom as well as on his heroic merits and therefore takes especial umbrage at being treated like one of the common people. Again the situation threatens to escalate in view of his strong individual sense of honor and lack of willingness to submit to the collective rules. Tancredi is, however, able to prevent worse and to calm Rinaldo’s ‘wild and presumptuous spirit’. He suggests to him an alternative that conforms to the ‘law of honor’: leave the army and go to Boemondo in Antioch. Rinaldo agrees and leaves the Christian army in anger against its leader (5.52).

Rinaldo leaves the role of the knight of the faith acting in the name of the collective in order to enter into the role of the wandering knight (‘Or vada errando’, 5.59.4) seeking to accomplish prodigious deeds on his own. His leaving the army precisely in anger against the commander belongs to the oldest, in the opinion of Curtius almost constitutive topoi of the epic: ‘Without the grumbling hero (Achilles, Roland, the Cid, Hagen) or god (Poseidon in the Odyssey, Juno in the Aeneid) there is no epic’.22 As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, the departure of Rinaldo motivated in this manner is of exceptional importance for the plot: first, Rinaldo’s departure is not to be equated with banishment from the text. On the contrary, his departure makes possible the opening up of the text—important for the narrative strategy—to the narration of Rinaldo’s fortunes as a wandering knight. This relaxes the linearity of the epic narrative without endangering it. Second, it is precisely the importance of Rinaldo for the epic project that makes his departure and his absence from the army a hazard for the Christian cause. Tancredi was indeed quite right in his statement shortly before the departure of Rinaldo: without Rinaldo the Christian camp would seem mutilated, like a body without arms or hands (5.50). That the role of executive power remains in fact reserved for Rinaldo and not Goffredo is confirmed in a later dream of Goffredo: Hugo turns to Goffredo and advises him to bring back Rinaldo. Only thanks to the energy of Rinaldo will it be possible to take Jerusalem.23 Independently of divine providence,

23 ‘Perché se l’alta Providenza elesse / te de l’impresa sommo capitano, / destinò insieme chégli esser dovesse / de’tuoi consigli essecutor soprano. / A te le prime parti, a lui concesse / son le seconde: tu sei capo, ei mano / di questo campo; e sostener sua vece / altrui non pote, e farlo a te non lece.’ (14.13) (‘For, if high Providence elected you supreme commander of the expedition, it decreed at the same time that he should be the sovereign...')
Rinaldo proves to be predestined for the role of the decisive executive power—primarily because of his disposition to anger. This emerges from the admonishing words of the magician of Ascalon, which he addresses to Rinaldo shortly before he rejoins the army:

T'alzò natura inverso il ciel la fronte,
e ti diè spirti generosi ed alti,
perché in su miri e con illustri e conte
opre te stesso al sommo pregio essalti;
e ti diè l'ire ancor veloci e pronte,
non perché l'usi ne' civili assalti,
né perché sian di desideri ingordi
elle ministe, ed a ragion discordi,

ma perché il tuo valore, armato d'esse,
più fero assalga gli avversari esterni,

[...] (17.62–63.1–2)

Rinaldo's disposition to anger is the basis for his warlike energy, which, already at an early stage, gave rise to his glory. Insofar as this inclination is placed under the law of reason (embodied in Goffredo), it is also the basis for the future glorious deed of the conquest of Jerusalem. The anger so typical of the hero is, accordingly, not a negative characteristic per se, but must only be put in the service of right, i.e., the Christian cause. Anger as the basis of a martial disposition stands in a metonymic relation to battle and violence in the form of positive kinetic energy, i.e., on that is directed against the (heathen) enemy. Read with regard to the problems of absolute rule, the conflictual distribution of roles between Goffredo (the leader directing by reason) and Rinaldo (the warlike-executive force) ultimately depicts, as Sergio Zatti notes, the problems that are connected with the formation of the absolute state, i.e.: ‘to consolidate executor of your plans. To you the prime functions are allotted, to him the secondary; you are the head of this army, he the hand; and to take his place none other is able, and for you it is not permitted.’)

24 ‘Nature raised you up your countenance toward heaven, and gave you a spirit lofty and generous, that you might look up, and with deeds famous and renowned exalt yourself to the highest honor; and gave you also anger swift and ready, not that you should use it in civil broils, nor that it should be the slave of exorbitant desires, out of tune with reason; // but that your valor, armed with it, might assail the more fiercely your external foes […]’
power by means of violence, but also to submit the same to a correct use in the exercise of government.\textsuperscript{25}

Before we turn to Rinaldo’s inner path of development and to the question of the relation between anger and love as well as between anger and warlike, reproductive masculinity, let us by way of introduction look at Tasso’s own interpretation of his text in his \textit{Allegoria della Gerusalemme}. Tasso’s \textit{Allegoria} is above all a psychological interpretation of \textit{La Gerusalemme liberata}, in which Tasso refers in particular to Plato’s \textit{Republic, Book IV}:

The structure that Tasso develops (the projection of the inner life of the person onto the level of a historical event that is especially suited to represent the inner life of the person) is based on the model of the \textit{Republic}. The intention of the \textit{Republic} is to give an exhaustive picture of an ideal city that is governed according to universal principles of justice: In the 4th dialog, Plato clearly defines the inner characteristics of the just city, and he creates a parallel between the organization of civil life and of the inner life. […] Just as justice in the city is a result of the peaceful cooperation of the “tria hominum genera” (leader, soldiers and craftsmen), so also there is justice in the human soul if there is order among the three forces […]\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{25} Zatti “La Gerusalemme liberata” 234: ‘di stabilire il potere attraverso la violenza, ma anche di sottoporre questa a un corretto uso nell'esercizio del governo.’ On the connection with Tasso’s contemporary context see also Quint D., “The Debate Between Arms and Letters in the Gerusalemme liberata”, in Looney D. (ed.), \textit{Phaethon’s Children: The Este Court and its Culture in Early Modern Ferrara} (Tempe: 2005) 363–387, 373: ‘Goffredo the captain is also the figure of a divinely-sanctioned authority to which Rinaldo, the mighty individual and independent soldier of fortune, must submit. This political scenario […] primarily describes obedience to the Counter-Reformation Church. But it also suggests the curtailing of feudal prerogatives by the nascent modern state whose princes enjoy—or claim to enjoy—absolute power over their subjects […]’.

\textsuperscript{26} Olini L., “Dalle direzioni di lettura alla revisione del testo: Tasso tra Allegoria del poema e Giudizio”, \textit{La rassegna della letteratura italiana} 89 (1985) 53–68, 64: ‘La struttura che Tasso costruisce (la proiezione cioè della vita interiore dell’uomo sul piano di un avvenimento storico particolarmente atto a rappresentarla) risente innegabilmente del disegno della Repubblica. L’intento della Repubblica è dare un’immagine esaustiva di una città ideale, governata secondo princìpi universali di giustizia: nel 4\textdegree{} dialogo Platone definisce chiaramente le caratteristiche interne della città giusta, e pone in atto il parallelo tra l’organizzazione della vita civile e la vita interiore. […] Come nella città la giustizia deriverà dalla cooperazione pacifica dei “tria hominum genera” (custodi, militari e artefici), così anche nell’animo umano vi sarà giustizia quando vi sarà ordine tra le tre forze […]’.
Tasso uses Plato’s analogy between the well-ordered forces of the tripartite soul (i.e., rational, concupiscible, and irascible faculties) and the well-ordered relationship between different groups and applies it to the Christian army. Thus he equates the Christian army with a man consisting of soul and body. While the less noble soldiers represent the body, Goffredo, Tancredi, Rinaldo and the other leaders stand for the forces of the soul; Goffredo, who incarnates reason, is enthroned at the head. Standing in the way of the taking of Jerusalem, which Tasso equates with ‘civil happiness’ and is to be led by Goffredo, are, however, above all the internal difficulties of the Christian army: love, which befalls Tancredi and many other knights, and Rinaldo’s anger. These difficulties between Goffredo on the one hand and Tancredi and Rinaldo on the other in their turn stand for the individual forces of the soul and their conflictual relationship:

The army, composed of various princes and other Christian soldiers, signifies mature man, who is composed of body and soul—not of a simple soul but of one distinguished by many varied faculties. Jerusalem—a strong city, located in a rough and mountainous region, toward which all the efforts of the faithful army are directed as toward an ultimate goal—signifies civic happiness, but the sort befitting a Christian, as will be clarified hereafter. This happiness is a good very hard to pursue, for it is set upon the summit of the steep and wearying ridge of virtue; and toward it, as toward an ultimate goal, are directed all the actions of political man.

Goffredo, who is captain of all this assemblage, stands for the intellect and, in particular, for that intellect which considers not necessary things but things that are mutable and can occur in various ways. He is elected captain of the enterprise through God’s will and that of the princes; for the intellect is created, by God and by nature, lord over the other faculties of the soul and over the body, commanding the former by civil power and the latter by imperial rule.

Rinaldo, Tancredi, and the other princes stand for the other faculties of the soul; and the body is represented for us by the less noble soldiers. Because of the imperfection of human nature and the deceptions of its adversary, man does not attain this happiness without many internal struggles and without finding many external impediments along the way […].

But let us come to the internal impediments: the love that causes Tancredi and other knights to act foolishly and alienates them from Goffredo and the wrath that causes Rinaldo to stray from the enterprise.
These signify the combat with the rational faculty waged by the concupiscent and the irascible faculty and the rebellion of these two.\footnote{Rhu L.F., “Tasso’s Allegory of Gerusalemme liberata”, in Rhu L.F., The Genesis of Tasso’s Narrative Theory: English Translations of the Early Poetics and a Comparative Study of Their Significance (Detroit: 1993) 155–162, 156f. (Tasso Torquato, “Allegoria della Gerusalemme liberata”, in id., Tutte le opere, ed. A. Quondam (Rome: 1997) [CD-ROM]: ‘L’esercito composto di vari principi e d’altri soldati cristiani, significa l’uomo virile, il quale è composto d’anima e di corpo: e d’anima non semplice, ma distinta in molte e varie potenze. Gerusalemme, città forte ed in aspra e montuosa regione collocata; a la quale, si come ad ultimo fine, sono dirizzate tutte le imprese dell’esercito fedele; ci segna la felicità civile, qual però conviene ad uomo cristiano, come più sotto si dichiacerà: la quale è un bene molto difficile da conseguire, e posto in cima a l’alpestre e faticoso giogo della virtù: ed a questo sono volte, come ad ultima meta, tutte le azioni dell’uomo politico. Goffredo che di tutta questa adunanza è capitano, è in vece dell’intelletto, e particolarmente dell’intelletto che considera non le cose necessarie, ma le mutabili, e che possono variamente avvenire. Ed egli, per voler d’Iddio e de’ principi, è eletto capitano in questa impresa. Però che l’intelletto è da Dio e da la natura constituito signore sovra l’altre virtù dell’anima, e sovra il corpo; e comanda a quelle con potestà civile, ed a queste con imperio regale. Rinaldo, Tancredi, e gli altri principi sono in luogo dell’altre potenze dell’animo; ed il corpo da i soldati men nobili ci vien dinotato. E perché per l’imperfezione dell’umana natura, e per gl’inganni dell’inimico d’essa, l’uomo non perviene a questa felicità senza molte interne difficoltà e senza trovar fra via molti esterni impedimenti […]. Ma venendo a gli intrinseci impedimenti, l’amor che fa vaneggiar Tancredi e gli altri cavalieri, e gli allontana da Goffredo, e lo sdegno che desvia Rinaldo da l’impresa, significano il contrasto che con la ragionevele fanno la concupiscibile e l’irascibile virtù, e la ribellion loro.’}}

This is followed by explanations concerning the central roles of Goffredo and Rinaldo. Rinaldo’s central role, situating him at only a minimal distance from Goffredo, is reflected, as noted above, in Tasso’s assessment of Rinaldo’s characteristic disposition to anger. The author, following Plato, sees this expression of the irascible part of the soul as the force that is the least removed from the nobility of the mind. The task of the ‘irascible’ is analogous to that of soldiers in a society: just as soldiers, in obedience to the commanding princes, have to fight enemies, so also the irascible faculty must in the name of reason arm itself against the concupiscent faculties. Tasso on the one hand declares the irascible faculty to be the ‘robust and martial part of the soul’,\footnote{Ibidem 160.} while on the other hand its perversion is only avoidable if it is placed under the guidance of reason. Otherwise, this faculty may fight not against, but for concupiscence,
as Tasso illustrates with the example of the dog that bites not the thief, but its master’s flock:

But when this faculty disobeys reason and lets itself be carried away by its own violence, it sometimes happens that it fights not against concupiscence but on its behalf; or, like a bad watchdog, it bites the flock, rather than robbers.29

The figure of Rinaldo stands, not exclusively, but primarily, for this irascible faculty:

Although this impetuous faculty, violent and invincible, cannot entirely be figured by a single knight, it is nonetheless principally represented by Rinaldo, as is well indicated in that verse which speaks of him: Sdegno guerrier della ragion feroce (16.34.4). Anger, fierce warrior of reason.30

Tasso wrote his Allegoria from 1575 to 1576, i.e., during the period in which he finished La Gerusalemme liberata. The fact that Tasso in a letter of June 15, 1576, tells Scipione Gonzaga that his Allegoria was meant to be a defense against his critics has in the research led to the Allegoria being neglected in its characteristic as a poetological document and instead being understood primarily as an interpretive pattern retrospectively imposed on the text. There are, however, works that, based on Tasso’s Poetic Letters, oppose the idea ‘that Tasso’s Allegoria was imposed on his poem only post hoc’.31 If we take these scholars seriously, Tasso should be considered ‘a good guide to his own poem’.32 Fredi Chiappelli also addresses the question of the Allegoria’s analytical value. He stresses above all its hybrid character: On the one hand, ideas can be identified that were developed before the completion of the La Gerusalemme liberata and insofar make the Allegoria an authentic interpretive paradigm. On the other hand, the Allegoria also includes intentions that Tasso attributes to La

29 Ibidem (Ibidem: ‘[M]a quando essa non ubidisce a la ragione, ma si lascia trasportare dal suo proprio impeto, a le volte avviene che combatte non contra le concupiscenze, ma per le concupiscenze; o a guisa di cane, reo custode, non morde i ladri, ma gli armenti.’).
30 Ibidem (Ibidem: ‘Questa virtù impetuosa, veemente ed invitta, come che non possa interamente essere da un sol cavaliero figurata, è nondimeno principalmente significata da Rinaldo; come ben s’accenna in quel verso ove di lui si parla: Sdegno guerrier della ragion feroce.’).
Gerusalemme liberata retrospectively: ‘That which remains of the programmatic in the Allegoria is useful in the same degree as that which is retrospective is suspect.’

Concerning the allegorical conception of the characters, Chiappelli now clarifies as follows:

A thorough distinction between the two elements that are hybridized in the Allegoria seems to us to be useful. In a case such as Goffredo’s, on the basis of an equation “army = composite human individual”, an absolute distributive interpretation (which makes Goffredo the representative of the intellect) is acceptable from a programmatic as well as a retrospective point of view; the other characters, however, become, to different degrees, one-sided if one ties them down retrospectively to a single force. From a programmatic point of view it was not a static and partitive description of the life of the mind that seems to have occupied the thoughts of the poet, but a dynamic of successive crises that the civil person goes through for the liberation and assertion of his capacities: The words that recur throughout also in the Allegoria are liberate, help, obstacle, hurdles etc. […]

The various characters all share in varying degrees in the different forces and form in fact throughout a single complex entity; nevertheless, they each embody in the first part of the text a crisis of the inner force, in order then to embody in the second part of the text the corresponding crisis of reconciliation. The ‘forces of the soul’, which Tasso is inclined to make his substantial theme, are not individual virtues or capacities, but polynomial critical conditions.

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34 Ibidem 13: ‘[U]n’approfondita distinzione fra i due elementi che ibridano la redazione dell’Allegoria ci sembra utile. In un caso come quello di Goffredo, data l’identificazione “armata = composto umano individuo”, l’interpretazione distributiva assoluta (che non fa il simbolo dell’intelletto) è accettabile tanto programmaticamente quanto retrospettivamente; gli altri personaggi, in misura varia, sono irregolari se portati retrospettivamente ad incapsulare una potenza singola. Programmaticamente, non una descrizione statica e partitiva della vita dello spirito sembra aver occupato i pensieri del poeta, bensì una dinamica delle crisi successive che l’uomo civile traversa per la liberazione ed asserzione delle sue facoltà: le parole continuamente ricorrenti anche nell’Allegoria sono liberare, aiuto, ostacolo, impedimento ecc. […] I vari personaggi tasseschi sono tutti in varia misura partecipi delle varie potenze, e continuano realmente a costituire un’entità complessa ed unica; ma impersonano volta a volta […] una crisi di
Taking up Chiappelli’s argument, I would like to suggest that Rinaldo is not a hero who is conceived of one-dimensionally and can be reduced to his disposition to excessive anger. Characters like Tancredi or Rinaldo are not static, but dynamic. In fact, in the foreground is less the embodiment of individual forces than rather their interaction on both the collective and the individual level, which is indeed conflictual, but ends in reconciliation. I will now turn to the interaction of the individual forces of the soul on the individual level using the example of Rinaldo and in light of the relationship between the irascible and concupiscible faculties just described. In the following I will demonstrate that Tasso connects the shift in the relationship between these forces with Rinaldo’s process of becoming a man.

The anger that erupts in Rinaldo’s duel not only marks a turning point in the fortunes of the army, but also the beginning of Rinaldo’s path of moral development. The description of this moral development shows that it is in fact primarily Rinaldo’s misdirected, irascible martial spirit that is the reason for his disloyalty to the Christian army. But, as Rochon remarks, based on the words that Hugo addresses to Goffredo in regard to bringing back Rinaldo (14.17), the evil of misdirected and excessive anger entails another: that of sinful concupiscence. Rinaldo thus also becomes susceptible to the lustful side of the world, especially to Armida’s arts of love. The same is true, however, for Armida, in that she will fall for the youthful beauty of Rinaldo. Both the fact that Rinaldo stands in a twofold relationship, i.e., to war and to love, and the circumstances in which Armida falls in love with Rinaldo are referenced in a prominent place, i.e., during the military review. There it is said of Rinaldo: ‘se ’l miri fulminar ne l’arme avolto, / Marte lo stimi; Amor, se scopre il volto’ (1.58.7–8).
It is significant that Rinaldo’s similarity to Mars and Cupid is linked precisely with the fact of whether or not he wears his armor, and points to the different stages in Rinaldo’s history of development: the process of changing identity that Rinaldo undergoes is above all coded in the wearing, not wearing, or exchange of war dress.\(^{38}\) Clothing and equipment for war, as will become clear below, stand in a symbolic relationship to the ethos of the warrior based on the values of masculinity and vigor. Clothing and armor are mentioned and used as the medium of poetic design in reference to Rinaldo more often than to any other warrior.\(^{39}\)

The fact that Armida falls in love with Rinaldo is only a result of him falling victim to her plot while he was not wearing his helmet and thus revealing his beauty. This occurs after Rinaldo frees his comrades from Armida’s enchanted castle and she wishes to revenge herself on him for this (14.51–52). Armida is easily able to attract Rinaldo onto a lovely island. He wants to rest and takes off his helmet. Shortly thereafter a female phantasmagoria addresses him with a song in which she tries to dissuade him from the way of the warrior and his search for glory and virtue and win him for the indulgence of desires. The seductive words cause Rinaldo to fall into an unnatural sleep. Armida, who now wants to take advantage of the situation and revenge herself, pauses. When she becomes aware of his beauty, she falls in love with him and carries him to the enchanted garden:

Ma quando in lui fissò lo sguardo e vide
come placido in vista egli respira,
e ne’ begli occhi un dolce atto che ride,
benché sian chiusi (or che fia s’ei li gira?),
pria s’arresta sospesa, e gli s’asside
poscia vicina, e placar sente ogn’ira
mentre il risguarda [. . .]. (14.66.1–7)
[…]
e di nemica ella divenne amante. (14.67.8)\(^{40}\)

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\(^{38}\) See, e.g., the fact that Rinaldo after his departure from the army decides to remove his Christian armor and put on that of a heathen (14.53.1–4).


\(^{40}\) ‘But when she fixed her gaze upon him and saw how calm of countenance he breathes, and how charming a manner laughs about his lovely eyes, though they be closed (now what will it be if he opens them?), first she stands still in suspense, and then sits down
Already the chains of flowers with which Armida binds her victim point to the fact that Rinaldo seems to have lost his warlike qualities (14.68.1–4). This is proven especially when Ubaldo and Carlo, who have been commissioned to bring Rinaldo back from Armida's enchanted garden, hold up to him a shield that reflects his outer appearance. The erstwhile warrior appears soft and effeminate:

Egli al lucido scudo il guardo gira,  
onde si specchia in lui qual si asi e quanto  
con delicato culto adorno; spira  
tutto odori e lascivie il crine e ’l manto,  
e ’l ferro, il ferro aver, non ch’altro, mira  
dal troppo luoso effeminato a canto:  
guernito è sì ch’innutilc ornamento  
sembra, non militar ferro instrumento. (16.30)⁴¹

How does Rinaldo react to this sight of himself? His reaction is already suggested when he catches sight of Ubaldo and Carlo for the first time, as they enter the lovely place in full war gear (‘pomposamente armati’, 16.27.8). Just the sight of their armaments goes some way in snatching Rinaldo out of his slumber and begins to awaken his warlike spirit (16.29.3–6). That it is precisely a shield in which Rinaldo is to see his reflection is no coincidence. It is ultimately the symbols of the warrior, which at the same time have to be seen as symbols of masculinity, which wrench him from his softness and effeminacy. Now also the anger that overcomes the ashamed Rinaldo once he has fully become aware of his condition is characterized by masculinity and a martial spirit. Just as the non-subordination of the irascible faculty to reason favored Rinaldo's indulgence in sensuality, now the same faculty emerges in his fight against concupiscence as the element supporting reason; Rinaldo tears off the clothing that is not worthy of him and wants to leave Armida's garden immediately:

beside him, and feels her every wrath becalmed while she gazes upon him [...]. // [...] and from his enemy she became his lover. // Of lilies, of privet flowers and of the roses that were blooming in those pleasant grounds, with strange art interwoven, then she constructed soft but most binding fetters.'

⁴¹ 'He turns his gaze upon the shining shield, in which is mirrored for him what manner of man he is become, and how much adorned with delicate elegance: he breathes forth all perfumed, his hair and mantle wanton; and his sword, he sees his sword, (not to speak of other things) made effeminate at his side by too much luxury; it is so trimmed that it seems a useless ornament, not the fierce instrument of war.'
Ma poi che diè vergogna a sdegno loco,
sdegno guerrier de la ragion feroce,42
e ch’al rossor del volto un novo foco
successe, che piú avampa e che piú coce,
squarciossi i vani fregi e quelle indegne
pompe, di servitù misera insegne. (16.34.3–8)43

The fact that anger stands in relation to the martial spirit and also to reproductive masculinity becomes obvious when the magician of Ascalon brings home to Rinaldo his genealogical importance—once again using a shield (17.64–83). Until now Rinaldo has not been ready or mature enough to take up his genealogical and reproductive role; indeed, Tasso continually emphasises his not yet fully developed masculinity.44 With his escape from the enchanted garden, Rinaldo may indeed paradoxically have turned his back on his future wife and thus distanced himself from his genealogical destiny, yet this first meeting of the two was not yet characterised by disciplined love and reproduction. The androgynous effeminization of Rinaldo during his stay with Armida and Armida’s show of excessively masculine qualities bear witness to this. Only the last stages of Rinaldo’s development allow the man to mature to the point that he will fully and entirely be able to fill the role assigned to him: in his conversation with Goffredo, he expresses his regret of his excessive anger; he submits to the Christian values and Goffredo’s command; he proves himself in the enchanted forest and together with the army takes Jerusalem. Rinaldo has

42 See on this also Gentilis’ (1587) comment, which Caretti cites in his edition of the text: ‘A saying of Plato, who in several places writes that anger was given to man by Nature to succor reason against the desires, and therefore he compares it to the dog that succors the shepherd against the beast that attacks him.’ (‘Sentenza di Platone il quale in piú luochi scrive che lo sdegno è dato dalla Natura all’uomo per soccorrere la Ragione contro le Cupidigie, e perciò lo compara al cane il quale dia soccorso al pastore incontro alle fiere che l’assalissero.’)

43 ‘But after shame gave place to anger—anger, fierce warrior of reason—and to the blushing of his face succeeded a new flame that blazes stronger and boils more, he ripped off his idle trims, and those unworthy gauds, the wretched insignia of slavery.’

44 His youthfulness and not yet fully developed masculinity is already emphasized in the first canto. Rinaldo is indeed approx. 18 years old, yet: ‘[…] molle piuma del mento a pena usciva’ (1.60.7–8). Erminia also describes him with the words: ’è fanciullo ancora’ (3.38.2). Boyish looks and lack of facial hair as characteristic of Rinaldo recur also in the eighth song: ‘uom giovinetto e senza peli al mento’ (8.54.8). Rinaldo seems to have only become a man after his wanderings and the test in the enchanted forest: ‘ei da lunge in bianco manto / compagnia venerabile e severo’ (18.39.5–6).
learned to set priorities: only after the conquest of Jerusalem does he return to the meanwhile feminized Armida in order to take her as his wife and take on his genealogical responsibility.\footnote{See on this point Careri G., “Rinaldo und Armida: Liebe, Ehre und geschlechtliche Identität”, in Burgard P.J. (ed.), Barock: Neue Sichtweisen einer Epoche (Vienna: 2001) 161–176, 162: ‘The relationship of this pair has a schismogenetic form, as Gregory Bateson would call it: Rinaldo’s transformations are dependent on Armida’s transformations and vice versa; his advances toward masculinity correspond to a symmetrical feminization of Armida.’}

Love and anger are not, contrary to what the one-sided reception history of La Gerusalemme liberata perhaps suggests, oppositional thematic axes. On the contrary, the importance of Rinaldo and his path of development for the plot show that aggressive emotions and sexual desire stand in a complex relational network to each other. The civilization of ‘aggressiveness and sexual desire’ is a ‘means of the warrior society to the attainment of its perfected political form: the absolute power of the Christian king.’\footnote{Ibidem 162.}

Selected Bibliography


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In the prologue to Hans Sachs’ *Tragedia mit 10 personen, die königin Rosimunda, unnd hat 5 actus* dated 12 December 1555, the herald introduces the audience to the plot: it is based on ‘the very sad, true story’ of Rosemond, the daughter of the Gepid king Cunimund.1 Rosemond was forced by her husband, the Lombard king Alboin, to drink from her father’s skull after the victorious Lombards had murdered him; she feels so deeply ashamed that she flares into a rage; she then decides to satisfy her desire for revenge by murdering her sleeping husband with the help of the knight Helmichis, whom she afterwards takes as her lover. The prologue also anticipates the end of Rosemond: having fled together with Helmichis to the court of the Byzantine governor Longinus at Ravenna, she makes a pact with Longinus against Helmichis and poisons him; but the dying Helmichis succeeds in forcing Rosemond to drink the poison too, and both die.2 As is typical for this period, the play is concluded by an epilogue, in which the herald leads the spectators back to the outside world: the negative *trias* “Zorn”, “Wut”, “Rache”, tailor-made for the literary character of Rosemond in the prologue, is now transformed into the normal, ordinary vices of ‘foolishness, carelessness and haste’ that are typical of the bourgeois woman; finally these vices are contrasted with the bourgeois virtues of ‘honour, fidelity and loyalty in marriage’.3

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2 KG 12, 404–405.

3 KG 12, 430: ‘Ein biderweib […] sey nicht gech, unbesint und schnell, […] bedenck ir ehr, trew und ehpflicht’. 
Sachs is one of the first German authors to address the subject of the female furia, popular since Antiquity with artists and poets, in serious theatre. Just two years earlier (on 2 January 1554), he had completed the Tragedia mit 14 personen, die mördisch königin Clitimestra, und hat 5 actus, whose main character is similar in some ways to Rosamond, even if the terms “Wut” or “Zorn” are not applied. In this case the false message of Agamemnon’s adultery with Cassandra leads the ashamed Clytemnestra to take revenge: she commits adultery herself with the young priest Aegisthus and afterwards forces him to murder her husband Agamemnon. On 5 October 1555, only one month after the Rosamond-Tragedia, Sachs also completed the Comedi mit zwey- und-zweyntzig personen, die vertrieben keyserin mit den zweyen verlornen söhnen, und hat sechs actus. In this play, the female protagonist, the (unnamed) wife of the East Roman emperor Heraclius, becomes the innocent victim of her malicious mother-in-law, who is inflamed by “bitter jealousy and hate”. Using a ruse, the mother leads Heraclius to believe that his wife has committed adultery: she orders a valet to lie down beside the sleeping empress in her bed and then calls her son; the angry emperor punishes both immediately: he kills the valet and sentences his wife and her two sons to be burned at the stake. Some years before, in 1552, in the Tragedia, mit 15 personen zu agirn, der wütrich König Herodes, wie der sein drey sön und sein gmahel umbbracht, unnd hat 5 actus, Sachs had already portrayed the kind of angry male character who would subsequently become very popular in German drama. Herod’s sister (Salome) is another female schemer here; she is moved by envy of her rival of her husband or father or of her mother-in-law.

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4 Already in 1551, the German-Bohemian poet Clemens Stephani (ca. 1530–1592) had written a dramatic Historia von einer Königin aus Lamparten, based on Sachs’ early poem Ein erschrökliche histori von einer königin auß Lamparten of 1536 (KG 2, 271–273), where the subject of anger is, however, not explicitly represented.

5 KG 12, 317–341. Sachs’ source, the example of Clytemnestra in Heinrich Steinhöwel’s German translation of Giovanni Boccaccio’s De mulieribus claris (ed. K. Drescher [Tübingen: 1895] 120–122), however, already introduces ‘Wut’ (for the Latin ‘audacia’) as a key word.

6 KG 8, 161–196.

7 KG 8, 161: ‘Darob des keysers muter was / Entzündt in bitter neyd und haß’. Blamires D., “Victim Heroines in Hans Sachs’ Plays”, in Aylett R. – Skrine P. (eds.), Hans Sachs and Folk Theatre in the Late Middle Ages: Studies in the History of Popular Culture (Lewiston, N.Y.: 1995) 105–138: 107, mentions this figure in passing as one of the heroines becoming ‘the victim of a rival of her husband or father or of her mother-in-law’.

8 KG 8, 162.

9 KG 11, 132–141.
sister-in-law (Mariamne) to persuade the pathologically jealous king to decapitate first his innocent, virtuous wife and then their two sons.\textsuperscript{10}

Angry figures are also numerous in Hans Sachs’ master songs and rhymed poems. Mostly these are male characters taken from the Old Testament or Greek and Roman Antiquity.\textsuperscript{11} Their increasing number is certainly indicative of the general importance attached to this subject in contemporary public discourse and therefore in the social practices with which Sachs was closely concerned in his writing. The following is an analysis of the literary representation of anger within this manageable corpus of texts in a synchronic direction. I would like to focus in particular on two different but also intertwined aspects: the specific connotations of gender and the specific differences of literary genre. This double focus will, of course, also lead back out of the texts into the historical context and to the discursive structures that constitute it.

Even at first glance, the angry figures of both sexes are always a decidedly negative category. Their conduct is characterized by an uncontrolled and therefore inevitably unjust use of force and violence. The short introduction to the Historia. Von den dreyen haidnischen mörderischen frawen in which in 1538 Sachs had already brought together the three ancient characters Clytemnestra, Tullia and Cleopatra, brings the relationship between anger and murder very clearly into focus: these three pagan women, he writes, were left with shameful memories because of their furious killing.\textsuperscript{12} In adopting this position, Sachs was conforming to the common moral philosophical conception of his time, which was heavily influenced by the Christian-Stoic model that condemned anger as one of the main vices and as a mortal sin.\textsuperscript{13} This model had been strongly reinforced by Italian humanism since the mid-fifteenth century, and in the sixteenth merged powerfully with the Lutheran doctrine of grace. One key Humanist text was, of course, Petrarch’s De remediis utriusque fortunae, which

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{10} KG 11, 132.
\bibitem{11} The male figures are generally distinguished by the attribute ‘Wüterich’ or ‘Tyrann’; often we find a remake both as a poem and a master song (sometimes written on the same day) and we can also observe chronological series (for example in 1542/43, 1545 and 1551/52). A complete overview, though beyond the scope of this paper, can be obtained with the help of Niklas Holzberg’s recently compiled repertory of Hans Sachs’ complete works; the manuscript was kindly made available to me by the author.
\bibitem{12} KG 2, 294–298 (14 May 1538): 294: ‘Man find haidnischer weiber drey / Sind durch ihr wütend mörderey / In schendlicher gedechtnuß bliben’.
\end{thebibliography}
had already in the fifteenth century been circulated widely in the German territories before being published by Heinrich Steiner in Augsburg in a complete German translation in 1532. The fact that the self-taught shoemaker and poet Hans Sachs purchased a copy of it for his private library is a strong indication of the general effect this work had outside academic circles, in the urban middle classes, which were only partially familiar with Latin. In Sachs' library we also find an important ancient reference text, *Sittliche Zuchtbücher*, which is the German translation of Seneca's *Dialogues*, compiled by the Alsatian doctor and translator Michael Herr and published in Strasbourg in 1536. Sachs' intensive study of this work is attested by a series of poems focusing on single human emotions. As for anger, Sachs had already made explicit use of Seneca’s *De ira* on 30 May 1540 in a poem and a master song. In both of these, special attention is given to the 'pictorial' representation of the abomination of anger that Seneca provides in the detailed introduction to his text. But Sachs was interested in this subject also in later times. In fact in 1563 (on 22 May), he presented a revised version of the first poem, entitled *Der abgemalet zorn*. In the didactic part, which is now more detailed and has been formally separated from the descriptive part, the author appeals to the reader to face up to the psychological, physical, material and moral damages caused by anger and to combat them with useful qualities of reason and wisdom.

Especially interesting for the present topic is another—largely unknown—work of Sachs': the rhymed *Kampff-gesprech zwischen zorn und senfftmütigkeit*, written on 31 March 1542. The poem distinguishes itself from the above-mentioned text series by the dialogue strategy and by the presence of implicit gender-specific connotations that extend beyond the general moral discourse. It is one of eight disputations that each deal with different antithetical pairs of values, creating together a catalogue of virtues and vices that appears closely

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15 Milde, “Bücherverzeichnis” 49.

16 Milde, “Bücherverzeichnis” 53; the German translation and their authors are still completely unexplored except for in the following brief article: Wickersheimer E., “Herr, Michael”, *Neue Deutsche Biographie* 8 (1969) 679.


18 KG 20, 493–496: 496: ‘Derhalb […] ein mensch […] mit der vernunfft den zoren zem […] mit weißheit derselb überwind’.
modelled on the Christian tradition. In view of the fact that they were written to be staged, as is explicitly expressed several times in the text, this genre is undoubtedly related to the dramatic form. The dialogues themselves are always preceded by an epic introduction in the first person that acts as a kind of dramatic prologue. In the present case, the narrator (the master of the house), lying awake at night in his bed, receives a ‘strange’ visitor: a female form of repulsive exterior and monstrous gestures. In addition, a lovely, gracious woman arrives and reveals to the deeply frightened narrator the identity of the uninvited dangerous guest: it is Anger. Then she asks him to chase Anger out of his house, so that she herself—Meekness—may take Anger’s place and provide future protection for the life, honour and possessions of the master of the house. Anger spits venom and raises his defence: he is brave and honest, strong in every emergency, bold and valiant; that is why he is so useful in war and for the punishment of injustice. With these characteristics, Anger collocates himself explicitly with the ‘strong’, male side, automatically provoking a contradiction with his allegorical representation as a woman; on the other hand, passive Meekness is assigned to the ‘weak’ female side.

Meekness’ reply, filling the entire rest of the poem, refutes all of Anger’s arguments, and refers explicitly to the ancient auctores, notably Seneca’s *De ira*, from which Sachs clearly borrows his structure and argumentation. This is evident for example in the parallels between his allegorical description of anger and Seneca’s ‘portrait’: the flaming and flashing eyes, the seething blood and

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20 Thus the narrator starts with the words: ‘Hört zu ein wunderliches wunder!’ (KG 3, 142); on the relationships between Kampfgespräch and drama in Sachs’ early work, see Stuplich B., *Zur Dramentechnik des Hans Sachs* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: 1988) 69–72.

21 KG 3, 142. The situation is characterised by the tension between fantastical-nightmarish moments (‘wunderliches wunder […]’. Du bist ein geist und gspenst’) and the explicitly identified waking state of the narrator (‘Als ich in einer nacht lag munder / In meym bett, / Sach ich bey des mons schein gar scharff / Zu meiner lincken stehn ein bild’).

22 KG 3, 142.

23 KG 3, 142.

the changing colour of the skin, the bared, clenched teeth, the cracking of joints and finally the choppy, stammering speech. Meekness in Sachs’ poem also invalidates the arguments put forward by Anger, particularly the male characteristics he claims for himself, with explicit reference to Seneca’s definition of rage as a disturbance primarily found in women and small children, its presence in men being attributed to ‘infantile and female characteristics’. Just as in Seneca, Meekness presents an antithetic catalogue of properties of anger—as being snivelling, vindictive, dangerous, devious—that were firmly established in contemporary misogynistic discourse and therefore connoted as mainly female in the collective consciousness. By contrast, the external effects of anger that consist in ‘strengthening all tyranny, nourishing every kind of anger and helping to rob, burn and kill, destroying the land and the kingdom, refer primarily to typical male fields of action. By analogy, the examples for angry conduct, which Sachs takes from Seneca, are exclusively male (Alexander, Ajax, Xerxes, Nero). The description of the specific symptoms of anger includes not only the realm of the mind and the emotions (Anger ‘fills the heart with bitterness, turmoil, vengeance and ignorance, so man does not know what he is doing’), but also the body, where wrath causes severe organic disorders. So wrath is equated with a real disease, a concept that can be traced back again to Seneca, who frequently draws parallels with the medical field. This is the case for example with the second book of De ira, where the humoral pathological predispositions of iracundia are discussed extensively. In view of the strong interest in medical and natural history to explain variations in body, health and gender, which is a hallmark of the German reception of De ira in the sixteenth century, it must also be borne in mind that the contemporary translation of the text was created by a trained academic doctor.

26 KG 3, 142–143: ‘Sein augen schussen wie ein schlang […] Mit seinen zenen es grißgrammet, / Zerbiß sein lefftzen allesammet / Sein blut sach ich in adren wallen / Auch loff im über sehr die gallen. / Ietz war es rot, daenn wurd es bleich / Im kracheten all seine gleich […] Ließ aus ein unverstending gal, / Mit halben wortten, vipretem mund’.
31 Seneca, De ira 113–114. Based on characters who are both gender-specific and portrayed in terms of humoural pathology, Seneca also describes angry affects, which in children and women are more sharp than weighty and start more softly than in men.
Unlike the two poems and the master song, which are rather shorter, focusing only on the phenomenology of anger and concluding with a short but powerful refutation of this affect, the disputation also reworks the therapeutic discourse that constitutes the real heart of Seneca’s essay. Thus Meekness presents different, sometimes very concrete strategies to thwart and overcome Wrath.\textsuperscript{32} Suitable examples are again provided by the famous wise men of ancient times: the stoic philosopher Athenodorus Cananites, Aristotle and Socrates, Chilon of Sparta, Heraclitus of Ephesus, the Macedonian king Philip II., and Seneca himself; concluding with his own name, Sachs finally leads the literary discourse back to the present.\textsuperscript{33}

Sachs’ disputation transforms Seneca’s description of anger into a visible phenomenon in an allegorical figure, whose clearly female identity is in contradiction with the grammatical gender of the German noun “Zorn”, used by the translator for the (female) Latin “ira”.\textsuperscript{34} However, this figure belongs to a tradition that embraces the iconographical and rhetorical conventions of Late Medieval representations of virtues and vices; an example are the wooden sculptures of the six female figures as allegories of the mortal sins created by the Nuremberg sculptor Peter Dell Senior around 1540.\textsuperscript{35} On the other hand, the historical discourse in the allegorical scene uses crossed signification (anger as a manifestation of female characteristics in men) to redirect the female features of Anger to men. Thus man becomes the real object of the literary discourse: both (negative and positive) categories of historical examples, presented by Meekness in the second part of her reply, are male.

As mentioned above, Sachs adds to the collection of angry men in numerous poems, dramas and master songs, where the individual character is always marked as ‘Wüterich’ or ‘Tyrann’; these texts can therefore be summarized into a specific thematic category. Using these two attributes as synonyms and creating in this way a fixed collocation of anger and tyranny, Sachs focuses primarily on the subject of political governance, to which Seneca had previously devoted considerable attention. This also applies to the above-mentioned drama of Herod the Great, the Roman client king of Judea, who is a classic example of an

\textsuperscript{32} Weber, “Beeindruckende Emotionen” 52, observes that moral religious discourse of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries focused not so much on the intimidating effect of anger, but on the possibility of counteracting it with the antidote of reason.

\textsuperscript{33} KG 3, 148.

\textsuperscript{34} Seneca, $De$ ira 158, had already associated $ira$ with the ancient Furies.

angry women and men in German drama

Also based explicitly on a historical subject, this drama is about Herod’s cruel murders of his wife and his own children, which precede the real ‘History of the Jewish War’, narrated by Flavius Josephus in the fifteenth book (chapter 9) of his *Jewish Antiquities*, which in 1532 was published for the first time in a German translation. The main male character is embedded in a complex structure of *dramatis personae*, in which, above all, the two female characters—his wife Mariamne and her sister-in-law Salome—also have important roles. These seem to be clearly defined by the herald in the prologue: on the one hand, Herod’s violence against his wife is characterized by impatience and injustice; on the other hand, Mariamne is endowed with the highest female virtues of chastity and fortitude. With the sneaky Salome she finds a female antagonist, who has a like-minded male ally in Antipater, Herod’s eldest son. In contrast, Mariamne’s role of innocent victim is shared by her own two sons Alexander and Aristobulus. These clear distinctions will eventually become blurred. Thus the short, impersonally formulated moral communicated by the herald in the epilogue confirms on the one hand the negative value of Herod as an example for the uncontrolled, angry exercise of power, while on the other hand putting a clear share of the blame on everything and everyone around him. While the usual court critics predictably denounce the vices of hypocrisy and slander (with clear reference to Salome), the audience is surprised by the critical view of the role of the wife (and thus of Mariamne): she is exhorted not to give encouragement to men and not to be recalcitrant towards her husband, because such conduct may arouse uncontrollable jealousy and suspicion in him, which always have a negative impact on everyone. A closer look at the text reveals that this advice corresponds with a short dialogue between the ‘satellites’ Thiro and Ewclides in the penultimate scene of the second act, in


38 On the *Josephus teutsch*, the German translations of the Latin version of the *Jewish Antiquities* and the *History of the Jewish war*, see Niefanger, *Geschichtsdrama* 100–101.


40 KG 11, 160–161.

41 KG 11, 161: ‘Welch fraw nicht thut manßbilder fliehen […] Und auch mit kleydung sich auffmutzt, / Mit worten ieren ehman trutzt, / Die entzündet ieren ehman / Die eyffersucht und den argwan’.
which both comment on the death sentence imposed by Herod on Mariamne: the former’s belief in her innocence contrasts with the latter’s argument that the Queen must have herself provoked her husband’s unreasonable decision with her ‘naughty words’. Ewclides is referring here to the fierce war of words between the spouses at the beginning of the act. In the first act, Herod had arranged for the assassination of his wife in the event of his not returning from a stay in Rome with Emperor Augustus, with the aim of preventing anyone after him from possessing her; Mariamne, who has succeeded in discovering this secret from the courtier Seemus, now accuses her husband of marital infidelity and lack of trust. She thus brings his anger on both herself and the traitor Seemus, as the stage direction indicates: ‘Herodes spricht zorniglich’. In this way, the play at least partially appropriates the critical view of the female protagonist in the historiographical source (the German Flavius Josephus), where the uncontrolled, angry conduct of Mariamne is much more clearly worked out, and the ethical-moral distance between herself and Herod is thus reduced. The drama, however, explicitly emphasizes the emotional shock experienced by Mariamne, who suddenly leaves the stage in tears after Seemus has revealed to her the content of Herod’s secret letter.

In his drama, then, Sachs uses the widespread motif—found in various manifestations in all genres of art—of the shrewish hag, embedding it with the help of the dialogue (between the ‘satellites’ as well as the spouses) in a dialectical structure, which produces a relativising effect. A particularly obvious parallel is Albrecht of Eyb’s Ehebüchlein, published in Nuremberg in 1472, which in the chapter entitled ‘So die fraw wolredende und zornig ist’ is highly critical of the inclination of the woman to raise her voice against her husband. Another analogy is to be found in the chapter “Von bosen wibern” in Sebastian Brant’s...

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42 KG 11, 141–142.
43 KG 11, 138.
44 KG 11, 139. The same formula is repeated several times in the course of the drama, including the last words of the dying Herod (KG 11, 159).
45 For a comparison between the drama and its source, see Niefanger, Geschichtsdrama 101–102, who, however, does not take into consideration the ambiguous traits of Mariamne in Sachs’ drama.
46 KG 11, 136.
1494 *Ship of Fools*. Here the author reproduces on the one hand the misogynist stereotype of anger as a genuinely female predisposition (illustrated by a series of female examples), but on the other hand also insists on the wife’s duty to manage her husband’s ire. These few examples should be sufficient evidence that the vernacular German literature of the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries developed a particular interest in the phenomena of anger and affects in general, which is different from the corresponding Humanist tradition: the framework of the discussion of anger is now primarily marital discourse, with a clearer emphasis also on female anger as a concrete, everyday reality with a specific character. More strictly than men, women are denied the right to feel and act out of anger, which is defined as a form of marital disobedience and therefore as a violation of the ‘natural’ hierarchy of gender, which guarantees indispensable protection of reason and morality. Consequently, the woman is pushed in marriage into the docile and passive role, but this is also a redemptive and educational role which, according to ancient tradition (in particular Seneca), philosophers performed for statesmen and governors. In Hans Sachs’ *Herod-Tragedia*, the discursive dialectic between prologue and epilogue indicates exactly the point of intersection of two different discourses: on the level of the historico-political discourse, Mariamne is the innocent victim of the choleric and therefore unjustified action of the tyrannical Herod, whose wrath, incidentally, stands in radical contrast with the always just divine anger; on the level of the matrimonial discourse, on the other hand, with her unrestrained behaviour against Herod, Mariamne neglects her duty as wife, and is therefore responsible for her husband’s rage.

The outpouring of Herod’s wrath is preceded by his specific portrayal as ‘Wüterich’, which is explained to the audience by the epic figures of the princes Seemus and Josippus in the second scene of the first act: Seemus accuses Herod of being much too severe and too tyrannical, while shortly afterwards Josippus refers to his passionate jealous love, the ‘brinnet lieb’, which is akin to the mortal sin of lust. The subsequent quarrel between Herod and Mariamne then

49 Brant Sebastian, *Narrenschiff* 318.
50 Badura, „Figuren der Wut, Figuren des Zorns“ 150–156, focuses on the literary subject of God’s wrath, in particular on the subject of ordeal, which Sachs uses for example in *Ein tragedi, mit acht personen zu agieren, die falsch keyserin mit dem unschluldigen grafen, hat fünff actus*. (31 August, 1551; KG 8, 107–130).
provokes the volatile Herod to fury and sets in motion an unstoppable spiral of violence: the irascible Herod is manipulated first by the scheming Salome and then by his eldest son Antipater, to the point where he orders the murders of his wife and his younger sons. He ends up being devoured by rage, in the truest sense of the word. The relevant symptoms of this pathological process manifest themselves first on the psychological level: when Herod comes to his senses after the murder of Mariamne, he falls into depression, feeling deep remorse for breaching the trust of his wife, who has always been so dear to him; immediately afterwards, the ‘satellite’ Thiro comments on the king’s insanity. In the fifth act, when Herod is finally confronted with the betrayal of his eldest son Antipater, the deathly disease has spread from his heart, the centre of the emotions, to his whole body. His urgently summoned personal physician speaks of ‘a wild fire’ burning Herod’s body, causing the decay of the viscera, while his swollen limbs are infested with enormous parasitic worms. The diagnosis appears consistent with the ancient doctrine of humoral pathology, already mentioned above, which had been passed down from Antiquity to the Middle Ages and the Early Modern period and was widely accepted in the scientific literature of the time. One example is Conrad of Megenberg’s Buch von den natürlichen Dingen (written between 1335 and 1350), a copy of which, along with other popular science texts, Sachs had in his private library.

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52 KG 11, 142–143; the same reaction pattern recurs in the fifth act after the murder of the two younger sons Alexander and Aristobulus (KG 11, 155). In his recent analysis of this drama, Fromholzer F., Gefangen im Gewissen. Evidenz und Polyphonie der Gewissensentscheidung auf dem deutschsprachigen Theater der Frühen Neuzeit (Paderborn [u.a.]: 2013) 71–85, reduces Herod’s angry madness to his inability, typical of the tyrannical character, to feel guilty and to take responsibility for his actions; this flaw is indicated clearly by the gaps in his memory related to the murders.

53 KG 11, 143–144.

54 KG 11, 157–158: ‘Nun bin ich [Herodes] gleich todt kranch von hertzen. / Mein gantzter leib der ist mit schmertzen / Umbfangen, dergleiych mein gemüht / In mir zappelt, dobet und wüht’. Fromholzer, Gefangen im Gewissen 82–84, interprets the process of physical degeneration in Herod as evidence of internal self-punishment that does not include, however, any real repentance and thus does not lead to salvation; the spectators are thus shown, ex negativo, the relevance of the Christian practices of repentance and penance.

55 KG 11, 158.

56 Riha, “Emotionen” 16.

The historical subject of Herod provided Sachs with the material for an almost prototypical literary representation of male anger in the dramatic medium. While the play minutely traces the psychological origins and the gradual development of anger as a form of pathological madness, the moral doctrine of the epilogue collocates the strategies for its prevention and control in social practices, notably in marriage and gender order. In this way, the drama connects to a literary tradition dating back to the High Medieval epos. An example is Hartmann von Aue's representation of the mad Iwein, whose rage and anger are a phase in the development of a disease spreading from the emotional field to the different parts of his body.58

Rosemond is the complementary female prototype to Herod in Sachs' drama. The author also deliberately chose a historical subject in her case, thus insisting on the connection between the literary representation and extra-literary reality.59 The title of the play provides no information about Rosemond's character; she is simply presented as 'Queen'. In the prologue, Rosemond's fury is clearly associated with the deep shame caused her by her husband Alboin, who is thereby put in a critical light. This perspective persists in the play itself, where Alboin is introduced in the first act as a haughty character, who seriously maltreats his initially unsuspecting wife.60 Alboin's superbia (another mortal sin or capital vice),61 makes him blind to external reality. The macabre ritual which he performs in order to impose on his Gepid wife his own Lombard custom codex,62 demonstrating to her his superiority as a political enemy, damages her self-respect and social image and therefore her trust in her husband.63 The obdurate, unrepentant Alboin subsequently refuses to make any conciliatory gesture, even though his councillors Gunipertus and Adoalphus urge him to do so; he thus underestimates the eminent danger of

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59 KG 12, 404: ‘Ein kleglich trawrige geschicht, / Wahrhafft geschen und nit erdicht’.
60 KG 12, 406, Rosemond expresses her desire to dine with her husband and unsuspectingly accedes to his request to drink from the cup.
61 In 1536 (20 March), Sachs treats this subject in his poem Die sieben haubtlaster mit ihren sündlichen anhangenden leydenschaften (KG 3, 357–360); see Schade, “Todsündendidaktik” 573–574.
62 KG 12, 404.
63 KG 12, 407, Rosamond accuses her husband of being ‘untrew’ to her.
Rosemond’s possible revenge. In accordance with these negative traits of the dramatic character, the epilogue first reminds the bourgeois man of his duty not to unjustifiably insult his wife; but this advice is ideologically founded on the usual misogynistic discourse, involving the stereotype of ‘difficult’, because faint-hearted and irritable, woman who for ‘petty reasons’ attempts revenge. The same stereotype is employed by Adolphus in the above-mentioned dialogue with Alboin at the beginning of the second act. The epilogue pointedly plays down Alboin’s conduct, while unilaterally positioning Rosemond in the role of the culprit. This strategy is a wholesale borrowing of a fixed pattern of interpretation dating back to Giovanni Boccaccio’s *De casibus virorum illustrium*, which Hans Sachs knew very well. Boccaccio not only gives the Lombard Queen her own chapter, but also takes her furor as an opportunity to embark on a misogynist excursus (‘In mulieres’). Here, virtuous ‘pious women’ are warned not to proudly demand things which are not due their gender, because, in order to obtain those things, they would inevitably be tempted to exceed the limits of decency and fall into the abyss of eternal shame. Thus Boccaccio depicts Rosemond’s anger as deriving exclusively from her own moral weakness as a woman and also presents a specific female pattern of reaction, based on women’s affinity for mental furor and physical lust. In comparison, in Sachs’ drama, this tradition of misogynist discourse is embedded in a more complex perspective, which is aligned with a pragmatic teaching on marriage. The effects of the passion are thus traced back to the interaction between woman and man, introducing a rudimentary bilateral structure.

64 KG 12, 410–412.
65 KG 12, 430: ‘Wann weiblich gschlecht das wird bald schwirig / Durch kleine ursach oft rachgirig / Und ubt gech unbesinte rach, / Die sie oft lang zeit rewt hernach’.
66 KG 12, 410: ‘Wann das weiblich gschlecht ist weichmütig, / Wird bald in zoren grim und wütig / Und ist geneiget zu rachsal’.
67 Blamires, “Victime Heroines” 107, however, assigns Rosemond to the category: ‘the heroine is goaded or tested to excess by her husband’, together with Marianne and Griselda; such categorization not only conflicts with the message of the epilogue, but also fails to take account of the different traits of the complementary male characters.
The drama describes very precisely the depressive mood which precedes Rosemond’s wrath. Immediately after she has been shamed by Alboin, she leaves in a state of profound sadness and falls again into mourning for her murdered father.\footnote{KG 12, 406–407, her state of sadness is stressed several times by the stage direction and by the dramatic speakers.} It is clearly a threatening condition that is not yet in any way connected with the Humanistic doctrine of affects, according to which melancholy was a state of mind between desperation and creativity, a concept expressed profoundly by the Nuremberg artist Albrecht Dürer in his famous copper engraving \textit{Melencholia I} of 1514.\footnote{Röcke W., “Die Faszination der Traurigkeit”, in Benthien C. (ed.), \textit{Emotionalität. Zur Geschichte der Gefühle} (Cologne: 2000) 100–118: 114–116, with the \textit{Faust}-book, also draws a connection to the literary discourse of the sixteenth century. See also Demmerling C. – Landweer H., \textit{Philosophie der Gefühle. Von Achtung bis Zorn} (Stuttgart: 2007) 270–271; for a general overview of this subject, see Klibansky R. – Panofsky E. – Saxl F., \textit{Saturn and Melancholy: Studies in the History of Natural Philosophy, Religion and Art} (London: 1964). On the German speaking area, see Wittstock A., ‘Melancholia translata: Marsilio Ficinos Melancholie-Begriff im deutschsprachigen Raum des 16. Jahrhunderts’ (Göttingen: 2011).} Sachs develops a kind of counter-discourse in his poem \textit{Gesprech der Philosophia mit eynem melancholischen, betrübten jüngling} of 1547, in which the rhetorical and discursive structures are in some ways analogous to the dispute between Anger and Meekness analysed above.\footnote{Klein D., \textit{Bildung und Belehrung. Untersuchungen zum Dramenwerk des Hans Sachs} (Stuttgart: 1988) 260–264, compares Sachs’ poem with Dürer’s picture, according to Klibansky – Panofsky – Saxl, \textit{Saturn und Melancholie}, who quote the poem as a typical example of representations of the \textit{morbus melancholicus} in late medieval allegorical literature; on the other hand, Kemper H.-G., “Träume eines melancholischen ‘bidermans’ (H. Sachs)”, in Kemper H.-G., \textit{Deutsche Lyrik der frühen Neuzeit 1} (Tübingen: 1987) 246–281, here 250–251, associates Sachs’ literary portrait with the Renaissance discourse of melancholy.} The dreaming narrator extensively describes the symptoms of Melancholy, who has introduced herself into his house in the form of an old witch and is blowing an ill wind his way. He asks Philosophy to help him to get rid of this uninvited guest, who threatens however to return. Philosophy’s advice on how to prevent this is to adopt an active approach to life: positive thinking, studies, work, sociability and piety.\footnote{KG 4, 141–146 (2 November 1547); see Klein, \textit{Bildung und Belehrung} 261–262. Sachs deals with the subject of sadness also in the master song \textit{Die trawrikeit} and in the poem \textit{Frau Traurigkeit mit irer ayygenschaft} (both 9 July, 1544), which present two almost identical adaptations of an aphorism of Plutarch inspired by the unfortunate destiny of the Macedonian Queen Arsinoe, also used by Sachs as tragic heroine in 1559.}
The poem describes passive acedia, characterized by lethargy and longing for death.\textsuperscript{74} Rosemond’s sadness on the other hand results from real pain and, in combination with anger, develops an aggressive potential. This variant echoes medieval descriptions of madness, which closely relate sadness and wrath as two complementary phases of a pathological process.\textsuperscript{75} Unlike the irascible Herod, whose behaviour is determined by mental derangement (between bouts of depression), Rosemond’s madness has method, in that it manifests itself as a meticulously planned and executed strategy of revenge. In the third act, for example, she uses a disguise to convince Helmichis that she is actually the maidservant Amata, in order to make him go along with her plan.\textsuperscript{76} Rosamond demonstrates negative qualities such as falsehood, arrogance and recklessness, which were connoted as female in the collective thinking of the time and which can also be found in Clytemnestra, who, in an obvious state of pathological delusion, uses a ruse to enlist the help of her lover Aegisthus for her revenge on Agamemnon.\textsuperscript{77} In both cases (Rosemond and Clytemnestra), the motive of personal revenge has a political dimension. The order of gender and the political order are directly correlated here: female revenge inevitably threatens patriarchal domination, which can be reconfirmed only by male counter-revenge and/or the death of the heroine. In Clytemnestra’s case, the revenge taken by her son Orestes presents an antithetic male pattern of action, which implicitly recalls the Old Testament concept of just divine anger, used frequently by Sachs in his religious works (in particular in his master songs).\textsuperscript{78}

In the drama, the concept is transposed to a secular field by the judge’s verdict, which formally acquits Orestes of the accusation of matricide.\textsuperscript{79} On the other hand, in the drama of Rosemond, the motif of adultery—and hence the affinity between female lust and anger, suggested by Boccaccio—is treated only marginally and is not explicitly mentioned in the epilogue.

\textsuperscript{74} Melancholy appears here as a variant of Idleness, a figure particularly prominent in Sachs’ poem \textit{Geprech mit dem schnöden Müssiggang} (KG 3, 486–490) from 1535; see Schade, “‘Todsündendidaktik’” 569–570.

\textsuperscript{75} Again refer to Hartmann’s \textit{Iwein}; see Schmitt, “‘Wahnsinn’”.

\textsuperscript{76} KG 4, 415–417.

\textsuperscript{77} At the beginning of the second act the valet Dion observes that Clytemnestra is ‘blind’ (KG 12, 322) and, at the beginning of the fourth act, Prince Taltibus comments: ‘Sie ist beraubet ihrer sinn’ (KG 12, 331).

\textsuperscript{78} Also in this case, for a complete overview, see the repertory of Niklas Holzberg.

Rosemond, indeed, first makes an alliance with Helmichis and then delivers him to Longinus, who has fallen in love with her; but the motivation for her revenge is still linked to the restoration of the political power of her tribe.80 The dramatic discourse, then, can be distinguished from other literary representations of this subject, notably Sachs’ own earlier poem *Erschröcklich histori von einer königin auß Lamparten* (14 January, 1536),81 which focuses strictly on the adulteress. Clytemnestra, driven by the vices of jealousy and lust in her adultery with Aegisthus, also fits into this pattern. Another example is provided by the ‘lusty’ duchess Romilda of Friuli in Boccaccio’s *De casibus virorum illustrium*, who also appears in a poem and a master song by Sachs, written on 13 May 1545. Moved by ‘angry desire’, Romilda betrays her own subjects to the enemy, King Cacanus of Bavaria, with whom she is madly in love and who in return promises to marry her.82 Thus she provokes her own ‘sad end’: after the wedding night, the cruel and unfaithful Cacanus allows her to be raped by twelve of his men and then orders them to impale her. A direct male counterpart can be found in the ‘lusty’ King Helgo of Denmark, the protagonist of a master song of 1547, who falls victim to the revenge of a virgin he had previously raped.83

In conclusion, the literary texts analysed above depict rage and anger as examples of the individual transgression of a collective order; both phenomena are always related to violence, which is why giving vent to anger never has a positive, liberating effect but always causes disorder, destruction and new guilt, which in turn manifest themselves variously as disease, tyranny, war, murder and suicide. In the context of the patriarchal order, the male figures exceed the collective norms which limit their scope for autonomous action, while the female figures, to whom such autonomy is not conceded at all, subvert the order itself.

In addition, anger always appears as a reaction to a strong emotion or feeling of pain, often associated with aggression, which triggers in the individual the inexorable need for revenge on the supposed or real aggressor. The root

80 In the second act Rosemond has not yet committed adultery (KG 12, 416); only in the fourth act, after the murder, does she address Helmichis as ‘hertzlieb’ (KG 12, 422–423).
81 All these adaptations are based on the much more ancient *Historia Langobadorum* by Paulus Diaconus, used by Boccaccio in his *De casibus virorum illustrium*.
83 Sachs again takes the subject from Albert Krantz’s *Danish chronicle*. 
causes of this reaction pattern can be found in a disturbance or latent instability of the social order deriving from an internal (tyranny) or external (war) form of violence. The external element closely corresponds to an internal, psychological instability of the character, dominated by “strong emotions”, such as pride, jealousy, hate or lust. Like anger itself, those emotions had been rigidly codified as capital vices in the literary tradition since the Middle Ages. In this way, the emotional discourse in these texts remains closely connected with the moral discourse, which is, however, clearly separated from the metaphysical concept of sin that characterizes the High Medieval theological tradition. The predisposition to anger as such an affective and moral weakness is anchored in the female characters, above all in their gender (overlapping with the common stereotype of the shrewish wife), while the male characters are marked by the specific typology of the “Wüterich”. Specific gender differences can also be observed in the ways in which anger is expressed: in the male figures it is hot-temper (iracundia) that dominates and discharges into acts of spontaneous direct physical violence; on the other hand, female anger is mainly associated with sadness and converts into cold-blooded, secret strategies of revenge.

Sachs depicts anger as a counterpart of virtue, and sees its high emotional energy as dangerous and harmful to health. This conception owes much to the Late Medieval vernacular tradition, which Klaus Grubmüller analyses in an exemplary manner in the works of Heinrich von Mügeln. Grubmüller considers the related emotion of sadness, anger, to be in conflict with collective norms (so it can never be, as in modern psychology, a ‘normal emotion’); it is crucial that the emotional transgression of those norms does not lead to divine furor, as in the case of the heroine’s anger in High Medieval epos or of the melancholy of the Renaissance genius. In Reformation period drama, especially, new possibilities emerge for a more complex, psychological analysis of anger, which takes account of the importance of human interaction (especially between woman/wife and man/husband), while at the same time representing a clear break from the moral and didactic strategy of the epilogue, which aims to provide semantic clarity and encourage conformity to the norms.

85 For the literary figure of the angry hero, see Grubmüller, “Historische Semantik” 51–54.
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Pierre Corneille’s *Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste* in Light of Contemporary Discourses on Anger (Descartes, Le Moyne, Senault)

Jakob Willis

1 Heroism and Anger

A hero or heroine is generally conceived as an exceptional figure who fights for the values of a community with courageous and selfless actions. Alongside gods, heroes are an essential part of the imaginative repertoire of all cultures from antiquity until the present day and comprise—at least in terms of the heroic pantheon of occidental cultures—fictional figures like Hercules, Achilles and Siegfried as well as historical personalities like Alexander the Great, Napoleon and Nelson Mandela. However, heroes are only heroes for and within specific groups, which they serve as figures of projection and identification as well as having important ethical, social and political functions.

In order to establish a minimal systematic definition, I would like to suggest that a hero is characterized by the following set of four necessary attributes: agency, transgression, *agon* and charisma. Heroes have the capability to act or exert power (agency); they exceed the bounds of ordinary human abilities, expectations and norms (transgression); they struggle in either physical, mental or intellectual ways (*agon*); and they inspire enthusiasm and allegiance through their power of authority (charisma). Regardless of the different historical and cultural contexts, a hero or a heroine can thus always be understood as a figure whose exceptionality lies at the intersection of these four indispensable attributes.\(^1\)

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1 For a more detailed discussion of possible definitions of heroic figures, heroism, media of heroisation, etc., see the paper summarizing the theoretical positions of the Collaborative Research Centre “Heroes—Heroizations—Heroisms. Transformations and Conjunctures from Antiquity to the Modern Day” at the University of Freiburg: von den Hoff R. et al., “Helden—Heroisierungen—Heroismen. Transformationen und Konjunkturen von der Antike bis zur Moderne. Konzeptionelle Ausgangspunkte des Sonderforschungsbereichs 948*, *helden.heroes.héros. E-Journal zu Kulturen des Heroischen* 1 (2013) 7–14. The Collaborative Research Center 948, supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG), has provided the institutional framework for this paper as well as for my PhD project on the construction and reception of heroic figures in seventeenth-century French literature.
In addition to this formal pattern, heroes can also be analysed with regard to their specific emotions. Throughout various forms of their cultural representation, heroic figures are rarely conceived as being apathetic. Quite the contrary, archetypical heroes such as Achilles, Roland or Joan of Arc are often represented as experiencing and provoking strong emotions, with compassion, pride and anger being especially frequent.2

The emotion of anger (colère) and the semantically related emotions of fury (fureur) and wrath (courroux) play a central role in heroic narratives in the premodern as well as in the modern era. Homer’s Iliad, Seneca’s Hercules furens, the early Irish epic Táin Bó Cúailnge, the Old English epic poem Beowulf, the French national epic La chanson de Roland, Ariosto’s Orlando furioso, Schiller’s Die Jungfrau von Orleans, Melville’s Moby Dick and Kazan’s Viva Zapata! are only a few of the most famous examples of the topical idea of furor heroicus. This strong emotion transports the hero beyond the limits of ordinary human scale, both physically and mentally reaching an extraordinary, socially often problematic sphere ‘beyond good and evil’. When the hero is driven by furor heroicus, he enters into an ecstatic state of frenzy in which he is no longer receptive to moral or rational considerations.3 In most cases, these literary and cinematographic representations of an excessive mode of heroic emotion, which can in extreme cases lead even to significant bodily transformations, are directly linked to situations of fighting and emphasize the hero’s agon. The Ulster warrior Cú Chulainn of the early Irish epic Táin Bó Cúailnge, for example, crosses the physiological boundary between man and animal by developing canine traits when entering the battle mode.4

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3 In sociological terms, this state of emotional turmoil can best be described with Émile Durkheim’s notion of “effervescence”: ‘l’homme devient autre. Les passions qui l’agitent sont d’une telle intensité qu’elles ne peuvent se satisfaire que par des actes violents, démesurés: actes d’héroïsme surhumains ou de barbarie sanguinaire.’ Durkheim E., Les formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse (Paris: 1991) 372.

Although the heroes of Pierre Corneille’s tragedies never reach a state of battle frenzy as intense as some of the aforementioned warriors, the idea of a *furor heroicus* plays an important part in his conceptualization of heroism as well. As we will see, some of Corneille’s most famous heroic figures, like the Cid, Horace and Nicomède, are characterized, at least to some extent, by heroic anger, fury and wrath. However, Corneille’s tragedy *Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste* (1642) marks a new conceptualization of heroism including a critical re-evaluation of anger, a tendency which developed during the second half of the seventeenth century in France.⁵ In this paper I analyse the transformation of Corneille’s modelling of heroic emotions in light of contemporary discourses on anger, referring to texts by Pierre le Moyne, René Descartes and—most importantly—Jean-François Senault.

Although the ongoing scholarly interest in Corneille has produced a great many studies on various aspects of his work, the topic of anger has so far been approached at most in passing. Bruno Méniel’s extensive research on the semantics of anger in the context of heroic narratives of the pre-modern era does not extend to Corneille’s theatre,⁶ and Roxanne Roy and Margot Brink’s relevant studies focus on other authors of the French seventeenth century.⁷ Jean-Philippe Gosperrin has dealt with the notion of *fureur* in a number of Corneille’s plays, like *Médée, Horace* and *Rodogune*, but limits his interpretation to the mythological topos of *furor* as a form of female distraction and madness.⁸ In an article on the emotional characteristics of some of Corneille’s heroines (*Médée, Théodore, Sophonisbe, Dirce*), Myriam Dufour-Maître

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⁵ The exact date of the first performance of the play remains unknown. According to Georges Couton, the play must have premiered in August or September 1642 at the Théâtre du Marais. For further information, see Corneille Pierre, *Œuvres complètes I*, ed. G. Couton (Paris: 1980) 1574.


approaches the question of the dramaturgy of violent feelings. According to her, it is above all the heroism of Sophonisbe which manifests in the emotion of wrath (*courroux*), a ‘force passionnelle poussée à l’incandescence’. In her study on the meaning of *vertu* in Corneille’s work, Astrid Grewe sheds light on the ambivalent nexus between his idea of rational control and the role of certain emotions. As Grewe points out, emotions like *courroux*, *colère* and *fureur* can sometimes appear morally legitimate, in which case attributes like *juste*, *noble* or *généreux* are often used to indicate approval. Finally, Loris Petris comes closest to analysing the heroic dimension of anger in *Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste*. In an article on Corneille’s rhetoric of magnanimity, he stresses the fact that Auguste proves to be a hero, an ‘avatar du magnanime’, by a ‘suprême victoire sur sa colère’, that is,—in our terms—a domination of his *furor heroicus*.11

2 **Furor heroicus in the Theatre of Pierre Corneille**

Within the large corpus of Pierre Corneille’s tragedies, the idea of anger is of seminal importance for a model of heroic emotions intimately linked to contemporary aristocratic discourses on honour, value and virtue. In most of the plays, the hero’s anger, even in its most excessive mode, is qualified as a justified response to disrespectful behaviour. By angrily reacting to an insult, the proud hero, who defends his cause with impetuosity, embodies an important aspect of the idea of a noble *générosité* characteristic of the heroic ideals of the aristocracy before and during the rebellion of the Fronde. After the Frondeurs’ final defeat in 1653, the French nobility had to increasingly adapt to the new political situation of absolutism with its emotional regime of courtly and urbane *honnêteté*—an emotional regime which explicitly turned against the idea of impetuosity driven by anger. As Christa Schlumbohm and Margot Brink point out, ‘[o]n passe de la colère vue comme une passion noble au bon usage de la colère civilisée dans le cadre des idéaux nouveaux de la bienséance et de l’honnêteté’.12

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12 Brink M., “La colère dans le processus de la civilisation” 142. In her seminal article on the transformation of female concepts of heroism during the *siècle classique*, Christa
Of the many possible examples of a Cornelian *furor heroicus*, I will briefly discuss two of its most representative manifestations in the plays *Le Cid* (1637) and *Nicomède* (1651): Rodrigue, the main character in *Le Cid*, accepts the challenge to fight a mortal duel because of an affront to the honour of his father and proves himself a hero precisely by the ‘colère’ (1,vi,264) he displays when faced with the news of the insult to his family. Don Diègue, Rodrigue’s father, is enthusiastic to see his son correspond so well to his own image of impulsive and vehement heroic emotionality:

Digne ressentiment à ma douleur bien doux!  
Je reconnais mon sang à ce noble courroux,  
Ma jeunesse revit en cette ardeur si prompte  
(1,vi,265–267)

Chimène and the Infanta, who are both in love with Rodrigue, describe the hero in similar terms. They see him as courageous, young, valiant, and—as mentioned in passing—full of anger:

*Chimène*  
Rodrigue a du courage.  
*L’infante*  
Il a trop de jeunesse.  
*Chimène*  
Les hommes valeureux le sont du premier coup.  
*L’infante*  
Tu ne dois pas pourtant le redouter beaucoup,  
Il est trop amoureux pour te vouloir déplaire,  
Et deux mots de ta bouche arrêtent sa colère.  
(II,iii,483–488)

However, in her optimistic view the Infanta underestimates the complexity of the tragic situation in which Rodrigue and Chimène are caught: Rodrigue

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is impelled by his honour and his anger to kill Don Gomès, who is both the offender of his father as well as the father of his beloved. In a social context in which honour is undeniably the highest value, his furious revenge killing of Chimène's father is paradoxically the only way to prove that he deserves her affection.

Nicomède, the eponymous hero of the second play I will briefly discuss, embodies the idea of a *furor heroicus* in an even more telling way than does Rodrigue. Already in the very first scene, when the hero is introduced in a meeting with his beloved Laodice, we encounter his main emotional characteristic: anger and fury. ‘Enflammé de courroux’, literally burning with wrath like, Nicomède hurries to the palace in order to take revenge for the murder of his heroic role model Hannibal and to end the imprisonment of Laodice:

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Lorsqu’à cette nouvelle, enflammé de courroux,
D’avoir perdu mon maître, et de craindre pour vous,
J’ai laissé mon Armée aux mains de Théagène,
Pour voler en ces lieux au secours de ma Reine.
(I,i,29–33)
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Throughout the play, Nicomède proudly and aggressively confronts his opponents. In Act ii, Scene iii, for instance, he insults his father, King Prusias, for his inability to deal with his political duties, and declares his own determination to continue fighting for the cause of his country. When Prusias tells his son to mind his language (‘Et vous devez dompter l’ardeur qui vous emporte’ [II,i,628]), the latter flies into a greater rage than ever before. Like a proud and dangerous animal (he is actually compared to a lion in Act v, Scene iii), Nicomède violently defends his and his country’s cause. Various other traits, such as his ‘orgueilleux esprit’ (II,iv,729), his ‘courage fier’ (IV,iv,1378), and his ‘juste colère’ (I,v,355) as well as his ‘prompt et bouillant’ character (ibid. 357), complete the description of an irascible temperament typical of a great number of Cornelian heroes.14

14 Quite contrary to his prior violent and revengeful behaviour, Nicomède presents himself at the end of the play as a pacifier who forgives his enemies and pleads for a merciful treatment of the rebellious people. The sudden moral conversion of Nicomède is a dramatic turn which, as Corneille explains in the *Examen* preceding the 1660 edition of the text, is mainly a concession to the ‘gout des spectateurs’ (Corneille, *Œuvres ii 644*). For a more detailed analysis of the play and its political context as well as its treatment of heroic emotions and affects, see Willis J., “Emotions and Affects of the Heroic—An Analysis of Pierre Corneille’s Drama Nicomède (1651)”, in Korte B. – Studt B. (eds.), *helden.*
The Transformation of Heroic Emotions in *Cinna ou la clémence d'Auguste*

Corneille's play *Cinna ou la clémence d'Auguste* (1642) displays significant changes in this literary discourse on heroic anger. Against the political backdrop of the consolidation of absolutism, within the moral context of Neostoicism, and still under the impression of the controversy caused by his preceding plays *Le Cid* and *Horace*, Corneille makes a shift from the heroic emotion of anger to that of clemency. In an unusual move, he gives the play a title referring to two heroic figures—the only other play of the Cornelian corpus for which this is true is *Tite et Bérénice* (1670)—which seems to imply an ambivalence of heroic emotions, a latent conflict which unfolds in the radical...

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15 For the historical and political implications of the play, see the commentary in Corneille, *Œuvres complètes* i 1582–1591.

16 Jacques Maurens has dedicated a large study to the influence of Neostoicism in the work of Corneille. For Neostoic elements in *Cinna ou la clémence d'Auguste*, see Maurens J., *La tragédie sans tragique : le néo-stoïcisme dans l’œuvre de Pierre Corneille* (Paris: 1966) esp. 269–276. Marc Fumaroli also emphasises the influence of Seneca's idea of a moral *exemplum* on Corneille's play: Fumaroli M., "Ethique et rhétorique du héros humaniste—Du Magnanime à l’Homme de ressentiment", *Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature* 4/5 (1976) 167–201, esp. 186. As Ellen McClure has indicated in a recent article, the hero of Corneille's play *Horace*—staged one year before *Cinna ou la clémence d'Auguste*—is already greatly influenced by the model of Neostoicism and even 'presents himself in many respects as the perfect Lipsian Stoic' (McClure E., “Neo-Stoicism and the Spectator in Corneille's *Horace*”, in Birberick A.L. – Ganim R.J. – Persels J. (eds.), *Spectacle* (Charlottesville: 2010) 151). The fact that Corneille prefixed his first edition of *Cinna ou la clémence d'Auguste* with an excerpt from Montaigne's translation of Seneca's *De clementia*, one of the central texts of Stoicism, can serve as additional proof of the influence of (Neo-)Stoic ideas. With regard to the different contexts of the political and ethical theories related to the configurations of clemency in the works of Seneca, Montaigne, Corneille and Metastasio, see Rudolf Behrens's seminal essay: Behrens R., "Die Macht der Milde. Konfigurationen der clementia als Herrschaftsührung bei Seneca, Montaigne, Cornelle und Metastasio", *Romanistisches Jahrbuch* 52 (2001) 96–132.

17 As Georges Forestier underlines in a preface to the play, Corneille tried systematically to avoid the same errors he had made in *Le Cid* and *Horace* and which had led to a multitude of violent accusations. He was successful and gained recognition from both the public and the critics as a result. See Corneille Pierre, *Cinna ou la clémence d'Auguste*, ed. G. Forestier (Paris: 2005) 8–12.
confrontation of characters displaying the traditional model of heroic anger with the new concept of a hero showing leniency.\(^{18}\)

In order to make the following interpretation more comprehensible, I will give a brief summary of the play, which, according to the author’s assertion in the *Examen* of the 1660 edition, evoked a ‘grande approbation’ among its contemporary critics and is still today regarded as one of Corneille’s most accomplished works.\(^{19}\)

Set during the early reign of Roman Emperor Augustus, who had thus far ruled like a brutal tyrant, the main story tells of an assassination plot against him organized by a group of Roman citizens and led by the young and charismatic Cinna. The driving force behind the conspiracy is Cinna’s beloved Emilie, whose father was killed during Augustus’s violent rise to absolute rule. Emilie has sought revenge ever since and stirs up Cinna by promising him marriage. When the play begins, however, Augustus already seems to have undergone a change of mood and announces to Cinna and Maxime, a co-conspirator, that he is thinking about abdicating. In order to be able to keep his promise to Emilie and kill the ruling tyrant, Cinna convinces the Emperor to withstand the desire to lead a more peaceful life. He succeeds in talking Augustus into continuing his difficult task of ruling and is generously rewarded for his advice. Faced with Augustus’s changing attitude, Cinna begins having considerable qualms about the righteousness of his assassination plot. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that his friend Maxime is also passionately in love with Emilie. Driven by jealousy, Maxime decides to reveal the whole conspiracy to Augustus in order to get Cinna, his rival in matters of love, out of the way. When the Emperor discovers the conspirators’ machinations, he is at first thoroughly disappointed and summons Cinna in order to mete out a severe punishment. But then—under the decisive influence of his wife Livie—Augustus decides to overcome his anger and pardons the whole group of conspirators. The former tyrant thus turns himself into a virtuous hero and serves as an *exemplum*, a moral and emotional role model for Cinna, Maxime and Emilie. However, in the first part of the play, the heroic model of anger prevails.

In the very first scene of *Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste*, Emilie expresses her passionate desire for revenge in a long monologue. Considering Augustus’s

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18 The idea of a clement monarch of course has a long tradition which goes back to the writings of philosophers and poets of antiquity, and was discussed by Seneca in his *De clementia*. The focus of my argument, however, is limited to the transformation of heroic emotions within the corpus of Corneille. After the young noblemen Rodrigue and Horace, Augustus is the first monarch to be presented as a heroic protagonist.

brutal behaviour in the past as well as his present position of power and glory agitates Emilie with a profound desire for revenge. She describes her feelings as ‘fureur si juste’ (I,ii,17) and ‘juste courroux’ (V,ii,1603) and resolves to stay faithful to her emotional and moral imperative even though she is at the same time worried about endangering her lover Cinna. Hence, two conflicting emotions struggle in her heart: hatred for Augustus and love for Cinna. The latter even appears to be the stronger emotion, for it seems to be capable of cooling down the ardour of her desire for revenge:

Au milieu toutefois d’une fureur si juste,
J’aime encor plus Cinna que je ne hais Auguste,
Et je sens refroidir ce bouillant mouvement
Quand il faut pour le suivre exposer mon Amant.
(I,i,17–20)

Similar to Rodrigue in Le Cid, Emilie fights against her feelings of love and tenderness and succeeds in giving priority to her duty of noble revenge. Her self-esteem and her glory, that is, her social standing as an honourable person, depend entirely on her controlling her affection for Cinna. In Emilie’s idea of heroic conduct, love may play only a secondary role when duty calls. Loyalty to her father’s heroic idea of honour and courage is revealed as the value Emilie still holds highest when, later in the play, she becomes convinced that Cinna’s conspiracy has failed and therefore contemplates suicide. In this passage, in which she invokes her father’s spirit, the emotion of noble wrath (‘généreux courroux’) is linked in a very distinct manner to the blood of great heroes (‘Le sang des grands Héros’):

N’ayant pu vous venger je vous irai rejoindre;
Mais si fumante encor d’un généreux courroux,
Par un trépas si noble, et si digne de vous,
Qu’il vous fera sur l’heure aisément reconnaître
Le sang des grands Héros dont vous m’avez fait naître.
(IV,iV,1310–1314)

While at the beginning of the play Emilie experiences the conflict between her feelings of furious revenge and tender love, the group of conspirators led by Cinna is driven by the violent emotions of anger, fury and wrath. When Cinna tells Emilie about the last meeting of the conspirators, he assures her that ‘tous font éclater un si puissant courroux’ (I,iii,151) and ‘[j]amais de telle ardeur on […] jura la mort’ (I,iii,147). Recalling more details of the group’s reaction to
his plans of tyrannicide, he explicitly mentions the mental and even physical transformation of the group of ‘hommes de courage’ (I,iii,145) driven by *fURor heroscius*. Some feelings of guilt and horror nevertheless remain:

Plût aux Dieux que vous-même eussiez vu de quel zèle  
Cette troupe entreprend une action si belle !  
Au seul nom de César, d'Auguste, et d'Empereur,  
Vous eussiez vu leurs yeux s'enflammer de fureur,  
Et dans un même instant, par un effet contraire,  
Leur front pâlir d’horreur et rougir de colère.  
(I,iii,157–162)

By rhetorically stirring up their emotions of pride, hate and revenge, Cinna succeeds in mobilizing the whole group for Emilie’s plan.20 The emotion of anger thereby reveals its potential as a means of political transformation that renders people capable of literally doing anything: ‘voyant leur colère / Au point de ne rien craindre, en état de tout faire’ (I,iii,213–214)—this is how Cinna describes the group’s state of mind. Given the fact that the conspirators construe the reign of Emperor Augustus as a criminal repression of their republican ideals of political justice and moral righteousness, his assassination seems legitimate and the play celebrates the anger of the group as the decisive emotional trigger of their act of heroic liberation.21 As anger can of course also lead to acts considered unheroic and criminal—such as, for instance, when Emilie refers to Augustus’s ‘implacable colère’ (I,iv,301)—, it is the moral orientation of the intended act that ultimately decides how the emotion will be evaluated. In the case of many of Corneille’s heroes, who like Rodrigue and Nicomède fight against malevolent aggressors and usurpers, the anger of the rebellious heroes clearly motivates heroic deeds and is consequently judged a ‘passion noble et héroïque’.22

However, in *Cinna ou la clémence d'Auguste* the situation is more complex. As mentioned above, Augustus undergoes a remarkable moral transformation and shows unexpected generosity towards Maxime and Cinna. Rewarding them

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22 Brink, “La colère dans le processus de la civilisation” 130.
for their advice and supposed loyalty, he treats them like friends and presents them with a moral dilemma. Is it still justified to punish Augustus for his past crimes by assassinating him, or does his conversion make this morally impossible? Throughout the third act, Cinna tries to find a solution to his dilemma and is already about to abandon his plans when Emilie, insisting on the assassination with fierce determination, obliges him to fulfil his promise. Against his own conviction, Cinna prepares to commit the ‘crime forcé’ (II, iv, 1064).

While at this point of the play Cinna is endangering his previously undisputed status as a virtuous hero, Augustus is about to become the actual hero. After the revelation of the conspiracy, his wife Livie, who wants to break the unending spiral of violence, suggests to him a new political strategy in which the emotion of anger is replaced by clemency: ‘Essayez sur Cinna ce que peut la clémence’ (I, iii, 1210). But Augustus is not immediately ready to follow Livie’s advice. In his view, the conspiracy is still an offense ‘[d]ont il faut qu’il la venge, ou cesse d’être Prince’ (I, iii, 1254). He angrily rejects her ‘conseil salutaire’ (I, iii, 1257) and walks off. But Livie is convinced that pardoning the conspirators would serve the pragmatic purpose of calming the political tensions and thus strengthen Augustus’s rule. Moreover, in her eyes, leniency would mark him as a true monarch:

Il [Augustus] m’échappe, suivons, et forçons-le de voir
Qu’il peut en faisant grâce affermir son pouvoir,
Et qu’enfin la clémence est la plus belle marque
Qui fasse à l’univers connaître un vrai Monarque.
(I, iii, 1263–1266)

When the confessions of Cinna, Emilie and Maxime at the beginning of Act V make Augustus aware of the full extent of the conspirators’ machinations, he at first laments his tragic fate (V, iii, 1693–1695). But then, quite suddenly, he affirms his liberty to decide, all by himself, the course of events. In a passage

23 Franziska Sick shows that the conflictual tension between monarch and hero, typical of Corneille’s early tragedies, is most distinctly expressed in Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste. See Sick F., “Tragisches Potential und untragisches Ende. Absolutistische Konzepte in den frühen Dramen Corneilles”, in Behrens R. – Galle R. (eds.), Historische Anthropologie und Literatur. Romanistische Beiträge zu einem neuen Paradigma der Literaturwissenschaft (Würzburg: 1995) 91–107. In my opinion, the play’s conflictual tension can also be interpreted as a conflict between two models of heroism and heroic emotions.

24 With Christopher J. Gossip, Wolfgang Leiner, Sheila Bayne and Andreas Kablitz, I argue for the interpretation of a sudden conversion of Augustus in Act V. In my opinion, there are not enough convincing arguments for situating the hero’s late conversion—as does René Pommier (Pommier R., “Quand Auguste décide-t-il de pardonner?” , XVIIe Siècle XLV
which has become very famous, he declares his authority over the whole universe and, what is even more important, over his own emotions. He considers the overcoming of his angry and revengeful feelings as his greatest triumph and proclaims himself determined to establish a new reign of clemency. As immediate proof of his good intentions, he also offers more political influence and even friendship to Cinna:

Je suis maître de moi comme de l’Univers.  
Je le suis, je veux l’être. Ô Siècles, ô Mémoire,  
Conservez à jamais ma dernière victoire,  
Je triomphe aujourd’hui du plus juste courroux  
De qui le souvenir puisse aller jusqu’à vous.  
Soyons amis, Cinna […]  
(V,iii,1696–1701)

After having first addressed Cinna, he then turns to Emilie in a fatherly fashion in order to persuade her to follow his example of clemency and vanquish her anger, too:

Aime Cinna, ma fille, en cet illustre rang,  
Préfères-en la pourpre à celle de mon sang,  
Apprends sur mon exemple à vaincre ta colère  
(V,iii,1711–1713)


25 Rudolf Behrens emphasises the play’s nexus between rhetorical control and political sovereignty. According to his convincing interpretation, Augustus paradoxically proves most powerful when rhetorically performing clemency, i.e., a renunciation of power. See Behrens, “Die Macht der Milde” esp. 122–124.

26 In his later play Tite et Bérénice (1671), Corneille presents a hero struggling against his strong feelings of love. He clearly alludes to the famous line from Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste but modifies its meaning considerably: ‘Maître de l’Univers, sans l’être de moi-même, Je suis le seul rebelle à ce pouvoir suprême’ (11,i,407–408).
Impressed by Augustus’s generous ‘acte de magnanimité’ and his moral and emotional conversion, Emilie actually consents to his appeal and announces that her emotional transformation is already taking place, as can be seen by the use of the future and present tense in this passage:

Ma haine va mourir, que j’ai crue immortelle,
Elle est morte, et ce cœur devient Sujet fidèle,
Et prenant désormais cette haine en horreur,
L’ardeur de vous servir succède à sa fureur.
(v,iii,1725–1728)

To sum up, the play’s shift from the heroic emotion of anger to the heroic emotion of clemency can be described as follows: while Emilie, Cinna and their group of conspirators—the heroes of the old order—are still addressing their ‘fureur si juste’ (i,i,17) and their ‘généreux courroux’ (iv,iv,1311) in order to appeal to their code of noble values and norms and to justify the intended tyrannicide, Augustus is beginning to fight against his own natural bent toward ‘implacable colère’ (i,iv,301) and ends up appearing as a heroic emperor who glorifies himself not only as ‘master of the universe’ but also as master of his own violent emotions. A world of fury and violence is replaced by a world of clemency and peace; a former villain turns himself into a virtuous hero and immediately serves as a new role model for Cinna, Maxime and Emilie. This is why Augustus can give Emilie the advice which sums up the play’s key moral lesson: ‘Apprends sur mon exemple à vaincre ta colère.’

What needs emphasising at this point is the fact that the two models of heroic emotion discussed in Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste are closely related to the political and social roles of the two heroes. The young and rebellious Cinna, who has justified claims to an important political position but is to a large extent excluded from participation, faces an unjust situation which can legitimately, if necessary even violently, be transformed—in the logic of the Roman idea of political justice as referred to by Corneille.28 In this context, the emotion of anger as an important motivating force can be perfectly integrated


28 André Georges rightly points out that Cinna’s main motivation for the tyrannicide remains his love for Émilie. As Cinna acts as deputy of her social and political as well as personal interests of retribution, his conspiracy plan is nevertheless closely related to
into a concept of heroic agency. Whereas a hero like Cinna defines himself as a fighter against unjust conditions, norms and laws, a heroic monarch like the morally converted Augustus considers himself above all a preserver of justice and peace. He is not interested in the transformation of a given situation but, on the contrary, seeks to maintain the status quo. In light of these observations, it is not surprising that, in various historical situations, representation as a lenient and generous peace-maker is a common mode of the heroification of a monarch. As will be shown, the transformation of heroic emotions from anger to clemency both depends on the topical idea of the just ruler and expresses a more general historical change in the discourses on anger.

4 French Discourses on Anger around 1640

The idea of anger-driven heroes like Cinna or Nicomède largely represents the moral and emotional ideals of the French nobility in the first half of the seventeenth century. After the suppression of the rebellion of the Fronde, the aristocratic elite had to increasingly adapt to the political situation of absolutism with its new emotional regime of courtly as well as urbane honnêteté. Amidst these political and social changes at the macro level, a historical transformation

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29 Although in De ira Seneca is altogether very critical of the social and political uses of anger, he grants on several occasions that it can under some conditions actually be a useful impetus for necessary courageous behaviour. See Seneca Lucius Annaeus, De Ira/Über die Wut, ed. and trans. J. Wildberg (Stuttgart: 2007) 25–27.

30 Only one of many possible examples is Pierre Corneille's play La toison d'or (1660). On the occasion of the Treaty of the Pyrenees and the resulting marriage between Louis XIV of France and Maria Theresa of Spain, Corneille heroises the king as a peace-maker in an allegorical prologue. See Corneille Pierre, "La toison d'or", in idem, Œuvres complètes III, ed. G. Couton (Paris: 1987) 205–289.

31 The context of the rebellion of the Fronde (1648–1653) is an important key to understanding the exceptional status of Nicomède (1651). Corneille probably modelled his hero Nicomède on the contemporary image of Louis II de Bourbon-Condé, the famous "victor of Rocroi", also known as the “Grand Condé” who was considered to be one of the greatest military heroes of his time and who was one of the leading figures of the aristocratic rebellion against Anne of Austria and Cardinal Mazarin. For a detailed analysis of the play's historical dimension and its ‘interprétation pro-condéenne’, see the commentary in Corneille, Œuvres II 1471–1476. For an even broader discussion of the political implications of Corneille's work during the time of the rebellion of the Fronde, see Couton G., Corneille et la Fronde: théâtre et politique (Paris: 2008).
of the semantics of anger was also taking place: anger, which, as Christa Schlumbohm and Margot Brink have shown, was for a long time considered a noble passion and ostentatiously displayed in public, was gradually transformed into a more civilised feeling and almost entirely lost its social value by the end of the century. In his Dictionnaire universel of 1690, Antoine Furetière, for instance, gives examples of the term’s contemporary use which not only express the idea of a violent human emotion but also refer to anger (colère) as a characteristic of animals:

COLERE.f.f. Emotion de l’ame, fougue, impétuosité des animaux, qui les fait agir & s’emporter contre ce qui les offence. C’est une vertu aux hommes de sçavoir arrester les transports de leur colere. C’est la brutalité des animaux qui les fait suivre les mouvements de leur colere.32

In fact, the emotional regime of the heroic, as represented in literature, was modified considerably during the second half of the century. Authors such as Guez de Balzac, La Rochefoucauld, Madame de Scudéry, Madame de Lafayette and Bossuet helped to establish a new heroic regime based on emotions such as humility, compassion, friendship and love.33

Rather than continuing to focus on political and social changes and their possible impact on contemporary discourses on anger, I will now turn to a selection of scientific, moral and aesthetic texts on anger and heroic emotions. Following a brief discussion of the idea of anger in Pierre Le Moyne’s La gallerie des femmes fortes (1647) and René Descartes’ Les passions de l’âme (1649), I will mainly focus on Jean-François Senault’s De l’usage des passions. Published in March 1641, this book was reissued several times during the following years—there were already five new editions by 1645—and was probably read and discussed by a large number of people interested in the nexus between emotions

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33 In his Entretiens, Guez de Balzac, for instance, first states that the two famous scholars Julius Caesar Scaliger and Joseph Justus Scaliger are ‘dignes du nom de Heros’ but then criticises them for not being sufficiently able to control their anger: ‘[J]’ose dire auec le respect qui leur est deû, que l’vn & l’autre Heros, Pere & / Fils, aussi-bien que les deux Cousins Achille & Aiax, ont peu travaillé à retenir leur cholere, & qu’ils se sont laissé aller à d’estranges emportemens.’ (Guez de Balzac J-L., Les entretiens (1657) 1, ed. B. Beugnot (Paris:1972) 239.) On the topic of a new concept of heroism in the context of the culture of aristocratic honnêteté, see Chariatte I., La Rochefoucauld et la culture mondaine: portraits du cœur de l’homme, (Paris: 201).
and morals.\textsuperscript{34} There is no evidence that Corneille himself knew Senault’s text, but—given the book’s success and the play’s first performance in August or September 1642—it is not impossible either. Irrespective of whether or not Senault’s tractate might have had a direct influence on Corneille’s play, there are many structural analogies between the two texts worth mentioning. The following discussion of theories of anger in Le Moyne, Descartes and Senault therefore places Corneille’s play and its treatment of anger in the broader context of contemporary discourses on (heroic) emotions.

In his book \textit{La gallerie des femmes fortes}, the Jesuit preacher and poet Pierre Le Moyne, who was one of the most prolific writers of his age on the topic of heroes, heroism and heroic values, comments on several occasions on the uses and dangers of anger.\textsuperscript{35} In a passage in the second part of his book, entitled “Si les femmes peuvent prétendre à la Vertu héroïque”, Le Moyne states that ‘[c]e n’est pas la hauteur de la taille, ny la force du corps qui fait les Heros: c’est la grandeur & l’élevation de l’Ame; c’est la vigueur & la fermeté de l’Esprit’\textsuperscript{36}—virtues which are accessible both to men and women. He then points out that, according to the classical authors of antiquity, ‘l’Amour & la Colere estoient les Passions dominantes des Heros’,\textsuperscript{37} but at this point in his text he leaves the question unanswered whether he considers it more heroic to give in to one’s strong emotions or to fight and eventually overcome them. Some pages further on, however, he once again underlines the equality of men and women and lets fall a more precise hint concerning his concept of a heroic attitude towards the emotion of anger: ‘Elles [the women] ne sont pas moins capables de bien user de la Colere, de purifier son feu par un autre feu plus spiritual; & la mener au supreme degré de l’Honneste par un transport Heroïque.’\textsuperscript{38} In light of this last explanation, it becomes evident that Le Moyne considers it necessary to purify anger in order to integrate it into the pattern of heroism. In his view, anger can

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\textsuperscript{35} Among other texts, he published a series of odes called \textit{La France guérie, odes adressées au Roy, sur sa maladie, sa guérison miraculeuse, ses dernières conquêtes et ses vertus héroïques} (1631), a \textit{Lettre héroïque envoyée à Mgr le Prince en Catalogne} (1648), a book on \textit{Devises héroïques et morales} (1648) and a heroic epic called \textit{Saint Louys, ou le héros chrétien}, which includes, as an introduction, a long \textit{Traité du poème héroïque} (1653).
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\textsuperscript{37} Ibidem 312.
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\textsuperscript{38} Ibidem 316.
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serve as a decisive *moven* for heroic conduct, provided that it is applied to a just cause and used in moderation.\(^{39}\)

In his book *Les passions de l’âme*, published in 1649, two years after Le Moyne’s *La gallerie des femmes fortes*, René Descartes discusses the emotion of anger in a more detailed way. Articles 199 to 203 give his definition of anger and explain its relation to his ideal anthropological model, the *homme généreux*.\(^{40}\) First of all, Descartes defines anger as ‘une espèce de haine ou d’aversion que nous avons contre ceux qui ont fait quelque mal, ou qui ont tâché de nuire, non pas indifféremment à qui que ce soit, mais particulièrement à nous’.\(^{41}\) In his opinion, anger is very often accompanied by a desire to take revenge for an act of aggression or an insult. It is a strong impulsive reaction—a violent ‘agitation du sang’.\(^{42}\) However, as he explains in article 201, there are two types of anger: the very sudden and violent one, which also manifests itself physically, and a more hesitant and internal one. Whereas the first type of anger disappears as quickly as it appears and often leads to a feeling of regret, the second type is a more ‘profonde haine’, which ‘ronge davantage le cœur’ and forms part of a person’s malevolent character.\(^{43}\) Although Descartes admits in article 203 that anger, especially the sudden and violent first type, ‘soit utile pour nous donner de la vigueur à repousser les injures’, he clearly warns against its excessive outbreak.\(^{44}\) In his opinion, the attitude of *générosité* and its resulting esteem of ‘l’empire absolu sur soi-même’ is the best remedy against any excess of anger.\(^{45}\)

*L’homme généreux* follows his own principles of virtue and honour and is not as easily irritated as *l’homme orgueilleux*, who depends entirely on the

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\(^{39}\) In an enlightening paper on both Le Moyne and Corneille’s concepts of admiration and catharsis, Bradley Rubidge underlines the importance of anger within Le Moyne’s theory of the *poëme héroïque*. See Rubidge B., “Catharsis through Admiration: Corneille, Le Moyne, and the Social Uses of Emotion”, *Modern Philology: A Journal Devoted to Research in Medieval and Modern Literature* 95, 3 (1998) 316–333, esp. 330–333. As I have tried to show, there is a profound ambiguity in Le Moyne’s concept of anger, for it is at the same time a condition for, and a danger to, *vertu héroïque*.

\(^{40}\) For a detailed discussion of Descartes’ idea of *générosité* and a possible connection to the Cornelian concept of heroism, see Schöpf S., “Ist der Cid ein Kartesianer? Von Psychologie und Ethik in Descartes’ ‘Traité des passions’ und Corneilles *Le Cid*”, *HeLiX-Dossiers zur romanischen Literaturwissenschaft* 4 (2011) 83–101, esp. 100.


\(^{42}\) Ibidem

\(^{43}\) Ibidem 272.

\(^{44}\) Ibidem 273.

\(^{45}\) Ibidem
recognition of others. In Descartes’s view, therefore, anger not only appears as a harmful and dangerous emotion but also as a sign of ‘les âmes […] les plus basses et les plus infirmes.’

Several years before the publications of Le Moyne and Descartes, Jean-François Senault’s *De l’usage des passions* (1641) already gave a detailed account of the social and moral status of anger. In this text, Senault, a Jesuit writer and preacher who later became Bourdaloue’s predecessor as Supérieur général of the Oratoire du Louvre, develops a theory of emotional control which, although explicitly directed against Stoicism, owes much to Seneca’s *De ira* and *De clementia*. As argued above, it is not impossible that Senault’s theory had an impact on Corneille’s play *Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste*.

In the *epître* to Richelieu preceding the treatise, the author sums up his main arguments: Richelieu, who is said to be ‘plus heureux que l’Hercule de la Grece’, is glorified specifically as a hero of self-control: ‘Vous employastes vostre force contre vous-mesme […] vous declarastes la guerre à vos Passions’ and—unlike Alexander the Great, who ‘avoit eu plus d’ambition de se rendre le Souverain du Monde que le maistre de ses Passions’—is said to have finally succeeded in managing his dangerous emotions. In contrast to the Stoics, who, according to Senault, tried to ban emotions altogether, he suggests moderating and refining them. In the case of Richelieu’s emotional self-control, for instance, even a violent affect like anger becomes a ‘juste indignation, qui n’ayant point d’autre objet que le crime, merite plûtost le nom de vertu’. When Richelieu is engaged in a struggle against enemies in neighbouring countries like Spain and England or—even more important to Senault—against Protestant heretic rebels inside his own country (‘l’Heresie’), his soul stays tranquil while his anger ‘porte la terreur dans les pays étrangers’ and to the city of La Rochelle, the centre of the Huguenots. Similar to Le Moyne’s later concept of a just use of anger, Senault, in his *epître* to Richelieu, puts forward his idea of the

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47 The range of different influences—Stoic, Augustinian, Jesuit—may be one reason for the theory’s sometimes striking incoherence. This incoherence shows most clearly in Senault’s preface to his book, where he places himself in the context of philosophical and religious discourses and refers to some of his most important influences, above all Augustine.
48 According to Georges Couton, however, Corneille’s main contemporary sources were Nicolas Coëffeteau’s *Histoire romaine* (1623) and Scipion Dupleix’s *Histoire romaine* (1638). See Corneille, *Œuvres complètes* t 1581.
50 Ibidem 5.
51 Ibidem 10.
52 Ibidem 5.
righteous use of anger in the interest of the monarchy and the Catholic religion. Although the topics of anger, vengeance and violence feature prominently in the treatise itself, the praise in the *epître* of ‘juste indignation’, ‘justes ressentiments’, and ‘juste vengeance’ is clearly motivated by the intention to present a flattering portrait to ‘Monseigneur l’Eminentissime Cardinal Duc de Richelieu’. Later in the text, however, Senault’s disapproval of the emotion of anger is expressed more openly.

In the second part of the book, where a whole chapter (called *traité*) is devoted to a reflection on anger, Senault first writes about ‘la nature, des proprietez et des effets de la Colere’ (287–295) before then concentrating on the ‘mauvais usage de la Colere’ (295–302) and finally commenting on the ‘bon usage de la Colere’ (303–310). As he states at the beginning of the chapter, ‘la colere n’est autre chose qu’un movement de l’appetit sensitive qui recherche la vengeance d’un outrage’. Even though he considers anger to be ‘moins criminelle que la Haine’, it is ‘la plus farouche de nos Passions’, which ‘en peu d’heures […] fait bien des ravages’. In contrast to Aristotle, who, according to Senault, believed anger to be a noble and reasonable passion, he highlights the emotion’s destructive force with rhetorical pathos:

Il n’y a point de Provinces où elle n’ait fait quelques dégâts, et l’on ne trouve point de Royaume, qui ne pleure encore sa violence: Ces ruines qui ont autrefois été les fondemens de quelque superbe ville, sont les restes de la Colere, ces Monarchies qui gouvernoient autrefois toute la terre, et que nous ne connoissons plus que par l’histoire, ne se plaignent pas tant de la Fortune que de la Colere : Ces grands Princes dont l’orgueil est reduit en poudre, soupirent dans leurs tombeaux, et n’accusent que la Colere de la perte de leur vie, et de la ruine de leurs Etats: Les uns ont été assassinez dans leurs lict : les autres comme des victimes ont été immolez auprès des Autels […].

In the context of this dramatic description of the ravaging effects of anger—which also evokes, like Corneille’s tragedy, the motif of a king’s assassination during a public religious ceremony—the emotion is even condemned as a ‘peste publique’. Senault then denounces the widespread effect of this public plague and declares it to be a universal phenomenon: ‘Elle regne parmy les
peuples civilisés aussi bien que parmi les peuples barbares, elle commande en
tous les lieux de la terre’.58 In the following two sections of the chapter, he goes
on to argue that anger is neither brave nor reasonable but rather ‘injuste’ and
‘lâche’.59 Even though anger might sometimes be perceived as a sign of courage
and greatness, ‘elle part toujours d’une ame basse, et qui n’affecte la grandeur
que pour cacher sa bassesse’.60 Real greatness, he finally points out, is based
on Christian virtues and emotions like ‘amour’, ‘misericorde’ and ‘douceur’, as
exemplified by Jesus Christ.61 Although it is true that in the last part of the
chapter on anger, Senault affirms that this emotion can be useful in defending
God and one’s country against aggression and insults, his verdict is neverthe-
less generally one of disapproval and rejection. In his opinion, it is not anger
but ‘[l]a Clemence, qui fait regner heureusement les Souverains’.62

In the later speculum for Louis xiv entitled Le monarque, ou les devoirs du
souverain (1661), Senault takes up the idea and even dedicates a whole chapter
to the assertion that ‘la Clemence est une des principales Vertus des Rois’.63 He
writes:

Si la Clemence est si necessaire au Prince, Elle luy est encore plus glo-
rieuse ; Elle fait la plus belle fleur de la Couronne. Il n'y a point de Diadème
qui soit plus digne de la grandeur de cette illustre Vertu, & il faut avoüer
avecque Seneque, que c'est le plus bel ornement, dont se puisse parer un
Souverain. Nullum ornamentum Principis fastigio dignius.64

As we have seen above, Corneille’s character Livie expresses a similar view:

Et qu'enfin la clémence est la plus belle marque
Qui fasse à l'univers connaître un vrai Monarque.
(IV,iii,1265–1266)

58 Ibidem 293.
59 Ibidem 295.
60 Ibidem 298.
61 Ibidem 301–302. Mainly referring to Senault’s later text Le monarque, ou les devoirs du
souverain (1661), Ehsan Ahmed shows that the author also vehemently argues against
excessive forms of the emotion of love. See Ahmed E., “L’Etat, c’est l’Autre: Passion,
62 Ibidem 287.
63 Senault Jean-François, Le monarque, ou les devoirs du souverain (Paris, P. Le Petit: 1661)
275–283.
64 Ibidem 280.
Thus, while there is no evidence that Senault’s work had a direct influence on Corneille’s dramatic art, Corneille’s play might have influenced Senault’s *Le monarque, ou les devoirs du souverain*: as we have seen, Senault several times refers approvingly to Seneca’s *De ira* and *De constantia*, two famous texts whose themes had also been taken up and presented to a broad audience by Corneille’s *Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste*. In relation to the historical figures Cinna and Augustus, Senault extols the glory of the Emperor’s merciful forgiveness in words which seem to echo not only Seneca’s treatise but also Corneille’s play: ‘Auguste se procura plus de gloire en pardonnant à Cinna […] et je ne vois rien de plus noble ni de plus grand que les paroles avec lesquelles il luy pardonna son crime, & luy donna son amitié.’

5 Conclusion

The starting point of this essay was the observation that a great many of Corneille’s famous heroic figures, like the Cid, Horace and Nicomède, are modelled on the topical idea of *furor heroicus*. His tragedy *Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste* (1642), however, does not affirm the concept of heroic anger, fury and wrath. On the contrary, in this play Corneille transforms his concept of heroism, shifting the emphasis away from the emotion of anger towards that of clemency, as the furious rebel Cinna, the focus of the first part of the tragedy, gives way to the lenient Emperor Augustus. The latter no longer obeys the imperatives of revenge but overcomes his anger and appears as a hero who is both ‘master of the universe’ and master of his own violent emotions.

In his play Corneille reflects on heroic emotions in the context of contemporary discourses on passions and their social uses. The development of the plot embodies a critical re-evaluation of anger, a tendency which became widespread in France in the second half of the seventeenth century and was debated in the writings of authors such as Guez de Balzac, La Rochefoucauld, Madame de Scudéry, Madame de Lafayette and Bossuet. In order to reconstruct some contemporary discourses on anger which were published immediately before and a few years after Corneille’s play, I focused on texts by Pierre le Moyne, René Descartes and—most importantly—Jean-François Senault. In Senault’s treatise *De l’usage des passions*, published about eighteen months before *Cinna ou la clémence d’Auguste*, the author gives a critical account of the usage and dangers of anger which in many ways seems to anticipate Corneille’s treatment of the issue. Even though a general rejection of anger, fury and wrath is

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65 Ibidem 281.
dominant in Corneille’s tragedy as well as in Senault’s treatise, some ambivalence remains in their respective attitudes towards the glorification or damnation of the emotion. Both authors seem to agree that anger can be legitimate and useful in defending oneself against acts of aggression such as blasphemy, insult or intended assassination. Yet in his play Corneille goes one step further than Senault and introduces the overcoming of even a justified anger as a necessary condition for heroism.

Selected Bibliography


PART 4

Visual Representations of Anger
CHAPTER 15

Visual Representations of Medea’s Anger in the Early Modern Period: Rembrandt and Rubens

Maria Berbara

If in my womb there still lurk any pledge of thee, I’ll search my very vitals with the sword and hale it forth.¹

1 Introduction

In present-day imagination, perhaps few mythological characters could more aptly represent the quintessence of anger than Medea, the wife so angry at her husband for having left her for another woman that not even love for her own children could appease her fury: in order to take revenge, Medea killed the two sons she bore him. The story appears many times in ancient literature: Pindar mentions her in his fourth Pythian, and, in the second half of the fifth century BC, Euripides composed his famous play.² On Roman soil the myth seems to have garnered even more interest: Seneca wrote a play and Ovid treated it in different works, to name but two iterations. Medea was represented regularly in ancient iconography, and in a variety of media: vase paintings, engraved Roman gemstones, wall murals, etc. In some Roman sarcophagi, she is actually depicted in the act of murdering her children.

Both Euripides and Seneca³ narrate what today seems to have become the best-known moment of Medea’s life—i.e., the infanticide—but the story

¹ Seneca, Medea, lines 1012–13.
² The play was first produced in the spring of 431 BC. Cf. Euripides, Medea, ed. D.L. Page (Oxford: 1938) 7 ff.
³ There is some controversy regarding Seneca’s authorship of Medea, as well as the relationship between his plays and his philosophical writings. Would it be appropriate to suppose that his plays mirror his Stoic writings? Even though many scholars have warned against the dangers of applying Seneca’s philosophy directly to his plays (cf. Braden G., Renaissance Tragedy and the Senecan Tradition. Anger’s Privilege (Yale: 1985) 28 ff.), in the particular case of Medea, the Stoic interpretation of the play has become a matter of unanimity in the last couple of decades (cf. Seneca, Medea, ed. J. Bloemendal (Voorthuizen: 2001) 11). Some scholars have recently argued that it is possible to understand Medea’s emotions from a Stoic point of view, according to which control over emotions is needed on the philosophical path.
begins earlier. Medea was the daughter of King Aietes in Colchis, a faraway region to the east of the Euxine Sea. Jason was the son of King Aeson, in Iolcus, who had been deprived of his kingship by Pelias. Pelias persuades Jason to capture the Golden Fleece, which was kept in a sacred grove on Colchis. Jason sets off on the ship Argo. Upon his arrival in Colchis, King Aietes demands that he accomplish difficult and dangerous tasks, and, Medea, who has fallen in love with him, comes to his aid. Medea escapes with Jason and the Golden Fleece by killing her brother and scattering his body in the sea, so that her father would have to stop pursuing her to gather up the dismembered corpse. Upon her arrival in Iolcus, Medea continues to help Jason with her magical powers: she rejuvenates Aeson and then manages to kill Pelias by persuading his daughters that he would be rejuvenated if they would cut him into pieces and boil him. The couple then moves to Corinth, but, once there, Jason leaves Medea in order to marry the daughter of the local king, Creon. Euripides’ play begins shortly after their wedding. As early as in the first couple of lines, the children’s nurse senses Medea’s anger and fears she might direct it towards her offspring:

I’ve seen her look at them with savage eyes,
as if she means to injure them somehow.
I know this anger of hers will not end,
not before she turns it loose on someone.5

As stated by the chorus leader in the next lines, there is power in Medea’s grief; all those around her can anticipate that her fury will make her act. When

One can ask, with Bloemendal, whether Seneca’s intention could have been to immunize the audience against these uncontrolled emotions by showing their terrible consequences. Seneca, in fact, is not the only Stoic to be interested in Medea (as noted by Braden, ‘Epictetos finds Medea megalophýôs, “great-hearted”, even if she showed it in the wrong way (Arrian, Epict. 2.17.19 ff), and quotes her lines in Euripides (1078–79) about the overmastering strength of her thymos (1.28.7). Chrysippus cites the same lines (SVF 3.473), and is said to have quoted from the play so often in one work that the treatise became known as “Chrysippus’s Medea” (Diogenes Laertios 7.180).’

4 Next to Euripides and Seneca, Medea appears in the following Greco-Roman literary sources: Hesiod (Theogony 956 ff.); Pindar (Phythian Odes 4.9 ff.); Herodotus (History 8.62); Apollonius Rhodius (Argonautica 3–4); Ennius (Medea in Exile); Diodorus Siculus (Biblioteca 4.48–52, 4.54–55); Ovid (Heroides 6, 12; Metamorphoses, 7.1–400); Apollodorus (Bibliotéca 1.9.16–28); Pausanias (Description of Greece 2.3.6–11; 2.12.1; 5.18.3; 8.9.1–3; 8.11.2), and Lucian (Dialogues of the Dead 9).

5 Lines 92–94 (Greek text). Here and elsewhere quotes are from the following translation: Euripides, Medea, ed. I. Johnston (Arlington, Virginia: 2008).
Medea finally leaves the house with the nurse, she gives a powerful speech to the women of Corinth, which seems to summarize not only her own desperate situation, but also that of all women: ‘Of all things with life and understanding’—she claims—‘we women are the most unfortunate.’

Women, she argues, need a husband and must give up their entire previous life for him, adapting to new rules and customs. Men can have lovers, but women are bound exclusively to their husbands, whether they are faithful partners to them or not.

Creon immediately notices her anger, and, fearing its consequences, sends Medea and her children into exile:

You there, Medea, scowling in anger
against your husband. I’m ordering you
out of Corinth. You must go into exile,
and take those two children of yours with you.

Medea repeatedly begs Creon to let her stay, but he fears her; the best he can do for her and her children, he says, is to grant them one day to prepare. Medea’s situation is hopeless; she must leave, and she has nowhere to go. At this point she has a long conversation with Jason, who comes to her in order to say farewell and to provide her with money and assistance in her exile. Both characters recount their versions of the story, with Medea’s side full of accusations. Jason tries to convince her to accept his offer of help: ‘Woman, stop being so angry. If you do, things will turn out so much better for you.’ But, of course, she doesn’t.

Shortly after receiving a visit from Aegeus, king of Athens, who solemnly promises to shelter her in her exile, Medea, for the first time, manifests her horrible plan: to kill Jason’s new wife, Creusa, by sending her gifts smeared with poison, and, immediately thereafter, to murder her own sons. This, she claims, will wipe out Jason’s house forever; his children will die, as well as his new bride. When asked by the Chorus if she could stand to kill her own children, she does not hesitate: ‘Yes. It will be a mortal blow to Jason’. The fact that, as a mother, it will devastate her, is, in her own words, beside the point. Medea carries out her plan: she instructs her children to bring Jason’s new wife poisoned gifts, which kill both her and her father, who tries in vain to help her. During the several lines in which Medea receives the news of what has just happened, her

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6 Lines 230–231.
7 Lines 271–274.
8 Lines 614–615.
9 The name of Jason’s bride appears as either Creusa or Glauce in the literary sources.
10 Lines 811 ff.
feelings are never linear: she experiences pity for her children, sadness and pain. At one point, when left alone with the boys, she changes her mind for a moment; why would she harm them only to hurt their father, and then suffer twice the pain of their loss? The sight and embrace of her children hurt her terribly; she loves them so much, she says repeatedly. After a few lines, though, she reverts to her original plan: there is no way her enemies will escape punishment for sentimental reasons; besides, she will never deliver up her boys to Jason and his bride. At this point, nothing can avoid tragedy: Medea murders her children and then escapes in a winged chariot, a present from her grandfather Helios.

2 Medea in Iconography

There seems to be a disparity in the early modern period between the frequency of Medea's representation in literature and her representation in iconography. In literature, she appears quite often: Boccaccio includes her in his *De mulieribus claris*; George Buchanan translates Euripides' play into Latin; Jean-Bastier de La Pérouse, Lodovico Dolce and later Corneille compose tragedies based upon those by Euripides and Seneca; Spenser retells her story in *The Faerie Queene*, among many other examples. In Antiquity, as previously mentioned, Medea was quite often visually represented, as well as in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, when the story was revisited by artists, dramaturges and filmmakers as brilliant as Lars von Trier and Pier Paolo Pasolini. In contemporary art, Medea has come to impersonate symbols and discourses connected to different cultures and social groups—especially in a feminist register. The gender conflict, in fact, has been present in different versions of Medea's story, to the extent that, despite the monstrosity of her acts, in many twentieth century representations one does occasionally sense a certain degree of sympathy towards the woman betrayed and then discarded by the very one for whom she gave up everything. In ancient literature, however, Medea's personality and character cannot be described in pure black and white: it is true that she kills her own children, but on the other hand she also enables Jason to steal the Golden Fleece; Seneca emphasizes her connection with witchcraft, but for example Ibycus, Simonides and Apollonius Rhodius tell us that she married Achilles in the Elysian Plain. Already in the Greek context, therefore, Medea

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11 Lines 1040 ff.
12 Apollonius mentions that Ibycus and Simonides wrote this in *Argonautica* 4.811–15.
was, as one author puts it, a complex figure. This means that, typologically speaking, it is not a simple task to identify Medea with a single attribute or characteristic.

A very important element of Medea's story—and one that is relevant to the iconographical analyses of her myth—is the fact that, to the Greeks, she is a foreigner. She comes from a far-away land, where she learned strange and powerful witchcraft. In many ways, Medea corresponds to the stereotype of the barbaric foreigner in Euripides' times: unrestrained, passionate, inclined to the powers of magic, and, somehow, naïve enough to blindly believe her husband. Shortly after the production of Euripides' tragedy, many artists began emphasizing her exoticism by dressing her in oriental clothing.

Many mythological images involve the representation of a climactic moment; this is generally the case, for example, with images of metamorphoses (Daphne turning into a laurel tree, Phaeton falling from the sun's chariot, etc.). Sometimes—as for instance in the case of Phaeton—these images are meant to function as a moral exemplum for viewers not to make the same mistakes as the mythological characters who fall into disgrace. The representation of violent mythological episodes—such as the flaying of Marsyas by Apollo—is also often meant as a moral warning. In the case of Medea, however, there is an apparent contradiction, because even though the most famous episode of her story is the infanticide, the actual killing of the children is almost never represented. On the other hand, neither in literature nor in the visual arts does Medea appear when being punished; unlike other ancient heroines such as Dido or Antigone, not even her death is represented, although her happy posthumous life is mentioned by poets such as the aforementioned Ibycus and Simonides. In every aspect, Medea triumphs. At the end of Euripides' play, her winged chariot appears in the very space reserved for the gods.

In the early modern period, Medea is represented at different moments of her life. In the mid-1500s, she appears in a significant engraving of Ovid's Metamorphoses by Bernard Salomon (1557) at the moment when she


15 An exception is Poussin's drawing currently held in the British Royal Collection.
rejuvenates Aeson, Jason’s father. This image came to serve as a model for many other Italian and German illustrated Ovids, as well as for Claude-François Ménestrier’s Art des emblèmes. Medea is represented as a young and beautiful woman, half naked and with her hair untied, stirring a vat in which the magic potion that will restore Aeson’s youth and health is being prepared. Aeson lies on the ground, and, behind him, one sees an altar surrounded by seven torches and inscribed with concentric circles, a crosshairs and other indistinct graphemes. In the seventh book of his Metamorphoses, in fact, Ovid describes at length Medea’s magical powers and knowledge, but does not narrate the infanticide.

The same scene appears in Girolamo Macchietti’s Medea and Jason, painted in the early 1570’s for the studiolo of Francesco I in the Palazzo Vecchio, Florence. The iconographical programme of the studiolo, designed by Vincenzo Borghini and executed by a team of artists under the supervision of Giorgio Vasari, was meant to illustrate the relations between art and nature; its four walls, accordingly, represented the four elements—earth, wind, water and fire. The studiolo was dismantled at the end of the sixteenth century and the paintings were reassembled in the early twentieth century. It is not possible, therefore, to know for sure the original position of each painting, but, according to the reconstruction based on six letters Borghini wrote to Vasari, Macchietti’s Medea and Jason hung on the wall dedicated to fire. Medea is represented as a beautiful and serene young woman stirring the potion with which she will rejuvenate Aeson, who lies next to the altar mentioned by Ovid. Apart from this painting and the aforementioned engraving, Medea appears many other times as she rejuvenates Aeson (for example in Dolce’s version of the Metamorphoses or in an enameled panel from the Salting Collection of

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16 Salomon’s engraving had important predecessors though: a Latin edition of the Metamorphoses—published by Tusculani, Apud Benacum, in aedibus Alexandri Paganini (Alexandrus Paganinus) in 1526 and presently held in the Bibliothèque Nationale de France—represents, in the foreground, Medea, fully naked, in the act of rejuvenating Aeson; to our left we see a burning vat, and to the right, a kneeling figure in an attitude of prayer. In the background we see Creusa receiving her poisoned gifts, and Medea’s spectacular escape in a winged chariot.

17 The altar refers directly to Ovid’s account, even though the poet speaks of two altars—one to Hecate, Medea’s tutelary goddess, and the other to Youth.


Limoges in the Victoria and Albert Museum). In these images, Medea is represented as someone who gives life instead of taking it, although in some artworks, such as, for instance, Macchietti’s, pictorial elements—in this case, the nocturnal tones—create a mysterious, frightening atmosphere.

As far as the representation of anger is concerned, it is important to pay attention to some of Medea’s attributes. As previously stated, in the early modern period she is not generally represented killing her children, but her irascible and passionate character figures indirectly in almost all of her images. One key element is her long, loose hair—pictured in the above-mentioned works—which is associated with representations of anger. In one of the famous grisailles figuring the seven vices in the Scrovegni Chapel, for example, Giotto depicts “ira” as a young woman with long loose hair tearing her robe. A cassone painted by Biagio d’Antonio in the early sixteenth century represents diverse scenes from the story of the Argonauts; in its center, King Aietes rides a triumphal chariot flanked by his two daughters, Medea and Chalciope. Whereas Chalciope—significantly placed at the king’s right—has her hair pulled back tightly, Medea’s hair flies loosely.20 Her right hand touches her heart, indicating her fulminating passion for Jason, whom she has just laid eyes on. Medea’s long loose hair is emphasized at the right of the composition, where she is shown running, probably to meet Jason.

3 Medea and Anger

Anger does directly appear, though, if not in all, at least in most of Medea’s literary representations. There is no doubt she is angry, and there is also no doubt that her anger makes sense—even if it may not justify her acts. It is clear that she is caught in a conflict, not necessarily between love (for her children) and hate (for Jason, Creon and Creusa), but between her own anger and her comprehension of the fact that what she is about to do is morally unacceptable.

Aristotle, it is well known, does not consider anger to be a negative emotion. If kept under control, he argues, anger allows us to serve justice by paying back our pain; it also motivates us to be victorious in all forms of competition. According to Seneca, however, once anger is “tamed”, i.e., once it is somehow controlled by other psychological elements, it is no longer anger, but something else, because one of the characteristics of anger is that it cannot be controlled

by reason. This dispute is reflected in competing analyses of Medea’s actions. In Seneca, Medea’s story is, potentially, the story of all who love, because no one who succumbs to love is safe from committing evil acts: ‘If thou seekst, poor soul, what limit thou shouldst set to hate, copy thy love’. Whereas the Aristotelian holds that it is possible to love and be virtuous at the same time, for Seneca there is no erotic passion that stops short of its own excess. The moment we begin to care so much for something external, and, therefore, out of our control, we are necessarily doomed to commit uncontrolled, maybe even criminal acts, if separated from what we love. According to Aristotle, on the other hand, the fact of loving something does not necessarily mean a lack of self-control; it is possible to love and still govern oneself. For Seneca, however, love creates a hopeless situation: the moment we start loving, we become open to all sorts of violation. Seneca’s play masterfully explores these arguments by pointing out that, in fact, none of us, if we were in Medea’s situation, could be sure to act differently from her. In this sense, therefore, Medea is an exemplum—not of punishment, but of how uncontrolled love can lead to anger, and how anger can destroy all morality.

As an emotion, anger seems to have been, from very early on, associated with women. Medea, as well as some other mythical women such as, for instance, Clytemnestra, seems to personify not only anger, but also its immediate consequence: revenge. This does not mean, of course, that there were no angry men in Greek mythology; the first line of the Iliad—‘Sing, goddess, the wrath of Achilles’—in fact, begins with the Greek word μῆνιν, i.e., ‘wrath’ or ‘anger’. In this same example, however, Achilles manages to control his anger (with the intervention of Athena) and lets it lose only when the moment is ripe: helped by anger, he kills Hector, taking a decisive step towards Greek victory. Many versions of Medea’s story stress that her anger is totally destructive and does not benefit anyone or anything.

According to Aristotle, as noted above, a lack of anger is as much a vice as its excess; a gentle man is not someone who is never angry, but rather one whose anger is controlled and proportionate to the offence. Excess anger

24 Cf. the fifth chapter of Book IV of his Nicomachean Ethics: ‘The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised’ (edition of W.D. Ross, Oxford: 1954).
leads to irascibility, but its lack, to spiritlessness, or even foolishness. The man whose anger is governed by reason, and not by passion, is not revengeful. Hot-tempered people retaliate openly, and this transforms their pain into pleasure. Stoics had a different view: all passions, anger included, are detrimental to virtue and should be eradicated. The stoic philosopher Chrysippus maintained, contrary to Platonic doctrine, that the soul is unitary, and not divided into a rational and an irrational part. In his paper “Medea among the Philosophers”, J.M. Dillon argues that Platonists and Stoics disagreed as far as their explanation of Medea’s infanticide is concerned: Platonists—such as Galen—saw it as proof of the divided soul, whereas Stoics—such as Chrysippus—argued that, even though Medea tried to blame anger for her actions, they were, nevertheless, hers: from a Stoic point of view, regardless of adversity, serenity must prevail.

Euripides’ play provided precious material for subsequent Stoic interpretations of Medea’s story. Few written sources express the argument of Medea’s understanding of her own anger—and its results—more masterfully than lines 1078–80 of his tragedy: ‘I understand too well the dreadful act I’m going to commit, but my judgment can’t check my anger, and that incites the greatest evils human beings do’. According to Chrysippus—who expressly quotes this passage—Medea’s soul is not divided here, but she is rather merely acknowledging the subjugation of her reason to passion. At the end of the first century AD, Epictetus makes use of the same passage to demonstrate that it is not possible to perform any act unless one believes it on the whole to be the best alternative. According to Epictetus, though, one must not be angry with Medea, but rather pity her, because she was deceived by herself: ‘Why, then, are you angry with her, because the poor woman has gone astray in the greatest matters […]? Why do you not, if anything, rather pity her? As we pity the blind and the lame, why do we not pity those who have been made blind and lame in their governing faculties?’

In this sense, even though one should be pitied if one allows anger to overcome reason, one’s angry actions can only be performed if one assents to them. Medea’s rational understanding of her actions is, in fact, also in line with
De Ira, in which Seneca explains that animals are incapable of being angry: ‘[…] neither wild beasts nor any other creature except man is subject to anger: for, whilst anger is the foe of reason, it nevertheless does not arise in any place where reason cannot dwell.’ For all Stoics, in fact, passions depend on assent to impressions expressible as propositions. Since animals lack language, they cannot experience anger. Reason and passions (anger amongst them), Seneca states later, ‘have not distinct and separate provinces, but consist of the changes of the mind itself for better or for worse’. Passions are not distinct from the mind’s reasoning faculty, but rather have the power to change it. For this reason, the best one can do is to resist outright anger from its very beginnings, for once it arises, it is much more difficult to avoid.

From a Stoic point of view, in spite of her anger, Medea can be said to take a decision, and this is a rational act of her soul.

4 Medea’s Decision

The discussion surrounding Medea’s decision to take revenge on Jason by killing his wife, father-in-law and children is central to the development of Medea’s iconography in Antiquity, and also plays a role in some early modern representations. Regardless of their opinion on anger and the division of the soul, ancient philosophers condemned Medea’s act, which they saw as a paradigm of the evils caused by (uncontrolled) anger. In this sense, Medea becomes an exemplum: in spite of her strength, and in spite of understanding the consequences of her acts, and in spite, furthermore, of being able to love her children, she was still overcome by anger.

As stated by Seneca and others, ‘No passion is more eager for revenge than anger.’ For this very reason, though, ‘it is unapt to obtain it: being over hasty and frantic, like almost all desires, it hinders itself in the attainment of its own object, and therefore has never been useful either in peace or war’. Because it is motivated by anger, Medea’s revenge is imperfect; it costs her her own children.

One of the most famous ancient representations of Medea is the so-called Timomachus’ Medea (Fig. 15.1)—actually a fresco produced in the Flavian

29 Seneca, De ira, 1, 3 (edition of A. Stewart, London: 1900).
31 De ira, 1, 8.
32 De ira, 1, 12.
period and found in the Casa dei Dioscuri, in Pompeii, which was most probably made based on a lost painting by Timomachus. Medea is represented, following Euripides’ play, during her monologue just before she kills her children, when, for a moment, she seems to change her mind. In a simple room filled with geometric forms and plain colors, Medea looks compassionately at her children, who are innocently playing under the watchful eye of their tutor.

Figure 15.1  Medea and her children, Flavian Period (4th style). Fresco. Museo Archeologico Nazionale, Naples.

Pliny the Elder (The Natural History, 7.126, 35.136) says that Julius Caesar himself owned the original Medea—which was paired with a representation of Ajax.
Their mother’s facial expression is one of profound tension, as she seems to fight with herself while (still) keeping her dagger withdrawn. The artist masterfully rendered Medea’s indecision by making a sharp line separating a light from a dark area cut right into her head, as if symbolizing her inner struggle. Lessing loved this fresco and cited it as an example of his theory of the ‘pregnant moment’: Medea is represented in the moment of apparent calm that precedes action. Another fresco found in Herculaneum is believed to represent Medea in a similar moment of inner struggle (Fig. 15.2); everything in this

FIGURE 15.2

painting—from Medea’s anguished gaze to the nervous interlacing of her fingers—is made to emphasize her internal conflict, moving the viewer to compassion. Epictetus, as noted above, stated that Medea is more to be pitied than hated; the fact that her soul was deprived of truth is not her fault, and it is not for us to be angry with her. We should rather be compassionate, because she was deceived by herself.35

If Pliny’s account is accurate, Julius Caesar paid eighty talents for Timomachus’ pictures of Medea and Ajax—a very high price—and placed them in the temple of Venus Genetrix. Both their price and the location in which they were displayed demonstrate that these works were held in very high esteem. Timomachus—if he is, in fact, the author of this painting’s prototype—managed to visually address Medea's internal process of decision making, while also eliciting our compassion by showing us the victims of a destiny we know already to be sealed. We do not know to what extent Timomachus and the other Roman artists who portrayed Medea were aware of the philosophical discussions mentioned earlier, but it is likely that by the time the paintings were transported to Rome, in the second half of the first century BC, the Stoic discussion about ethical decision making contributed to Caesar’s interest in the works and to their general success.36

As noted by Braden, ‘Seneca is […] not the only Stoic to be fascinated by the story of Medea; and if Seneca has Medea summon Stoic resources as a prelude to murderous revenge, if he has Hercules and Hippolytus slip almost without notice from wisdom to fury, he is again only exemplifying what De ira obliquely declares: that Stoic detachment is continuous and deeply involved with the most paralytic kind of anger. The real common ground between Seneca’s plays and his philosophy is on this level […]’.37

These contrasting readings about Medea, her decision and her anger managed to make their way through the early modern period and, in a way, to the present day.

5 Rembrandt and Rubens on Medea

In 1648, Rembrandt produced an etching representing Medea or the Marriage of Jason and Creusa (Fig. 15.3). The previous year, the tragedy Medea, written by Rembrandt’s friend and patron Jan Six, had been performed in the

35 Discourses 1. 28.
Figure 15.3  Rembrandt, Medea or the Marriage of Jason and Creusa, 1648, etching, private collection.
Schouwburgh in Amsterdam. The artist’s etching was reproduced in the play’s frontispiece, even though the moment he chose to represent does not appear in the play. Rembrandt’s etching has remarkable conceptual affinities with the tradition of Timomachus’ painting, even though the moment both artists chose to represent is different. In an atmosphere marked by a strong contrast of light and shadow, Medea is represented in a dark area at the right foreground holding a dagger and what seems to be her poisoned wedding gifts, while, to the left, the marriage of Jason and Creusa is being merrily celebrated in a contemporary church. Medea, all alone in her dark corner as she watches Jason’s marriage amidst the overall joy, becomes a pathetic figure, and one is prone to pity her, following the sympathetic reading of Epictetus. This is emphasized by the quatrain written under the etching:

Creusa and Jason here pledge their troth
Medea Jason's wife unjustly cast aside,
Becomes inflamed by regret, desire for revenge spurs her on.
Alas! Unfaithfulness, how dear you cost!

It has been pointed out that none of the dramatizations—including Jan Six’s—of the story of Medea before 1670 include a scene of the marriage of Jason and Creusa. According to S. Michalski, the curtain suspended from a point above the arcature in the Rembrandt etching indicates that the marriage was staged as a vertooning, or tableau vivant, between the second and third act. This kind of tableau vivant, staged between the acts and revealed by drawn curtains, attempted to synthetize the main moral aspects of the play, which, in this case, would be related to the idea that Medea’s evil actions were precipitated by Jason’s unlawful wedding, as well as to the peripeteia, i.e., the moment of reversal which announces that the happiness of Jason’s marriage will soon veer around to disgrace.

The strength of Neostoicism as an influential philosophical current in Holland during the seventeenth century has been widely studied; on the Dutch

38 Six was not only a patron, but also a good friend of Rembrandt's, who made a portrait of him in ca. 1654. The canvas is still in possession of the Six family.
stage, its presence was particularly visible.\textsuperscript{41} Would it be possible to interpret Rembrandt's etching in light of Stoic influences and related discussions on our lack of control over fate, on the one hand, and the motivations of evil actions, on the other? Stressing the moment of Jason's wedding—and its injustice towards Medea—as well as Medea's internal transformation, could have been a response to the circulation of Stoic ideas in contemporary Dutch society. The abrupt shifts of light and shadow—which were also present in the frescoes of Pompeii and Herculaneum—not only emphasize the dramatic pathos of the situation, but also point to the duality of Medea's feelings—anger, pity—and our own feelings toward her.

The literary source of Rembrandt's etching, I would like to suggest, is the twelfth poem of Ovid's \textit{Heroides} in which Medea laments the infidelity of Jason. She begins her epistle by recalling everything she had done for him and how her disgrace began the moment she laid eyes on him: ‘Then ‘twas that I saw you, then began to know you; that was the first impulse to the downfall of my soul’.\textsuperscript{42} Medea continues to describe her magical interventions to protect and help Jason accomplish his labors, as well as the evil actions she performed against her own family for his sake: ‘Words like these—and how slight a part of them is here!—and your right hand clasped with mine, moved the heart of the simple maid’.\textsuperscript{43} Medea painfully remembers Jason's wedding to Creusa:

At your bidding I have withdrawn from your palace, taking with me our two children, and—what follows me evermore—my love for you. When, all suddenly, there came to my ears the chant of Hymen, and to my eyes the gleam of blazing torches, and the pipe poured forth its notes, for you a wedding-strain, but for me a strain more tearful than the funeral trump, I was filled with fear; I did not yet believe such monstrous guilt could be; but all my breast none the less grew chill. The throng pressed eagerly on, crying “Hymen, O Hymenaeus!” in full chorus—the nearer the cry, for me the more dreadful. (XII, 129)

Rembrandt masterfully captures, in his etching, Medea's isolation and the hopelessness of her plea. Towards the end of the epistle, however, Medea's suffering is slowly transformed into anger and a burning desire for revenge:

\textsuperscript{43} XII, 89.
Let her [Creusa] make merry and be joyful over my faults! Let her make merry, and lie aloft on the Tyrian purple—she shall weep, and the flames that consume her will surpass my own! While sword and fire are at my hand, and the juice of poison, no foe of Medea shall go unpunished! (XII, 175)

Medea makes one last attempt to convince Jason to come back to her before finally succumbing to her anger:

Whom, hark you, I will straight—but what boots it to foretell your penalty? My ire is in travail with mighty threats. Whither my ire leads, will I follow. Mayhap I shall repent me of what I do—but I repent me, too, of regard for a faithless husband's good. Be that the concern of the god who now embroils my heart! Something portentous, surely, is working in my soul! (XII, 199)

The quatrain under Rembrandt’s etching emphasizes the meaning of Medea’s “letter” in the *Heroides*: it was Jason’s unfaithfulness that disturbed her emotions in such a way that she must act wrongly. On the other hand, it was her openness to love—she was completely alienated from herself the moment she saw Jason for the first time—that made her vulnerable to uncontrollable feelings; Medea is the victim of her own passions and becomes an *exemplum* of the evils that may follow from a lack of control over oneself and excessive outwardly focused love.

The *Heroides* seem to have been the literary source for another contemporary Dutch painting, namely Paulus Bor’s *Medea* now at the Metropolitan Museum of Art. Produced in the same years as Rembrandt’s etching (ca. 1640), the painting represents a melancholic Medea resting her face on her right hand while the left holds a magic wand whose powers are of no use to her anymore. This painting was most probably produced as a counterpart to the *Cydippe* now in the Rijksmuseum in Amsterdam, which equally represents a tale narrated by Ovid in the *Heroides*: the young and wealthy Cydippe was loved by Acontius; while she was offering a sacrifice, Acontius cast an apple at her feet. The apple was inscribed with the words: ‘I vow at the shrine of Diana that I shall wed Acontius’. Bor represents the exact moment when Cydippe, kneeling next to an enshrined altar, takes the apple and reads its inscription. After this incident, Cydippe was betrothed several times, but always felt sick just before the wedding. When the oracle was consulted about this matter, it was revealed that the reason for her sickness was the promise she had made, whereupon she married Acontius. The intention of Bor in pairing these
subjects—if Medea was seldom represented in the early modern period, Cydippe almost never was; Bor is, in fact, the only painter known to have depicted her—might have been to illustrate the evil consequences of marriage undertaken in passion as opposed to the good consequences of marriage according to reason and divine will.

Some decades earlier, Rubens had rendered a very different type of Medea: on the verso of a drawing representing three groups of apostles at the Last Supper, the Flemish artist made three sketches for the representation of Medea carrying the dead bodies of her children (Fig. 15.4). All of the sketches represent her in movement, her hair loose and flying, as she drags the boys' limp bodies. Medea's facial expression can be seen in two of these sketches; in the one to our left, it appears more contained, whereas in the one to our right her mouth is opened in a scream of rage. In the sketch on the left, a knife can be seen protruding from one of the children's lifeless bodies, accentuating the overall pathos of the composition. The artist clearly sought to emphasize Medea's indifference to her children, whom she drags like objects; the middle sketch shows how carefully Rubens studied their positions. An inscription in the drawing reads as follows: 'vel Medea respiciens Creusam ardentem et Jansonem [sic] velut Inseguens' (Medea looking back at the burning Creusa

**Figure 15.4** Rubens, *Three Sketches for Medea and Her Children*, 1600–1608 ca., drawing in pen and brown ink, J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles.
and at Jason as if [?] pursuing . . . [?]). This would mean that Rubens thought of representing the contrast between her angry expression as she looks back at her enemies and her cold-bloodedness towards the death of her children. In these representations, more, perhaps, than in any other of the early modern period, Medea appears as the personification of anger and the victory of hate over love.44 Her loose hair—which, as already mentioned, also appears in other representations—, her open mouth, her rolling eyes, are all iconographical elements that emphasize her agitated state of mind.

Here, too, Rubens could have been under the influence of Neostoicism. The relation between Rubens and Lipsius has received a lot of attention in recent decades;45 the painter’s brother, Philip, studied with Lipsius and Rubens represented him—among other works—in his The Four Philosophers (1611), produced around the same time as the Medea sketches. In this painting Lipsius is represented sitting under the bust of Seneca and teaching three students, among which Rubens’ brother and the artist himself.46 In the years 1612/13, the painter also produced the beautiful Death of Seneca, representing the philosopher’s suicide. According to Morford, until the 1620s Rubens was mainly concerned with illustrating the Stoic concept of apatheia, i.e., the independence from passions and external objects or events.47 The vivid representation of Medea’s wrath, in this sense, could provide the perfect example of what a disturbed soul is capable of if it lets itself depend too much on things that cannot be controlled. Medea, again, works as an exemplum—not of punishment, but of the evils of passions.

44 Rubens made a second drawing of Medea, which is currently held by the Boymans-van Beuningen Museum of Rotterdam. He finished both drawings, most probably, during the first years of his Italian sojourn (ca. 1600–1608). Particularly in the case of the Rotterdam drawing, it seems that the artist used an ancient model as his source, such as, for instance, the Medea sarcophagus in Ancona or the one in Mantua’s Palazzo Ducale. Cf. Dacos N., “Rubens in Italia. Le mostre del Quadricentenario”, Prospettiva 18 (1979) 71. The drawing at the Getty, however, is not a direct quotation or rendering of an ancient prototype, but a free variation. Cf. Kepetzis, Medea in der Bildenden Kunst vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit 143 ff.
45 Cf. especially Morford M.P.O., Stoics and Neostoics: Rubens and the Circle of Lipsius (Princeton: 1991) ch. 6. This book has been reviewed many times and triggered an important discussion in the field of the reception of Stoicism in early modern times.
47 According to Morford, Stoics and Neostoics 193, the loss of his daughter in 1623 and shortly after of his wife, in 1626, compelled Rubens to admit that he could not meet the demands of Stoic doctrine.
Conclusion

The answer to the question of how Medea is represented in the visual arts during the early modern period is not univocal. She may appear as an almost archetypical representation of anger, following Horace’s typology in his *Ars Poetica*—‘Sit Medea ferox invitaque’—but also as a battlefield confronting feelings of pity and anger. Representations of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*, on the other hand, emphasize her magical powers and amazing deeds. One of the main difficulties related to the analysis of Medea’s iconographical representations is the diverseness of her character. As pointed out by S.I. Johnston, some mythical characters are connected to a single act or story; others, to a type or quality (Odysseus, for example, has different adventures, but is marked by characteristics such as cleverness and endurance throughout). Medea, however, impersonates different, sometimes contrasting, attributes and features, leaving it to each philosopher, artist, etc., to choose the most suitable one(s). In this sense, she was represented in the early modern period at different moments of her life and in different moods; she could be pictured as the sorceress of Ovid’s *Metamorphoses*; the abandoned wife who should be pitied more than hated for her evil actions, or as an arena of contrasting emotions.

As far as the relation between Medea’s story and (Neo-) Stoicism is concerned, there is no doubt that she was a favorite among Stoic writers and also that—in spite of the general objections to reading his plays as illustrations of his philosophical writings—there are strong parallels between Seneca’s *De ira* and his *Medea*. In the early modern period, Medea seems to have been represented more often in contexts informed by the circulation of Neostoic discussions, especially in the Low Countries. It must not be assumed, however, that artists were strictly referring to Neostoic programmes specifically conceived as such; these ideas and interpretations were certainly circulating in different ways in contemporary society and, most likely, representations of Medea included them in one way or another.

It should be noted, finally, that the rejuvenation of Aeson was, perhaps, the most represented episode of Medea’s story in the early modern period, perhaps in connection with the new editions of the *Metamorphoses* and the production of cycles depicting stories of the Argonauts. Medea’s actions, independently of the period and medium, are always guided by anger, and her anger, regardless of other considerations of anger in general or its (possibly justified) causes, must always be condemned; the way her anger is interpreted, though, can

serve as a possible conduit for understanding perceptions of anger in a given historical context.

Selected Bibliography

PART 5

Anger in Political Discourses
In late spring of 1671, Viennese court society gathered at the Hofburg Theatre to see a comedy that was being staged for the empress's birthday. The French envoy Jacques de Grémonville was also in attendance. Little did he know that he and the other spectators were to witness, in the auditorium, the most interesting spectacle of the evening even before the actual play began. Upon taking his seat next to one of the emperor's ministers, Prince Lobkowitz angrily lashed out at him.

The said prince having approached me, I greeted him very politely. He told me angrily that I should not place myself near his seat [...] with the same fury, raising his hands as if to push me away, saying I really should remove myself from the place or he would make me do so by force.\(^1\)

The incident was unprecedented and Grémonville struggled to find a good explanation for his superiors. It was the notoriously “dovish” and moderately pro-French Prince Lobkowitz with whom he had earlier struck a deal concerning the breakup of the Spanish Monarchy in case it should remain without an heir.\(^2\) Moreover, both sides were in the process of settling on imperial neutrality for the vigorously planned French attack on the Dutch Republic in the following year.\(^3\)

\(^1\) ’Ledit Prince s’en étant venu à moi, que je saluai fort civilément, il me dit tout en colère que je ne devais pas me mettre à son poste [...] avec la même furie, en haussant les mains comme pour me repousser, que je devais me retirer ou qu’il me ferait faire par force’. Mignet F., Négociations relatives à la succession d’Espagne sous Louis XIV, vol. 3 (Paris: 1838) 521.


Why was Lobkowitz so angry at the French negotiator? And why did he choose to expose de Grémonville to his anger in front of a courtly public for no apparent reason, as it seemed, and risk grave political repercussions? The following article explores the role of openly displayed anger in early modern diplomacy, as well as in political relations of dominance, mainly in late seventeenth-century France.

In contrast to Medieval Europe, where, according to Gerd Althoff, anger was an important element of political communication, it has been assumed that early modern society was subdued by what Norbert Elias christened ‘a process of civilization’. This process first took hold of the French court as a social and political centre, and more “peaceable” styles of behaviour trickled down to society at large. Yet, Elias’ theory, including his conceptualisation of the early modern court, has received a substantial amount of criticism. Whereas self-control and mastery of emotions were indeed idealised in the upper crust of early modern society, the courtly ideal of the honnête homme, and its civilising effect either remained superficial or was channelled into the refinement of ritualised violence in duels or conflicts of honour.

Where does this leave the early modern display of anger as a traditionally ‘exemplary emotion’? Was it entirely stripped of its legitimacy, or did anger retain a certain social appropriateness or ‘functionality’ as a marker of authority—for instance where the honour and political status of actors had to be reaffirmed? Was the expression of anger employed in instances where the

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highly stylized language of civility was unable to adequately express dissent or sincerity?¹⁰

This article, on the one hand, looks at discourses and norms of anger as laid out in seventeenth-century normative texts on the parfait ambassadeur;¹¹ on the other, at practices of anger engaged in by seventeenth-century French diplomats and other political officials, which often varied according to circumstance or context of communication.

The main focus of this contribution is on how displaying anger was part of pre-modern acts of symbolic political communication, how they were construed as indicative of an actor’s intentions and depicted or created social and political states of affairs.¹² Yet, these acts of sense-making were themselves part of complex negotiations between various actors in interpretive communities, e.g., diplomats and their superiors at home.

While this article cannot thoroughly explore recent approaches to the history of emotions as a history of their changing conceptualisations and “experiences”,¹³ I hope it will contribute to our understanding of the place of emotions in the cultural history of early modern diplomacy and a “microhistory” of political communication.

In the following I first briefly highlight some of these contexts, focusing mainly on practices of negotiation and diplomatic correspondence. Second, I discuss the norms of diplomatic conduct and the role of displaying anger and self-mastery as laid out in the contemporary normative literature on diplomacy. I also address ways in which diplomats practiced and dealt with anger and used explanatory “stories” towards their superiors. Third, I demonstrate the peculiarities of early modern diplomacy and the early modern structural conflicts of norms that required the display of anger or even violence by political actors. Fourth, I show how anger could be transformed into meaningful political interaction and how it could be regarded as indicative of political intentions and attitudes in a way that went beyond regular political interaction. In the same context I also take a brief look at asymmetrical negotiations

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¹¹ For a comprehensive study on this literature see Kugeler H., Le parfait Ambassadeur. The Theory and Practice of Diplomacy in the Century Following the Peace of Westphalia (DPhil. University of Oxford: 2009).


between ruling political officials and French subjects, and how ministerial anger and impoliteness represented and constituted asymmetrical political relations.

1 Contexts and Practices of Communication in Diplomacy

Early modern diplomatic theory set forth three main tasks for the early modern diplomat: to represent, to negotiate and to inform (représenter—négocier—informer).\(^{14}\) Representation and diplomatic ceremony remained a heavily disputed field with which diplomatic theoreticians remained very much preoccupied.\(^{15}\) An ambassador’s raison d’être was a powerful fiction of law that remained in place throughout the early modern period: an ambassador represented his master by virtual "embodiment".\(^{16}\) This gravely enhanced the potential for conflict over precedence. Even after the Peace of Westphalia, rank and status were not primarily considered in terms of international law, but rather were analogous to the expression of status in early modern stratified society expressed in particular practices of distinction.\(^{17}\)

Nevertheless, by the early eighteenth century French diplomatic theory had experienced a clear shift in interest towards the practice of negotiation, which emerged as a field of practice in its own right.\(^{18}\) In spite of its relative autonomisation, negotiation according to the normative literature remained immersed in the norms and ideals of the honnête homme and his ability to handle conversation and civility.\(^{19}\)

The value of civility remained ambiguous and disputed throughout the early modern period. On the one hand, rituals of civility were an instrument to generate an elementary level of communication, characterised by mutual respect and acceptance of social norms, which were vital for ensuing more meaning-

\(^{14}\) Callières François de, De la manière de négocier avec les souverains (Amsterdam, La Compagnie: 1716).


\(^{19}\) On the notion of honnête homme, see Scheffers H., Höfische Konvention und die Aufklärung: Wandlungen des Honnète-homme-Ideals im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert (Bonn: 1980).
ful interactions. On the other hand, civility was depicted as a strategic and manipulative social technique that capitalised on its psychological effects. It seemed to promise “governance” and persuasion of one’s counterpart through subtle insinuation and refined compliance. These strategies were “idealised” because of their alleged efficiency in furthering one’s strategic aims.

The Dutch theoretician of diplomacy Abraham de Wicquefort likened the rules of negotiation to those of polite conversation. The ability to persuade by what he called ‘douce violence’ was, according to him, by far preferable to an “oratorical” style and to pedantic argumentation. Even more explicitly, François de Callières based his concept of negotiation on an “art of pleasing” (art de plaire). In addition to being tactful and appropriate to the situation, polite conversation was also a “commodity” for directing conduct and taking control of one’s counterpart, thus committing him to cooperation. To bring the strategic value of such interaction to bear, practices of dissimulation were crucial. The key to emotional control was to uncover the other’s hidden true intentions and to determine his sincerity, while hiding one’s own agenda under a smokescreen of dissimulation.

Thus, in contemporary diplomatic theory, negotiation figured as a manipulative and antagonistic process. Even though practical discourse during negotiation was more often preoccupied with trust building or persuasion by the allegedly better argument, such strategic concepts of negotiation were frequently referred to in diplomatic correspondence. Explicit negotiation with the actors present on the ground was accompanied by a parallel process of

20 See, for example, Beetz M., Frühmoderne Höflichkeit. Komplimentierkunst und Gesellschaftsrituale im altdutschen Sprachraum (Stuttgart: 1990).
24 Ibidem 33.
25 Waquet, Callières 138–139.
implicit negotiation in the diplomatic correspondence between diplomats and their masters. Here, the third element of the triad comes into play: diplomatic information. While early modern treatises endorsed dissimulation as a negotiation technique, it was not permitted when a diplomat addressed his superior: on the contrary, here comprehensive truthfulness was demanded.

Nevertheless, diplomats clearly produced opportunistic interpretations of the situation on the ground. The central organs of French foreign policy made up a complex body that was neither willing nor capable of processing the tidal wave of oftentimes uncertain information. Thus, principals and diplomats alike produced self-affirming accounts of situations that extensively borrowed from social norms as well as self-affirming auto-stereotypes and preconceived concepts about their political enemies in order to accelerate decisions and also to serve ‘organisational sense making’. These structures of diplomatic communication, as we shall see, had an influence on the way anger was perceived and ‘debated’ among diplomats.

2 ‘Very Capable of Ruining Their Affairs’—The Inappropriateness of Anger in Diplomatic Theory and Practice

At first glance it seems perfectly clear that displaying anger was particularly ill advised for a diplomat and why, for example, ‘moderation’ became such a prominent concept. There were two dimensions to the case diplomatic theory made against expressing anger: first, anger ran contrary to requirements of the political and social roles of a diplomat. It tarnished his ability to represent his master adequately and violated the more general requirement of being agreeable at the place he was sent to. Displaying anger would render him irreverent and unworthy of representing his master. Jean Hotman, French humanist, theoretician and practitioner of diplomacy alike, regarded uncontrolled anger as a trait unworthy of someone charged with diplomatic representation. Hotman regarded expressing anger as “bourgeois” in the worst sense, a trait

29 Wicquefort, L’Ambassadeur 11, 106.
32 See Wicquefort, L’Ambassadeur 11, 91–96; Callières, Manière 169 resp. 203; see also: Pecquet Antoine, De l’art de négocier avec les souverains (The Hague, Jan van Duren: 1738) 11.
33 See primarily Wicquefort, L’Ambassadeur 1, 145–147, 152–153; Callières, Manière 224–227.
of brutish greed and explicitly not of noble individuals: ‘I saw ambassadors becoming angry and impatient, as financiers often do when asked for money and when they are in a bad mood.’

And there were other fierce rejections of anger in the seventeenth century. Dwelling on fashionable courtier ideals, Abraham de Wicquefort made clear that the combination of political rank and noble social status compelled an ambassador to refrain from incivility and (symbolic) violence. Such acts were perhaps understandable among mercenaries, but not among high-ranking ambassadors. Wicquefort also paraphrased Hotman (without explicitly referencing him), saying that ‘those spirits made of brimstone and saltpetre, who can be ignited by the slightest spark, are very capable of ruining their affairs.

Here Wicquefort also touched on the second dimension of the rejection of diplomats who showed anger: the necessity of suppressing negative emotions was intimately connected with the strategic concepts and goals of what contemporary diplomatic theory described as negotiation. Negotiation was an operation of psychological control and manipulation fuelled by an “art of pleasing” and put into practice via civility and polite conversation. A negotiator who lashed out in anger not only lacked interpersonal moral standards. He also ran the risk of undermining the manipulative effort enacted by civility, thus losing essential emotional control in a social process aimed at directly disposing one’s counterpart to certain beliefs and actions.

Such notions of anger reappeared in the language of practical politics, notably in diplomatic correspondence as a space of implicit negotiation. At the 1657–58 imperial election diet in Frankfurt, the French wished to influence the election in favour of a non-Habsburg emperor. It is apparent that the French ambassadors Gramont and Lionne, for example, in a letter to Cardinal Mazarin sought to highlight their masterful prudence to dissimulate their anger over the exaggerated demands for money made by German princes, which they regarded as insolent and ungrateful.

In turn, the Spanish ambassador to Frankfurt, the Conde de Peñaranda, who was to ensure the election of a Habsburg candidate, became a projection

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35 Wicquefort, L’Ambassadeur 1, 369.
36 ‘ces esprits composés de souffre & de saltpetre, que la moindre estinecelle fait prendre feu, sont fort capables de gaster leurs affaires’; Wicquefort, L’Ambassadeur 1, 91.
37 Gramont and Lionne to Mazarin, Frankfurt, August 18, 1658 (AMAE, CP Allemagne 141, fol. 300r).
screen for French contempt towards their dynastic political rival, which was infused with anti-Habsburg stereotyping. The Spaniard was thus denounced on a regular basis for being prone to uncontrollable anger and for showing a brutish and disrespectful demeanour towards his German counterparts. Cardinal de Mazarin mentioned in reports that Peñaranda had in anger called the Elector of Mainz and his court nothing but a bunch of Lutherans and converts, thereby revealing himself to be a typical Habsburg bigot.

It was also reported that he had the effrontery to fiddle about with his rapier, came close to losing his temper and angrily attack the Elector of Mainz and Archchancellor of the Empire, Johann Philipp von Schönborn, in order to intimidate him. In the face of this and other apparent threats to the elector’s personal safety, the French ambassadors, who allegedly gave Schönborn refuge from Peñaranda’s wrath in their Frankfurt residence, fashioned themselves as his protectors—a claim very much in line with contemporary French political ideology towards the Holy Roman Empire in general.

Thus, it seems that anger in diplomatic negotiations was vilified and denounced as inappropriate and disruptive by both the normative literature and practical political writings. Nonetheless, this did not preclude a certain ambiguity towards this emotion and its effects. Both theoretical texts and diplomatic letters concede to a certain usefulness to anger.

While it was considered socially disruptive, instigating anger could nonetheless serve a purpose in dismantling dissimulation in order to reveal the counterpart’s true intentions. Wicquefort and Callières, for example, lauded a very young Giulio Mazzarini, later to become the almighty Cardinal Mazarin, for an episode where he managed to infuriate his interlocutor, a Spanish governor, in order to ‘discover […] his true sentiments’. Here, instigating anger could be incorporated into the prevalent strategic concept of the negotiation process, as a means to gain the upper hand in a complex play of dissimulative practices.

Examples for employing anger in similar ways can also be found in the practice of French diplomacy. For example, in 1657 at the Frankfurt election diet

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40 Mazarin to Gramont and Lionne, Paris, April 17, 1658 (AMAE, MD France 277, fol. 98v).

41 ‘découvrir […] ses véritables sentiments’; Wicquefort, *L’Ambassadeur* 1, 91; Callières, *Manière* 41.
mentioned above, French envoy Robert de Gravel tried to convince Johann Philipp von Schönborn—Elector of Mayence and arguably the opinion leader among his colleagues—to support the election of a non-Habsburg candidate. Gravel attempted to play on parallel registers of emotional manipulation. On the one hand he apparently utilised a well-composed language of complimenting and cajoling,42 while at the same time also seeking to provoke anger to a similar end. Gravel claimed to have heard that Johann Philipp’s ambition of securing peace and his attempts to reign in imperial supremacy were being utterly ridiculed in Vienna. This seemed to strike home with Johann Philipp, who reacted as angrily and emotionally as Gravel intended. The latter reported to Mazarin:

Even though the elector is of a rather cold temperament and of very moderate humour, he could not stop shaking his head and beating on the table when he said […] that he would not leave it at thrusts of the pen and that he would take such powerful measures that derision could soon turn into remorse.43

Gravel tried to push further in this direction, but Johann Philipp’s conspicuous ire failed to yield immediate political profit. It becomes clear, however, that provoking anger could readily be depicted as a technique for inciting control by negative emotions to be used alongside art de plaire-approaches.

François de Callières was well aware that honour and reputation as internalised role requirements made princes prone to being malleable and to being governed by emotional appeals; in Callières’ case through an art of pleasing.44 Callières here psychologised the importance of princely honour. Yet, its at times violent maintenance and defence was a substantial political cause. Revising Elias’ classical account of the prince and his court as a primary social laboratory for the suppression of affect,45 one is perhaps not mistaken in assuming that rage and anger became a practice increasingly reserved for those in power.46

42 Robert de Gravel to Mazarin, Frankfurt, September 3, 1657 (AMAE, CP Allemagne 137, fol. 53r).
43 ‘quoy que Mon[dit] s[jeu]r l’Electeur soit d’un temperament assez froid et d’une humeur moderée, il ne laissa pas de tourner la teste et en frappant sur la table et de dire […] que l’on n’en seroit pas quitte pour des coups de plumes et que l’on y apporteroit des remedes si puissans que la derision pourroit bien enfin tourner en repentir’; Robert de Gravel to Abel de Servien, Frankfurt, May 5, 1657 (AMAE, CP Allemagne 137, fol. 302r–v).
44 Waquet, Callières 118–119.
45 For examples of “toned down” princely anger, see Elias, Court Society 82–93.
46 Frevert, Emotions in History 92–93.
During the aforementioned election, the Palatine elector Karl Ludwig, for example, reacted with highly stylized anger and ‘symbolic’ violence to a proposal made by Bavarian diplomat Dr Johann Oexle. This document was read during a session of the Electoral College. Karl Ludwig considered it disgraceful and dishonouring to his house and reacted by throwing an inkpot at Oexle. The elector later claimed that it was urgent fury that led him to act the way he did: ‘I could no longer hold back […] I would have rather died than endure such words’.47

Yet, contemporary norms had to be considered even by those who saw their anger as entirely justified. Karl Ludwig was thus reined in by his colleagues. He also claimed that Oexle’s ‘heated and slanderous words’ left him no other choice and referred to the Peace of Westphalia that should have obligated Oexle (apparently not himself!) to a more contained demeanour.48

This raises one question: How should a parfait ambassadeur, who pledged to honnête homme values but at the same time as his ‘master’s shadow’ represented an entire political persona encompassing dynastic honour—how should he comport himself in matters where defending his prince’s honour and status could lead to violent conflict?

During the latter half of the seventeenth century, practitioners of diplomacy increasingly sought avoidance strategies in order to create fewer conflict-prone ‘ceremonious situations’.49 Contemporary diplomatic theory began to put greater emphasis on the ‘social performance’ of representation and, like Wicquefort, regarded elaborate honnête homme behaviour as inextricably linked with appropriate representation.50

Where conflicts of honour loomed, a honnête homme diplomat should refrain from being the simple mouthpiece of his master. Wicquefort embedded this prescript in a historical cautionary tale: an English ambassador to Charles V had actually expressed verbatim his master’s anger and discontent towards the emperor and Spanish king. Due to the fact that Henry VIII—’a very unregulated prince’ as Wicquefort put it—had not cared to mince

48 Ibidem 71–72.
50 Wicquefort, L’Ambassadeur 11, 2.
words, allegations of ingratitude were tossed around that resulted in a severe reprimand for the unnamed ambassador.\textsuperscript{51} Thus, for Wicquefort the core value of moderation also evened out detrimental effects of “literal” princely representation, especially when wrath and anger threatened to cloud relations among fellow sovereigns.

However, Wicquefort granted his ambassador the liberty of free speech, which could and should be honest, candid and, if necessary, confrontational.\textsuperscript{52} Nevertheless, Wicquefort demanded—in line with the contemporary perception of blunt and passionate sincerity as nothing short of barbarism—\textsuperscript{53} that it had to be kept free from any inappropriate negative passion.\textsuperscript{54}

3 Righteous Anger—Anger as Role Requirement

There were, however, two characteristics of early modern diplomacy’s social make-up and the structures of communication surrounding it, that made it more difficult to put peaceable prescripts into practice, giving the expression of anger a certain degree of legitimacy, even inevitability.

\textit{First}, conflicts over precedence could lead to violent incidents that forced the ambassador, as a public minister, to respond violently to instances where his master’s reputation was at stake. Throughout the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, the long-standing rivalry between the French and Spanish crown for precedence had led at times to preposterous acts of violence among ambassadors.\textsuperscript{55} This traditional rivalry for precedence once again erupted resoundingly during an infamous quarrel between the French ambassador Jean Godefroi d’Estrades and his Spanish colleague Jean de Watteville in the streets of London in 1661 on the occasion of a Swedish ambassador’s entrée.\textsuperscript{56}

Estrades had vigorously prepared for a bitter struggle by gathering a large armed company to fight for the king’s precedence, and reaped the violence he had willingly risked. Watteville had also assembled an armed

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{51} Ibidem 75.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibidem 79.
\textsuperscript{53} See also Benthien – Martus, “Einleitung” 12.
\textsuperscript{54} Wicquefort, \textit{L’Ambassadeur} \textit{II}, 75.
\textsuperscript{56} On this episode, see, for example, Rohrschneider M., “Das französische Präzedenzstreben im Zeitalter Ludwigs xiv.”, \textit{Francia} \textit{36} (2009) 135–179, 149–152.
\end{flushleft}
cortege, which was supported by an enraged anti-French London mob and attacked and dispersed the French before they made any attempt to enforce Estrades’ precedence.\footnote{For a colourful description of the event, see \textit{The Diary of Samuel Pepys: a New and Complete Transcription}, vol. 2, ed. W. Armstrong et al. (Berkeley: 1983) 187–189.} In recounting the violent scenes, a quite shell shocked Estrades claimed: ‘I have not stopped risking it all according to the king’s intentions […] [He] will know that I don’t shy away from danger.’ He underlined this attitude by mentioning a musket bullet shot through his hat during the incident.\footnote{‘Ie n’ay pas lessé de risquer tout, voyant l’intention du Roy par ou il coignistra que je requittere aucun peril lors qu’il s’agira d’executer ses ordres’; Estrades to Lionne, London, October 10, 1661 (AMAE, CP Angleterre 75, fol. 194r).} Estrades pledged to defend his master’s honour whatever the cost. He also employed a semantics of military self-endangerment that lay at the ethical foundation of royal service and which was frequently mobilised in the implicit negotiations described above.\footnote{On this semantic connection, see Smith J.M., \textit{The Culture of Merit: Nobility, Royal Service, and the Making of Absolute Monarchy in France, 1600–1789} (Ann Arbor: 1996) 36–37.}

Nevertheless, Estrades restrained his own pugnacity and rendered the honourific value of ambassadorial violence quite ambiguous. Since street fighting for his master was not a suitable task for an ambassador, Estrades announced his immediate withdrawal from London, since ‘an ambassador of the king cannot stay here without honour or personal safety.’\footnote{‘un Ambassadeur du Roy ne pouvant demeurer ici ni avec honneur ni avec secrette de sa personne’; D’Estrades to Lionne, London, October 13, 1661 (AMAE, CP Angleterre 75, fol. 197r).} Moreover, the French, employing social stereotypes, blamed the outbreak of violence on the Spanish, as well as on the unruly and uncontrollable bourgeois London mob.\footnote{Lettre escrite à M d’Estrades, London, October 21, 1661 (AMAE, CP Angleterre 75, fol. 221r).}

A second factor that kept the risk of expressive and disruptive anger in diplomacy was that most ambassadors were nobles themselves. Although noble rank and status rendered ambassadorial representation more credible,\footnote{von Thiessen H., “Diplomatie vom type ancien. Überlegungen zu einem Idealtypus frühneuzeitlicher Diplomatie”, in Thiessen H. – Windler C. (eds.), \textit{Akteure in Außenbeziehungen} (Cologne – Weimar – Vienna: 2010) 471–503.} claiming to act on noble role requirements could also lead to honour being a prominent medium of social and political conflict. This was perhaps most apparent in 1644 during the early stages of negotiations at the Peace Congress of Westphalia, where the French ambassadors Abel de Servien and Comte d’Avaux, regardless of the fact that they served in the same embassy, were bitterly divided. Even before their mission had properly begun, they clashed with
one another in an angry exchange of abusive letters. In one of his responses Servien emphasised the desirability of *modération* over anger, claiming:

> I was rather determined to cede to you the glory of having offended me, and was not seeking any other victory over you but by my moderation.

But since he accused d’Avaux of having published insults against him, he saw himself coerced into a conflict of honour: ‘It is clear that you wanted to deprive me of the liberty to dissimulate the insult.’ While Servien certainly described expressive anger and the defence of honour as a role requirement, it was an emotion that had to be carefully negotiated and aligned with both *honnête homme* norms and the requirements of being a public minister.

Servien did not escalate the conflict right away. He tried to frame d’Avaux in such a way as to make it d’Avaux’s fault should he, Servien, be pushed beyond the limits of his self-control. He likened himself to a mortally wounded soldier who in desperation ‘could put fire to the powder’. While Servien justified violent anger over attacks to his reputation, it seems that at the same time both men were ridiculing and denouncing each other for having become consumed by anger in the first place. They even admitted that such conflict between fellow public ministers was detrimental to the crown’s reputation. Here, even more clearly, anger was an emotion that was not ruled out, but that had to be balanced with contrary norms and courses of action. However, this was rather typical for early modern noble self-fashioning, which constantly switched between adaptation to norms of civility and their role requirements for princely service in Europe’s transforming monarchical states, and a certain self-assertive pugnacity reminiscent of “noble liberty.”

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64 ‘j’avois esté en quelque resolution de vous laisser la gloire de m’avoir offence, & ne chercher autre victoire sur vous que par ma moderation’; Servien to d’Avaux, Munster, August 6, 1644, in *Lettres de Messieurs d’Avaux & Servien, Ambassadeurs pour le Roy de France en Allemagne, concernant leurs differens & leurs responses de part & d’autre en l’année 1644* (s.l.: 1650) 182.

65 ‘Il appert visiblement que vous m’avez voulu oster la liberté de dissimuler l’injure’; ibidem 183.

66 ‘Il peut mettre le feu au poudre’; ibidem 187.

67 Ibidem 161, 182; D’Avaux to Anne d’Autriche, Munster, August 18, 1644, in ibidem 193–194.

68 Servien to d’Avaux, Munster, August 6, 1644, in ibidem 182.

Similar problems characterised the clash between Lobkowitz and Grémonville, cited at the beginning of this article. In that case, however, Grémonville was reluctant to carry out a conflict of honour. Towards his superiors he dispelled the idea that the Hofburg theatre incident was a major attack on royal honour requiring ostentatious conflict, arguing that it was a quarrel between individuals. In an attempt to prevent the breakdown of negotiations and his own withdrawal from Vienna, Grémonville explicitly emphasised the value of modération. As a Knight of the Order of Malta, modération prevented him from escalating the conflict and giving in to anger and revenge. This was in addition to his obligation to be respectful and agreeable towards the emperor. Nevertheless, Grémonville felt obliged to show off a certain social pugnacity towards Viennese courtiers, emphasizing his ability to ‘search for means to take resounding revenge’.

4 Anger as a Political Index

Grémonville's reaction also reveals another trait of anger in diplomatic communication, apart from simply indicating dissent and conflict: anger could also be an instrument for professing political loyalty and affiliation. Apart from the political and social functions outlined above, anger could be described as what American political scientist Robert Jervis calls a political index, a sufficiently ‘expensive’ signal ‘believed to be inextricably linked to the actor’s capabilities or intentions’.

Grémonville did his best to describe the conflict with Lobkowitz not as a breakdown, but as a feinted signal to a third party: the Spanish and their ambassador at court. According to Grémonville, Lobkowitz had positioned himself as pro-Spanish in order to ensure Spanish patronage for him and his family. While Grémonville maintained to have called Lobkowitz’s bluff, other French diplomats credited such ostentatious practices of anger as being “indexical”: their purpose was to assess a genuine and authentic willingness for

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70 Grémonville to Louis XIV., Vienna, June 25, 1671 (AMAE, CP Autriche 40, fol. 150v); Mignet F., Négociations relatives à la succession d’Espagne sous Louis XIV (Paris: 1898) vol. 3, 521.
71 ‘chercher les moyens de me vanger avec éclat’; Grémonville to Louis XIV., Vienna, June 25, 1671 (AMAE, CP Autriche 40, fol. 150v).
74 Grémonville to Louis XIV., Vienna, June 25, 1671 (AMAE, CP Autriche 40, fol. 150v).
long-term cooperation. Moreover, they justified the handing out of substantial resources of patronage.

During the imperial election of 1657–58, Johann Christian von Boineburg, one of Johann Philipp von Schönborn's most powerful ministers and a self-professed adherent of the French party within the empire, initiated a harsh dispute about imperial politics in the emperor's antechamber with the Prince of Auersperg, one of the leading pro-Spanish figures at the Viennese Court. In these social spaces of deference and civility, such a course of action could be regarded as what Erving Goffman called acts of ‘ceremonial profanation’.75

Boineburg’s behaviour made an impression on both sides. Auersperg informed him that he would avoid any further contact and cut him off from any information.77 French diplomats, on the other hand, were now inclined to regard Boineburg as the ‘good Frenchman’ and the trustworthy client that he claimed to be, since his ties to the House of Habsburg seemed definitively severed. Boineburg’s staged anger can be regarded as an expensive political signal, precisely because it surpassed the shortcomings of polite conversation. Prior to the incident, Boineburg was perceived as protean. He meandered between the French and the Habsburgs, apparently giving the same emotionalised, yet insufficient and contingent pledges of loyalty to both sides.78

It is important to note that it was less the expressive emotionality of anger than the circumstances, the spaces and the audience of such a confrontation as well as the willingness of an interpretive community to construe political emotions that ensured the alleged genuineness of Boineburg’s attitude. The difference his expressive “just anger” made can only be fully grasped if we consider that it valiantly exposed what the French saw as typical Habsburg disregard for the German estates’ political liberties. According to the standard stories frequently repeated among the interpretive community of French diplomats, this earned Boineburg persistent hostility, since neither Vienna nor Madrid were able to accept or excuse any dissent whatsoever. These two powers were also unable to function as ‘good patrons’ towards any clients.79

75 Gramont and Lionne to Mazarin, Frankfurt, April 16, 1658 (AMAE, CP Allemagne 142, fol. 16v).
77 Gramont and Lionne to Mazarin, Frankfurt, April 30, 1658 (AMAE, CP Allemagne 142, fol. 69v).
78 Lionne to Mazarin, Frankfurt, January 8, 1658 (AMAE, CP Allemagne 142, fol. 46v).
That it was not the ferocity and drama with which anger was expressed that indicated its genuineness can be seen from the notes of another of Louis XIV’s diplomats, Jean Colbert de Torcy, who later became secretary of state for foreign affairs at the beginning of the eighteenth century. He describes his explicit scepticism towards the authenticity of expressively displayed negative emotions.

During the preliminary peace negotiations towards the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, the aged Sun King expressed to his secretary of state his intention to reluctantly accept conditions of peace, which Torcy regarded as humiliating. Torcy describes his decisively interior anger and frustration: ‘Another man might have sought to make an impression through feinted tears. I held back those that wanted to flow naturally.’

Interestingly, in this document the French secretary of state seems not only to be criticising the display of political emotions as a feinted, inauthentic gesture, but also to suggest that the interiorisation of such feelings and a considerably heightened threshold for their expression rendered them more sincere—at least to himself!

The French crown not only negotiated with foreign princes, ministers and their diplomats, but also with its own subjects. The conventional assumption that Louis XIV’s “absolutism” had imposed royal autocracy on the French realm aided by a strong bureaucracy can now, in large parts, be considered a myth. Monarchical rule remained dependent on cooperation, compromise and perpetual negotiation on various levels between rulers and subjects. Much of the absolutist effort to strengthen royal rule, such as installing intendants throughout the provinces and integrating local power brokers into the crown’s vast network of patronage, was directed at facilitating such cooperation in favour of the crown.

“Negotiated rule” was, however, much more than a sociological abstraction. It notably comprised royal ministers who frequently negotiated decisions directly. The court and royal ministers’ offices were far from being a detached

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80 Un autre peut-être eût cherché à faire sa cour par des larmes feintes. Je retins celles qui voulaient se répandre naturellement; Journal inédit de Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Marquis de Torcy Ministre secrétaire d’état des affaires étrangères pendant les Années 1709, 1710, 1711, ed. F. Masson (Paris: 1884) 207.


centre of power. Instead, they witnessed a constant influx of provincial delegations and other bidders and remonstrators, and became increasingly important as places for the political brokerage of patronage and favourable decisions.\footnote{See Kettering S., “Brokerage at the Court of Louis XIV”, The Historical Journal 36 (1993) 69–87.}

When royal ministers displayed anger in such an environment, it was in an attempt to discourage bidders from attempting to influence royal decision-making in their own favour. Not surprisingly, unpleasant encounters with a royal minister became a repeatedly recounted experience for delegates and bidders in the French court in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The Brandenburg diplomat Ezechiel Spanheim described one remarkable trait of Jean-Baptiste Colbert: he was dreaded for ‘the chagrin and the hardship he showed to those who sought his help’.\footnote{‘le chagrin et la dureté qu’il faisoit paraître à l’égard de ceux qui avoient recours à lui’; Spanheim Ezechiel, Relation de la Cour de France en 1690. Nouvelle Édition, ed. É. Bourgeois (Paris: 1900) 176.} Colbert himself explicitly advised his nephew and would-be-successor Seignelay that while benevolence was a royal official’s highest value, being tough towards bidders was essential to guarding royal authority.\footnote{Vergé-Franschesci M., Colbert ou la politique de bon sens (Paris: 2003) 429–430.}

It was therefore not surprising that individuals who questioned decisions made by ministers or the royal council or emphasized their ancient privileges suffered most intensely from ministerial anger.\footnote{See Kettering, “Court Brokerage” 77.} The representatives of the Burgundian town of Dole, for example, who tried to overturn the decision to remove their parliament following the annexation of Franche-Comté by the French, ended up being angrily scolded by Minister of War Louvois for their allegedly useless and puny fortifications.\footnote{Windler C., “Städte am Hof. Burgundische Deputierte und Agenten in Madrid und Versailles (16.–18. Jahrhundert)”, Zeitschrift für historische Forschung 30 (2003) 207–250, here 247.} In 1690 when one of the town’s informal deputies approached the minister for an interview, he was blatantly shouted down by a furious Louvois.\footnote{See “Journal de Gaspard Bonaventure Lallemand de Belmont” published in: Longin E. “Un Franc-comtois à Paris sous Louis XIV (1691–1692)”, in: Bulletin de la Société d’Agriculture, des Sciences et Arts du département de la Haute-Saone 3 (1894) 1–77, here 67.} Jean Hérault de Gourville remarked that Louvois ended an otherwise polite encounter, snubbing him ‘rather abruptly’.
when Gourville pleaded with him to reconsider a decision made by the royal council.90

Yet, the ministers’ strategy of using ostentatious anger to sanction departure from administrative procedure was part of a strategy to symbolically assert and strengthen the still volatile manoeuvring spaces of the royal administration, rather than a by-product of an emerging operatively closed state bureaucracy.91 While Orest Ranum may have exaggerated the crown’s role in shaping practices of courtesy and its reversals as a political instrument, anger and impoliteness were used to assert ministerial prerogative and express symbolic disdain for provincial corporate actors and their political privileges, which the crown nonetheless had to formally accept to a large degree.92

In reality, it was not least the close intertwining of court nobles and ministers through family and other alliances that perforated these spheres and made the court such a vibrant centre for royal brokerage.93 Given the fact that ‘corporate’ actors could not be denied all their privileges and a presence in the court, or that they frequently made efforts to employ court networks in their favour, the ministerial style of conspicuous anger and impoliteness served to set conditions for asymmetrical negotiations in their own favour, rather than to stop them altogether.94

‘Ministerial anger’ can be regarded as a practice intended to enforce and underline the asymmetry that, in contrast to diplomacy, characterised these negotiations. It might also be argued that by the eighteenth century, the crown had found ways to regularly deal with at least some provincial estates’ representatives in a more collaborative manner.95 Thus, conspicuous anger did not contribute to fostering blind obedience to a Tocquevillian behemoth, but rather to creating an atmosphere of asymmetrical cooperation and an efficient administration under royal prerogative.

95 See, for example, the account in Legay M.L., Les Etats provinciaux dans la construction de l’état moderne aux XVIIème et XVIIIème siècles (Geneva: 2001).
5 Conclusion

First, considering the norms of diplomatic practice, it seems at first glance perfectly clear that openly expressing anger would be entirely inappropriate and damaging for a diplomat representing his prince, adhering to *honnête homme* ideals and at the same time furthering strategic aims through practices of dissimulation.

These ideals are not only found in normative treatises, but also informed opportunistic and self-serving narratives used in the practical writings on diplomacy, mainly in diplomatic correspondence. The unresolved conflict between the ethical standards of propriety and agreeableness and the strategic and antagonistic semantics of early modern norms of communication led the same treaties to endorse instigating anger in order to dismantle dissimulation or to create emotional control.

Second, while the display of anger could be described as a lack of “civil” social norms or as a proneness to manipulation, situations could occur where the defence of honour and status could “bring back” anger as an advisable course of action. The Watteville–Estrades incident demonstrates that violence in the prince’s name could turn into a role requirement for an ambassador. Likewise, ambassadors used anger over alleged offences against their own honour. Nonetheless, such anger was not wholeheartedly embraced, but was balanced and re-negotiated with more peaceable norms of moderation, notably by framing others for having enforced the enactment of anger.

Third, we have seen in various contexts that the display of anger could be used as a political symbol. Anger could indicate political conflict that could in turn be interpreted by others as enhancing political loyalties. Alternatively, ostentatious anger and the refusal of courtesy could underline royal prerogative and enlarge the social and political asymmetries during subject-ruler negotiations.

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### Secondary Literature


CHAPTER 17

Narratives of Reconciliation in Early Modern England: Between Oblivion, Clemency and Forgiveness

Jan Frans van Dijkhuizen

1 Changing Conceptions of Reconciliation: From Early Modern to Modern

An examination of the cultural construction of anger in early modernity brings with it a complementary question that is the focus of this article: how did early moderns understand the nature of reconciliation? An important starting point for my analysis is the idea that concepts of and forms of reconciliation are culturally constructed and therefore historically contingent: different eras and cultures conceive of interpersonal reconciliation in different ways. A single culture, moreover, can entertain various and potentially conflicting notions of conflict resolution, while its dominant reconciliation paradigms can change over time. My focus in this article is on the ways in which reconciliation between people was envisioned in early modern culture, with early modern England as my main case study.

One early modern model of conflict resolution can arguably be found in Neo-Stoicism. Yet rather than offering advice on how to resolve an existing conflict, Neo-Stoicism recommends an emotional economy that renders conflict resolution irrelevant. The true Stoic sage is not affected by the actions of other men, knows no anger or resentment, and therefore never arrives at a point where he is in need of reconciling with others. Such an attitude is recommended, for example, in Seneca’s *De ira*, which not only advocates a wholesale elimination of angry feelings but also urges that any retaliation for wrongs be carried out purely as matter of duty, never from a sense of injury. In Christianity, by contrast, there is a long theological and pastoral tradition which stresses the importance of anger suppression (rather than its elimination). This tradition finds one important origin in the New Testament letters attributed to the apostle Paul, with Ephesians 4:26 as a much-cited example: ‘Be ye angry, and sin not: let not the sun go down upon your wrath’.1

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My main focus in this article is on the interplay between, on the one hand, this early modern interest in anger control as a basis for reconciliation and, on the other hand, an alternative notion of interpersonal reconciliation that I will refer to as *remorse-based forgiveness*, and that differs in fundamental ways from both the Stoic model of anger elimination and the Christian model of restraining anger. As several scholars and commentators have noted, remorse-based forgiveness has become especially dominant in modern culture, both in relation to political conflict and in personal relations.\(^2\) Within this model of interpersonal reconciliation, a victim foresees resentment on the grounds that the wrongdoer feels genuine remorse and has successfully communicated this feeling to the victim. Both victim and wrongdoer, in other words, undergo, or bring about, a self-transformation. The wrongdoer regrets his wrongful actions and is therefore a different person from who he was when he committed his crime. It is to a large extent for this reason that the victim lets go of his anger and resentment towards him, or commits himself to doing so. The victim’s self-transformation revolves around this letting go of resentment and his willingness to see the wrongdoer in a new light. An important additional precondition for modern-day forgiveness in a political context is that the perpetrator reveals the whole truth about his crimes. A particularly well-known example of forgiveness in the political realm is the South-African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, set up in 1995. The Commission saw forgiveness as a prerequisite for a successful transition from the Apartheid regime to democracy: the horrors and injustices of Apartheid could be overcome only if perpetrators publicly disclosed the truth about their crimes, in this way making forgiveness by their victims a possibility. Desmond Tutu, one of the Commission’s main founders, famously claimed that there is ‘no future [for South-Africa] without forgiveness’, and confession and remorse on the part of perpetrators were recurrent themes in the Commission hearings.

My aim in this article is to reflect on the cultural-historical origins of this modern preoccupation with remorse-based forgiveness as a road to reconciliation. Is this preoccupation peculiar to the twentieth and early twenty-first

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centuries or can its roots be discerned in earlier historical eras? If remorse-based forgiveness is peculiar to the modern era, moreover, what alternative reconciliation paradigms were available in early modernity, and what transformations were necessary to lend forgiveness its cultural dominance in the modern world? As I hope to show, early modern culture thought of reconciliation primarily in terms of clemency and oblivion; both are linked intrinsically, moreover, to the Christian idea of anger control, and the suppression of resentment, referred to above. The role of heartfelt remorse as a starting point for reconciliation, by contrast, was at best limited. At the same time, as a brief reading of four Shakespeare plays will hopefully demonstrate, the idea that remorse can have a role to play in interpersonal reconciliation was beginning to be explored in literary texts. Likewise, the origins of the idea that victim and perpetrator share a common humanity, central to the modern idea of remorse-based forgiveness, can be traced at least to the early modern era.

It is important to realize at the outset that the notion that forgiveness in its modern confession and remorse-based sense has a role to play in political conflict resolution would have seemed alien to many early moderns. During and immediately after the great politico-religious conflicts of the early modern era, there do not seem to have been any attempts at forgiveness in a (proto-) modern sense. In the case of the Atlantic Isles, after the Wars of the Three Kingdoms (1638–1651), official policies after the Restoration were aimed at forgetting the events of the preceding years, rather than at the kind of truth-finding in which the South-African Truth and Reconciliation Commission engaged. In the Declaration of Breda (1660), Charles II famously ordained that ‘henceforth all notes of discord, separation and difference of parties be utterly abolished among all our subjects, whom we invite and conjure to a perfect

3 In this article I shall use “reconciliation” as a general term for conflict resolution, regardless of the specific form which this resolution takes. “Forgiveness” and especially “remorse-based forgiveness” refer to a modern reconciliation paradigm in which a wrongdoer is forgiven an account of his heartfelt remorse.

union among themselves’. The Indemnity and Oblivion Act of 1660, moreover, declared that of all who had taken part in the Civil War, only those who had a leading role in the regicide of 1649 were to face the force of the law. Charles’ aim was to foster a collective form of oblivion—to bury all Seeds of future Discords and remembrance of the former as well in His owne Breast as in the Breasts of His Subjects one towards another. In the preamble of a General Act of Pardon and Oblivion to be passed by the Rump Parliament in February 1652, Oliver Cromwell had used similar language. For Cromwell the aim of the Act was ‘that all Rancour and Evil Will occasioned by the late Differences may be buried in perpetual oblivion.’

Andrew Shifflet has analysed attempts at reconciliation between Charles I and his opponents in an earlier stage of the mid-seventeenth-century conflicts, during the years leading up to the regicide in 1649. While Shifflet repeatedly refers to this reconciliation as ‘forgiveness’, it seems clear that it bears little resemblance to forgiveness in its modern guise, with its emphasis on inner self-transformation (both on the part of the wrongdoer and the victim) and truth-finding. Rather, what Charles I offered to his opponents—provided they abandoned their campaign against him—was clemency: a ‘free and general pardon’ that would ensure ‘a perfect reconciliation between him and all his subjects’. This notion of reconciliation proceeded from a hierarchical view of society in which a monarch or ruler is in a position to grant clemency at his own discretion, much like the way in which Charles II, after the Restoration, would attempt to put to rest the conflicts of the preceding decades by means of a magnanimous royal gesture—or indeed the way in which Cromwell attempted to effect ‘a just Setling of the Peace and Freedom of this Commonwealth’ in the immediate aftermath of the Civil Wars.
What separates these early modern conceptions of political reconciliation from modern-day notions is not only a lack of interest in uncovering traumatic experiences of the recent past but also an assumption that political “forgiveness” is granted within a strongly hierarchical relationship characterized by a disparity in power between those who grant oblivion and amnesty on the one hand, and those who receive it on the other. Indeed, clemency served in part to confirm asymmetrical power relationships. In modern-day scenes of political apology, by contrast, it is the representatives of the state who ask for forgiveness on the state’s behalf. The apologies offered by the Canadian government to the Aboriginal peoples of Canada are an illuminating example. In a 2008 statement expressing the government’s regret for the suffering caused by government-funded residential schools for native children, Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated that ‘the Government of Canada sincerely apologizes and asks the forgiveness of the Aboriginal peoples of this country for failing them so profoundly’.\(^\text{11}\) Such apologies are informed by an assumption that the relationship between state and citizen has a degree of equality and (emotional) reciprocity that makes remorse by the state a conceptual possibility. Although both during the Wars of the Three Kingdoms and the Dutch Revolt, monarchic power was of course challenged, this did not mean that confessions of guilt and expressions of remorse by a monarch or his representatives were seen by any of the parties involved as a possible ingredient of political reconciliation. During the 1640s, Charles I’s opponents rejected his offers of clemency but they do not seem to have offered him anything like “forgiveness” on the condition that he confess his guilt and express his remorse.

It hardly needs stating that the modern-day conceptions of forgiveness referred to above draw on Christian theology for their vocabulary of remorse and repentance. Yet, as David Konstan has recently argued, while Christian theology is of course centrally concerned with remorse and forgiveness, the focus in the church fathers and in late medieval scholastic writers was first and foremost on divine forgiveness—one repairing the damaged relationship between God and sinful humanity.\(^\text{12}\) It was not until relatively recently that Christian notions of divine forgiveness came to be applied systematically to

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12 Konstan, Before Forgiveness 112–145.
interpersonal and political relations. Remorse now became an issue within inter-human relations. Konstan locates an important starting point for this shift in the early eighteenth century, with Bishop Joseph Butler's sermon “Upon Forgiveness of Injuries” (1726; I will return to this sermon in more detail below).  

It is important to note, moreover, that in Christian models, divine forgiveness is to a significant extent a mysterious gift, an act of divine grace that cannot ultimately be seen as a response to, or as the result of, human initiatives. While humans do have an obligation to feel remorse and to repent of their sins, there is ultimately no causal relationship between such human efforts on the one hand and God’s forgiveness on the other (and this is true, albeit to different degrees, for both Catholic and Protestant theologies). Indeed, as Konstan notes, in Christian theology, divine forgiveness implies a radical erasure of sin that is fundamentally different from the mechanics of interpersonal forgiveness:

there is a deep gulf […] between God's ability to cancel or obliterate sin […] and human or interpersonal forgiveness, in which the reality of the offense—always a particular act—must in some sense persist into the present, neither abolished nor forgotten.

If, as we have seen, early moderns thought of interpersonal reconciliation in terms of an obliteration of guilt at all, it was in the context of the relationship between a government and its subjects – for example, Charles II’s offer of a ‘free and general pardon’ to (most of) those who had opposed the royalist

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13 Butler J., "Upon Forgiveness of Injuries", in id., Fifteen Sermons Preached at the Rolls Chapel (London, James and John Knapton: 1726) 137–177. For Konstan’s discussion of this sermon, as well as Butler's sermon “Upon Resentment”, see Konstan, Before Forgiveness 152–155.


15 Konstan, Before Forgiveness 134.
cause during the first and second Civil War. Indeed, such an offer confirmed Charles’ status as divinely anointed ruler, whose manner of offering unilateral absolution was analogous to divine grace.

Two Early Modern Forgiveness Sermons: John Tillotson & Joseph Butler

We can usefully map some of the key parameters of early modern thinking about reconciliation by analysing a late seventeenth-century sermon on forgiveness preached by John Tillotson (1630–1694) before Queen Mary II on 8 March 1689, in the aftermath of the Revolution of 1688, and approximately a month before William and Mary were officially crowned. The sermon is an exegesis of Matth 5.44: ‘But I say unto you, love your enemies; bless them that curse you; do good to them that hate you; pray for them that despitefully use you, and persecute you.’ Tillotson defines forgiveness in terms of anger control. While anger may be our first, instinctive response to our enemies, he claims, ‘the Monuments of our Mercy and Goodness are a far more pleasing and delightful spectacle, than of our Rage and Cruelty’ (5). Tillotson’s formulation suggests a concern with reconciliation in a wider social and political sphere. A forgiving attitude is a more pleasing public “spectacle” than revenge, and the term “mercy” indicates that the reconciliation recommended here takes place within a hierarchical relationship: mercy is granted to an inferior by a figure of power. Indeed, Tillotson’s reconciliation vocabulary is tinged with the aggression which it seeks to overcome or prevent: ‘a more glorious Victory cannot be gain’d over another man than this, that when the Injury began on his part the Kindness should begin on ours. If both the wayes were equally in our power, yet it is a much more desirable Conquest to overcome evil with good, than with evil. By this, we can only Conquer our Enemy’ (11). Forgiveness here is a form of conquest, a way of asserting one’s moral superiority over one’s enemies, and therefore a confirmation of one’s hierarchical relationship to them. Later in the sermon, this sense of superiority takes on a specifically denominational dimension: for Tillotson, ‘the Humanity of the Protestant Religion’—as opposed to ‘Popery’ (31)—reveals itself in its superior ability to foster forgiveness rather than revenge.

16 Cobbett, *Cobbett’s Parliamentary History of England*, vol. 4, 89. The phrase echoes Charles I’s attempts at reconciliation during the 1640s quoted above.
17 Tillotson J., *A sermon preach’d before the Queen at White-Hall, March the 8th, 1688/9* (London, Brabazon Aylmer and Will. Rogers: 1689) 1.
In spite of this, Tillotson also presents the essential humanity shared by all persons as a central argument in favour of forgiveness. Indeed, resentment is destructive because it prevents us from seeing a wrongdoer as human in spite of his crimes:

At the worst, though never so sore and causeless an Enemy, though never so bad a Man, yet he is a Man, and as such, hath something in him which the blindest Passion cannot deny to be good and amiable. He hath the same Nature with our selves, which we cannot hate, or despise, without hatred and contempt of our selves. Let a mans faults be what they will, they do not destroy his Nature and make him cease to be a Man. (7)

In relation to this, we should be moved to forgiveness by an awareness of our own sinfulness, and therefore our own far greater need for forgiveness before God. God's mercy towards mankind should inspire a similarly lenient attitude towards our fellow human beings: ‘Look up to that Just and Powerful Being that is above, and consider well, Whether thou dost not both expect and stand in need of more Mercy and Favour from Him, than thou canst find in thy heart to shew to thine offending Brother?’ (35).

Tillotson does not see remorse as the sine qua non of reconciliation. Rather, remorse is understood as enabling an exceptional form of reconciliation, available only in extraordinary cases: ‘sometimes Forgiveness does signifie a perfect Reconciliation to those that have offended us, so as to take them again into our Friendship; which they are by no means fit for, till they have repented of their Enmity, and laid it aside’ (19). While Tillotson does see remorse-based forgiveness as the supreme form of forgiveness, he grants it only a limited place within real-life conflict resolution.

Both its audience and its immediate political context—the transition to a new reign after the politico-religious conflicts that culminated in the Revolution of 1688—gave Tillotson’s sermon added topical urgency. This comes to the fore especially in a revealing passage that is worth quoting in full:

The general Wrongs which are do Humane Society, do not so sensibly touch and sting men, as personal Injuries and Provocations. The Law is never angry or in passion, and it is not only a great indecency, but a fault, when the Judges of it are so. Heat of Prosecution belongs to particular Persons; and it is their memory of Injuries, and desire to Revenge them, and diligence to set on and sharpen the Law, that is chiefly to be dreaded: And if the truth were known, it is much to be fear’d that there are almost as few private as publick Acts of Oblivion pass’d in the World; and they
commonly pass as slowly, and with as much difficulty, and not till the grace and good effect of them is almost quite lost. (25–26)

Tillotson equates forgiveness in the private sphere with public acts of oblivion, presenting such public oblivion as a model for more private acts of reconciliation. Individuals should behave with the same equanimity and composure as the law (and there is more than a hint of [Neo-]Stoic discourse here), or as rulers who proclaim an act of oblivion, yet Tillotson laments the rarity of such acts. There is an all but overt appeal to Queen Mary and her husband to muster—at this crucial juncture in English history—the magnanimous forgiveness displayed by Charles II in the 1660 Act of Oblivion, and to do so quickly. Injuries of the past should be allowed to fade into oblivion: reconciliation is made difficult precisely by the persistent memory of wrongs.

As I noted above, David Konstan argues that the privileging of remorse-based forgiveness as a mode of reconciliation is the product of a modern development whose beginnings can be traced especially to the early eighteenth century, with Joseph Butler’s eighteenth-century sermons on resentment and forgiveness as an important starting point. Yet Butler’s sermon “Upon Forgiveness of Injuries”, important though it may be within the larger history of forgiveness, bears at best a partial resemblance to modern forgiveness paradigms. Rather, it reveals just how persistent were the reconciliation models that inform Tillotson’s sermon. Butler’s sermon revolves around the problem of ‘Anger, Indignation, Resentment’. While he sees these emotions as ‘plainly natural’ (156), they are also potentially destructive to the community at large and should therefore be kept under control. Indeed, for Butler, as for Tillotson, ‘to forgive Injuries’ (165) is synonymous with avoiding the ‘Excess and Abuse’ (157) of resentment. Butler sees resentment also as an impediment to justice. If justice were to be administered on the basis of personally felt resentment, it would no longer be equitable, but rather become mere retaliation: ‘from the numberless Partialities which we all have for ourselves, every one would often think himself injured when He was not: and in most Cases would represent an Injury as much greater than it really is; the imagined Dignity of the Person offended would scarce ever fail to magnifie the Offence’ (160). Moreover, resentment-driven justice would produce further resentment in the punished party and as a result, Butler notes, ‘it is manifest there would be no Bounds, nor any End’ (160). Resentment furthermore reduces the wrongdoer to his crime and makes it impossible to see him as more than a moral monster. Indeed, humans have an obligation to be forgiving towards others because of a

Butler, “Upon Forgiveness of Injuries” 156.
basic human vulnerability, and a capacity for emotions, shared by wrongdoer and victim:

It is not Man's being a social Creature, much less his being a moral Agent, from whence alone our Obligations to Good-will towards him arise. There is an obligation to it prior to either of these, arising from his being a sensible Creature; that is, capable of Happiness or Misery. (166)

Conspicuously absent from Butler's model of forgiveness is any interest in remorse. Much like Tillotson, he never imagines forgiveness as occasioned by remorse or repentance on the part of the perpetrator. Indeed, in presenting Christ's forgiveness of his crucifiers as the model for inter-human forgiveness *par excellence*, he sidesteps the issue of remorse altogether: ‘We have an Example of Forgiveness […] in its utmost Perfection, and which indeed includes in it all that is Good, in that Prayer of our Blessed Saviour on the Cross: “Father, forgive them; for they know not what they do” ’ (174). Christ forgives his crucifiers precisely because they ‘know not what they do’, and this renders remorse on their part conceptually irrelevant.

These two sermons shed light on some of the key elements of early modern reconciliation discourses. Although they are separated by almost fifty years, both Butler and Tillotson present forgiveness as a matter of anger control, a restraining of resentment unrelated to any moral transformation on the part of the wrongdoer. Indeed, while Tillotson does see repentance as a prerequisite for a ‘perfect reconciliation’, such perfect reconciliations are exceptional and do not play any meaningful role within the real-life forgiveness scenarios which he recommends. For Tillotson, moreover, humans have an ethical duty to be forgiving to others because they are sinful themselves: it is because we are all in need of divine forgiveness that we should be ready to grant others forgiveness.

For Tillotson the Christian obligation to keep one's anger in check in interpersonal conflicts is analogous to the forms of political oblivion outlined above. He sees no fundamental distinction between forgiveness in the personal and political spheres—the occasion on which the sermon was preached would have made that difficult—and presents both as revolving around a gratuitous forswearing of anger and resentment that is occasioned first and

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19 In this sense, the two sermons should be understood at least in part as partaking in a long tradition of Christian pastoral discourse on the virtues of anger control that goes back at least to the eleventh century. For this tradition, see for example Hyams P., *Rancor and Reconciliation in Medieval England* (Ithaca, NY: 2003).
foremost by an awareness of universal human sinfulness. This sense of shared sinfulness plays a less prominent role in Butler, who stresses more strongly the vulnerable humanity that wrongdoer and victim have in common, a humanity that precedes the crime to be forgiven. Finally, both Butler and Tillotson seem uninterested in remorse because their concern is more with forgiveness as a *social* duty: resentment and anger should be forsworn, or at least moderated, in order to safeguard harmony and stability within society, rather than as a way of fostering the victim’s personal emotional well-being.

Especially Tillotson’s sermon also reveals an important faultline in early modern reconciliation paradigms. There is a tension in his sermon between, on the one hand, an understanding of reconciliation as hierarchical and, on the other hand, a notion that reconciliation can be occasioned by a sense of shared humanity common to the perpetrator and his forgiver alike. The latter concept is more pronounced in Butler, and it is especially in this sense that his sermon can be seen as more akin to modern forgiveness paradigms.

3 Two Dilemmas in Modern Forgiveness Scenarios

3.1 Divine versus Interpersonal Forgiveness and the Problem of Remorse

In his recent analysis of the modern paradigm of interpersonal forgiveness, Charles Griswold points out that forgiveness can never be demanded or compelled, even in situations where there are good reasons to forgive, and he stresses that forgiveness can in principle always be denied. In this sense, Griswold notes, ‘forgiveness is elective’.

If this problem of the elective nature of forgiveness plays a relatively marginal role in Griswold’s model, it is the central focus of Jacques Derrida’s remarks, in *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness*, on the modern preoccupation with forgiveness in the political and interpersonal spheres. Derrida’s understanding of forgiveness hinges on his paradoxical proposition that ‘forgiveness forgives only the unforgivable’. To forgive an act that is intrinsically forgivable, Derrida notes, requires no special effort on the part of the forgiver. It is only in relation to the unforgiveable, and therefore only as an *impossibility*, that forgiveness becomes meaningful. In a characteristically poststructuralist move, Derrida argues that the concept of forgiveness is haunted by what it would seem to exclude—by the very concept which it would seem to deny.

20 Griswold, *Forgiveness* 68.
21 Derrida, *On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness* 32.
For Derrida, this also implies that what he terms ‘pure forgiveness’ is a form of ‘madness’. That is to say, it is not ultimately granted on the basis of a wrongdoer’s remorse or commitment to mending his ways, or on any other act that would render the perpetrator and/or his misdeed ‘forgivable’.22 Indeed, forgiveness, for Derrida, is not a transaction: it is an unconditional, ‘gracious gift’ that escapes from any logic of exchange (the kind of exchange suggested, for example, by the assertion that ‘I forgive you because you feel remorse’).23 Forgiveness in this sense is therefore ‘heterogeneous to the juridico-political, judicial, or penal order’ and resists political agendas, such as national reconciliation after traumatic violent conflict.24 In this sense, Derrida’s understanding of ‘pure forgiveness’ is clearly analogous to the Christian notions of divine forgiveness discussed above, with their emphasis on divine forgiveness as a form of grace.

On Derrida’s reading, it is at the very least highly difficult to formulate the philosophically and ethically coherent paradigm of forgiveness which Griswold attempts to offer in Forgiveness: A Philosophical Exploration: forgiveness remains necessarily unintelligible, defined by its own impossibility. The differences in their understandings of forgiveness (which are in part a difference in emphasis) point to a more general conceptual problem built into the modern privileging of forgiveness as a road to reconciliation. This problem is borne in part from the fact that modern forgiveness paradigms transfer originally divine forms of forgiveness to inter-human relations, both in the personal and political sphere. This conceptual move assumes that the relationship between humanity and God, insofar as it pertains to reconciliation, can serve as a model for inter-human relations. Yet, as Derrida points out, inter-human forgiveness is necessarily tainted by politics and history, and is therefore unavoidably ‘impure’. While what Derrida sees as ‘pure’ forgiveness is ‘irreconcilable’ with political and historical conditions, inter-human forgiveness can only emerge within concrete political, historical and legal contexts.25 This is a dilemma to which the modern forgiveness paradigm gives rise: it is premised on a divine model of forgiveness to which it cannot ultimately live up. Indeed, Derrida prefers to refer to forgiveness in a political context as ‘reconciliation’ rather than forgiveness, and the distinction which he proposes points to a core conceptual problem in modern forgiveness discourses.

A second dilemma inherent in modern forgiveness models is of an epistemological nature. If, in divine forgiveness, it is God who assesses the sincer-

22 Ibidem 49, 39.
23 Ibidem 44.
24 Ibidem 45.
ity of a sinner’s remorse and repentance, in modern inter-human forgiveness discourses, a wrongdoer’s ‘[r]epentance and the concomitant achievement of a new self are […] to be judged not by God but by the person who has been wronged’. Forgiveness in its modern guises, therefore, is, in David Konstan’s words, ‘depend[ent] on fathoming another person’s sincerity’. Yet within a strictly human sphere, assessing the wrongdoer’s moral transformation is inherently problematic. While God, in his omniscience, has untrammeled access to a sinner’s innermost thoughts and feelings, remorse ultimately remains unknowable to a fallible human forgiver. Remorse-based forgiveness therefore necessarily entails a leap of faith, on the part of the victim, in a perpetrator’s self-transformation. In cases of institutional or political forgiveness, moreover, the meaning and relevance of genuine, inner remorse are arguably even more problematic. In the case of the Canadian government’s apologies to aboriginal peoples, for example, can we meaningfully speak of heartfelt remorse on a level somehow more profound than its expression in a public speech and in related, concrete government initiatives such as the Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission?

It seems, then, that remorse played at best a marginal role in early modern political and interpersonal conceptions of reconciliation, and that early modern reconciliation paradigms proceeded from a deeply hierarchical view of human relationships. These are two respects in which early modern reconciliation scenarios differ fundamentally from modern remorse-based forgiveness. At the same time, as Tillotson’s sermon suggests, early modern reconciliation discourses were poised between such a hierarchical view on the one hand and a perhaps nascent sense of a common humanity shared by victim and perpetrator. For Tillotson, it was in part this shared humanity that made reconciliation an ethical duty. Moreover, if early modern political and theological discourses of interpersonal reconciliation evince a limited interest in remorse, the following section of this article will attempt to show that remorse was beginning to figure as an important theme in literary explorations of interpersonal reconciliation. Indeed, it is part of my argument that the shift of remorse-driven forgiveness from the divine to the interpersonal sphere initially occurred in part on a level of cultural representation: it is in literary narratives of reconciliation that forgiveness in its originally divine sense came to be reconceptualised as a key theme in interpersonal relations. As I hope to show, the first stirrings of this shift can be traced at least to the early modern era. In this sense, this article can be seen as a response to David Konstan’s invitation to literary scholars

26 Konstan, Before Forgiveness 157.
27 Ibidem 164.
to ‘trace the emergence of forgiveness as a theme in early modern literature’. He notes that ‘doubtless, there are many passages that would repay analysis, and it is conceivable that there lurk in one of them testimony to the originary moment of the modern concept’. In addition to this, early modern literary representations of reconciliation explore the idea of a universal humanity of which both victim and perpetrator partake—an idea fundamental to modern reconciliation paradigms.

The second half of this article offers a reading of reconciliation in John Milton’s *Paradise Lost* (1667/1674) and four plays by William Shakespeare. The reconciliation between Adam and Eve in *Paradise Lost* is very much informed by the discourses of royal clemency and pardoning discussed above: Adam pities Eve in her self-abasement, and his forgiveness of her is to a significant extent a function of the hierarchical relation between them. *Paradise Lost* can therefore be seen as a confirmation of the early modern reconciliation scenarios outlined above. By contrast, the reconciliation scenes in Shakespeare’s *Measure for Measure* (1604), *King Lear* (1603), *The Winter’s Tale* (1610) and *The Tempest* (1610) investigate the idea of remorse as a key to reconciliation in a manner that is in some respects strikingly modern. Yet in these plays remorse-based forgiveness, even in human relations, is ultimately possible only as a strongly theologically inflected concept: an unaccountable gift, an act of grace in a fallen world. While Shakespeare does explore what might be termed proto-modern reconciliation scenarios, therefore, his understanding of reconciliation is distinctly non-modern in its insistence on the theological and spiritual dimension of remorse-based forgiveness—its suggestion that reconciliation is a mysterious act of grace. In this sense, I hope to nuance Konstans’s notion of an ‘originary moment of the modern concept’ of remorse-based forgiveness: the modern concept, at least in Shakespeare, does not so much emerge in a

28 Ibidem 151–152.
29 The modern *politicisation* of forgiveness can usefully be understood as an application to political relations of forgiveness notions that originally emerged in relation to the more intimate interpersonal sphere—for example in literary representations of reconciliation between spouses or family members. States and institutions now came to be thought of as capable of experiencing remorse and of mending their ways, and forgiveness came therefore to be seen as a viable theme in the relationship between state and citizen, or between institution and individual. This shift of forgiveness from the personal to the political can be thought of as a second stage in the history of forgiveness that came after the shift from the divine to the interpersonal sphere. This second change is beyond the immediate thematic scope of this article, yet it was made possible in part by a prior rethinking of the nature of interpersonal reconciliation (with forgiveness becoming an increasingly dominant reconciliation paradigm) which found an important locus in literary works.
pure form, but in dialogue with other, pre-existing notions of reconciliation. Indeed, Shakespeare’s examination of forgiveness can usefully be seen as a critical reflection on the consequences of transferring remorse from the divine to the inter-human sphere: Derrida’s critique of modern forgiveness discourses would arguably not have come as a surprise to Shakespeare.

What I will offer below is a necessarily schematic and sketchy analysis of an important long-term shift in literary reconciliation narratives that awaits more detailed and sustained study. What follows, therefore, is intended first and foremost as a starting point for such study, both in terms of the larger cultural history which I seek to elucidate and in terms of the literary works I analyse.

4 Literary Narratives of Reconciliation in Milton and Shakespeare

The reconciliation between Adam and Eve is one of the key events in Paradise Lost. While Book 9 leaves them locked in ‘mutual accusation’ (9.1189), blaming each other for the Fall, at the end of Book 10 the harmony between them has been restored and ‘both confes[s] / Humbly thir faults’ (10.1100–1101) to God. Scholars have noted that the reconciliation between them—and therefore their shared repentance before God—is made possible by Eve, who offers to take the full blame for the Fall in response to Adam’s bitter rejection of her. It is only after Eve’s offer that Adam’s anger abates, that his love for Eve is rekindled, and that he acknowledges his own responsibility for the Fall. As Philip Gallagher has argued, in granting Eve such an instrumental role in the reconciliation between herself and Adam, and therefore in their eventual redemption, Milton went against the grain of a long-established Christian tradition in which Eve is first and foremost cast as the cause of the Fall. Indeed, there is a

30 Such further study should also venture beyond the early modern era. Henry Fielding’s novel Tom Jones (1749), for example, is centrally concerned with the question of remorse as a road to reconciliation. For an exploration of more politically charged forms of forgiveness in the work of William Blake and Percy Bysshe Shelley, see Potkay A., The Story of Joy: From the Bible to Late Romanticism (Cambridge: 2007) 162–193.

31 Quotations from Paradise Lost are taken from The Riverside Milton, ed. R. Flannagan (Boston – New York: 1998).


scholarly tradition which sees Eve as becoming partially Christ-like in her offer
to take upon herself Adam’s guilt too.34

In spite of Eve’s important role in initiating human repentance before God,
the reconciliation between her and Adam also reconfirms—and is even made
possible by—the hierarchical relationship between them. Indeed, Adam is
moved by Eve’s words because she humiliates herself before him. As Eve falls
down at Adam’s feet, she describes herself as his ‘suppliant’, and ‘clasps[his] knees’ (10.918–919). It is because of her submissiveness and her self-abasement
that Adam pities Eve, and it is this pity which leads him to forgive her: ‘her
lowlie plight […] / in Adam wraught / Commiseration; soon his heart relented’
(10.937–940).

The phrase ‘lowlie plight’ is echoed in the opening line of Book 11, in which
Adam and Eve stand before God ‘in lowliest plight repentant’ (11.1). In addi-
tion, a few lines later the Son asks God to ‘bend thine eare / To supplication’
(11.30–31), just as Adam responds sympathetically to Eve’s entreaties as his sup-
pliant. After the reconciliation, Eve claims to be ‘restor’d’ (10.970) by Adam, just
as Christ is described as the ‘restorer of Mankind’ (10.646; for similar descrip-
tions of Christ, see 1.5, 3.288–289 and 12.623). These echoes create a partial
analogy between Eve’s self-abasement before Adam and their shared humility
before God, and therefore between Adam and God in their role as forgiver.35

The relationships between Adam and Eve on the one hand and between Adam
and Eve and God on the other are marked by a comparable hierarchy (Adam’s
god-like superiority over Eve is, of course, also captured in the famous ‘Hee for
God only, shee for God in him’ [4.299]). Likewise, the ‘commiseration’ which
Adam feels with the tearful Eve resonates with the compassion towards sin-
ful humanity displayed by God and Christ. Christ is described as radiating
‘divine compassion’ (3.141), while both God and the Son are inclined ‘much
more to pitie’ (3.401, 404) towards the fallen Adam and Eve than to wrath.
If Eve becomes Christ-like in her self-sacrifice, it is Adam who comes to resemble
God and Christ in his pity for Eve.

In spite of the parallels between Adam and God in their roles as forgiver,
Adam is not in the first instance moved to forgiveness by Eve’s remorse. The

34 The locus classicus is perhaps Summers J.H., *The Muse’s Method: An Introduction to
Paradise Lost* (Cambridge, MA: 1962) 183; for a more recent view, see Doerksen D.W.,
“‘Let There be Peace’: Eve as Redemptive Peacemaker in *Paradise Lost*, Book X”, *Milton

35 The analogy is necessarily partial since in the case of Adam and Eve’s repentance before
God, it is in fact God himself who makes them capable of repentance in the first place:
‘from the Mercie-seat above / Prevenient Grace descending had remov’d / The stonie from
thir hearts’ (11.2–4).
importance of heartfelt remorse—‘sorrow unfeign’d’ (10.1092; repeated at 10.1104)—is stressed only in relation to Adam and Eve’s collective repen-
tance before God. Indeed, Adam and Eve’s contrition before God is strongly
inward in nature, both intensely felt and ineffable in its depth: they emit ‘sighs
[. . .] / Unutterable, which the Spirit of prayer / Inspir’d’ (11.5–7), and the Son
‘interpret[s]’ (11.33) their inarticulate prayers for God. Eve’s contrition before
Adam, by contrast, is a matter of visible, external signs of humility which sig-
nify that Eve has once again acknowledged Adam’s authority over her. As was
noted above, she clasps Adam’s knees; in addition to this, her hair is ‘all disor-
derd’ (10.911), she is ‘at his feet submissive in distress’ (10.942), she weeps, and
Adam is moved by her female beauty—he sees her as a ‘Creature so faire his
reconcilement seeking’ (10.943). The reconciliation between Adam and Eve is
in part a return to hierarchical gender relations.

In its emphasis on self-abasement and on ritual gestures of supplication,
the reconciliation between Adam and Eve is also modeled on a long tradition
of rituals of royal pardoning and the granting of favours by monarchs. In such
rituals, pardoning serves not to foster identification between king and suppli-
ant but functions rather as a sign of the disparity in power between them—the
suppliant prostrates himself before the monarch—and as an expression of the
god-like status of the monarch: supplications to a king and to God are analo-
gous. As Geoffrey Koziol observes in his study of royal pardoning in medieval
France, ‘Laymen and laywomen knew what it meant to prostrate themselves
and beg God’s grace in prayer or his forgiveness in penance. They therefore
understood that when they knelt to beg favor or forgiveness from a lord who
claims to hold his authority “by the grace of God”, they were countenancing
that claim by approaching him as they approached God’.36 Similar petitions
were addressed to knights or lesser lords, yet, Koziol argues, this did not detract
from the divine status of royal power. Rather, it shows how widespread was the
notion of the monarch as a quasi-divine figure, and reveals the extent to which
divine royal power served as a template for a wide range of forms of authority.

This notion of supplication as a self-abasing petition to God or to a divinely
appointed monarch was also current in seventeenth-century England, cer-
tainly after the Restoration.37 In 1661 a group of royalist army officers addressed
a ‘most humble supplication’ in verse to Charles II, asking for modest financial
provisions, in acknowledgement of their loyal service to Charles I, and for their

36 Koziol G., Begging Pardon and Favor: Ritual and Political Order in Early Medieval France
37 The Oxford English Dictionary lists ‘the action of addressing a solemn request to God (or a
god); prayer’ and ‘a formal, usually written, petition made to a king, official, court’ as two
meanings of ‘supplication’ (OED, s.v. “supplication”, 2a; 4a) current between 1500 and 1700.
unwavering dedication to the royalist cause during the Interregnum. Likewise, in 1660 George Willington of Bristol wrote a ‘most humble Supplication’ to Charles I in which he ‘upon [his] bended knees most humbly beseech[es]’ the king to defend the cause of true Christianity against ‘Anabaptists, Quakers, and Atheists’. In 1679 Henry Valentine defined supplication as a particular species of prayer to God, in which ‘we intreat of God that he would give us such blessings as we want, or continue and inlarge such blessings as we have received’. In imagining reconciliation between the two spouses in Paradise Lost, then, Milton drew in part on the traditional language of supplications to a monarch. Milton seems to have understood such reconciliation, even when it occurs in the most intimate, personal sphere, as a highly hierarchical, even politically inflected matter. That even a republican figure like Milton should have represented interpersonal reconciliation in terms strongly associated with royal authority is suggestive of the persistence in early modern culture of this notion of reconciliation (the same can be said for the General Act of Pardon and Oblivion, passed by Parliament in 1652, to which I referred earlier in this article).

This conceptual link between intimate reconciliation on the one hand and political supplication on the other finds an intriguing parallel in the account, published in 1694, of Milton’s own reconciliation with his first wife Mary Powell by his nephew and biographer Edward Phillips. In 1642, approximately a month after she married Milton Mary Powell, then seventeen years old, left

38 To the Kings Most Excellent Majesty, and the Lords and Commons assembled in this present Parliament. The most humble supplication of all those commission-officers, &c. that have faithfully and constantly served and suffered for your Majesty’s royal father of ever blessed memory, and your most sacred Majesty (London, R.D.: 1661).

39 Willington G., The thrice welcome, and happy inauguration of our most gracious, and religious sovereign, King Charles II. To the crown and kingdoms of Great-Brittain and Ireland. Containing, in the first place, the authors most humble supplication to the King’s most excellent Majesty, in order to the reformation of religion, in six particulars. In the second part, the subjects duty to their sovereign, in sundry heads, and divers particulars very usefull for these times: together with a recommendation of the work to the Kings Majesties subjects (London, R.D.: 1660) 6.

him to return to her family. She unexpectedly returned in 1645 and Phillips describes their reunion as follows:

There dwelt in the Lane of St. Martins Le Grand, which was hard by, a Relation of our Author’s, one Blackborough, whom it was known he often visited, and upon this occasion the visits were the more narrowly observ’d, and possibly there might be a Combination between both Parties; the Friends on both sides concentring in the same action, though on different behalffs. One time above the rest, he making his usual visit, the Wife was ready in another Room, and on a sudden he was surprised to see one whom he thought to have never seen more, making Submission and begging Pardon on her Knees before him; he might probably at first make some shew of aversion and rejection; but partly his own generous nature, more inclinable to Reconciliation than to perseverance in Anger and Revenge, and partly the strong intercession of Friends on both sides, soon brought him to an Act of Oblivion, and a firm League of Peace for the future […] .

Annabel Patterson notes that ‘significantly, Phillips’ language for the reconciliation is itself political’. Gordon Campbell and Thomas N. Corns note both the allusion to the Restoration settlement and to the reconciliation between Adam and Eve in Paradise Lost. Yet the implications of the political language and of the echoes from Paradise Lost have gone unexamined. While Milton’s perspective cannot be equated with that of Phillips, whose political sympathies were possibly more royalist, it is worth noting that Phillips’ account makes explicit what remains implicit in Paradise Lost: the monarchical overtones of supplication. The phrase ‘Act of Oblivion’, of course, specifically aligns Milton with Charles II and turns Milton into a magnanimous monarch, merciful to his former enemies after a period of civil strife. The analogy is strengthened by the fact that Mary begs her husband to ‘pardon’ him. In recounting this hierarchical reconciliation, Phillips also drew on the language of Paradise Lost. His claim that Milton was ‘more inclinable to Reconciliation than to perseverance in Anger and Revenge’ echoes Milton’s own description, in Paradise Lost, of God as merciful towards fallen humanity: ‘thou didst not doome / So strictly,

44 For Phillips’ royalist leanings, see Flannagan, The Riverside Milton 18.
but much more to pitie encline’ (3.401–402; two lines later, Christ, too is charac-
terized as ‘much more to pitie enclin’d’ [3.404]). In addition, the kneeling Mary
Powell supplicates to her husband in a manner reminiscent of Eve’s supplica-
tion to Adam. As in Paradise Lost, inner remorse does not seem to be a crucial
factor: what matters most is Mary’s outwardly (and even semi-publicly) vis-
ible submission to her husband. In both cases reconciliation between spouses
is made possible by a wife’s self-abasement before a husband who is god-like
both in his authority over, and his mercy towards, her. Although Milton had
come to reject the monarchy as a political principle, and in spite of the empha-
sis on the virtues of companionate marriage in Paradise Lost and the Doctrine
and Discipline of Divorce, the hierarchical language of monarchy continued to
provide a vocabulary for his representation of gender relations. This becomes
especially evident in his understanding of reconciliation between an irate hus-
band and his wife: Milton and Phillips share a conception of intimate recon-
ciliation as modeled on royal pardoning and on the reconciliation between a
divinely appointed monarch and his rebellious subjects.

The Shakespearean play most clearly dominated by such hierarchical forms
of forgiveness is Measure for Measure. Duke Vincentio’s pardoning of Lucio
with the words ‘Thy slanders I forgive’ (5.1.511), a few lines before his closing
monologue, captures the role and meaning of pardoning in the play: it under-
scores both a ruler’s mercy and his discretion in meting out punishment, and
therefore serves as a supreme enactment of the power which he has over his
subjects.45 In Measure for Measure, moreover, the postponement of pardon-
ing further underscores its symbolic force: mercy comes when it is no longer
expected—when a convict has resigned himself to death—and therefore
seems all the more wondrous.46

Yet hierarchical reconciliation in Measure for Measure aims to be more than
an outward ritual—more than a public reassertion of the asymmetrical power
relation between ruler and ruled. The Duke pardons his subjects only after he
has succeeded in moulding their emotional lives: after they have experienced
profound remorse and have become convinced that both their inner lives
and their crimes are utterly exposed to his gaze. Indeed, remorse effectively
becomes synonymous with this sense of exposure. This is illustrated especially

45 All quotations from Measure for Measure are taken from the New Cambridge edition,
46 For this reading of pardoning in the play, see also Spencer J.M., “Staging Pardon Scenes:
Bodies, Absolute Laws, Staging Punishment in Measure for Measure”, in Murray Kendall
89–112.
by Angelo’s response when he finds out that the Duke has known about his crime all long:

Oh my dread lord,
I should be guiltier than my guiltiness
To think I can be undiscernible
When I perceive your grace, like power divine,
Hath looked upon my passes.
(5.1.359–363)

For Angelo, to think that his crimes could escape the Duke’s gaze would be a crime in itself, and add to his guilt. Indeed, since Angelo has been prevented, by means of the bed-trick, from actually sleeping with Isabella, his crime is now effectively synonymous with his intention to do so, and the Duke therefore sees into Angelo’s deepest and most secret desires.

Angelo’s characterization of the Duke as ‘power divine’ is fitting not only because of the panoptic vision he attributes to him but also in view of the remorse which the Duke manages to instill in Angelo. The latter expresses his deep inner remorse at having disappointed Escalus, for example: ‘I am sorry that such sorrow I procure, / And so deep sticks it in my penitent heart / That I crave death more willingly than mercy’ (5.1.467–469). This remorse, since it is a prerequisite for Angelo’s pardoning, is also at the heart of the conceptual shift which the play investigates. While royal pardoning, as we have seen, is modelled on divine forgiveness in that is presupposes a divine ability to cancel out a crime, it is unlike divine forgiveness in that it is unrelated to remorse. Royal pardoning is gratuitous, even synonymous with oblivion, remorse a matter between sinful humans and God. Similarly, in Milton pardoning is made possible by the supplicant’s outwardly visible self-abasement, not by her inner remorse. Duke Vincentio, by contrast, is not content with such outward reassortions of hierarchy. Rather, he seeks to engender an inner moral transformation in his subjects akin to the remorse before God felt by sinful humans. It is in this sense that he can be said to apply divine forms of forgiveness to the human realm in a manner that seems novel in early modern culture. Such remorse before a ruler entails a form of political power that is more profound than the royal absolutism embodied, for example, by Charles II in that it extends the scope of that power into the subject’s mental sphere.47

The problem explored in Measure for Measure is that such a shift is possible only if a ruler has untrammeled, god-like access to his subjects’ inner lives and

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47 For the classic account of such power, see of course Foucault M., Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. A. Sheridan (New York: 1977).
has unlimited knowledge of their actions. Moreover, the play suggests that this shift renders the concept of remorse itself problematic. Remorse no longer emerges within the apolitical relationship between divine creator and sinful human beings but is occasioned by a subject's awareness of a ruler's power over him: Angelo feels remorse only when he has become convinced that none of his actions will go undetected by the Duke's gaze. Similarly, unlike God, who forgives out of unconditional love, Duke Vincentio employs remorse not only as an instrument of political power but ultimately seems to use it also in the service of a more personal agenda whose logic remains enigmatic and which strains the play's comic ending almost to breaking point. This is, of course, suggested especially by his famous out-of-the-blue marriage proposal to Isabella, which she meets with silence. Modern directors have perhaps been especially eager to stage this as a problematic and even sinister moment, at which Isabella is subjected once more to a ruler's sexual desires, but the tensions and ambivalence built into it are inescapable.48

The play also offers an alternative form of mercy, represented by Isabella, and similar to the forgiveness model we have encountered in Tillotson's sermon. When, in Act 2, Scene 2, Isabella pleads with Angelo for her brother's life, she effectively asks him to model his own judicial practice on divine mercy: ‘How would you be / If he, which is the top of judgment, should / But judge you as you are?’ (2.2.77–89). The concept of mercy proposed here is similar to the pardons eventually granted by Duke Vincentio in that it presents divine clemency as a template for human justice, yet it also differs radically from them in that it also asks the ruler to acknowledge his own guilt before God. This in fact robs the ruler of his divine status and turns him into a fallible, sinful human being. The pardon's granted by Duke Vincentio, by contrast, effectively make him god-like in his power. In Measure for Measure Isabella's more egalitarian mercy remains only a fleeting possibility and plays no role in the play's denouement. Yet if pardoning by a god-like ruler is ultimately the only form of forgiveness available in Measure for Measure, the play also voices deep misgivings about the notion that divine mercy can serve as a model for human justice. Indeed, as Sarah Beckwith notes, ‘it is […] apparent what the human costs are in the terrible exposure and humiliation of [Vincentio's] subjects. Here the secrets of the confessional are not so much protected as used as part

48 See for example Angela Stock's overview in Gibbons' edition (68–84).
of the state apparatus. And it is confession itself that has collapsed entirely into the coercive external apparatus of the state'.

A particularly fraught form of the hierarchical forgiveness that predominates in Measure for Measure occurs in Act 2, Scene 2 of King Lear. In response to Lear's bitter complaints about Goneril's 'sharp-toothed unkindness' (2.2.324), Regan defends her sister and suggests that Lear make amends with her:

Regan
O, sir, you are old:
Nature in you stands on the very verge
Of her confine. You should be ruled and led
By some discretion, that discerns your state
Better than you yourself. Therefore I pray you
That to our sister you do make return;
Say you have wronged her, sir.

Lear
Ask her forgiveness?
Do you but mark how this becomes the house:
[Kneels] Dear daughter, I confess that I am old;
Age is unnecessary. On my knees I beg
That you'll vouchsafe me raiment, bed, and food.

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49 Beckwith S., Shakespeare and the Grammar of Forgiveness (Ithaca: 2011) 75. Beckwith reads Shakespeare's exploration of forgiveness in the late plays as a sustained response to the transformations in the languages and forms of repentance and forgiveness introduced by the Reformation. In broad terms, Protestantism no longer understood penance as a matter of ritual actions presided over by a priest but as a form of inner repentance. Forgiveness, therefore, could no longer be granted by a priest acting on the public, visible authority of the Catholic Church; nor could it be obtained by virtue of the priest's ritual utterances. In the absence of such conventional procedures, Beckwith argues, forgiveness lost its collective epistemological moorings: how can one be certain that forgiveness has indeed taken place if it is radically inward and therefore invisible, a matter of faith alone? I am indebted to Beckwith's analysis for this article, yet she does not discuss the equally fundamental transformation in forgiveness discourses that I seek to elucidate here: the application of divine forgiveness paradigms to 'horizontal', interpersonal relations.

50 I follow the scene divisions in R.A. Foakes' edition of the play (London: 1997). Quotations from King Lear are also taken from this edition.
Regan
Good sir, no more. These are unsightly tricks.
Return you to my sister.
(2.2.335–347)

As his sarcastic confession makes clear, Lear sees Regan’s request as a humiliation that only confirms the inversion of traditional hierarchies which she and Goneril have brought about. The crime for which he seeks forgiveness is his old age, and he suggests it is absurd for a royal father to beg forgiveness from his daughters. The omission of Regan’s ‘sir’ from the Folio version of the play turns Regan’s request into an instruction and lends a degree of support to Lear’s response. While she initially addresses Lear as ‘your highness’ (2.2.317), she now does away with such formalities and takes control, agitated as she is by what she sees as Lear’s unreasonable accusations against Goneril. Yet it is primarily Lear himself who, as a (former) monarch, assumes that asking for forgiveness is a necessarily hierarchical affair, a gesture that requires self-abasement on his part, much like Eve’s supplication with Adam in Paradise Lost. Regan’s complaint that ‘these are unsightly tricks’ expresses in part her irritation with this. She is not asking Lear to ‘beg’; rather, it is Regan herself who ‘prays’ her father to make amends with her sister.

A radically different form of forgiveness occurs when Lear and Cordelia are reunited in Act 4, Scene 7—perhaps the most celebrated reconciliation scene in Shakespeare. Their reconciliation is especially illuminating within the larger argument of this article since Cordelia’s forgiveness of her father is utterly unlike the modern forgiveness scenarios outlined above, and more akin to Derrida’s notion of ‘pure’ forgiveness as a form of ‘madness’. Cordelia’s forgiveness of Lear is not a response to remorse on his part. Far from suggesting a causal relation between the sense of guilt which Lear expresses and her forgiveness of his deeds, she obliterates her father’s wrongdoings and effectively denies that they have occurred, in a gesture reminiscent of divine forgiveness as a radical erasure of sin:

Lear
Be your tears wet? Yes, faith; I pray weep not.
If you have poison for me, I will drink it.
I know you do not love me, for your sisters
Have, as I do remember, done me wrong.
You have some cause, they have not.

51 For this point, see also Kordecki L. – Koskinen K., Re-Visioning Lear’s Daughters: Testing Feminist Criticism and Theory (London: 2010) 118.
Cordelia
No cause, no cause.

(4.7.71–78)

A few lines later Lear asks Cordelia to ‘forget and forgive; I am old and foolish’ (4.7.83–84), yet this is precisely what she has already done at ‘No cause, no cause’. Hers is an act of oblivion—a burying of all remembrance of former discords—of the kind recommended by Tillotson. The absence of a grammatical subject and finite verb from Cordelia’s words underlines their extraordinary generosity: her forgiveness of Lear exists outside ordinary time (and in this way makes oblivion possible) and cannot even be understood as an ‘action’ in the customary sense of that word, with Cordelia as its agent, or even Lear as its object. Rather, it is to be construed as a mysterious, unconditional gift—a form of radical forgiveness that is possible precisely because it forgives the unforgivable. Cordelia’s ‘no cause’, therefore, refers both to her erasure of a possible ‘cause’ against Lear and to the causelessness of her own forgiveness. Indeed, Lear’s wronging of Cordelia can be forgiven only through such an act of grace ‘without cause’; no amount of remorse or other form of recompense can render it intrinsically forgivable.\footnote{Commenting on Henry VI’s response to the death of Winchester in 2 Henry VI, Agnes Heller makes a similar observation: ‘[r]adical goodness in Shakespeare has nothing to do with justice. The radically good is the one who forgives the unforgivable’. Heller A., The Time is Out of Joint: Shakespeare as Philosopher of History (Oxford: 2002) 155.}

If Cordelia’s forgiveness is a response to Lear’s condition at all, it is primarily to his suffering and physical vulnerability—a vulnerability, moreover, that is not uniquely his but shared by all human beings, and even animals. Cordelia acts on a sense of universal humanity akin to that recommended by Tillotson in his forgiveness sermon:

Was this a face
To be opposed against the warring winds?
To stand against the deep dread-bolted thunder?
In the most terrible and nimble stroke
Of quick, cross lightning? to watch, poor perdu,
With this thin helm? Mine enemy’s dog,
Though he had bit me should have stood that night
Against my fire; and wast thou fain, poor father,
To hovel thee with swine, and rogues forlorn
In short and musty straw? Alack, alack!

(4.7.32–40)
It is this suffering of vulnerable fellow human beings to which Lear himself has also become alert in the cause of the play, with Poor Tom as its central embodiment. Indeed, Lear’s newly acquired ability to recognize Poor Tom as an embodiment of ‘unaccommodated man’ (3.4.105) is at the heart of his moral transformation. An audience, therefore, may well construe Cordelia’s forgiveness of Lear as made possible in part by Lear’s newly acquired sensitivity to the pain of others, yet Cordelia herself does not posit a correlation between the two.

The extraordinary, logic-defying nature of Cordelia’s forgiveness is underlined by Lear’s fantasy about reenacting it in an unending series of rituals:

Come, let’s away to prison;  
We two alone will sing like birds i’ the cage.  
When thou dost ask me blessing I’ll kneel down  
And ask of thee forgiveness. So we’ll live,  
And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh  
At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues  
Talk of court news; and we’ll talk with them too—  
Who loses and who wins; who’s in, who’s out—  
And take upon’s the mystery of things  
As if we were God’s spies.  
(5.3.6–15)

If this moment echoes Lear’s kneeling down in front of Regan in Act 2, Scene 2, this time Lear’s request for forgiveness is sincere, while his kneeling down no longer signifies only self-abasement. Rather, Lear’s asking for forgiveness is now part of a reciprocal ritual, in which Cordelia, in turn, asks for his blessing. Moreover, Lear sees Cordelia’s forgiveness not as a single, definitive event but as something for which he will ask time and again and which will therefore never be finished. Indeed, he would almost like their future life together to be reduced to a ritual reenactment of forgiveness. At the same time, such endlessly repeated forgiveness is part of the withdrawal from the world about which Lear is fantasizing here, and part of his acceptance of his imprisonment at the hands of Goneril, Regan and Edmund. Forgiveness as an act of unconditional grace, therefore, has at best an extremely limited purchase on the tragic world of the play. Like Isabella’s egalitarian mercy, it is ultimately glimpsed only as a fleeting possibility: Lear’s fantasy of perpetually renewed forgiveness is, of course, cut short by Cordelia’s death.

The question of reconciliation returns with especial intensity in the romances. I have singled out *The Winter’s Tale* and *The Tempest* as my case
studies here. Both plays are centrally concerned with the question of whether reconciliation is possible after destructive interpersonal conflicts, and with the forms that such reconciliation can take. It is especially relevant for the overall argument of this article that in *The Winter’s Tale* Leontes feels deep, self-tormenting remorse about his irrational and extreme marital jealousy, which has resulted in the deaths of his wife Hermione and his son Mamillius (the play is famously ambivalent on the question of whether Hermione has indeed died). Yet far from leading to forgiveness, Leontes’ remorse produces a stalemate. No amount of remorse seems sufficient to render his terrible crime forgivable. Indeed, Paulina insists that Leontes’ repentance is futile since his misdeeds are beyond repentance:

O thou tyrant,
Do not repent these things, for they are heavier
Than all thy woes can stir. Therefore betake thee
To nothing but despair.
(3.2.204–207)

Leontes resolves to do daily penance at the graves of Hermione and Mamillius, yet without hope of absolution, and at the beginning of Act 5, he still seems destined to feel remorse and repent until his dying day. Urging Leontes to ‘forgive himself’, Cleomenes attempts to reassure him that he has ‘done enough’ and that he has even ‘paid down / More penitence than done trespass’. Yet Leontes is caught in his self-sustaining guilt:

Whilst I remember
Her and her virtues, I cannot forget
My blemishes in them, and so still think of
The wrong I did myself, which was so much
That heirless it hath made my kingdom, and
Destroyed the sweet’st companion that e’er man
Bred his hopes out of. (5.1.6–12)

It is Paulina who keeps reminding Leontes of his crimes, and who insists that his sense of guilt remain undiminished. Indeed, the notion that through his 16-year period of penance, Leontes has redeemed himself—and therefore that the heinousness of his crimes can be quantified—seems informed by political

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rather than purely ethical or spiritual considerations. Dion states that Paulina’s insistence that Leontes never remarry poses a danger to the continuation of the realm:

You […] consider little
What dangers, by his highness’ fail of issues,
May drop upon his kingdom and devour
Incertain lookers-on. (5.1.25–28)

Of course, Paulina’s uncompromising stance is part of a larger plan to restore Hermione to her husband, and when Leontes agrees never to remarry until ‘[his] first queen’s again in breath’ (5.1.83), she is in fact preparing him for the miracle of her resurrection. Leontes’ eventual reunion with the wife whom he had killed (or thought he had killed) comes when he has resigned himself to the idea that nothing can absolve or undo his wrongful actions. Yet Leontes’ remorse does not *in itself* render his reunion and reconciliation with Hermione possible. Rather, when Hermione’s statue comes to life, Leontes is required to make a leap of faith. Paulina asks him, and the other characters present, to credit the reality of Hermione’s resurrection in the mode of religious belief: ‘It is required / You do awake your faith’ (5.3.94–95). That is to say, he needs to believe in her resurrection as a sacramental miracle that takes place in spite of the continuing reality and absoluteness of his own crimes, just as divine grace does not erase the fact of human sinfulness. Moreover, although Leontes’ own remorse, and his sense that he cannot be forgiven, do play an important role in making the resurrection a possibility, this miracle is ultimately not brought about by Leontes’ own penance. Indeed, the statue of Hermione initially strikes Leontes with a renewed sense of his own guilt: ‘There’s magic in thy majesty, which has / My evils conjured to remembrance’ (5.3.39–40). He can only move beyond this, and be reunited with Hermione, by accepting the reality of the miracle of the statue’s coming to life, and with this the partial erasure of his misdeeds—and to do so in the knowledge that both of these things are an impossibility. *The Winter’s Tale* can be said to examine the conceptual shift with which this article is concerned in that it explores in what sense remorse can serve as a road to interpersonal reconciliation (as opposed to divine forgiveness). Yet the play ultimately suggests that after grievous wrongs of the kind committed by Leontes, reconciliation—a future beyond those wrongs—is possible only as an unaccountable, miraculous gift, rather than as a response to human penance and remorse.

John Pitcher aptly describes the Hermione’s resurrection as a ‘counterfactual’ that is possible only in the world of romance, where the distinction
between the factual and the illusory is blurry and the two can in fact co-exist.\textsuperscript{54} Indeed, the play suggests that it is especially in the make-believe world of the theatre that faith in a future after tragedy is possible, since it is in the theatre that the distinction between reality and fiction is temporarily bracketed and the dead can be brought to life, the traumas of the past partially undone. This means that Paulina’s injunction to ‘awake your faith’ is also addressed to the audience, who are asked to suspend common sense explanation that Hermione simply went into hiding for sixteen years, and credit, against their better knowledge, the theatrical marvel unfolding before their eyes. Yet \textit{The Winter’s Tale} also draws attention to the tragic loss that remains unredeemed by miracles. Hermione has aged and the final reconciliation scene is haunted by the spectre of the boy Mamillius, whose death cannot be reversed, and by Paulina’s grief over the death of Antigonus:

\begin{quote}
I, an old turtle, \\
Will wing me to some withered bough, and there \\
My mate, that’s never to be found again, \\
Lament till I am lost. (5.3.132–135)
\end{quote}

Leontes’ sudden announcement, in response to Paulina’s words, that Camillo will marry her, can hardly undo the power of her grief further to darken the play’s closing scene. Given Leontes’ indirect responsibility for Antigonus’ death, moreover, his sudden decision over Paulina’s future love-life is likely to disturb audiences.

In the final act of \textit{The Tempest} Prospero exchanges his vengefulness for a more forgiving attitude.\textsuperscript{55} He does so because Ariel has alerted him to the suffering which Prospero has inflicted on Alonso, Sebastian, Antonio and their company, and because he is convinced that their suffering has made them ‘penitent’.\textsuperscript{56} The aim of his project, then, was to instill remorse in his wrongdoers, and especially in Antonio. This remorse now makes forgiveness possible. Yet Prospero’s forgiveness of Antonio is at best partial, and tinged with undiminished resentment. It is only when Antonio is still under Prospero’s spell, incapable of responding to or even registering the latter’s words, that Prospero

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Shakespeare, \textit{The Winter’s Tale} 6.
\item Shakespeare William, \textit{The Tempest}, ed. V. Mason Vaughan – A.T. Vaughan (London: 2011) 5.1.28. All further quotations from the play are taken from this edition.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
is prepared to acknowledge him as ‘brother mine’ (5.1.75) and forgives him. By contrast, later, when Antonio is fully conscious, Prospero addresses him as a ‘most wicked sir, whom to call brother / Would even infect my mouth’ (5.1.130–131). Moreover, whereas Prospero initially offers Antonio full forgiveness as a person (‘I do forgive thee’ [5.1.78]), this time he merely forgives Antonio’s ‘rankest fault’ (5.1.132). The second formulation suggests a split between Antonio on the one hand and his crimes on the other, and therefore a more limited forgiveness, in which Prospero absolves Antonio’s wrongdoings but does not accept him once again as his brother. The degree to which Prospero and Antonio can be said to reconcile remains elusive, therefore. Unlike Alonso, moreover, Antonio never expresses remorse and it seems clear that Prospero’s confidence in the penitence of all of his wrongdoers—at the beginning of the final scene—was premature. Indeed, Antonio remains virtually silent throughout the play’s closing scene and this makes the problem of his remorse an acute one: Antonio’s feelings at this point remain unknowable and this compromises the reconciliation that marks the comic ending of the play.

That the question of reconciliation and forgiveness remains unresolved in the play’s closing scene is underlined by the fact that it also forms the central theme in Prospero’s epilogue. He famously asks the audience to pardon his faults and to ensure his forgiveness by praying for him. Whereas Prospero initially wished to punish others for their wrongdoings, now he confesses to unspecified crimes of his own. At no point does Prospero express remorse for his ‘faults’ (18), however; nor does he present remorse as a reason why he should be forgiven. Rather, Prospero urges the audience to forgive him, and in this way release him from the fictional world of the play, because the audience itself is also in need of forgiveness: ‘As you from crimes would pardoned be, / Let your indulgence set me free’ (Epilogue, 19–20). As in the sermon by Tillotson, universal human fallibility and sinfulness should render all human beings willing to forgive others. In addition to this, Prospero presents his loss of magical power as a reason for forgiving him. Without his magical art, he is a vulnerable human being; and this renders him dependent on others and therefore eligible for forgiveness.

As the epilogue suggests, then, The Tempest ultimately presents universal human vulnerability, as well as a universal human capacity for sin—rather than a wrongdoer’s remorse—as reasons for forgiveness. In doing so, moreover, the play suggests that such forgiveness is a fundamentally religious act, intelligible only if it is couched in the language of divine forgiveness. Prospero simultaneously asks for forgiveness from God and from the audience:

57 I am indebted for this point to Beckwith, Grammar of Forgiveness 168.
my ending is despair,
Unless I be relieved by prayer,
Which pierces to that it assaults
Mercy itself, and frees all faults. (15–17)

Like divine forgiveness, interpersonal reconciliation is a matter of grace, an act of faith that is ultimately unrelated to penance or remorse on the part of a wrongdoer.

5 Conclusion

I have characterized early modern conceptions of reconciliation as revolving around hierarchical pardoning, rather than inner remorse on the part of a perpetrator. In this respect, early modern reconciliation paradigms differ radically from modern scenarios, which privilege heartfelt inner remorse on the part of a wrongdoer as a key to reconciliation—I have referred to this paradigm as “remorse-based forgiveness”. In early modernity, remorse figures especially in divine forgiveness scenarios: humans have an obligation to feel remorse for their sins towards God, although their remorse does not in itself ensure forgiveness. I have read Paradise Lost as an exponent of this early modern reconciliation paradigm: Adam and Eve reconcile because Eve humbles herself before Adam. Remorse, by contrast, is an emotion which they express only before God, not to each other. In Paradise Lost, as in other early modern texts I have discussed, divine and interpersonal forgiveness mirror each other only in that both require supplication and self-humiliation—before God and before a superior or more powerful human being respectively.

In spite of this, the idea that remorse can be a requirement for interpersonal reconciliation is not altogether alien to early modern culture. Indeed, the beginnings of the idea that remorse is also applicable to interpersonal reconciliation can be traced at least in part to the early modern era. This becomes clear from the representation of reconciliation in Shakespeare’s plays, in which remorse is a recurrent theme, and which explore the ways in which remorse can enable reconciliation between people. Yet in Shakespearean narratives of reconciliation, remorse also remains a problematic component: it can be withheld or unknowable (as in The Tempest), it can lead to spiritual deadlock (as in The Winter’s Tale) and it can be a mere tool in the consolidation of state power (as in Measure for Measure). In the four plays analysed in this article, moreover, reconciliation ultimately requires a leap of faith in the possibility of a future after traumatic conflict. Reconciliation in Shakespeare remains
fundamentally a matter of grace, and therefore a fundamentally religious gesture. No amount of remorse or penance can render genuinely destructive wrongs forgivable, and in such cases, reconciliation, like divine grace, can only be an unconditional gift. In other words, to transfer divine forgiveness to the human sphere is to turn interpersonal reconciliation at least potentially into a form of grace. This, in Shakespeare, is perhaps the only way to forgive the unforgivable.

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PART 6

Transcultural Notions of Anger
Royal Wrath: Curbing the Anger of the Sultan

N. Zeynep Yelçe

‘Our mercy will excel our wrath,’ cried Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan during a political rally on March 3, 2014. While his audience did not seem surprised by the remark, his opponents found his statement cataclysmic. His secularist opponents deemed these words as outright hypocrisy, given that the angry speeches of Erdoğan had become a commonplace in the course of the preceding eight months. Several commentators, in fact, had already warned against the rising tone of anger in Erdoğan’s mood. More conservative and religious opponents, on the other hand, were scandalized by the remark. These words actually derive from the sayings of the Prophet, where God said to Muhammad ‘My mercy excels my wrath.’ Commentators found these words unfit for a believer to utter, with such appropriation of God’s words deemed inappropriate as it gives away the fact that the speaker regards himself as superior to mankind. Coming from a religious background with the relevant education, Prime Minister Erdoğan, however, probably meant no blasphemy.

One might expect the introductory paragraph above to appear in a volume on contemporary politics. The actions of a twenty-first century political leader would not have been my choice for the beginning of an article on early modern anger had Prime Minister Erdoğan not pronounced the words, ‘We are the offspring of the Conqueror,’ during another political rally twelve days later.

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2 The Turkish Medical Association, for example, issued a press release on March 15, and declared: ‘We are worried about the emotional state of Prime Minister Erdoğan.’ http://www .ttb.org.tr/index.php/Haberler/basbakan-4447.html.

3 Sahih Muslim, Book 037, Number 6627, trans. A.H. Siddiqui (Lahore: 1976).

later. The ‘Conqueror’ is Mehmed II (d. 1481), the famous Ottoman sultan, who conquered Constantinople/Istanbul in 1453. The mention of the ‘Conqueror’ is an overt allusion to Erdoğan’s overwhelming entry into the first league of the political arena with his election as mayor of Istanbul in 1994. ‘Conquering Istanbul’ was not the only thing the two men had in common. Mehmed II was also notorious for his quick temper. ‘His wrath excelled his gentleness,’ it was said. His contemporaries would have preferred for him to have possessed the quality identified by the phrase ‘my mercy excelled my wrath.’

These historical parallels are intended to serve as a starting point for an exploration of the notion of anger in the Ottoman context of the early modern period. Deemed a role model by his successors, Mehmed II will be the focus of this exploration. On the basis of his actions and the representations thereof through a period of approximately 150 years, the following paragraphs will trace the conditions, manifestations and expressions of his wrath, seeking to explain how it shaped, reinforced and helped perpetuate the image and the authority of the Ottoman sultan.

This exploration is mainly based on four sources representative of different phases of the 150 years under question. The authors belonged to court circles, and as individuals they had first-hand experience with the rulers during more than one reign. The first of these authors, Tursun Beğ (d. 1490s), was an exact contemporary of Mehmed II. He served the Sultan in the high-ranking capacity of Secretary of the Council of State and also as Chief Financial Officer of Anatolia. He was in the service of the grand vizier Mahmud Pasha for twelve years. He accompanied the Sultan and the grand vizier in several campaigns, including the siege of Constantinople/Istanbul. His posts gave him the opportunity to personally observe both the events of the period and the attitudes of the Sultan. Tursun’s work, History of the Conqueror (Târîh-i Ebü’l-Feth), a chronicle of events within the genre of advice literature, was intended as a guide for the reigning Sultan Bayezid II (d. 1512) and his successors.

The second source is the History of the House of Osman (Tevârih-i Âl-i ‘Osmân) by the famous Ottoman statesman Kemalpaşazade (d. 1534). Although the author began his career in the military, he left it to pursue a career in the learned establishment. Kemalpaşazade, who served Bayezid II, Selim I

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(d. 1520) and Süleyman I (d. 1566), was a first-hand witness to major events and an esteemed advisor. His History was initially commissioned by Bayezid II, and covers the period until 1508. The initial commission comprised seven books, but Kemalpaşazade completed ten books before his death, covering also the first decade of Sultan Süleyman’s reign.\(^8\)

The third author guiding this study is Mustafa Âli (d. 1600), an Ottoman bureaucrat who rose from the ranks of the learned establishment. He also served in several capacities such as janissary secretary, provincial governor and director of finance. Âli served as secretary in Lala Mustafa Pasha’s chancery. He largely spent his career moving between provincial posts, which caused him to feel quite bitter toward the central administration. He started writing his dynastic history, Essence of History (Künhü’l Ahbar), in Damascus, where he made friends with Kinalızade Ali (d. 1571), our fourth author.\(^9\) Kinalızade was a member of the learned establishment. His career was typical of an Ottoman scholar who climbed his way through various professorships level by level. He served the high-ranking judge-ships of Damascus, Cairo, Bursa, Edirne and Istanbul, followed by the military judgeship of Anatolia. This route would have lead to the highest ranking religious post of Sheikhul-Islam, had death not intervened.\(^10\) Kinalızade’s High Ethics (Ahlâk-ı Alâî) is a work of ethics based on Aristotelian principles and medieval Muslim theories. While this work reflects in a theoretical manner the attitude toward anger at the end of the period in question, its main views are quite similar to those espoused in a more popular piece of advice literature, the Translation of Attar’s Book of Advice (Terceme-i Pendnâme-i Attar), presented to Prince Selim (later Sultan Selim II) in 1566.\(^11\)

Modern theories include anger among the fundamental emotions along with happiness, sadness, fear and disgust, since ‘they represent survival-related patterns of responses to events in the world that have been selected for over the course of our evolutionary history.’\(^12\) In this sense, anger has been attributed several functions operating both at the personal and at the social level. On the personal level, anger has been related to self-defense, as it serves the function of organizing and regulating physiological and psychological processes. Theorists have emphasized the role of anger in regulating social and

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interpersonal behaviour as well as its place as a driving force in overcoming obstacles blocking the achievement of a specific goal.¹³

An essentialist analysis of emotions has increasingly given way to interpretations of emotions as social constructs. The essentialist approach tended to see emotions as internal, irrational, natural and universal physiological and psychological processes. Social constructivist approaches, on the other hand, evaluate emotions in relation to cultural norms. As such, anger appears as one of the fundamental emotions shaped by the social and cultural system of a given society.¹⁴ In our case, then, investigating a powerful emotion like anger has the potential to tell us a lot about the cultural system of early modern Ottoman society.

Given the lack of personal accounts, let alone the possibility of empirical study on physiological markers like changes in endocrine levels and the central nervous system, attempting ‘a history of emotions’ proves almost impossible at the level of individual analysis.¹⁵ In this case, a historian trying to make sense of emotions experienced by early modern Ottomans has little choice but to follow Randolph R. Cornelius and ‘look at what the emotions accomplish socially.’¹⁶ If it is in fact, as Norbert Elias pointed out for courtly societies, ‘the structure of society that requires and fosters a specific standard of affect-control,’¹⁷ then with narrative material at hand, the historian may be able to discern the norms specific to a given culture regarding who gets to experience and display a particular emotion as well as when and why, towards whom, how and to what extent.¹⁸


¹⁵ For a four-level analysis model, see Keltner and Haidt, “Social Functions of Emotions” 509. Dacher Keltner and Jonathan Haidt propose four levels of analysis to evaluate the social functions of emotions: the individual level, the dyadic level related to the relation between two individuals, the group level involving a set of interacting individuals and the cultural level within a context of shared beliefs and norms.


¹⁸ Cornelius, “Theoretical Approaches”.
In the case of Mehmed II and his successors (including an aspiring non-dynastic successor like a certain modern-day political leader of a republic), what has anger accomplished and how has it accomplished it? If emotions are ‘cultural products that owe their meaning and coherence to learned social rules,’ as argued by social constructivists, early modern Ottomans seem to have defined those rules quite clearly in their narratives. A focused reading of the extant sources demonstrates a multi-level process of creating, presenting, representing and maintaining an image of the authoritarian ruler capable of justly managing an empire. This process entails defining identities and roles with the help of emotions, whereby these definitions along with the relevant emotion types shape and perpetuate ideologies and power structures.

The Ottoman sultan was regarded as ‘the shadow of God on earth’ (es-sultan zillullahifi’l-arz). Fifteenth century chronicler Neşri (d. 1520), for example, started his history by explaining this conviction and stressing that the sultan was endowed with the power to find the right path through the guidance of the prophets. Oruç Beğ (d. c. 1502), another early Ottoman chronicler, claimed that all writers should write about the morals of the rulers of their time because these rulers are the ‘shadow of God on earth.’ As such, the Ottoman sultan was expected to possess the qualities of God, including ‘mercy excelling wrath.’ And yet, despite being ‘the Merciful, the Compassionate’ (Rahmân and Rahîm), was God not wrathful as reflected by several verses in the Quran? The Quran clearly delineates the limits and conditions of God’s wrath: ‘[...] do not overstep the bounds, or My wrath will descend on you. Anyone on whom My wrath descends has truly fallen. Yet I am most forgiving towards those who repent, believe, do righteous deeds, and stay on the right path.’

The seeming contradiction between wrath and mercy, whether divine or royal, is ever present in Ottoman accounts. However, rather than being perceived as a contradiction, the two emotions are presented as a dichotomy inherent in the nature of the ruler. Royal wrath in the eyes of the early modern Ottomans resembled the wrath of God. The Islamic notion of the wrath of God followed that of Abrahamic religions in general. In other words, mercy and

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19 Ibidem.
wrath were both inherent qualities of God. As God’s wrath would be upon those who sinned against him, so would the sultan’s be on those who slighted him. This transference of a divine quality onto an earthly ruler is in fact very similar to the transference of \textit{ira Dei} to \textit{ira regis} in the medieval European context. In other words, if the anger of God could be a good and justified thing, so could that of the ruler. There was, then, a time and a place to be angry, as Tursun Beğ advised: ‘at the place of mercy and at the time of wrath, now be a healing lotion, then be like fire.’

Discussing the reparation of Constantinople after the conquest, Kemalpaşazade mentions two central elements involved in ruling the world: mercy and power. The author sees both in the aftermath of the conquest: ‘After burning [the city] to ashes with the fire of rage and violence, he [Mehmed II] looked with merciful eyes and turned it into a decorated rose garden.’ Kemalpaşazade’s reasoning closely resembles that of the Greek historian Polybius (d. 118 BC), who wished ‘to convince his readers that Alexander had in fact behaved decently after the sack of rebellious Thebes.’ Although Alexander had destroyed the city in a rage, ‘he respected the temples of the gods.’

Admiring Alexander the Great and taking him as a role model, Mehmed II wished not only to emulate, but also to surpass him. As the Sultan was well-versed in the life and stories of Alexander, one wonders whether he modelled both his own expression and management of anger on that of the Macedonian ruler notorious for his outbursts of rage. Dwelling on the perceptions of Alexander’s wrath, Harris writes:

\begin{quote}What matters here, in any case, is what was believed about him. His significance in the present context is that although he was widely seen as a man of wrath, he was also regarded by many Greeks as a great hero. Like Achilles, whom he greatly admired, the figure of Alexander thus tended\end{quote}

\begin{enumerate}
\item Tursun Bey, \\textit{Târîh-i Ebû’l-Feth} 28.
\item İbn Kemal, \\textit{Tevârih VII} 96.
\item For Mehmed II’s interest in and knowledge of Alexander the Great, see Babinger, \textit{Mehmed the Conqueror and His Time}, trans. R. Manheim (Princeton: 1978) 410, 499–500.
\end{enumerate}
to undermine the cultural opposition to the expression of passionate anger.29

Given the Alexandrine literature available to Mehmed II in the form of the various *Iskendarnamah* translations and *Shahnamah* copies, a similar comment could be made for the Sultan.

Why did Sultan Mehmed get angry? Modern theories of anger, building on the Aristotelian notion of anger,30 agree that the emotion is triggered by humiliation and insult. The insult or slight, perceived or real, is often taken as an assault on one's honour and an injury to one's public image. This perception frequently results in aggression.31 It is also this sense of being slighted that justifies anger. When Ottoman chroniclers present a specific instance of a sultan's wrath, they usually present a justification of it as well. Their explanations convince the reader that the Sultan had every right to be angry and that he could not have acted otherwise.

Mehmed II’s wrath frequently fell on the neighboring lords of Karaman in Anatolia. There were times when they were enemies, and times when they were allies. During a period of peace, the Sultan called Pir Ahmed, Lord of Karaman, to arms in an invasion of Egypt. Pir Ahmed was bound by his oath of alliance to join forces with the Sultan. When he failed to do so, ‘the fire of the wrath of the Sultan was excited.’ Tursun Beğ justifies the anger of the Sultan by pointing to the breach of alliance, reinforcing his argument with a Quranic verse: ‘Those who pledge loyalty to you [Prophet] are actually pledging loyalty to God Himself—God’s hand is placed on theirs—and anyone who breaks his pledge does so to his own detriment’ (48:10).32 Tursun Beğ’s justification serves a triple purpose. First, he justifies the Sultan’s anger by appealing to a political norm. Having thus confirmed the offence causing the anger, he justifies the Ottoman assault on Karaman. Finally, by making reference to a Quranic verse relevant to the offence, in this case breach of loyalty, he makes the divine connection between God and the Sultan. The latter being the representative of the former, he is thus not only justified in punishing the ‘wrong-doer’, but also required to do so.

29 Harris, *Restraining Rage* 235.
32 Tursun Bey, *Tārīh-i Ebü’l-Feth* 146.
Mehmed II’s rage was unleashed at his western neighbours as well. When Mehmed marched to Trabzon on the eastern Black Sea coast, the voivode of Walachia took the occasion to kill two Ottoman frontier commanders and raid into Ottoman territory. When the news reached the Sultan, recounts the sixteenth century historian Âli, ‘the law of his blazing wrath came to be, avenging flames reached the skies with the zeal of Islam made to blaze by his flaming tongue.’ He wished to ‘save’ the people there. Mehmed II’s wrath in this case was spurred by several reasons to do with the actions of the voivode. The voivode was supposedly an ally, and his assault on Ottoman territory in the absence of the Sultan meant betrayal. While betrayal alone would be a valid reason for retaliation on the part of the betrayed party, the assault also meant harm and danger to the territories and people under the Sultan’s protection. The danger and possibility of harm inflicted on his people occupied Mehmed’s attention while he was occupied elsewhere, thus introducing an obstruction to his immediate goal of conquering Trabzon.

The most famous rival of Mehmed II in the east was probably Aq-qoyunlu Uzun Hasan. The Ottoman ruler seems to have been obsessed with fighting Hasan. According to Tursun Beğ, this obsession was due both to Hasan’s expansion of his kingdom and to the fact that Mehmed could not find a worthier opponent to destroy. Contemporary Ottoman chronicler Neşri also dwells on Mehmed’s intention to fight the Aq-qoyunlu ruler. However, rather than introducing the enmity as a competition for glory, Neşri emphasizes ill-advised actions on the part of Hasan who ‘did not respect the Sultan and wrecked Karaman.’ Since this was an insult to his honor, Mehmed II had to march against Hasan, Neşri writes. Following the battle, Mehmed did not pursue the retreating Aq-qoyunlu army, an act the chronicler attributes to ancient custom: ‘At that moment, it was within reach of the Sultan; if he had marched on, he could have conquered the whole of the Persian lands and shortened Hasan the Tall. But he respected ancient custom and did not.’

Writing in the late 1520s, Kemalpaşazade slightly modifies the episode in order to explain Mehmed II’s decision to extend his mercy. Accordingly, having defeated his mighty rival, Mehmed’s wrath was acquiesced, and he found this defeat punishment enough for Hasan’s misconduct. The Sultan did not

34 Tursun Bey, Târîh-i Ebü’l-Feth 152.
see it fit to ‘extinguish’ such a mighty dynasty. Mehmed’s mercy had not come easily, however. Kemalpaşazade’s account demonstrates that the rage of the Sultan did not simmer down easily, even when Uzun Hasan showed signs of remorse: ‘Flames of wrath moved by the storming rage of the omnipotent and auspicious Sultan did not acquiesce. Such chastisement did not suffice to extinguish the fire of contempt that had already flared.’ Later in the sixteenth century, Âli neither attributes the Sultan’s decision to Mehmed’s respect for ancient custom nor to his merciful attitude once his wrath was acquiesced. Âli recounts a war council deliberating over whether to pursue the retreating army and attributes the decision to Mahmud Pasha’s good council. These differing interpretations point not only to the rising level of bureaucratization of the Ottoman administration toward the end of the sixteenth century, but also to the fluctuating attitude toward anger throughout the 150-year period under discussion. While Neşri’s Mehmed relies on ancient custom to make the decision even when angry, the wrath of Kemalpaşazade’s Mehmed is his own to decide. In the late sixteenth century, however, the decisions of a bureaucratic administrative apparatus led by the grand vizier takes Âli’s center stage rather than the wrath and mercy of the Sultan, no matter how strong his emotions were.

As seen in these two examples, Mehmed II’s wrath often translated into violent action in the form of military campaigns. Rage turning into a military campaign is a motif in Turkic legends as well. A case in point would be Oghuz Khan, who was furious with a certain Urum Khan for not submitting to his over-arching authority. In both contexts, the defiance of an allegedly superior authority gives rise to the anger. While military campaigns signify wrath and retaliation on a collective scale, royal wrath also targeted individuals. Mehmed’s fury often landed on those in his proximity, most commonly on his viziers. Halil Pasha was probably the first to have lost his life as a direct result of the wrath of Mehmed II. Mehmed seems to have held a grudge against the old grand vizier as he was the one who had called back his abdicated father to the throne. Following the conquest of Constantinople, Halil Pasha was imprisoned in the towers and soon executed. A similar case of accumulated rage ending

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36 İbn Kemal, *Tevârih VII* 331.
with execution involves Mehmed II's famous grand vizier Mahmud Pasha. According to Neşri, Mehmed's anger started building when Mahmud Pasha won a castle peacefully when the Sultan intended to take it by force.\textsuperscript{41} Tursun Beğ and Kemalpaşazade attribute the initial wrath to a misjudgement on the part of Mahmud Pasha relating to issues about Karaman.\textsuperscript{42} While Mahmud Pasha was ultimately executed, he was reprimanded several times, fell from favour, and even dismissed from the grand vizierate before things came to that. In this case, like that of Halil Pasha, it seems that the execution did not come about as result of momentary rage but rather of an accumulation which grew gradually as a result of the proximity between the two men.

Mehmed II's wrathful attitude toward those in his proximity seems to have set the pattern for his successors who saw him as the epitome of the dynasty. His grandson Selim I was especially notorious for his rage at his viziers. As the rumour goes, the phrase 'May you be vizier to Sultan Selim' was a favourite popular curse during his reign.\textsuperscript{43} Of the five viziers who served him, three were executed under his command. Hersekzade Ahmed Pasha (d. 1517), the first grand vizier of the wrathful Sultan, was deposed after serving for two years, only to be reinstated after a year. Together with his grand vizieral services to Selim's father Sultan Bayezid II, Ahmed Pasha occupied the post for five individual terms. He was finally executed by Selim I.\textsuperscript{44} Another victim of his proximity to the Sultan was Hemdem Pasha (d. 1514), who accompanied Selim I in the Persian campaign. The soldiers were not actually very pleased to be marching against the Safavids; the army felt uneasy about fighting other Muslims. The terrain was rough, the climate unfriendly and the march challenging. The soldiers raised their complaints to Hemdem Pasha and expressed their desire to return home. Kinalzade describes Hemdem Pasha as being 'in the immediate circle of his majesty and privileged with full intimacy.' Apparently this intimacy gave him the liberty to convey the complaints of the soldiers to the Sultan, only to arouse his wrath. Hemdem Pasha was executed on the spot by order of Selim I. Years later, Kinalzade blamed the liberty with which Hemdem Pasha told the Sultan of the complaints on his 'haughtiness based on intimacy.'\textsuperscript{45}

\textsuperscript{41} Neşri, \textit{Kitâb-ı Cihân-nûmâ} 765.
\textsuperscript{42} Tursun Beğ, \textit{Târîh-i Ebü'l-Feth} 203, and Ibn Kemal, \textit{Tevârîh VII} 278.
\textsuperscript{45} Kinalzade Ali, \textit{Ahlâk-ı Alâi} 470.
Ottomans seem to have believed in the wisdom of staying at a reasonable distance from the ruler. ‘Proximity to the sultan is a burning fire’ warned the advice book presented to Prince Selim in 1566. Elsewhere in the same advice book, we read:

First, lords know not of friendship
Do not wish for intimacy.
Proximity to the sultan is a fire blazing
Do not go near if you care for your well-being.
Neither remain too far, lest you shiver and dry out
Nor go too close, lest you catch fire and burn up.

Not all viziers or royal intimates were executed as a result of the momentary rage of a sultan. Usually another high-ranking figure, or figures, would intervene on behalf of the accused vizier to curb the anger of the sultan. Mehmed II’s grand vizier Rum Mehmed Pasha (d. 1470), for example, was at some point accused of misconduct. Secret intercessions and countless pleas saved him from execution. His life was spared and he was punished only by dismissal from office and a loss of favours. Influential figures interceding on behalf of the object of fury is not a rare phenomenon in Ottoman sources. During the siege of Rhodes in 1522, Sultan Süleyman was furious with the commander Ayas Pasha because the latter was unable to achieve a decisive victory. Unlike Mehmed II, Süleyman did not rush into a harsh and irreversible judgement. ‘Although the storm of his rage was ferocious,’ Kemalpaşazade reports, he did not hastily order the commander’s execution and confined himself to imprisoning him. Ayas Pasha was soon liberated and returned to office with the intercession of Ibrahim, the intimate companion and would-be-grand vizier of the Sultan.

Among several victims of Mehmed II’s wrath, Âli also mentions Sinan Pasha. The author uses the example of Sinan Pasha not only to point out the wrathful nature of Mehmed II, but also to illustrate the Sultan’s inconsistency. Sinan Pasha, a man of the religious class, was once a scholar at the highest level madrasah in the empire and the private tutor of the Sultan. Mehmed II seems to have had great affection and respect for him, so much so that he promoted Sinan to vizierate. It is then that the fortunes of this favoured companion

46 Bilgin, Terceme-i Pendname-i 'Attar 47.
47 Ibidem 91.
48 Âli, Künhü'l-ahbar 164. He too was executed in the end.
started to fluctuate. First, he was granted a position as scholar at the prestigious madrasah of Hagia Sophia, the church that was turned into a mosque on the Sultan's orders. This was followed by another relatively high-ranking madrasah, Gallipoli. Just when it seemed that Sinan Pasha was climbing to the top, the wrath of the Sultan fell on him. He was imprisoned, only to be liberated with the intervention of other members of the learned establishment. He was then granted a relatively unimportant district and its madrasah. This meant exile from the capital. He was even punished with incarceration at the asylum at Nicea and was given fifty beatings a day. In time, he was pardoned thanks to bold intercessions on the part of the scholars.\textsuperscript{50} Áli also accuses Mehmed II of ‘dismissing, imprisoning, and executing valiant viziers like Mahmud Pasha and Gedik Ahmed Pasha because of trivial allegations.’\textsuperscript{51}

These accusations aimed at Mehmed II a century after his death probably served Áli’s purpose well in criticizing rulers of his own time, who quickly changed their minds and displayed inconsistent behaviour in dealing with their officials.\textsuperscript{52} Áli argued that rulers should refrain from inconstancy. He explained: ‘It is not appropriate [for rulers] to immediately turn back and execute those on whom they continuously bestowed favours. Similarly, to receive hastily into their proximity those at whom they have been angry is proof of the inconstancy and instability in their attitudes.’\textsuperscript{53} Whatever Áli’s motives for accusing Mehmed II of inconsistency, Kemalpaşazade seems to have been thinking along the same lines. Kemalpaşazade relates that Mahmud Pasha was granted governorship of Gallipoli a while after he was dismissed from the grand vizierate. This appointment had become possible only after ‘the violence of the rage and the grudge [of the Sultan] subsided and the heat of the fire of his wrath cooled down.’ Kemalpaşazade also presents the case as an example of Mehmed II’s inconsistent behavior, likening his character to the weather: ‘The Sultan of the time resembled the sky—now cloudy, then sunny. The clouds of his grace poured forth showers of favour and the thunderbolts of his rage cast down flames of destruction.’\textsuperscript{54}

By the end of the sixteenth century, royal wrath against viziers seems to have become a daily issue. Koca Sinan Pasha (d. 1596), five times grand vizier to two successive Ottoman sultans, openly declared in daily letters to Sultan

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{50} Áli, \textit{Künhü'l-ahbar} 204.
\item \textsuperscript{51} Ibidem 177.
\item \textsuperscript{52} Mustafa Áli himself suffered from chasing after favours from the sultan. He believed that he was not promoted as he deserved. For a comprehensive discussion of Áli’s life and career, see Fleischer, \textit{Bureaucrat and Intellectual in the Ottoman Empire}.
\item \textsuperscript{53} Áli, \textit{Künhü'l-ahbar} 204.
\item \textsuperscript{54} İbn Kemal, \textit{Tevârîh vii} 279.
\end{itemize}
Mehmed III (d. 1603) that he was afraid of the wrath of the Sultan. In one of these letters, he lamented that he worked night and day, yet some janissaries complained and conspired against him. Because of the complaints of these janissaries, the Sultan had ordered him to pay their wages immediately. However, Sinan Pasha lacked the funds and the paperwork to make the payments. Explaining the situation, he writes:55

This servant of yours is an old man; the days of my life are numbered. I swear that I do not guard my own head as I do your honour. However, I fear bringing any matter to your exalted presence. Even if I do, it is not deemed important, and I am left with the scolding I receive […]. My auspicious Padsah, please grant me the favour of considering this matter and regard the opinion of this servant of yours as good will and intention; and do not curse this servant of yours through wrath and rashness.

It is probably this rising tone of royal wrath, or rather the daily display of royal wrath, which kindled the all-powerful absolutist image of the sultan reflected in the words of advice to Prince Selim in the advice book:

To swallow the rage is the habit of rulers
The work of rage is the art of the devil
He who does not get along well with the people
Spends his life in poisonous [grief] and suffering.56

‘If you do not swallow your rage but go along with it, you will regret it but to no avail,’ warns the same advice book, as a reminder that uncontrolled rage can lead to actions that have consequences.57 Ottoman theorists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries deemed anger to be a driving force. Their views on anger, both as a bodily function and as an ethical issue, are based on the thinkers of medieval Islam, primarily the prominent Muslim philosopher Nasiruddin Tusi (d. 1274) and his Nasirean Ethics (Akhlaq-i-Nasri). Following the lead of the famous philosopher, Tursun Beğ defines the driving forces of the self. According to Tursun Beğ, it is with these three forces partnered with the will that man ‘accomplishes various deeds and manifests distinct works.’ The first of these is the force of reasoning (kuvvet-i-nâtıka), also known as the angelic self, which sheds light on truth, enabling judgment and understanding. The second is the force of wrath (kuvvet-i-gazâbi), also known as the

55 Koca Sinan Paşa’nun Telhisleri 87, n. 59.
57 Ibidem 70–71.
bestial self. The force of wrath is ‘the initiating source of anger, bravery, and fearful affairs as well as of victory, aggression, expulsion and glory.’ The third is the force of passion (kuvvet-i-şhevâni), also known as the instinctive self, which is the source of lust and appetite.58

Almost two hundred years later, Kınalızade Ali mentions the three forces of the self. Rather than explaining all three, he refers to the category of ‘driving forces’ (kuvvet-i-muharrike), consisting of the force of wrath and the force of passion. The force of passion, according to Kınalızade, is the force by which the self attracts the object it desires. It is through the force of wrath that the self avoids, expels and punishes the object or objects that it finds unpleasant and abhorrent.59 In this sense, anger serves a protective and defensive function as well.

Preaching moderation in all things was not an uncommon approach in the early modern era, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. While such an approach in Christian societies of the time can to some extent be associated with humanism and the revival of classical ideals, a similar approach in Islamic societies owed as much to the works of medieval Muslim scholars as to Aristotelian notions such as the ideal of ‘the mean’ as equally distant from the extremes.60 When defining ‘virtue’, Tursun Beğ underlines the importance of moderation in the regulation of the forces: ‘Each of these three forces has three states: excess, deficiency and moderation. It is a virtue to observe moderation, avoiding excess and deficiency.’ Tursun Beğ explains how wrath can turn into virtue:

And when the actions of the wrathful self are in moderation and in keeping with the intelligent self, content with the lot provided by the intelligent self, not excited in an untimely way, and do not cross the line; those actions give rise to the virtue of dignity. This naturally requires bravery.61

While the lack of bravery causes cowardice—a vice of its own—the excess of bravery causes rashness, which too is regarded as a vice. Advocating for moderation in all things, Kınalızade applies the theory of moderation to anger. He argues that anger as a driving force gives rise to bravery, which is a virtue

58 Tursun Beğ, Tarih-i Ebü’l-Feth 16.
60 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 11, Book 1V.5 and especially Book 1V.7 for treatment of anger.
61 Tursun Bey, Tarih-i Ebü’l-Feth 16–17.
in its own right, yet excess in either direction leads to vice. He even deems a total lack of anger or a deficiency in the force of wrath as dangerous. Inability to feel anger, Kınalızade argues, gradually leads to annihilation and unrest in the matters of state.

Mehmed’s father Murad II, in many instances a man with quick temper, appears to have valued the moderate approach. Chronicles describe Murad as a man who was able to keep his anger under control before it led to serious consequences. In a book of advice, he allegedly passed these words onto his son: ‘If a valiant man carries a weapon and immediately reaches for it each time he hears something he does not like and wants to fight without reason, they do not call him valiant, but perhaps insane.’

Murad II’s alleged comparison of valour with insanity brings to mind not only the previous discussion of instability but also extraordinary physical actions ignited by emotions. Anger, as indicated by modern empirical studies, involves not only physical reactions such as clenching one’s fist, pounding on things or gritting one’s teeth, but also a rising sense of vigor and power as well. Anger functions as a driving force often leading to aggression. The consequences of Mehmed II’s anger can be explained by Harris’ recent formulation of a theoretical definition of anger: ‘a vigorous, temporary, emotional condition in which the subject desires the object’s harm, and/or desires to attack the object with words, because of some perceived failing.’

The force of wrath, according to Kınalızade, ‘involves avoidance of harm and fear, perseverance before danger, a demand for aggression and arrogance and a manifestation of conceit and haughtiness.’ The author defines the source of wrath as the heart, which is also the source of life and the origin of the animal spirit common to animals and men. Kınalızade explains that although anger is a defensive and protective force, its excess can be identified in adolescent rage. Such excess leads to ‘inordinate revenge’ and ‘unwarranted rage.’ As such it causes a desire for assault and increases one’s daring. Thus excessive anger brings damage to the soul and hurts the living. Kınalızade warns his readers about pursuing ‘vicious vengeance’ as it would eventually bring harm to the

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62 Kınalızade, Ahlâk-ı Alâî 118–123.
63 Ibidem 171–172.
64 See, for example, Dukas, Bizans Tarihi, trans. V. Mirmiroğlu (Istanbul: 1956) 139.
65 Sultan Murad Han, Fatih Sultan Mehmede Nasihatler, ed. A. Uçman (n.d.) 67. Transliteration of the manuscript TSM R. 407 at Topkapı Palace Museum Library, Istanbul.
67 Harris, Restraining Rage 40.
68 Kınalızade, Ahlâk-ı Alâî 76.
person’s mind and soul. The author gives examples of men hurting themselves by beating inanimate objects out of rage. He likens such excessive bouts of anger to the tantrums of infants.69

Mehmed II seems to have taken the unsuccessful course of the siege of Belgrade quite hard, as descriptions of his behavior by Ottoman authors imply. Ali’s comments describe the violent bodily effects of anger on the Sultan: He was short of breath, his lips burst open, his blood started to flow against the enemy. ‘He rushed onto the battlefield on the spur of the moment with a rage of chagrin’, Ali writes, and recounts how the raging Sultan sliced off the head of the enemy soldier who attempted to approach him and how he killed several others with his sword.70 Writing closer to the actual event, Tursun Beg, by contrast, puts the blame on the vizier who excited the wrath of the Sultan by suggesting retreat. And yet it was the enemy soldiers who suffered his anger.71

The wrath of the ruler is usually represented by imagery related to the forces of nature. The most common metaphors are storms and fires, described in the sources as destructive when extreme. Kinalızade explains to his readers: ‘A man should achieve serenity of mind and resolution, and abandon pain and compulsion, so that storms of wrath and rage can neither shake him nor render him degenerate, making him descend from the peaks of the mountain of dignity.’72

Fire as an expression of anger often appears in the full phrase ‘the blazing fire of wrath [leheb-i nâr-ı gazâb].’73 Given the relationship between hell and fire, the contemporary reader would not have been surprised to find that the wrath of the Sultan, mimicking that of God, is often symbolized by fire. In a tradition of the Prophet, God explains to Muhammad that heaven and hell constitute ‘the instrument of his wrath and mercy.’ In the biblical tradition, Jeremiah compares the wrath of God to the ‘consuming power of an unstoppable fire’ that has dire consequences.74 ‘When in a state of fury, try to envision in your heart the possibility of God’s wrath falling on you. This thought will extinguish the fire of wrath,’ writes Tursun Beg.75

69 Ibidem 171–172.
70 Ali, Kühü’l-ahbar 108.
71 Tursun Bey, Târîh-i Ebü’l-Feth 82. Tursun Beg does not give as vivid of a description of the bodily reactions of the Sultan as Ali does.
73 See, for example, Kemalpaşazade, X: 43.
75 Tursun Bey, Târîh-i Ebü’l-Feth 21.
‘The fear of the fire of the wrath of the Sultan crashed into the burning body of the young man like a wave of water,’ Tursun Bey writes of the fear of a young army guide who made a mistake during a campaign.\textsuperscript{76} While employing the dichotomy of fire and water to reflect the anger of the Sultan, this episode also emphasizes the cumulative effect of the wrath of the sultan. This particular young man feared the anger of the Sultan most probably because he knew what happened when Mehmed II got angry. Hemdem Pasha’s death, mentioned above, gave rise to a similar fear. Kınalızade mentions that none of the commanders dared display opposition or hindrance after his execution.\textsuperscript{77}

Mehmed II’s commanders seem to have preferred to suffer the harshest conditions rather than be the object of the Sultan’s fury. Süleyman Pasha, commander of the Rumelian army and governor-general of Rumelia, was one such commander. He was sent with the army to Albania but returned without tangible results because of the approaching winter. Mehmed II is reported to have regarded the retreat as an insult to his honour and ordered Süleyman Pasha and his army to march into Moldavia, where winter conditions were even more severe than in Albania. While this seems to be a punishment for the retreating army, needless to say that at the same time, the wrath of the Sultan had already fallen on the voivode of Moldavia. A seasoned commander, Süleyman Pasha certainly knew that this move was strategically irrational. However, as Ali recounts, for the Pasha the severity of winter seemed more peaceful and comfortable than ‘the blazing fire of the wrath of the Sultan [gazāb-i ates-leheb-i sultân].’\textsuperscript{78}

The metaphors of fire and storm actually play not only on Islamic (in fact Abrahamic) notions of the ultimate punishment and wrath of God, but also on an ancient collective memory of pre-Islamic times when the wrath of Zeus and Poseidon found expression in thunderbolts and fire. Using metaphors most recognizable to mankind makes the wrath of the sultan a political element which places the royal person above all others. Royal wrath, as depicted by Ottoman authors of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, appears to be a tool of intimidation reinforcing the authority of the sultan. Presented with vivid examples, the expressions of royal wrath serve as warning and threat against possible opposition.

The Quranic verse cited above—‘[…] do not overstep the bounds, or My wrath will descend on you. Anyone on whom My wrath descends has truly fallen. Yet I am most forgiving towards those who repent, believe, do righteous

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{76} Ibidem 172.
\item \textsuperscript{77} Kınalızade Ali, Ahlâk-ı Alâî 470.
\item \textsuperscript{78} Ali, Kühü'l-ahbar 167.
\end{itemize}
deeds, and stay on the right path\textsuperscript{79}—seems to summarize the content of this paper and reflects the essence of the early modern Ottoman understanding of royal wrath. As exemplified by the actions of Mehmed II and reflected in the views of Ottoman authors over a span of 150 years, the wrath of the Ottoman sultan descended on those who overstepped the boundaries of obedience and loyalty. And those on whom the wrath of the sultan descended were considered to have fallen, usually never to get back up. Their memory, as well as the memory of the wrath which brought about their fall, remained as a reminder of the authority of the sultan.

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Chapter 19

Anger and Rage in Traditional Chinese Culture

Paolo Santangelo

This study presents some of the anthropological characteristics connected to the notion of “anger” and its correspondents in late imperial China, i.e., during the two last imperial Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) dynasties, in which China underwent great changes even before it had contact with the Western powers. The imperial culture reached its highest levels during the Ming dynasty. A great economic development took place in China, especially in the eastern part of the empire, thanks also to the international flux of silver, and Chinese products started to flow to Europe. New ideas were elaborated especially among the intellectual circles of Jiangnan, and literature and theatre developed both in the south and the north. This development continued in the subsequent Qing dynasty, after the collapse of the Ming and the Manchu conquest of China. Economic and intellectual development continued until the eighteenth century, although political authority strengthened control and supported the orthodox tradition. The economic and political crisis started soon thereafter, because of the excessive demographic explosion and under the increasing pressure of the Western powers.

This essay, with textual analysis of significant literary sources that reflect the everyday life of the period, is mainly concerned with the usage of the main corresponding terms. In the second half of this article I summarize how the emotion of anger is represented by providing an overview of its main characteristics, both with literary and historical descriptions.1

Wierzbicka has demonstrated that there is no exact correspondence between the semantic value of a word denoting emotion in one language and its so-called equivalent in another. Therefore I first introduce the terms in Chinese that have a similar meaning to the English word “anger”, then match the situations corresponding to the concept in English, presenting some typical cases of their use. I synthetically present which terms in traditional Chinese

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1 This essay is part of my international project on the representation of emotions and states of mind in late imperial China. I am grateful to Carmen Casadio for her diligent polishing of my English that is now clearer and easier to read. The Chinese characters are supplied. Their romanisation (pinyin) with the corresponding tone is given only for the main cases.
Anger and Rage in Traditional Chinese Culture

Although anger, which is often accompanied by rage, is a subjective and “lived experience” (*Erlebnis*), we must follow the traces of its representation in literary and historical sources to understand its characterisation. The scope of anger-related emotions is very broad as it mainly concerns the more aggressive and destructive side of human beings, as well as their fight against injustice and the abuse of power. This double aspect and its contrasting effects on society are reflected in the written tradition. Moreover, in every language terms relating to anger can emphasise various aspects, such as the intensity of the feeling, or the difficulty of self-control, or its motivation and its various forms of manifestation.

In Chinese, as the next paragraph explains, the most common term for anger-like emotion in its broadest definition is *nù* 怒, which can apply to anger, irritation, rage, exasperation and also indignation. Very frequent too is *qì* 氣, which may have different meanings, from anger to aggressiveness and indignation. These can be followed by *fèn* 忿 (indignation) and its compounds, which can largely be rendered as “indignation” or “motivated anger” (because of a wrong suffered, jealousy or shame) in English. Nonetheless, it is not always easy to draw the boundary between the above-mentioned terms and *hèn* 憎 (hate, resentment, grudge, rancour, regret), *yuàn* 怨 (hatred-resentment), *yàn* 厭 (aversion, repulsion or contempt), *nǎo* 惱 (irritation-worry), *hui* 惡 (rage), *chēn* 嗤 (anger-displeasure) and *bùpíng* 不平, 氣甚不平 (indignation-discontent). Multifarious expressions denoting their manifestation and general effect are no less important than these terms purely referring to anger-like feelings, however.

These manifestations show how such emotion is expressed and characterised in the Chinese context, and also demonstrate that, traditionally, Chinese

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2 Also, respectively: 大怒, 怒發, 發怒, 赫怒, 震怒, and 憤怒, 恨怒, 憤怒.
3 For instance, “to suppress anger and not say a word” 忍氣不言, “throat and chest choked with anger” 氣填吭臆, “in a fit of pique” 攤氣.
4 Respectively 忿, 氣忿, 洩忿, 忿爭, 羞忿, 忿然, 憤憤, 憤, 積憤, 憤忿, 忿, 憤激, 懷忿 and 忿忿, 忿然, 臆忿, 憤, 憤, 忿, 憤激, 憤烈, 冤憤, 哀憤欲死, 黯憤.
5 A broader analysis of several Ming and Qing sources revealed that amidst 3,753 entries broadly relating to anger (including any occurrences of its manifestations, dispositions, symbolic descriptions, etc. pertaining to the 1,293 emotion words) the most frequent character was *nù* 怒 and the compounds 大怒, 惱怒, 愤怒, 震怒 (448), followed by *qì* 氣 and its compounds (422), then by *fèn* 忿 and its compounds (133), which can mostly be rendered into English as “indignation” or justified-motivated anger (because of a suffered wrong, or caused by jealousy or shame).
people were not as self-controlled as some descriptions tend to state, at least as far as anger-like emotions are concerned. These expressions are portrayed in terms of psychophysical reactions connected to appearance or behaviour: indignant posture (怫然/艴然), a stern look (厲色), eyes fierce or sparkling with discontent, impudent manners (悍然), teeth grinding (切齒 or 怒目切齒), leaving in a huff and disdainfully shaking one’s sleeves or clothes (拂衣) and gesticulating frantically (指天畫地). Temporary external or internal reactions are described, such as “hands trembling and heart quivering” (手顫心搖), or “a wild attitude” (野橫); ‘If angered by any unfair treatment, they become wilder than wolves or tigers, but if spoken to pleasantly as equals, they quickly turn submissive’. 而激之非義, 則野橫過于狼虎, 幸一言公平, 率然拜服 (Fusheng liujie, 4:58). Agitation may cause tossing and turning all night in bed (轉側達旦). Moreover, amongst the actions that manifest the accumulated aggressiveness, the most frequent is “cursing and abusing” (罵, 賛 and compounds), which is followed by blaming-punishing (貣 and compounds), often associated with punishment and beating; blaming (咎, 怪, 罪), slapping (批), shouting out, scolding or speaking in a stern voice, shouting noisily, roaring (喝; 吼; 呼, 喊, 喊噪, 啸然), caning, beating and whipping (杖, 毆, 擊, 笥, 打, 棒, 鞭), offending or insulting (犯 and compounds, 得罪, 閒罪, 侵), quarrelling and making trouble (爭, 鬧, 口角), spitting at (唾[面]) and kicking and howling (蹴踇噪嘶). Another reaction is throwing somebody or something to the ground (擲), or dragging or grabbing (捺), roaring and leaping (叫跳) and biting (啮). If the resentment lasts long and the cause of the conflict is not resolved, the subject will even be ready to face the dangers of pursuing a lawsuit (訟).

Recent cross-cultural studies from various perspectives—linguistic, anthropological, psychological—have contributed to a richer understanding of the phenomenon of anger. Even ‘spontaneous’ phenomena like emotions are in fact ‘constructed’—‘cultural artifacts’ according to Geertz (1975)—on the basis

6 For instance 愤色, 變色, 吹鬍子瞪眼.
7 Some expressions are 怒之以目, 怒形於色, 怒眦欲裂, 怒色, 怒色, 撐目, 眉豎頰紅, 横眉怒視, 横眉怒目, 怒目而視, 目奠, 變色, 金剛怒目, and 戟指怒目.
of cultural elements. In the West, the notion corresponding to the “anger-rage” reaction is usually considered one of the basic emotions. In Chinese texts as well, anger is considered a very common emotion (怒者常情), and is sometimes portrayed poetically as the cold winter versus the tepid spring of joy (怒如烈冬, 喜如温春). While in the West the opposing

9 Geertz C., The Interpretation of Cultures (London: 1975). If we understand this complex nature of emotions, we can avoid the endless debate between “the view that emotional experience is almost endlessly mediated through language and culture and the alternative view that psychology is a privileged internal domain which may, in theory, remain untouched by culture.” Lutz – White, “The Anthropology of Emotions” 408.

10 In his famous The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals (1872), Charles Darwin dedicates the tenth chapter to “Hatred and Anger”, and associates these emotions with several manifestations, which he presents as more or less universal. Among modern psychologists, R. Plutchik derives eight fundamental emotions from biological functions based on evolution (fear, anger, acceptance, disgust, joy, sorrow, surprise and curiosity); S. Tomkins derives nine primary emotions from models based on the nervous system; Johnson-Laird and Oatley distinguish five basic emotions (happiness, sadness, fear, anger and disgust) from complex emotions; R. Watson focuses on the three fundamental emotions of fear, angry and love. While recognising both innate and acquired elements in their “neurocultural” theory, P. Ekman and W.V. Friesen identify six basic emotions (happiness, sadness, surprise, fear, disgust and anger) on the basis of the so-called “display rules”. Some draw a distinction between the “natural emotions” directly linked to instinctive stimuli (e.g., fear of the unknown, the joy aroused by warmth, and anger borne of frustration) and the “moral sentiments” learnt through social experience and by conforming to moral, religious and ideological criteria (e.g., indignation, benevolence, sense of guilt). Cf. Rawls J., A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: 1971).

11 The complete sentence is ‘anger is a common emotion, but smiling cannot be evaluated’ (怒者常情，笑者不可测也), in the sense that if someone reacts with anger, it is rather natural, and less dangerous than if he or she, instead, smiles, as this makes it difficult to understand their true feelings (from 唐國史補. 太平廣記, 器量二, 元載).

12 The term nü is used in Buddhist texts and in the Huangdi neijing. Cf. Russell J.A. – Yik M.S.M., “Emotion Among the Chinese”, in Bond M.H. (ed.), The Handbook of Chinese Psychology (Hong Kong: 1996) 182. See also the sentence ‘anger and joy are not expressed on the face’ 喜怒不形於色, thus ‘expressionless’ (from Sanguozhi 三國志, Shuzhi 蜀志, ...
concept is either “calm”, “quiet”, or “pacification”, Chinese lists of emotions contrast the equivalent of anger with the equivalent of “joy” in the pair 喜怒.13 Someone who is easily subject to a change of mood is said to be “changeable

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13 See Santangelo, Sentimental Education 218–228. See, for a synonym of 喜, Liaozhao zhuiyi 6 (“The Eighth Prince” 八大王), the seventeenth-century collection of strange stories: ‘from rage to pleasure’ 怒為歡. See also idioms such as xīnhuānùfā 心花怒發; xīnhuānùfàng 心花怒放, for “being elated”, “wild with joy”, “bursting with joy”, where the first part resorts to the symbolic imagery of flowers for the blossom of joy and the heart in full bloom of happiness.
from joy to anger" xǐnù wúcháng 喜怒無常. The Classic of Music—one of the Confucian classics, which was lost during the last centuries BC—establishes a contrast between violence and harmony. Another etiological relationship is indicated by the following passage from the Confucian classic Zuozhuan (a commentary and narrative extension of another Confucian classic, the chronicle Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu 春秋), probably compiled between the sixth and fifth centuries BC: 'Joy is born of liking, anger is born of disliking'喜生於好，怒生於惡. Another definition can be inferred from the great Neo-Confucian philosopher Zhu Xi’s (1130–1200) comparison of anger with shame: 'shame is the feeling of embarrassment for one’s own bad behaviour, while indignation is the loathing that one feels for the bad conduct of others’羞，耻己之不善也；惡，憎人之不善也. Both emotions are moral reactions toward bad behaviour, and they differ depending on whether the actor is the person experiencing the feeling or someone else.

In traditional Chinese medicine—where the five organs correspond to the classical emotions—the liver is the seat of anger (肝 = 怒), and this connection contributes to anger’s symbolic representation. In the Huainanzi, a second-century BC eclectic philosophical work, nù 怒 is related to “bitter inner agitation” (fèn 憤), and considered to be a state of unrest in which the temperament is extremely excited, with physiological reactions in both the blood and energy levels. The emotion is violent but quick and short: ‘It is human nature for people to get angry whenever they are offended or plundered. When anger is aroused, the blood swells the veins and temper quickly rises. But once anger has been vented, hatred and regret are soon released’.

14 For emotional instability and changeability, cf. the Lü Shī Chun Qiu 吕氏春秋 (Wu tu 謫徒), an encyclopedic work compiled around 239 BC: ‘喜怒無處，言談日易.’ (comment by Gao: 高誘注: ‘處，常也.’).
15 ‘It was by music that the ancient kings gave elegant expression to their joy; by their armies and axes that they gave the same to their anger. Hence their joy and anger always received their appropriate response. When they were joyful, all under heaven were joyful with them; when they were angry, the oppressive and disorderly feared them’夫樂者，先王之所以飾喜也，軍旅鉛錐者，先王之所以飾怒也。故先王之喜怒，皆得其儕焉。喜則天下和之，怒則暴亂者畏之. (Legge’s translation).
16 Zuozhuan, Zhao 25.
The sentiment's motivation is not far from that described by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*: any perceived aggression or act of hostility can provoke it.

The Chinese Lexicon

1) *Nù* 怒 (translated as “anger” in English dictionaries), is in fact the term with the most general meanings in the lexicon of anger.\(^{18}\) It is, together with sadness and happiness, one of the four classical emotions (*xǐ nù āi lè* 喜怒哀樂), and is usually opposed to joy, as mentioned above.

This feeling’s potentially destructive quality is described well in ancient sources:

> When the Son of Heaven becomes angry, dead bodies count in the millions and the blood flows for thousands miles. When a common man becomes angry, he throws away his hat, his feet become naked and he rubs his head against the ground. 天子之怒, 伏尸百萬, 流血千里…

布衣之怒, 亦免冠徒跣, 以頭搶地爾\(^{19}\)

The pre-imperial historical work “On the States”, *Guoyu* 國語, compares two different types of anger: righteous indignation and tempestuous, out-of-place fury. The chapter dedicated to the state of Lu 魯 describes the following incident: Wenbo 文伯 had invited Nangong Jingshu 南宮敬叔 to a banquet; another guest, considered to be of inferior rank, was offended at seeing that his portion of tortoise was smaller than that given to Nangong Jingshu, and left disdainfully. The guest’s resentment was immediately followed by the anger of

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18 Cf. Gujin tushu jicheng, Minglan huibian, Renshi dian, [38] 51:46852–57. Out of on hundred cases of anger, extracted from various stories by Pu Songling, 63 are expressed by *nù*: in most cases they only indicate pure irritation (for instance, the case of the bandit who kills his victim out of rage, *Liaozhai zhiyi*, 2:143), while only a few cases explicitly contain the idea of indignation from a wrong suffered. Exceptionally different meanings can be found in some expressions such as *xīnhuānùfàng* 心花怒放, to be elated, or *niùmǎ* 怒馬, a sturdy and powerful horse. The term *niùmǎ* (literally: *angry horse*) is interesting in this aspect as it describes the stubborn, unmanageable horse that kicks, bites, cannot be mounted and therefore is out of control. See *xiānyìniùmǎ* 鮮衣怒馬 “leading a luxurious life”. Another possible hint is the image of the horse and the monkey as uncontrolled tendencies of the human body-mind.

19 "Strategies of the Warring States", *Zhan Guo Ce* 戰國策, Wei Ce 魏策, 4 (Shanghai: 1988) 922. The volume was compiled between the third and first centuries BC.
Wenbo’s mother, indignant at the guest’s haughtiness and his inability to accept his rank.\(^{20}\) The difference between virtuous and “selfish” joy and between righteous and iniquitous anger depends, in the final analysis, on whether or not these emotions conform to nature and to a given circumstance (從其類), in other words, whether they are excessive and out of place or not.\(^{21}\) Thus, ‘you should not get angry when circumstances do not allow anger’ 無怒不應怒無怒之物. (Zhuge Liang ji 諸葛亮集. 卷三. 便宜十六策. 喜怒).

Anger therefore may be condemned for its disruptive effects, but also regarded as a correct and justified reaction. Depending on the situation, it can be fitting, and even rage be allowed, as in the dictum ‘Proper both in anger and joy’ (宜嗔宜喜, Wang Shifu 王實甫, Xixiang ji 西廂記, 11 第一本第一折). Likewise, the term nù is used positively in Pu Songling’s comment on the story A Strange Kind of Pigeon (Ge’yi 鴿異): ‘From this we can see that it is greed, not foolishness for beautiful things, that arouses the wrath of ghosts and spirits’ (亦以見鬼神之怒貪，而不怒痴也。)\(^{22}\) Nù is then used as synonym of fèn, indignation (see below), as in the sentence: ‘Heaven is angry and people resentful’ 天怒人怨 (Later Han History, 後漢書, Yuan Shao zhuàn 袁紹傳), or ‘It is difficult to resist people’s anger’ 衆怒難任. In the following example, the excessive manifestation of anger emphasises dismay over injustice:

> Such a learned scholar is relegated to a remote countryside, and is humiliated by a miser! This allows people to be so indignant that their hair will stand up, briskly lifting their caps! 窮鄉僻壤, 有這樣讀書君子, 卻被守錢奴如此淩虐, 令人怒髮沖冠!\(^{23}\)

Anger was frequently disapproved of because it led to a loss of human dignity. *The History of the Tang* (1060) records an episode in which Huangfu Shi went mad while waiting for a servant to bring him a stick in order to punish his son for having made a mistake remembering a character, and bit his poor son’s shoulder.\(^{24}\) An ancient legend recounts that Gonggong 共工, after losing

\(^{20}\) Cf. Guoyu, Luyu, quoted in Gujin tushu jicheng, Minglun, [38] 51:46853. The Guoyu is of the Warring States period (475–221 BC).

\(^{21}\) Cf. “Record of Rites”, Liji 禮記, Yueji; quoted in Gujin tushu jicheng, Minglun huibian, [38] 51:46856.

\(^{22}\) Liaozhai zhiyi 6. Italics are mine.

\(^{23}\) Rulin waishi 9:19. See similar expressions for “the hair stands erect, raising one’s cap” (發怒沖冠 // 發上沖冠 // 怒髮衝冠 // 沖冠怒發).

\(^{24}\) Cf. Xin Tangshu 176:5268.
the war with Zhurong 祝融, banged his head against Mount Buzhou 不周山, the pillar of the sky and the terrestrial axis, until it broke down.25 There are numerous examples showing how excessive anger, or even joy, can be deleterious. In another example, the Viscount of Zhu 邾子, furious that one of his employees could not be arrested for involuntarily failing to show him respect, inadvertently fell into a brazier and was burnt alive.26 Xie Hogwei 謝弘微, on the other hand, died in a fit of rage while playing weiqi, when his opponent, on the point of losing, was given a hint by a guest watching the game.27

The broad meaning of nù also encompasses the concepts of fury and rage, as is made clear in the phrase “unable to control one’s rage” (怒不自勝), “unable to contain one’s fury” (怒不可遏), and “in a towering rage” (怒氣衝天 // 沖天). It is also used to refer to the fury of elements, as in “the howl of the violent wind’s blowing” (狂風怒號). In various chéngyǔ it is described as thunderous rage (雷霆之怒 // 雷噴電怒), fierce and frightening anger (驚風怒濤 // 驚濤怒浪 // 鯨波怒浪), burning rage (怒火中燒) and sudden fury (勃然大怒 // 春笋怒發). Indiscriminate venting of rage is expressed in the phrase “arbitrarily blame and complain about what is here and there” (東怨西怒 // 東怒西怨), and “venting one’s anger on others” (敢怒敢言 // 遷怒于人). It can be hidden (藏怒宿怨, “nursing one’s anger and rancour”; 敢怒而不敢言, to be furious but not dare to speak out), manifested (“showing one’s rage” 怒形于色), or modulated (“restraining one’s anger at home and venting it outside” 室怒市色).

2) Amongst the meanings of qi 氣, there is one that is connected to the state of dissatisfaction and ranges from anxiety to anger.28 Compared to other similar terms, qi focuses on the passive, inner irritation experienced by the subject. In China, as well as in any other society, there is widespread recognition of the danger this emotion poses for the individual’s equilibrium and for social harmony, and thus every moral system tries to control it.29 Furthermore, the

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25 Cf. Gujin tushu jicheng, Minglun huibian [38] 51:46853.
26 Cf. Zuozhuan, Ding gong 3; Cf. Gujin tushu jicheng, Minglun huibian [38] 51:46853.
27 Cf. Gujin tushu jicheng, Minglun huibian 51:46854. For examples of diseases due to excessive emotional feeling, see Yi'an 醫案 ibid., Bowu 博物, Yishu dian 藝術典 [44] 341:54747–49.
28 On medical cases of neurasthenia with anxiety turning into anger, see Ots, “The Angry Liver, the Anxious Heart and the Melancholy Spleen” 36–37.
29 On the relationship between wind and time in Chinese medical literature, see Kuriyama Sh., The Expressiveness of the Body and the Divergence of Greek and Chinese Medicine (New York: 1999) 251–259. Moreover, when in reference to a person, qi may also mean "heroic spirit", hence the positive side of qi ([see later one of don't understand this phrase] si
term can be rendered as “to anger” or “irritate somebody”, “to be angry”, and “to be outraged”. Qi refers to situations which make somebody displeased and irritated, though not necessarily always due to somebody else's actions; it may be the result of a natural or casual event that creates obstacles to one's plans. Kornacki notes that

while nù is usually conceptualized as being directed “outside” (by its aggressive and destructive symptoms), shēng/qì turns “inside” (being destructive for) the person experiencing the emotion. Thus one may “die of qi” (qisi 氣死), being almost dead of anger (qi de ban si 氣得半死).30

Self-destructive aspects of shēng/qì are also stressed in popular sayings: ‘flaring up is noxious to one's health’ (氣大傷身), ‘being so incensed as to cough up blood’ (氣得嘔血) or ‘furious to death’ (氣得要命).

Among several compounds (生氣, 盛氣, 氣色, 賭氣, 出氣, 動氣, 火氣, 氣膨膨, 氣忿, 氣焰), nùqì 怒氣 is used in many idiomatic expressions, such as ‘one's wrath filling the sky’ (怒氣沖天), while shēngqì is one of the most ancient of the above-mentioned terms. It is a key term in traditional Chinese medicine and philosophy, with several meanings, ranging from cosmic psychophysical energy to breath.31

Internal discomfort and tension (constriction, trembling) are emphasised by stamping one's feet in anger (氣得跺腳); a person overcome with shēng/qì is more inclined to retreat or to perform any kind of passive-aggressive behaviour (such as refusing to speak or to share): “Wan Xuezhai was so angry that his hands turned ice-cold and he could no longer utter a word” (Rulin waishi 23:289). Shēng/qì may last a long time, hidden and constricted (biē 膄) in “the belly” (dùzi 肚子) and—

31 Han-Ying Cidian 汉英词典, Chinese-English Dictionary (Beijing: 1988) 535–536 lists eleven present-day meanings of this word: gas, air, breath, smell, weather, way of behaving, soul/morale, to make somebody angry, to irritate somebody, to be angry, to be outraged, to be in pain undeservedly, and life energy. Shēngqì is often associated with other meanings, such as “vitality” in shēngqì bóbó 生氣勃勃 “full of vitality”, or 生氣方盛 “fully-developed in vital energy”.

*tan 四貪): for instance, qízhùuàngshānhé 氣壯山河, stirring and inspiring, a heroic spirit whelms heaven and earth. More evident are the following sentences: “[apparently] fierce as a bull, but actually chicken-hearted [timid as a mouse]” (氣壯如牛 膽小如鼠). Idiomatic sentences are used for “swollen with arrogance, overwhelming arrogance” (氣爛囂張, 氣爛熏天).
contrary to *nù*—it does not necessarily “explode” on the outside. Thus, there is a long tradition of admonitions and exercises for self-control to ward off the upheaval of *shēng/qì*.

*Qi* may also be expressed by a brooding feeling of depression and rage, or resentment (惹了一肚子的气, 惹起一肚子气, 生了悶气; 一肚子悶气, 悶氣). Enduring one’s anger (*qi*), for example when circumstances do not allow for an immediate retaliation, gives the suppressed anger the opportunity to create an imbalance of energy in the body because of the impossibility of yielding to one’s grudge, and was believed to affect a person’s emotional and mental state. In some cases, the grudge held for being wronged was so strong it was able to survive the dead, especially in the case of violent death. Thus *yuānqì* 冤氣, “vengeful and indignant resentment”, as it is reported in the official history of the Ming dynasty (*Mingshi* 202:5325), is used to describe the case of a man’s murder by his wife and her lover (婦與所私者殺之).

But there are also other cases in which *shēng/qì* was associated with aggressive behaviour, such as venting one’s anger *chū/qì* 出氣 by taking it out on a third party’s person/objects, for example after a marital argument, one of the parents may “vent his/her *qi* on a child”. Anger (*qi*) may be vehement and excessive, as in “extremely furious” (氣生氣死, *JinPingMei* 2, *Qi yong ru shan* 氣湧如山, *Sanguo zhi* 三国志, *Wu zhi* 吴志, *Wu zhu zhuàn* 吴主傳).

Moreover, *qi* does not only correspond to the emotion of “anger”, but to a characteristic attribute, one of the three or four cardinal vices. In these cases

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32 According to Paweł Kornacki (“Concepts of ‘anger’ in Chinese” 255–290), examining some of the grammatical constructions (the durative aspect *zai* and –*zhe*) reveals the ‘two most important aspects of *shēng/qì*—duration in time (which differs this term from *nù* that relates to a single, immediate action and not a process) and its “internal” character (not expressed, emphasising the inner experience)’.

33 ‘The lady was so furious that she fainted; 太太就氣了個發昏。Rulin waishi 27:335; ‘Kuai Yushi was so angry that he was dumbstruck; with his eyes open wide, he looked just as dead as rotten wood!’ 氣得蒯遇時目睜口呆, 如槁木死灰模樣！*Jingshi tongyan* 18:629. ‘During an attack of rage, he was so furious that he couldn't get a moment's worth of sleep’, 惹了一肚子的氣, 回來氣的一夜也沒有睡著。Rulin waishi 47:578.

34 *Hongloumeng* 77:1169, 81:234, 101:496, 67:1021, *Liaozhai zhiyi* 3:326, *Tang Gong* 湯公, *Rulin waishi* 47:578, 93:25, 23:286): ‘Niu Pu returned in a bad temper, sitting there and pursing his lips.’ 牛浦到了下處, 惹了一肚子的氣, 把嘴脣嘟著坐在那裏。Rulin waishi 23:286. *Mingshici* can be rendered sometimes as “depressed”, and other times as “sulking”. In the following example for instance it is something between sullen and depressed: ‘One day, the Hua mother and daughter had to go elsewhere. Once again, they locked Lian in the room. Bored, Lian walked around the room, calling for Qiao Niang from behind the door’., 一日，華氏母子將他往，復閉生室中。生悶氣，繞室隔扉呼巧娘。*Liaozhai zhiyi*, 02:0260, *Qiao Niang* 巧娘.
it can be rendered with the broad meaning of “impulsiveness”, “arrogance”, “vehemence”, “aggressiveness”, “impatience and irascibility”, the dark side of the traditional *vis irascibilis*.\(^{35}\) Considered the last of the four major vices (*si tan*) after wine, lust and covetousness (酒, 色, 財), *qì* was the focus of attention of thinkers, moralists and writers after the Song dynasty. They took the danger of aggressiveness for the individual’s equilibrium and for social harmony very seriously. Thus, recklessness was considered one of the most important aspects of (a disruptive) personality (Buss and Plomin), and in any society it is generally regarded to be dangerous for social relations.\(^{36}\) Li Ruzhen 李汝珍 (1763–1830) mentions the “pass without fire” (無火關), which stands for *qì* (which is used instead of *qì* 氣); its antidote is endurance, *rěn* 忍,\(^{37}\) and patience, *nài* 耐, in the allegorical battle centred on the four passes giving access to the capital, Chang'an (*Jinghua yuan* 98:497). Aggressive and violent aspects of personality are the opposite of “agreeableness”—even-tempered and good-humoured—in the common perception (the opposite of a quiet character is *xīnpíngqìhé* 心平氣和). Impulsiveness (*fēnghuǒxìng* 風火性),\(^{38}\) implies impatience (*xìngjí* 性急).

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35 The famous dramatist Li Yu 李漁 (1611–1680) relates this notion to heroes and warriors: ‘If you are very easily led to arrogance, the phantasmata will take the form of Meng Ben and Wu Huo, who are holding their strengths to with contend you.’ 你若所重在氣，他就變做孟賁、烏獲，拿力氣來與你爭. Hanan translates this *qì* with “pride” (And if you put pride above all else [...]; *Silent Operas* (*Wusheng xi*) by Li Yu, ed. and trans. P. Hanan [Hong Kong: 1990] 138), which can be defined as ‘overbearing pride’. In a positive way it can be a trait of heroes, such as in the case of Zhang Tiebi’s temperament in *Rulin waishi*; thanks to his bad temper, he was ready to fight in order to help the weak and poor and to avenge the injured: ‘[…] but I have been always irritable,’ said Zhang Tiebi. ‘Every time I face an injustice on my way, I draw my sword to succour the weak, and what I like most is to fight like a hero to conquer the world, and when I have money in my hands, what I like most is to help the poor.’ 張鐵臂道：「[...], 祇是一生性氣不好，慣會路見不平，拔刀相助，最喜打天下有本事的好漢；銀錢到手，又最喜幫助窮人 [...]’ (*Rulin waishi* 12:161).

36 Its negative meaning is presented in the novel *Hongloumeng*: ‘Though very young, no one would have expected that this Jia Jun was hot-tempered and extremely naughty, with no fear of anybody.’ 誰知這賈菌年紀雖小，志氣最大，極是淘氣不怕人的 (*Hongloumeng* 9358, see also 470).

37 Cf. the erudite novel of 1828, *The Destiny of the Flowers Reflecting in the Mirror*, *Jinghua yuan* 96:485. *Rěn* is not an emotion, but rather a disposition. It is quite important in traditional Chinese culture as it is related to the values of harmony and hierarchy, and ascribed to the family system. It is difficult to define in English, because it is close to patience, tolerance and endurance, without corresponding precisely to these terms.

38 The drama *Mudanting* 47:253.
39 quickness of temper (xingkuai 性快), and the attributes of being foolish and stubborn, irritable and impatient (bazo 暴躁, zao 燥暴, zaoji 躁急). Qi, however, can also be used positively, as in “indignation because of an injustice” [抱其沉冤抑塞之] 氣 (Rulin waishi 56:678).

3) Two other terms are nao 惱 and chen 聾. Nao 惱 emphasises annoyance and frustration, and can be rendered as “getting angry”, “annoyed”.

‘Flowers reveal rich beauty when they are in full bloom. On a spring night, why are you annoyed by the clusters of flowers?’ 花正開時豔正濃，春宵何事惱芳叢? (Jingshi tongyan 8:230). Chen 喲, homophonous with 嗤 “staring angrily”, often expresses the quick nature of anger, as in “from anger to joy” 回嗔作喜: ‘She then changed her anger into pleasure and invited the scholar to come in’ 乃轉嗔作喜,請學士入, (Zibuyu 11:211, “Curing Jealousy” 醫妒). Another chéngyu emphasises the relation between the emotion and its manifestation: ‘To stop anger and any angry expression’ (息怒停瞋).

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39 Hongloumeng 52:792, 81:1237, 58:889. The image of crackling charcoal (爆炭) (Hongloumeng 52:786) also appears in a song collected by Feng Menglong, with the title "Just married" xinjia 新嫁, in which a girl tries to convince her lover to control himself: ‘She was just married last night, but as her secret lover is so rash and short-tempered that he is already at the gate, she says to him: “During a match, you should first observe the opponent. Please don’t be impatient or reckless.”’ 姐兒昨夜嫁得來,情哥郎 性急就忒在門前來,姐道郎呀,兩對手打拳你且看頭勢,沒要大熟牵礱做出來 (Shange 3:88). Here the expression dashuqianlong 大熟牵礱, describing confused work in the fields, implies recklessness or a disorganised approach.

40 JinPingMei 1:35.

41 See for instance the novel Rulin waishi 15.

42 See for instance Shange 6:175. The above-mentioned collection of songs also includes the expression pizhuxing 劈竹性, a metaphor for an impatient disposition and irascible temperament 喻急躁脾氣 in the Wu dialect (Shange 8:225, Shange 6:165). The metaphoric images of the firecracker (爆杖) and fire (火性) are used: ‘What I am afraid of is your fire-like irritability which is often shuddering.’ 怕只怕你火性兒時常不定 (Shange 8:226); ‘My lover is irritable like a firecracker […]’ 情哥郎燥暴好像爆杖能 […] (Shange 6:175). 好像爆杖能 should be read as 好像爆杖一样). Fire is also a metaphor for the passion of love, like 火発 (Shange 6:169), but this is outside the scope of this volume.

43 For instance, Qing shilu, 聖祖仁皇帝實錄 234:337.


45 See the phrase ‘sudden anger’ (勃然變色).
Since “anger” has so many meanings and broad definitions, in English and in other languages, when referring to righteous or dignified anger, synonyms are often used that highlight the just motivation, the indignation, the sense of having been wrongly hurt or of an injustice committed against an innocent person. One example is suicide because of a wrong suffered (for instance: “hanging oneself out of anger” 氣忿縊死/身死), which is almost equivalent to the previous expression 憤激而亡 (Zibuyu 7:130, Li Zhuo 李倬). Yuàn 怨 and compounds, which I examine below, are similar to “resentment”. Thus, indignation suggests righteous, justifiable anger in response to injustice, whereas “irritation” and “rage” (怒 nù) do not necessarily do so.

Widespread indignation and discontent are expressed by the already mentioned set phrase 天怒人怨, stressing the universal reaction to injustice. We should also note the synonymity of 怨 and 怒. A similar concept is expressed in ‘It’s dangerous to anger the masses’ 罡怒難犯 (from the Zuozhuan commentary《左傳·襄公十年》Duke Xiang, 10). Something similar to the English concept of indignation can be found in the Chinese fèn (忿/憤), righteous indignation, lǐyìnù 理義怒—as we have seen: ‘you should not harbour vigorous anger, but you must not lack righteous indignation’ 氣血之怒不可有, 理義之怒不可無. For instance, gōngfèn 公憤 is public wrath, the popular discontent borne from righteous anger at the immoral behaviour of public authorities, and yìfèn 義憤, moral indignation caused by injustice.

46 怨, 怨誹, 怨鬼 and 怨望, Yuànguǐ 怨鬼 is obviously not an emotion, as it means the ghost of a wronged person, but it contains the idea of “resentment” that leads the “lamentful spirit” to avenge the wrong.

47 Mencius (Wan Zhang 万章上) states that ‘[the virtuous man] does not harbour wrath nor shelter resentment’ 仁人…不藏怒焉, 不宿怨焉. Fèn on the contrary may sometimes just mean “rage” or “fury”, without any moral justification, especially if it is combined with morphemes expressing anger and hatred, as in the following sentence from the “The Outer Commentary to the Book of Songs by Master Han”, Hanshi waizhuan 《韓詩外傳》9:19: ‘perils come from fury, and disasters rise from trifles’ 患生於憤怒, 禍起於纖微 (see online http://www2.iath.virginia.edu/saxon/servlet/SaxonServlet?source=xwomen/texts/hanshi.xml&style=xwomen/xsl/dynaxml.xsl&chunk.id=d2.12&toc.depth=1&toc.id=0&doc.lang=bilingual).

48 See Hou Han shu 後漢書 Yuan Shao zhuan 袁紹傳.
Thus, a classical case is the indignation caused by the injustice or violence committed against others: to have a sensation of unfairness when a weak person is bullied:

He looked like a beggar and he was grabbing a scholar to demand repayment of a debt. He beat the scholar and spat at him. The scholar could not bear the pain and he begged for help to all the others in the market. But no one replied. I felt it to be unfair and struck the man out of indignation.

Summing up, although in theory fèn should be distinguished from nù, as the former expresses more indignation with an explicit moral connotation while the latter is defined as anger as a gut reaction (氣血之怒), in reality they are often used interchangeably as the moral response to an injustice (有理義之怒). Furthermore, even fèn is sometimes used in reference to pure irritation, as in ‘Miao always detested those who talked about his drinking ability, and hearing Weng’s words, he became even more angry, and cursing he banged his fists on the table’繆素厭人道其酒德,聞翁言益憤,擊桌頓罵 (Liaozhai zhiyi 4:585).

“Solitary indignation” (gūfèn 孤憤) is a source of inspiration for Pu Songling, who borrows the term from Hanfeizi 韓非子, where it serves as the title of the eleventh chapter with the meaning of “frustration due to lack of recognition.” However, if excessive, even indignation as fèn is considered negative, like any immoderate selfish passion: ‘holding too great a grudge is harmful to people and things’—writes Cui Dunli 崔敦禮 (Song dynasty)—‘lavish desires harm oneself; exaggerated idleness damages one’s nature; inordinate worry harms one’s aspirations’多忿害物,多欲害己,多逸害性,多憂害志. Furthermore, in The Great Learning the passion of resentment and hatred are judged negatively as passions that blind man: ‘if someone is under the influence of resentment and hatred, he cannot be correct in his behaviour’身有所忿懥,則不得其正. Moreover, in Pu Songling’s stories we can see that the effects of such feelings can be as noxious as other types of rage:

49 Furthermore, other terms like bùpíng zhī qì 不平之氣 may be found in the sense of indignation, like in this sentence in response to Yan’s arrogant behaviour, ‘Chen Lian was filled with resentful indignation’沈鍊一肚子不平之氣 [...] (Gujin xiaoshuo 40:762).

50 See Pu Songling’s Preface, Liaozhai zizhi 聊齋自誌, 3. Hanfeizi is a legalist work attributed to the thinker of the same name (c. 280–233 BC).
Fan went into his daughter’s room and tried to bring her to her senses, but she, instead of listening to her father, used vicious words against him. Fan left in a huff and swore that he would break off his relationship with his daughter. Soon later, Mr. Fan got so angry that he fell ill and died. Not long after, his wife died too.

Other Chinese characters are used to render the idea of indignation, such as yuàn 怨 for resentment, complaint, and hèn 恨, which can not only mean “to hate” and “hatred”, but also “to regret” and “exasperation”. Thus, a person’s great indignation can be described by revealing the interference of the gods, as in the expression rén yuàn shén nù; shén nù rén yuàn 人怨神怒;神怒人怨, which renders the idea of how difficult it is to bear the brunt of someone’s anger.

A special term is yuān 冤, “injustice”, and thus “hatred” and “enmity”. This term, together with its compounds, can be considered an objective description of a condition of deep rancour and hate towards someone who has done wrong: the victim’s sense of having suffered injustice is a form of indignation that creates a state of suffering, expectation and determination to avenge and redress the wrong. Calling the attention of relatives and officials in an attempt to redress such a wrong (shēnyuān 申冤), can mean that the offended subject may even have to pay with her/his own life. Thus, the anger motivated by the resentment for a past wrong which has not been punished is exemplary in literature. Here, a sense of justice is not distinguished from a spirit of revenge. Vagrant spirits and ghosts that have no peace until the wrong has been redressed are classical examples of this, just as the figure of the heroine, who, notwithstanding her condition as a female, harbours a strong determination to avenge the injustice done to her father or to her husband, showing a strength which one may not expect from a young lady: her cold enduring anger is guided by the principle of retribution (bào 报) which prevails over any other feeling, including love. In these cases, even murder is justified as an act of filial piety and moral justice.

It is not always easy to draw the boundaries between anger and hatred/resentment (yuàn 怨 and wù 恶), resentment (hèn 恨) and indignation/resentment (fèn 憤), aversion, repulsion or contempt (yàn 厌). Yuàn 怨 can be rendered as “rancour,” “resentment” and “indignation” and is also considered

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51 Yuān 冤, and its compounds: 诉冤, 冤抑, 冤讎, 冤鬼, 冤魄, 冤魂, 含冤, 冤案, 冤案, 冤殺, 負奇冤, 呼冤, 報冤, 奇冤, 宿冤, 有冤, and 申冤.
the chief source of poetic inspiration—inspiration that is permeated by a sense of morality. Confucius himself was supposed to have listed the ability to express resentment (kěyǐ yuàn 可以怨) amongst the purposes of poetry in the *Shijing, The Classic of Odes.*

Hatred is the passion most akin to indignation/resentment (憤恨), or the one that most often accompanies it: ‘once [Lady Zhang] had suffered a terrible affront, her hatred for Ma Xueshi steadily grew’ 一旦凶威大損, 愈恨馬學士. (*Zibuyu* 11:266). Again, ‘She thought that only by torturing the concubine who had been presented to her husband could she relieve her anger’ 計惟毒苦其所贈姬, 以抒憤 (*Zibuyu* 11:266–67). *Hèn*, on the other hand, can basically be rendered as “resentment” and hence “hatred”, “regret”, “dissatisfaction”, and “frustration”, e.g., the regret arising from separation (離恨). In any case, while *qì* and *nù* focus respectively on the passive experience and the momentary stormy reaction, *hèn* is a deep and long-lasting sentiment. The first case concerns indignation:

At these words, Tang Bi for a moment remained dumbfounded, then, grinding his teeth with resentment, he said: ‘A real man floating in the sea of officialdom, who is not even in a position to protect his wife! Where is his foothold?’ 唐璧聽罷, 呆了半晌, 咬牙切齒恨道: 大丈夫浮沈薄宦, 至一妻之不能保, 何以生為?...怒氣不息 (*Guojin xiaoshuo* 9:370–71).

The close relationship between the various synonyms is made clear here. The second case is an example of ill-will: ‘he then remained silent but agitated, concentrated on his search of a plan to take care of Mr. Lu, whose death alone would extinguish his ill-will’ 當下口中不語, 心下躊躇, 屢思計策安排盧生, 必置之死地, 方洩吾恨 (*Xingshi hengyan* 29:21). The last case shows individual anger and resentment:

Then her resentment towards her cousin became unbearable at the assumption that he had come into her room that night to sully her reputation, without the slightest good reason or motivation 他只說那夜進房的, 果然是表兄, 無緣 無故走來玷污人的清名, 心上恨他不過.*

*Bùpíng* 不平 may have different meanings according to the context, but overall it extends to general dissatisfaction, indignation, and uneasiness (憤憤不

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52 *Wushengxi* 無聲戲, in *Li Yu quanjí* 李漁全集 vol. 10 (Hangzhou: 1992) 5656.
When used for indignation, it usually relates to a wrong done to other persons and not to oneself. The following examples are self-explanatory:

The man felt indignant for her, so he came out and said, ‘You have suffered so much injustice and misery.’ 心懷不平, 轉身出來, 叫道姑: “你受恁般冤苦,” Jingshi tongyan 11:372.

Nanny Zhang was annoyed and bickered with her several times, so they haven’t talked to each other since. 後來張家的氣不平, 鬥了兩次口, 彼此都不說話了。Hongloumeng 74:1124.

3 Some General Features

The phenomenon of anger-like emotions seems very broad and multifarious in the Chinese culture, as it does in others, in their perception of an “injury” and the attendant search for “righteousness” and “violence”. The examples quoted above offer dimension to a whole family of emotions that respond to a universal and basic drive in human beings. This means that, notwithstanding the cultural and linguistic differences between societies in their historical processes, we can find both universal and specific elements in the representation of anger-like emotions in any civilisation. The specific elements are interesting, as they are the keys to investigating the deepest strata of a particular civilisation. In Ming-Qing descriptions of anger, we can find both positive and negative elements: seeking justice and redressing wrongs, as well as a short-sighted, often aggressive attitude towards a target.

The data we have collected can contribute to understanding the ways anger was represented and evaluated in China, the codes of conduct and action related to it, and the cultural values transported by the verbal form. The richness and variety of expressions deserve a separate study. We cannot speak of Chinese or French wrath per se, and yet the specificity of this phenomenon as it occurred in China can be found in the nuances of its manifestation, or in the justifications and motivations expressed in Chinese sources.

Anger-like emotions are amongst the most frequently described feelings in these sources, and this at least testifies to the interest of readers in such experiences of literary characters, and, more generally, to their consciousness of the social and individual problems related to said emotions. In the rich material

53 I will dedicate further studies to the multifarious manifestations of and reactions to anger, as well as of its symbolic descriptions.
that our sources offer, the main concerns are the ambiguous nature of these emotions, for not only do they breed hatred and violence, they are dangerous for society, as well as for the health of the subject; on the other hand, they work in self-defence, in response to injustice and the aggressions faced in everyday life. This raises the question of the role of such emotions in a Confucian society, where harmony was preached and emphasised. Confucianism was the dominant and official ideology and promoted the hierarchical ladder with its designated roles in the service of a harmonious interaction of groups and individuals. All kinds of sources, however, point out how difficult this harmony was to reach even for subjects who practised self-cultivation, both within themselves and in social relationships. We read of complaints at every level, about the powerful and arrogant subjugating the weak and humble and the cunning and the opportunistic cheating the naïf; likewise about officials taking advantage of their positions and privileges. Courts of law could only partially redress these wrongs and sometimes colluded with oppressive local authorities. Moreover, even the sophisticated system of civil service examinations for the selection of leaders (and judges) often did not correspond to the needs of the society. Thus, the need to imagine a parallel world with more or less perfect tribunals and the desire to believe in a fundamentally moral destiny in which, sooner or later, all actions would be punished or rewarded, was widespread: destiny, heaven, or a strike of thunder, as an “angry energy” nùqì 怒氣.54

The quest for justice is the positive aspect of these kinds of emotions, accompanied as they are by resistance against private and public iniquities, and individual and collective opposition to wrongdoing. Harmony could not silence the angry voices of dissent. In the measure that “harmony” has hushed such voices and crushed such opposition—by avoiding the rise of indignation and the occasion to protest—it failed and became a tool of tyranny, as in the “principles” denounced by Dai Zhen 戴震 (1724–1777).55

54 Literati commonly accepted a moral explanation for a strike of thunder. The Cheng brothers (Cheng Hao 程顥, 1032–1085, and Cheng Yi 程頤, 1033–1107), for instance, at the beginning of Neo-Confucianism saw thunder as an “angry energy” nùqì 怒氣 that the victim’s “evil energy” (eqi 惡氣) had attracted. See also my introduction to the translation of the “What the Master Would Not Discuss”, Zibuyu.

55 ‘Whoever is respectable resorts to “principles” to criticise the humble; the elder resorts to “principles” to criticise the younger; the powerful resorts to “principles” to criticise the oppressed. Even if they are in error, they say they are right. If those who are humble, young, oppressed then resort to those principles to fight, even if they are in the right position, they are judged as rebels. As a result, the emotions and common wishes of the humble people cannot reach those who are on the top of society. The latter use principles
The basic perspective on anger-like emotions is moralistic. It is not by chance that various kinds of dissatisfaction, especially those mirroring resentment and indignation, are often considered the chief source of a writer’s inspiration—inspiration that is permeated by a sense of morality and civil responsibility. This trend supposedly began with Confucius, with his appreciation of the ability of the poet to express resentment (kěyǐ yuàn 可以怨), and continued with Sima Qian, who in his *Historical Records* placed indignation (fèn 憤) at the origin of artistic inspiration; the Confucian scholar Han Yu 韓愈 (768–824), who stressed the role of emotions, especially hatred and resentment, and the great nonconformist thinker Li Zhi 李贄, who attributed the composition of his work to discontent (bùpíng 心中之不平, 大不得意). “Solitary indignation”, gūfèn 孤憤, is Pu Songling’s source of inspiration, in the sense of frustration caused by a lack of recognition.

It seems, however, that anger is primarily considered a negative phenomenon, and its destructive aspects are more emphasised than its righteous aspects; repeatedly it is described as negative for the individual and for their to blame the former, and the “fault” of those who are below becomes immeasurable […]’

56 Cf. the masterpiece of the great historian Sima Qian (c. 145 or 135–86 BC), *Shiji* 130:3300.

57 Han Yu was one of the thinkers who further developed Sima Qian’s concept of the role of the emotions in literature. In the letter he wrote to introduce himself to the prime minister (Shang Zaixiang shu 上宰相書) in 795, Han Yu boasted of writing about “the wonders of compassion and gratitude, and of hatred and resentment” (gǎnjī yuànduì qíguài 感激怨懟奇怪); furthermore, he appreciated the writing of Zhang Xu (張旭) because it reflected the joys, the anger, and difficulties (xìnì jiǎngqìngqìng 喜怒窮), the grief and joy (yōubēi yúyì 憂悲愉佚), the hatred, resentment and admiration (yuánhèn sīmù 忿恨思慕), the intoxicating effects of wine, the boredom and the discontent (hānzuì wúliáo bùpíng 酣醉無聊不平) that agitated his heart. On dissatisfaction and injustice (bùpíng 不平) in Han Yu (768–824), see his *Song Meng Dongye xu* 送孟東野序, Preface for “Meng Dongye’, *Jingtan Changhe shi xu* 荊潭唱和時序 “Preface to Jingtan and Changhe poems”, in *Zhongguo meixue shi ziliao xuanbian* 中國美學史資料選編, 上 298–99, and *Song Gao Xian shang ren xu* 送高閑上人序, quoted in Matsumoto H., “Kan Yu-shujôsei no bungaku”, *Kaga hakushi taikan kinen Chûgoku bun shi tetsugaku ronshû* (Tokyo: 1979) 493–506, here 494 and Ono Sh., “‘Happun’ to ‘waki’”, *Miyagi kyōiku daiyaku kokugaku kokubun* 20 (1992) 54–65.


health. Amongst these health precautions is the wise proverb *yīnǎo yīlǎo* (一惱一老), which stresses the danger anger presents to vital energy: ‘every time one is annoyed, one gets older’. Anger is also considered negative for social relations and society in general. For instance *qì* is considered one of the four worst vices, as it can instigate violence. The subjective perception of mistreatment does not always correspond to an objective situation. Likewise, anger is not a good adviser, because the reaction it elicits is often disproportionate to the offence, and this could mean the beginning of a chain of reactions and counter-reactions that create instability and violence in the community. Rather than the violence itself, it was the violent effects of rage that were primarily blamed for their negative effect on social harmony and order. Violence is a basic and constitutive element of any traditional culture, the Chinese civilisation included. Even the monopoly of violence by the state was not exclusive, and not only due to the impossibility of retaining control in all areas. Thus clan feuds and other private militias were more or less tolerated, but also in legal affairs some private forms of punishment were allowed or justified by penal codes. Uncontrolled aggression, as in the examples quoted above of beating and cursing, was aimed at taking revenge on or punishing the accused person. At other times, the aggression would be unleashed onto a third party.

Gender plays an important role in the evaluation of anger, especially in traditional China. The character of the fierce wife is very frequent in the narratives of the late Ming and early Qing dynasties. Fierce and violent viragos and jealous and merciless shrews intimidate their husbands, keeping them from fulfilling their filial duties and hampering their efforts to ensure the perpetuation of the family. This phenomenon, which appears prominently in late imperial Chinese literature, cannot be explained only by a rekindling of misogynist ideas. Although both genders have reactions like this, the persistent, angry attitude of women was not just considered some kind of irascibility, or excessive emotionalism, but rather a dangerous kind of madness. Women who exhibited this vice were seen as harming the social hierarchy and family harmony. We can trace back the reasons for this severe condemnation to the influence of gender roles and the cultural values regarding this emotion: 1) the main crime behind it is female jealousy; 2) the dominant position of the wife is a reversal of the hierarchical order of one of the five cardinal relationships.

*Ira regis*, i.e., imperial anger (帝怒), can be found in both literary and historical sources. It was not, however, the result of an impulsive and unpredictable passion, but rather a collective process, with rituals and political functions, related to the kingship. Sometimes, albeit quite rarely, we can read criticism
of the authority’s cruelty between the lines. On the other side, the idea of the “wrath of God”, so frequent in historical, religious and moral European writings, is lacking. Divine wrath cannot be associated with the loss of the Heavenly Mandate (tianming), so important in China’s historiography, political treaties and legitimization of power. The wrath of God requires a personal god, such as the God of Israel: when there is a covenant between the subject, God and the community, breaking that covenant attracts the wrath of God, which marks the political fate of the community. The rupture of this relationship is due to the infidelity and adultery of man, a notion which combines the Greek hybris with the Biblical “jealousy” of God. Since the concept of god and of moral defilement are different in Chinese culture than in the West, in China we can find various concepts of retribution. In Chinese thought, retribution does not require the presence of a god who grants repentence and forgives the sinner. While the analogous “transference” of the burden through offering sacrifice is possible in China, e.g., by replacing the offender with a scapegoat, as in emperor’s sacrifices and penitences in certain situations of disaster, the counterpart is a universal order, not a personal god who can be outraged.

We can single out various levels of reaction that concern the manifestation of anger-like emotions as voluntary and involuntary acts of communication; besides the most common physiological manifestations, conventional and peculiar expressions are kept in idiomatic phrases, which stress change of facial colour and expression, or the fierceness and threatening mood as expressed in the shape of eyes, mouth and gestures, and describe different physical and psychological reactions, gestures and expressive acts. The face is

60 Concerning Taizu, see also the report of Xie Jin’s critical memorial of 1388, where it is mentioned that “everybody says that the emperor spares lives and gives death according to his mood, happiness or anger”. 天下皆謂陛下任喜怒為生殺 (Mingshi 147:4117).

61 This does not mean that people did not fear spirits and gods. For instance we can read in a story in Zibuyu 子不語 that one day a peasant went to the temple and worshipped the god to cure his young son of smallpox. However, notwithstanding the positive auspices, his only son ended up dying, at which the furious father lost his temper, stormed into the temple and destroyed everything—the statue and the building. The villagers were terrified, as they expected the revengeful divinity to send future calamities their way at the sight of such blasphemous vandalism. (The God with the Ox Head 牛頭大王, Zibuyu 13). On the contrary, nothing happened. Thus the god’s anger was felt by the villagers, but this anger seems qualitatively different from the monotheistic God’s wrath.

the first part of the body which expresses this emotion: a change in the colour or look of the face is one of the most frequent phenomena described, followed by “pulling a long face”. When it comes to the face, the eyes—protruded, wide, flashing—play the major role, as they characterise the gaze and interplay with the eyebrows. The reaction can differ depending on the gender of the subject. Grinding teeth and gnashing—which can be combined with the expression of the eyes, or hair standing on end—is another common manifestation of anger-like tension in Chinese sources. The position of the mouth, e.g., protruding lips, is another expression of an angry mood typical in Chinese culture. Gesticulating with one’s hands or legs is another classic reaction which is often portrayed in various ways. Some of them are peculiar, e.g., disdainfully shaking one’s sleeves or clothes and stamping one’s feet in anger.

Other important features are the directing of anger at other persons, as well as the express will to manifest anger, or, on the contrary, the inability to hide it. The variety of expressions demonstrate how rich the language was when it came to describing such emotions, and how in fact the population was not so composed and self-controlled as it had seemed from afar.

To sum up, based on the examples cited above, the following general categories may be suggested: 1) anger-rage in the most general meaning (怒), 2) anger-indignation (憤): intense displeasure due to moral injustice, wrong, injury, or offence [moral value]; 3) consuming/burning anger (氣): the energy of this emotion or/and its self-destructive effect; 4) hatred-resentment (怨/恨): intense ill-will and vindictiveness, often including the frustration caused by the impossibility of retribution; the victim may direct his or her anger at himself or at someone/something else; 5) anger-irritation (惱): loss of temper due to a temporary and less intense displeasure. These phenomena are mostly presented as consequences of humiliation and injustice, both in terms of psychology and in terms of revenge and retribution, but also as expressions of violence and as causes of social disruption. In women expressions of this kind are only tolerated in the case of strong indignation, when cold rage is manifested by a determination to redress the wrong that is not inferior to a man’s. In other cases they are not allowed, and ascribed to jealousy or to an abnormally violent nature borne out of excessive masculine elements. Rage was also important in relation to social and political affairs, not only in the case of the “king’s fury”. Obviously anger was expressed in personal inter-relationships as well in order to re-balance levels and roles. In certain cases, an angry mob could influence local policy, such as when the people tried to push the authorities to relieve the tax burden, which often led to a backlash from the central government.
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